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Preface
We started this project in September 1997, soon after finishing our
previous book for the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
At that time we were fairly confident that enterprise zones were one of
those good ideas that could actually work in practice. Our reasons for
this confidence were both theoretical and empirical. Enterprise zone
programs seemed to target those in most need of employment and thus
were likely to raise fewer economic red flags than other place-based
economic-development strategies. Moreover, there was reason to believe that the major incentive instrument used in enterprise zones, tax
breaks, could be effective. Indeed, the evidence seemed to support the
idea that taxes (and thus tax incentives) could materially alter the geography of business investment. And some of the earlier work that looked
directly at enterprise zones indicated that they could be effective in creating local growth.
As will become clearer later, our empirical results have made us
much more skeptical of the usefulness of enterprise zones, at least to
the extent that zones are primarily a tax incentive program. We find
that their effect on growth is close to minimal, they often encourage the
use of capital rather than labor, their power to influence business decisions has been diminished by the growth in non-targeted incentives,
and they do not alter the wider spatial functioning of urban labor markets. Of course, all of this does not prove that state and local enterprise
zones cannot work or even that they do not currently work effectively
in a few states. But it certainly does suggest that their implementation
at the state and local level in the United States has not been a success.
More so than any other research we have done, the work on this
book has been information technology intensive. Not only have we
been able to use a wide variety of data sets that are huge but nevertheless accessible (compared to the past), but by the end of the project we
were astounded at the amount of software we had found it necessary to
buy, license or, in quite a few cases, create from scratch. Close to a decade of major improvements in computer programming technology
made software development for such a project feasible. At the beginning of the new century it seems needless to add that the Web and
xi

xii Preface

e-mail were crucial to getting much of the work done. Indeed, it is
quite ironic that so much information technology should go into the
creation of such an ancient and unchanged commodity—a book.
The book relies heavily on the output of our new TAIMez (Tax and
Incentive Model—Enterprise Zones) hypothetical-firm model. Although in concept the model is similar to the TAIM model developed
for our previous book on taxes and incentives, Industrial Incentives
(Fisher and Peters 1998), TAIMez is entirely new and considerably bigger. We developed the basic code and many of the associated submodels using a series of grants from the Iowa Department of Economic Development (DED). Staff at Iowa DED—particularly Phil Dunshee,
Allen Williams, and Harvey Siegleman—were crucial in guiding the
development of the overall structure of the software and debugging the
software and the tax models. In all this, the Director of Iowa DED,
David Lyons, was a great supporter, as were David Forkenbrock, Director of the Public Policy Center at the University of Iowa, and John
Lewis, Director of the Iowa Research Council. A large grant from the
State of Ohio, to investigate the use of economic-development incentives in that state, provided us with an opportunity to apply the new
software in a policy setting. We are grateful to Don Iannone, then at
Cleveland State University, who directed this project; to a number of
Ohio officials in the Department of Development, Statehouse and Treasury; and to the legislative committee (chaired by Senator Horn) that
oversaw the research. The Ohio work was particularly important since
it provided us with an opportunity to investigate and then firm up our
ideas on the role of enterprise zones in economic-development policy
(the first report we wrote as part of this project was on the Ohio enterprise zone program).
The completion of this book required pulling together a number of
pieces beyond the TAIMez model. Two data sources were particularly
important. The first, the SSEL (Standard Statistical Establishment List)
ZIP-code database required three special runs by the Bureau of the
Census. Melvin E. Cole III was our contact person there. He helped us
decide that the SSEL was indeed the data source we needed and then
helped us understand the data. Unfortunately, converting the data we
received from the census into something useful for our analysis was a
huge job. The other major data source, the Census Transportation
Planning Package (CTPP), consisting of a mass of CD-ROMs, is provided free to researchers by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics.

Preface xiii

The CTPP’s main use is transportation planning at the local level but it
is a wonderful—and little used—resource for commuting research.
The CTPP is set up for use within TransCAD®, a commercial GIS
(Geographic Information Systems) software package, which significantly aided ease of analysis.
John Engberg, at Carnegie-Mellon University, who also writes on
enterprise zones, provided us with his valuable list of enterprise zones
in the United States and then helped us think through some of our initial econometric ideas. His help and support were invaluable. Tim
Bartik, this project’s monitor at the Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research, also provided enormous help and guidance. Indeed, our
biggest scholarly debt is to Tim and we thank him. Johannes Ledolter
furnished invaluable insight and help on our use of cross-sectional panel data. Randy Eberts, Director of the Upjohn Institute, was thankfully
unconvinced by our first round of models on enterprise zones and
growth. His skepticism forced us to reevaluate and better justify our
econometric decisions. Kevin Hollenbeck at Upjohn guided the book
through the editorial process. He provided enormous help, reviewing
the manuscript not only for content but also for its readability and coherence. We owe Kevin a special debt. Upjohn then sent the manuscript out to two anonymous external reviewers; both wrote extensive
and very helpful comments on the original manuscript. All along the
way we endeavored to present our preliminary findings and methods at
various academic and policy conferences. We thank all those who
made comments on early drafts of our work.
Although we delivered the first full manuscript to the Upjohn Institute 19 months late (in February 2000), we still find it difficult to believe that we were able to do so much in so little time. We hope the
book does not suffer too gravely from our expeditiousness. Certainly,
we trust the results of our effort will be useful and worthwhile to both
policy and academic audiences. It should be clear from this Preface
that this book could not have been completed without the help, input,
and support of a large number of people. Nevertheless, the errors and
omissions the reader is bound to find are ours alone.
There are a number of other people at the Upjohn Institute to whom
we owe a huge debt. David Nadziejka, the editorial manager, moved
this book from manuscript to finished product. David had a way of
making this transition as painless as possible for us. Elaine Goldberg,
the primary editor for the manuscript, improved our writing and tables.

1
Introduction
Enterprise zones have been part of American urban policy for more
than two decades. Between 1981 and 1991, 38 states and the District of
Columbia passed enterprise zone legislation. As of 1995, 34 of those
programs remained active, and in those states, 2,840 zones had been established (Wilder and Rubin 1996).1 Two more states—Iowa and
Michigan—have initiated enterprise zone programs since that time, and
Pennsylvania has introduced a much more aggressive version of its enterprise zone. While thousands of state-sponsored enterprise zones
now exist, there continues to be controversy about what enterprise
zones should be designed to achieve, what incentive instruments are
appropriate to enterprise zone goals, and whether these zones are likely
to be more or less effective than the rest of the state and local economic-development effort. Moreover, the situation became even more confusing in 1993 with the passage of the Empowerment Zone and Enterprise Community Act. With this legislation the federal government
jumped into the enterprise zone arena. The federal program initially
added 11 empowerment zones and 99 enterprise communities to the list
of state zones (Hambleton 1996). It also added a distinctive set of incentives and policy goals.
Given the public resources being dedicated to U.S. enterprise zones
by the federal government and by states and cities, and given the small
size of the literature on enterprise zones, we believe it is high time for a
multistate evaluation of the effectiveness of enterprise zones. In this
book we look at state and local zones only, and our sectoral focus is on
manufacturing. We ignore federal zones because they are very different from state zones, making summary comparison figures difficult to
construct, and because there are vastly more state zones than federal
zones. We ignore retail and other services because state zones still tend
to concentrate on new manufacturing investment. Erickson and Friedman (1990a) found in a study of 357 zones between 1982 and 1987 that
manufacturing accounted for 73 percent of new jobs. In a more recent
study, we found that 74 percent of enterprise zone agreements in Ohio
have been with manufacturing firms (Peters and Fisher 1998). Here we
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examine seven policy issues that we believe should be the core of any
serious evaluation of enterprise zones.
• What sort of business incentives are provided in state enterprise
zones?
• What is the size of these incentives and what is their relative importance compared to other sorts of state and local business incentives?
• Do enterprise zone incentives encourage businesses to use more
labor than would otherwise be the case? More generally, what
sort of investment do the incentives favor?
• Do enterprise zones make sound fiscal sense? In other words,
are enterprise zone incentives likely to produce revenue gains or
losses for state and local government?
• How much business turnover is typical in enterprise zones?
• Is there a “causal” relationship between enterprise zone incentives and economic growth in enterprise zones? Do enterprise
zones create growth?
• Do enterprise zones draw their labor from poorer, more depressed parts of metropolitan areas?

ENTERPRISE ZONES AND
ECONOMIC-DEVELOPMENT POLICY
A central problem with almost all economic-development program
evaluation is that, even after decades of research, we lack conclusive
evidence on the effectiveness of policy. The problem is particularly
acute in the case of enterprise zone incentives. Two difficulties bear
special attention: proper measurement of incentives and assessing the
impact of incentives on firm behavior.
At heart, almost all economic-development policy is a trade—government provides incentives that reduce the costs of doing business at a
site; in return, business is meant to change its investment behavior in
some way, by locating at one site rather than another or by employing
more labor at a site than it otherwise would have, and so on. The problem we face is that, outside of a few geographically and temporally limited studies,2 we do not have good measures of what government is giv-
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ing away in enterprise zones; we don’t know enough about the size of
the public carrot being offered to the private sector. We need to know
by how much zone incentives reduce the tax burden on business—thus
increasing business profitability—since it is precisely this reduction in
burden that is meant to give government its leverage over the firm’s behavior.3 To our minds, this is the fundamental hole in the enterprise
zone literature. Our first tasks then are to find out what enterprise zone
incentives are worth to business and to compare these to the size of other non-enterprise zone incentives routinely offered to industry (see
Chapter 3). It turns out that these tasks have the useful side effect of allowing us to measure the true cost of incentives to government and to
draw some conclusions about how incentive instruments could be designed to improve their overall cost-effectiveness (see Chapter 5).
The second issue is a variant on the first. A pressing policy question is whether enterprise zones actually work—whether they actually
result in new local growth. Typically, econometric models are built to
investigate whether a particular policy instrument has some “causal”
influence on economic growth.4 The problem is methodologically difficult because so many other factors could influence local growth, and
all of these must be accounted for before the effect of enterprise zones
alone can be properly measured. The existing econometric literature
on enterprise zones reveals little regarding the impact of zone incentives on local economic growth, in part because the literature is so
small and contradictory and in part because zone incentives have been
measured so poorly. Some researchers, for instance, have simply
counted enterprise zone programs to see whether places with more programs have more growth. This approach misses the fundamental economic point. It makes no economic or financial sense to expect a 100
percent property tax abatement over 10 years to have the same impact
on growth as a 33 percent abatement over three years, or either of these
to have the same impact as a sales-tax exemption on all machinery and
equipment bought for use in the zone. Incentives lower the costs of operating at a particular site; the more they lower these costs, the more
effective they are likely to be. If an econometric growth model treats
all incentives as essentially homogenous, it ignores what makes a particular incentive “work.” Other studies have looked at whether the
geographical area covered by an enterprise zone experienced more economic growth after the designation of zone status than before designa-

4 Chapter 1

tion. Again, what this misses is that designation alone does not alter the
business operating environment; it is the incentives that come with designation that do that. At best, designation is a crude signaling mechanism to business of incentives to come. Our second major task, then, is
to look at the impact of incentives on firm behavior.
In Chapter 7 we do finally develop econometric models investigating the relationship between incentives and local growth. Throughout
the book, however, we look at the effect of incentives on firm behavior
in various ways. In Chapter 3, for instance, we look at the size of incentives and compare them, using a wage-equivalency technique, to a
factor widely seen as important in investment decisions, labor costs.
This allows us to draw some conclusions about the likely impact of incentives on business decisions without having to rely on the results—
and assumptions—of our econometric models. In Chapter 4 we look at
whether zone incentives are likely to result in firms employing more labor than they otherwise would.
In this book, as in our previous book on economic-development
competition, we use the “hypothetical firm” methodology to measure
the value of enterprise zone incentives to business. The idea behind
this method is quite simple. Construct a set of financial statements for
reasonably typical firms, then apply the tax code and incentives to those
firms. The extent to which a particular incentive increases the firm’s returns on investment (calculated either as increased cash flow or an increased internal rate of return) is the measure of the incentive’s worth to
the firm. Underlying this approach are the principles of modern location
theory—firms are profit maximizers and will therefore choose sites that
maximize profits; government can influence firm location decisions by
changing the after-tax profitability of operating at particular sites.
We use a new hypothetical firm model, TAIMez (the Tax and Incentive Model for Enterprise Zones), the building of which started in 1997.
The new model is a direct descendant of the TAIM model that we used
for much of our research in the mid 1990s. The TAIMez model, however, is larger, more flexible, and capable of tax simulations we were not
able to perform in the original model. In order to encourage openness
and transparency in this area of research, we feel it is imperative to discuss some of the methodological considerations involved in building
this model before discussing our results. We include a short discussion
of this model in Chapter 3 but leave almost all of the technical informa-
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tion for Appendix A. In Appendix B we also provide a comparison of
results from TAIMez with results from the earlier TAIM model; this
should aid comparability with past research.
The focus of most of the research reported in this book is on the enterprise zone programs in place in 13 states. These states were selected
because they are the largest states (in terms of total manufacturing employment) that had significant enterprise zone programs in place by
1990. We examine the incentive packages available in a sample of 75
zones within those 13 states during the period 1990 through 1994, and
the changes in manufacturing establishments within the zones from
1989 through 1995. A more complete discussion of the sample is provided later in this chapter.

THE ORGANIZATION AND ARGUMENTS OF THE BOOK
The book is organized into eight substantive chapters. In the first
of these, Chapter 2, we provide the background to the other chapters in
the book; it should be read by all readers. Here we examine the history
of enterprise zones in the United States—in particular, what policymakers hoped to achieve with zones—and the arguments for and
against an enterprise zone strategy. In Chapters 3 through 8 we cover
our research results. In the first three of these we use TAIMez to measure the size and comparative worth of enterprise zone incentives sponsored by state and local governments. In these chapters we also look at
the extent to which enterprise zone incentives are biased in favor of
some industrial sectors and capital-intensive sorts of investment, and finally at the cost to government of these enterprise zone incentives. In
Chapters 6 and 7 we utilize a new, very complete, business establishment database to analyze the growth that has occurred in enterprise
zones. In Chapter 8 we focus on the labor markets that enterprise zones
draw from. And finally, in Chapter 9 we summarize our results and
consider alternative policies.
Needless to say, the organization of this book has posed some challenges. As we indicated above, our results often depend on fairly complex methodological procedures. The book is aimed at a broad policy
audience, however, and we suspect that most readers will not want to
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wade through all the supporting methodological material. On the other
hand, many readers will at some point wonder exactly how a particular
number was calculated or conclusion reached. Our solution has been to
segregate, wherever possible, the most technical material into appendices or endnotes. Moreover, by providing guides to our research and
conclusions, both here and at the beginning of each chapter, we hope to
direct readers to those places most appropriate to their individual interests. What follows is a brief summary of the content of each chapter
and the conclusions we draw.
Chapter 2: Enterprise Zones and Economic-Development Policy
In Chapter 2 we present a history of enterprise zones in the United
States and then critique the various rationales that have been put forward to justify geographically targeted approaches to economic development in general and enterprise zones in particular. The most notable
of these rationales is the “spatial mismatch” hypothesis, which claims
that inner-city residents face high rates of joblessness because they are
spatially separated from suburban job opportunities. Enterprise zones
can then be justified as a way of bringing jobs to depressed inner-city
neighborhoods, thereby increasing employment rates of the urban poor.
In this chapter we also review the major theoretical and policy criticisms that have been leveled at the enterprise zone idea. There is reason to be skeptical that spatial mismatch is the main cause of underemployment among inner-city minorities and that job proximity will
necessarily produce higher rates of employment. Even if these claims
were supported, it would be unclear that enterprise zones are the most
cost-effective way to provide employment opportunities to those most
in need of them. The primary conclusion of this chapter is that, even
after decades of program experimentation, there is considerable confusion as to the goals of U.S. enterprise zone policy and the policy tools
appropriate to attaining those goals.
Chapter 3: How Valuable Are Zone Incentives to Firms?
In this chapter we look at the sorts of incentives offered to firms locating in enterprise zones, estimate the true value of those incentives to
business, and compare enterprise zone incentives to other (nontargeted)
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incentives available to firms. The typical package of incentives available to firms locating in an enterprise zone consists of an investment
credit and a jobs credit, under the state corporate income tax, and local
property-tax abatements. Looking at the 13 states that had substantial
enterprise zone programs in place by 1990, we find that the average
package among our 75 sampled cities was worth $5,048 per job in
1994, where the value of the package is measured by the increase in the
present value of the 20-year cash flow attributable to investment in a
new plant. Among the 75 cities, half had at least one sector for which
the total incentive package exceeded $10,000 per job, and 14 cities
would have granted at least one sector more than $20,000 per job. Incentives of this magnitude are equivalent to a gross undiscounted value
in the range of $20,000 to $60,000 per job.
The total incentive-package values reported above included both
incentives available only within enterprise zones in the 13 states and incentives available anywhere in the state. We also examined incentives
available in a broader set of 20 of the most industrialized states and
found that the average incentive package increased in value from
$4,061 per job in 1990 to $5,338 per job in 1998. On average among
the 20 states, the enterprise zone incentives per se accounted for 63
percent of the total package in 1990, but only 51 percent by 1998.
Looking just at our 75-city sample, the enterprise zone share fell from
65 percent in 1990 to 57 percent in 1994. General incentives have been
increasing more rapidly than enterprise zone incentives. Still, for the
typical manufacturing firm, the incentive package more than doubles if
the firm chooses an enterprise zone location over a non-zone location in
the same state.
Competition among states and localities for manufacturing investment has led to reductions in basic state taxes as well as to increases in
state and local incentives. The importance of these tax and incentive
changes can best be measured by their effect on the overall state-local
tax rate on new investment. The overall trend in the 1990s was overwhelmingly to reduce basic taxes on corporations. Among the 20
states, the median basic tax rate was reduced from 8.5 percent in 1990
to 7.9 percent in 1998. Larger reductions in the median effective tax
rate occurred when general incentives were included (from 7.6 percent
to 6.7 percent) and when targeted incentives were added (from 6.3 percent to 5.2 percent).

8 Chapter 1

We found that tax rate and incentive competition continued through
the 1990s with no indication that this is producing convergence in effective tax rates among the states; the process resembles a game of
leapfrog, with no state apparently content to be merely average. The
most striking evidence of this is the prevalence, by 1998, of negative
tax rates on new investment: not only does the construction of a new
plant, and the generation of sales and income from it, fail to generate
additional tax liability to the state in which the plant is located, but the
plant actually reduces the firm’s tax liability to that state in many instances because new-plant credits exceed the entire new-plant tax.
Chapter 4: How Taxes and Incentives Favor One Industry over
Another and Capital over Labor
Knowing how incentives increase business profitability is clearly
key to evaluating enterprise zones, but we also need to have a sense of
the firm’s likely behavioral response to incentives. Do enterprise zone
incentives change the relative prices of capital and labor, and should we
expect to see some substitution of labor for capital, or capital for labor?
This is an important issue. We argue in Chapter 2 that the central justification of the enterprise zone idea is the creation of employment in targeted areas. If the incentives we use “cause” a firm to locate in our
zone, but at the same time cheapen the cost of capital relative to labor,
the employment-creating effects of the investment may be much smaller than they otherwise would have been.
We found that 4 of our sample of 13 states provide, at the state level, a set of incentives to zone firms that clearly lowers the price of labor.
Four other states have a clear capital bias. In the other 5 states, credits
provide no clear reduction in labor or capital prices at the margin.
When local incentives—property-tax abatements, primarily—are
brought into the picture, however, the capital bias becomes much
stronger.
The possible effects of incentives on a firm’s choice of technology,
and the relative use of capital and labor in the production process, depend not on the dollar amount of incentives but on changes in the prices
of capital and labor. The effects of labor incentives on the price of labor are quite small. In only two states does the average price reduction
exceed 1.0 percent, and the maximum price reduction among the 16
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sectors we looked at never exceeds 3.0 percent in any state. Capital incentives, on the other hand, have substantial price effects in several of
the states. The average price reduction among sectors exceeds 5.0 percent in 8 of the 13 states, and in 6 states the maximum exceeds 20 percent for at least one sector. Indeed, there is a clear bias of incentive systems in favor of capital in all but 2 of the 13 states. Given the
significant substitutability between capital and labor in manufacturing
reported in empirical studies, it is likely that this capital bias in incentives will cause firms to adopt at least somewhat more capital-intensive
methods of production, which would partly offset—or possibly more
than offset—the employment gains from the location effects of incentives.
A related concern is the industrial policy implicit in enterprise zone
incentives. Incentives not only change the relative prices of capital and
labor, but also favor particular sorts of industrial firms. For instance,
the exemption of machinery and equipment from the local property tax
will benefit those firms that use relatively more machinery and equipment in their production processes. Sales-tax exemptions on energy
use will benefit those firms that use relatively more energy in their production processes, and so on. We find that the industrial-policy effects
of incentives are quite strong within our sample of 75 cities. It is quite
common for the most heavily taxed sector in a particular city to be facing a state-local tax rate two (or even three) times the rate on the leasttaxed sector. Thus, state and city taxes and incentives effectively discriminate in favor of some sectors and against others. We believe it is
most unlikely that the industrial policy implicit in this pattern of sectoral preferences is intended, or even known, by state or local development officials or policymakers.
Chapter 5: The Fiscal Effects of Incentives
Even if enterprise zones do manage to encourage both new investment and new employment, they may still not be fiscally cost-effective
for government. There are a number of reasons for this, the most patent
being that expensive incentives may have a real but nevertheless small
total effect. The aim of this chapter is not to conduct a benefit-cost
analysis—we believe the benefits and costs of most economic-development policy still to be too ambiguous to be measured uncontroversial-
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ly—but to analyze the direct fiscal impact of enterprise zone incentives.
The analyses that we perform to look at this issue also permit us to
evaluate the design of incentives and to recommend ways to structure
them to increase the likelihood of generating a fiscal surplus.
Our research indicates that the direct revenue effects of enterprise
zone incentives on state and local government combined are very likely to be negative, and rather strongly so. In the average enterprise zone
city, among our sample of 75, each job that is actually induced by the
zone incentives—in other words, jobs that would not exist there “but
for” the incentives—would generate about $7,200 in net additional revenue to state government (in present-value terms over 20 years) and another $11,000 in local revenue. On the other hand, the state would lose
about $4,600 for every new job that was not attributable to incentives
(because some growth would have occurred anyway and that investment will receive the same incentive package), and localities would
lose about $3,200 for each noninduced job. The key to determining
whether government gains or loses from incentives is the ratio of induced to noninduced jobs. We find that in the average city, as long as
this percentage of induced to total jobs was more than 30 percent, state
and local government combined come out ahead. The problem is, research (ours and others) suggests that the percentage is likely to be considerably lower than 30 percent, if one defines an induced job as a job
that would not have existed in that state but for the state-local incentive
package. In fact, the current research consensus on the interstate or intermetropolitan effects of taxes on growth suggests the inducement percentage would be about 9 percent and the net annual state-local revenue
loss would be about $7,130 per induced job in our average city. Total
annual fiscal losses produced by an average-sized zone with an average
incentive package could eventually be $1 to $2 million.
The purely local fiscal effects of a local zone tax incentive, on the
other hand, are more difficult to estimate because of the paucity of intrametropolitan research studies, though positive effects are more likely since a move within the metropolitan area, while not representing a
net gain for the state, will nonetheless produce a net gain for the receiving locale. Higher local inducement percentages are plausible and are
supported by some research.
The work done for this chapter also allowed us to consider the design of incentive instruments. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we
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find that governments lose more revenue the more they front-load their
incentives; other things being equal, a cost-effective incentive is a
back-loaded one. Moreover, a permanent tax cut is more likely to produce positive revenues than a temporary cut with the same power to
create jobs (i.e., with the same value to the firm over some decisionmaking time horizon).
Chapter 6: Manufacturing Growth and Decline
in Enterprise Zones
In Chapters 3 through 5 we focus on zone incentives. In Chapter 6
we turn our attention to enterprise zones and growth. The analysis in
Chapter 6 is descriptive and relies on special data runs undertaken for
us by the Bureau of the Census. The data consist of establishment
counts by industry and employment-size class. Our focus is on the
composition of economic growth and decline in enterprise zones—the
relative importance of establishment births, deaths, relocations into and
out of zones, and employment expansions and contractions in zones.
When we examine the 13 sample states as a whole, we find that the
six-year period 1989–1995 saw relative stability in the manufacturing
sector, as measured by changes in the number of manufacturing establishments. The enterprise zones within those states, on the other hand,
experienced a net loss of establishments. The average zone had 111 establishments in 1989; about 11 establishments were born or moved into
the zone each year, but about 12.4 died or moved out. The net effect
was a decline in establishments at a rate of about 1.2 percent per year,
or a 7 percent net loss for the six-year period. Twenty-four zones experienced net declines of 15 percent or more over the period, however,
while 11 experienced net growth of over 10 percent.
Establishments exiting the enterprise zones (through deaths or
moves out) were, on average, just slightly larger than those entering.
The percentage loss of manufacturing employment over the six-year
period due to net loss in establishments was therefore likely to be a little more than the percentage loss of establishments. Zone employment
was also greatly affected by the job expansions and contractions of
firms that remain in the zone. Overall, of the establishments existing in
these 64 zones at the beginning of a given period, about one in three expanded employment within the two-year period, and about one in three
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reduced employment. Larger establishments were much more likely to
contract than smaller establishments, however, so it is likely that the net
effect of expansions and contractions in these zones was further erosion
in the job base, beyond the more than 9 percent attributable to net loss
of establishments.
When we compared establishment growth and decline in zones
with the states of which they were a part, we found that zones had a
pronounced comparative disadvantage in attracting and retaining the
more capital-intensive sectors of manufacturing. It is also clear that
manufacturing in enterprise zones remains concentrated in “old economy” sectors, particularly printing and publishing and fabricated metal
products. Zones appear to have a comparative disadvantage in electronic equipment, instruments, and chemicals.
When we examine expansions and contractions by time period we
find a striking trend, however: the percent of establishments that remained in the zone and expanded increased with each two-year period,
while the percentage that remained but reduced employment declined.
Expansion rates exceeded contraction rates by a wide margin in the
most recent period studied, 1993–1995, especially for the two smallersize classes. It is quite possible that in the 1993–1995 period there was
net employment growth in existing establishments in these zones sufficient to offset, or more than offset, the job losses due to exits exceeding
entries. We think it likely that this trend persisted as the national economic expansion continued through the 1990s.
Chapter 7: Enterprise Zones, Incentives,
and Local Economic Growth
In this chapter we make use of the same data set we employed in
Chapter 6 and look again at the issue of growth, this time from an
econometric point of view. Our aim here is to answer what is probably
the key policy question: do enterprise zone incentives actually “cause”
economic growth? We begin the chapter by looking at the various
econometric models of enterprise zone impacts on growth developed
by other researchers. Then we present results from our own analyses:
one for our near-national sample of enterprise zones and another for enterprise zones in Ohio (Ohio has some of the best economic-development data in the nation). In essence, we develop models at two spatial
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scales and thus are able to measure both interstate enterprise zone impacts and intrastate impacts.
If zone incentives are to be effective, they must be sizeable enough
to influence geographic investment decisions. We find that the average
incentive packages for each of the sectors for the 13 states are equivalent to a 1.6 percent to 7.1 percent cut in wages. Thus, a relatively
small wage premium would be sufficient in many locations to wipe out
the advantages created by the incentive packages there. With the exception of some extreme cases, therefore, one would not expect incentives to have noticeably large effects on location decisions. Our statistical models of enterprise zone incentives and growth bear out this
deduction. We find no evidence of a strong positive impact of enterprise zone incentives on growth: zones offering larger incentives (or a
lower net tax rate) for firms in a given sector did not attract significantly more births and in-migrations of establishments in that sector than
zones with a less attractive tax and incentive regime. While we do not
claim that our research settles this matter, we do believe our results cast
considerable doubt on the belief, widespread in economic-development
policy circles, that incentives are crucial for growth in targeted areas.
Our conclusions here are in line with much, but not all, of the recent
econometric work on enterprise zones and growth. It is almost certain,
then, that incentives have little impact on employment growth.
Chapter 8: Enterprise Zones and Access to Employment
All this leaves out an important issue: Who are the people who
work in enterprise zones? Enterprise zones “may”—the results of
Chapter 7 suggest that this is a big “may”—encourage new investment
and employment, but we still need to know whether the zones provide
jobs for residents of neighborhoods with less access to growing suburban labor markets. Merely creating local growth may not, in and of itself, be good enough. In Chapter 8 we assemble various data to give
what are only preliminary answers to these questions. They are preliminary because the data we are able to use are both limited and not entirely appropriate to most of the questions we need to answer. We focus
on the extent to which enterprise zones are able to attract more-disadvantaged workers and the extent to which they provide special work
opportunities to those living in enterprise zones.
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Tying the provision of business incentives to the requirement that
recipient firms hire targeted workers appears not to have been a success. These requirements usually only apply to jobs credits and jobs
credits are typically only a small part of the incentive packages provided. Moreover, it is possible that firms may avoid using incentives with
strong “tying” provisions.
Improving the access of inner-city minorities and others to buoyant
labor markets by locating zones in targeted areas also seems to be problematic. Enterprise zones attract workers from far and wide. In most of
the enterprise zones we looked at, the majority of jobs were taken by
commuters from outside the enterprise zone. Moreover, commute time
of those working in enterprise zones appears to be longer than the average for those working elsewhere in the regions that contain the enterprise zones. This suggests that spatial proximity between home and
work does not necessarily improve the accessibility of jobs.
Chapter 9: Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
In the final chapter we summarize our results and provide some
broader thoughts on the role of enterprise zones, targeted incentives,
and economic-development policy. Our overall assessment of enterprise zones is negative. There is great variability in what enterprise
zones look like, what they are meant to achieve, and consequently what
incentives are offered. Although our research has focused on those
states in which enterprise zones are targeted at problem areas, enterprise zones in some other states look to be little more than delivery
mechanisms for standard state and local economic-development policy.
During the 1990s, in fact, non-spatially targeted incentives grew in importance relative to enterprise zone incentives, thus lessening the potential impact of enterprise zones. The zone incentives offered tend to
favor capital rather than labor and appear to constitute a chaotic and unplanned industrial policy. Furthermore, these incentives usually cause
losses to the public purse. Although there is a lot of business turnover
in enterprise zones, zone incentives have only a minimal impact on new
investment. Finally, enterprise zones do not seem to improve the spatial accessibility of employment to the disadvantaged. We end by proposing policy alternatives to enterprise zones.
There are many other policy questions about enterprise zones that
need to be answered. For instance, we need to know the relationship
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between housing effects and economic-development effects in residential enterprise zones, whether zones can encourage minority entrepreneurship, and so on. We do not address these issues in this book, although we recognize that they are important to evaluating the overall
effectiveness of the enterprise zone strategy. Because of how little we
know about the basic employment effectiveness of enterprise zones, in
this book we focus on a small set of basic economic questions: What
are the incentives offered in enterprise zones and what are the employment growth effects of those incentives? Answering even this small set
of questions has taken a huge research effort. We leave the other questions to other researchers.

STATES, CITIES, AND ENTERPRISE ZONES SAMPLED
The final issue to be dealt with in this chapter concerns our various
state, city, and enterprise zone samples. The sample starts with the 20
states modeled in TAIMez—the largest industrial states, in terms of
manufacturing employment. For these 20 states, we modeled taxes
from 1990 through 1998. This sample provides us with our broadest
historical view of enterprise zone policy in the United States and is the
basis of the results in Chapter 3 comparing enterprise zone and nontargeted tax incentives. From these 20 states, we selected the 13 states
with significant enterprise zone programs in place by 1990. (States
with fewer than five enterprise zones were eliminated.) In each of these
13 states enterprise zone policy was “targeted” at distressed areas.5
Within each state, we identified the enterprise zones located within
cities of 25,000 population or more that were within a metropolitan statistical area (MSA or PMSA). The population cutoff was employed for
two reasons: to facilitate data collection (since census data are readily
available in much more detail for larger cities and for MSAs) and to
avoid skewing the sample in favor of small cities in those states, such
as Texas and Ohio, that have a very large number of zones in cities of
all sizes. We then randomly selected six zones in each state, if possible
(in a few states, there were only five zones in cities of 25,000 or more).
This left us with a sample of 75 cities (see Table 1.1). It is a stratified
sample, of course, based on states, in order to avoid having a sample
made up largely of zones in the handful of states with 100 or more
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Table 1.1 The 75 Enterprise Zones Sampled
State and zone name
California
Altadena/Pasadena (EZ)
Los Angeles, NE
Valley/Pacoima
Porterville (EZ)
Shasta Metro
Redding/Anderson (EZ)
Sacramento: Northgate
(EIA)
Stockton (EZ)
Connecticut
Hamden
Hartford
Meriden
New Britain
Norwalk
Norwich
Florida
Clearwater
Fort Lauderdale
Fort Myers
Jacksonville
Miami Beach
Tampa
Illinois
Champaign/Champaign
County
Kankakee County
(Manteno city)
Maywood
Moline/Quad Cities
Pekin/Tazewell County
Riverbend/Alton
Indiana
Evansville
Fort Wayne

Year
started

City

1992 Pasadena
1986 Los Angeles

City
population Includeda
131,591
3,485,398

x
x

1986 Porterville
1991 Redding

29,563
66,462

x

1986 Sacramento

369,365

1993 Stockton

210,943

1989
1982
1987
1982
1982
1987

Hamden
Hartford
Meriden
New Britain
Norwalk
Norwich

52,434
139,739
59,479
75,491
78,331
37,391

x
x
x
x
x
x

1986
1986
1986
1986
1986
1986

Clearwater
Fort Lauderdale
Fort Myers
Jacksonville
Miami Beach
Tampa

98,784
149,377
45,206
635,230
92,639
280,015

x
x
x
x
x

1986 Champaign

63,502

x

1986 Kankakee

27,575

x

1988
1988
1986
1986

27,139
43,202
32,254
32,905

x
x
x
x

126,272
173,072

x
x

Maywood
Moline
Pekin
Alton

1984 Evansville
1984 Fort Wayne
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Table 1.1 (Continued)
State and zone name
Indiana (continued)
Hammond
Lafayette
Muncie
South Bend
Kentucky
Covington
Hopkinsville
Lexington
Louisville
Owensboro
Missouri
Joplin Area/Webb City
Kansas City Enterprise
Zone
Springfield Enterprise
Zone
St. Joseph/Buchanan
County
St. Louis Mid Town
New York
Auburn
New York City
Niagara Falls
Syracuse
Troy
Utica
Ohio
Canton
Cincinnati 2 (#154)
Cleveland (#24)
Elyria
Massillon
Warren (#111)
Pennsylvania
Chester
Johnstown

Year
started

City

City
population Includeda

1985
1993
1989
1984

Hammond
Lafayette
Muncie
South Bend

84,236
43,764
71,035
105,511

x
x
x
x

1982
1982
1982
1982
1982

Covington
Hopkinsville
Lexington
Louisville
Owensboro

43,264
29,818
225,366
269,555
53,549

x

x

1985 Joplin
1985 Kansas City

40,961
435,146

x
x

1984 Springfield

140,494

x

1985 St. Joseph

71,852

x

1983 St. Louis

396,685

x

31,258
7,322,564
61,840
163,860
54,269
68,637

x
x
x
x
x
x

x

1988
1988
1988
1987
1987
1988

Auburn
New York City
Niagara Falls
Syracuse
Troy
Utica

1986
1989
1985
1987
1986
1988

Canton
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Elyria
Missillon
Warren

84,161
364,040
505,616
56,746
31,007
50,793

x
x
x
x
x
x

1983 Chester
1983 Johnstown

41,856
28,134

x
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Table 1.1 (Continued)
State and zone name
Pennsylvania (continued)
Lancaster
Philadelphia-Hunting Park
West
Pittsburgh: North Side
Scranton
Texas
Amarillo
El Paso East
Fort Worth North
Pharr II
San Antonio: Eastside &
Westside
Waco Northwest
Virginia
Danville
Lynchburg
Newport News #1
Petersburg
Portsmouth
Richmond #1 (south)
Wisconsin
Beloit
Fond Du Lac
Green Bay
Milwaukee
Racine
a

Year
started

City

1988 Lancaster
1983 Philadelphia

City
population Includeda
55,551
1,585,577

x
x

1983 Pittsburgh
1988 Scranton

369,879
81,805

x
x

1989
1993
1988
1991
1988

157,615
515,342
447,619
32,921
935,933

x
x
x
x
x

Amarillo
El Paso
Fort Worth
Pharr
San Antonio

1991 Waco

103,590

1984
1985
1984
1985
1984
1993

Danville
Lynchburg
Newport News
Petersburg
Portsmouth
Richmond

53,056
66,049
170,045
38,386
103,907
203,056

1989
1991
1991
1989
1989

Beloit
Fond Du Lac
Green Bay
Milwaukee
Racine

35,573
37,757
96,466
628,088
84,298

x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x

x indicates that the zone was included in the final sample for the regression analyses.

zones each. There was no weighting applied; thus the results can be interpreted as comparisons of state enterprise zone policies, since each
state receives approximately the same weighting in the sample. More
detailed data on the sample can be found in Appendix E.
For the descriptive analyses of taxes and incentives in Chapter 3,
we used the entire 75-city sample. The analyses in Chapters 6 and 7, on
the other hand, were performed on a reduced sample of 65 zones, due to
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problems with the additional data required for these analyses, particularly the mapping of zone boundaries (see Appendix E for a discussion
of the boundary issue). For the 13-state, 75-city sample and its derivatives, our concern was with taxes and incentives in 1990, 1992, and
1994.
We also conducted a subsidiary analysis of enterprise zones in the
state of Ohio. Because the state had readily available complete data on
local taxes, including the actual property-tax-abatement schedules employed, as well as a complete set of computerized enterprise zone
boundaries, it was feasible to do an additional analysis of all 104 Ohio
cities with populations of 15,000 or more, with or without enterprise
zones. Such a data set would be difficult or impossible to assemble for
any of the other states we researched. The Ohio data set has an additional advantage: a number of new zones were created in these 104
cities during the period of our analysis, 1990–1994. This allows us to
look directly at the impact of zone designation.
Finally, we have a small subsample of cities and zones (drawn from
the original 75) for which we do further commuting analyses—these
are described in Chapter 8. The reason for the reduction in sample size
was that we needed to include a further set of conditions for zone specification in order to make sure that commuting patterns to and from
zones were being measured appropriately. Thus, cities with fewer than
50 Traffic Analysis Zones (TAZs) were excluded as were cities that
were part of very large, complex commuting regions (in essence, commuting regions with multiple, large, central cities). Also excluded were
cities in which there were major changes to enterprise zone boundaries.

Notes
1. Of these zones, 2,083 were in just two states—Arkansas and Louisiana—and another 227 were in Ohio. At the other extreme, seven states had three or fewer
zones. See Wilder and Rubin (1996).
2. See L. Papke (1994), Fisher and Peters (1997a), and Peters and Fisher (1998).
3. This assumes that differing tax burdens are not capitalized into land prices. We return to this issue in Chapter 2.
4. We put “causal” in quotation marks since econometric models by themselves are
not evidence of truly causal relationships.
5. However, the degree of targeting varied, and some states had stricter targeting criteria than others. In Ohio, there were both targeted and nontargeted zones (see
Table 2.1 in Chapter 2).

2
Enterprise Zones and
Economic-Development Policy
Enterprise zones have been on the American urban policy landscape for more than two decades. Indeed, there are many thousands of
enterprise zones scattered across the United States. But there is still
confusion as to exactly what enterprise zones are, what they are meant
to achieve, and whether they are likely to be more effective than the
rest of state and local economic-development efforts. The confusion is
registered in the various names that states have given their enterprise
zone programs: Renaissance Zones, Keystone Opportunity Zones, Development Zones, and Program Areas, for example.
In this chapter we attempt to bring some order to this confusion.
We begin by looking at the early history of, and justification for, enterprise zones in the United States. We then focus on some of the more
compelling arguments made in favor of enterprise zones: 1) the idea
that targeting economic development at depressed areas is more effective and efficient than not so targeting; and 2) the claim that residents,
particularly minority residents, of depressed inner-city neighborhoods
are excluded from buoyant suburban labor markets and thus need targeted economic-development assistance. In the final section of the
chapter we turn to the literature on the effectiveness of enterprise
zones. We should point out that the issues highlighted in this chapter
are important to understanding the arguments we make and conclusions
we draw throughout the rest of the book.

WHAT IS AN ENTERPRISE ZONE?
With the passage of the Empowerment Zone and Enterprise Community Act in 1993, the federal government jumped into the enterprise
zone arena, which until that time was exclusively a state and local policy domain in the United States. Between 1981 and 1991, 38 states and
the District of Columbia passed enterprise zone legislation. As of
21
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1995, 34 of those programs remained active, and in those states, 2,840
zones had been established (Wilder and Rubin 1996).1 Two more
states—Iowa and Michigan—have initiated enterprise zone programs
since that time, and Pennsylvania has introduced a much more aggressive version of its enterprise zone. The federal program added 11 empowerment zones and 99 enterprise communities to this list in late 1994
(Hambleton 1996). These empowerment zones are located in eight major cities, each eligible for about $100 million in federal aid, and three
multicounty rural areas, each eligible for $40 million. The enterprise
communities are smaller cities and rural areas, each eligible for $3 million in federal assistance.2
It should not be surprising, then, that zones look different “on the
ground.” They vary widely in size, from sites smaller than 50 acres to
entire counties (Rubin and Richards 1992). Louisiana has many thousands of zones, and more than one-third of Ohio is covered by the
state’s enterprise zones, whereas in many states there is a mere handful
of zones and each zone is geographically small. Erickson and Friedman’s (1990a) study of 357 zones found a median population of 4,500
and size of 1.8 square miles. In most states, zones are aimed at traditional industry (especially manufacturing), but some states encourage
retail and service activity in their zones. Most zones have a residential
component—in fact, many states have seen community and housing redevelopment as a crucial part of zone policy—but some do not. Probably the starkest difference concerns the incentives provided. States differ in what sorts of things they are prepared to subsidize with their
enterprise zone legislation. Many have felt the need to cheapen the cost
of labor in their zones in an attempt to increase labor demand for zone
residents, but many others have adopted a strategy of cheapening the
costs of capital, usually by utilizing some type of property-tax abatement or some type of tax credit for investment. Presumably, the capital-cheapening strategy has been pursued in the hope that the resulting
new investment will create jobs.
Before moving on to more complicated questions we need a better
understanding of what an enterprise zone is, or should be. In particular,
we need to know how enterprise zones differ from other economicdevelopment policy instruments and whether they have a unique set of
goals that distinguishes them from other instruments. The words “enterprise,” “empowerment,” “renaissance,” and so on, all point to the de-
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sire to revitalize or re-invigorate or regenerate targeted areas (zones) by
relying on new private investment and entrepreneurship. In many
states the criteria for zone designation suggest that they are antipoverty
strategies as well. The implication—and it is no more than that—is that
the enterprise zone strategy differs from most, but not all, other economic-development policy in that it is:
• geographically targeted;
• targeted at economically depressed (and probably older) areas,
or areas in need of regeneration; and
• primarily reliant on investment by the private sector.
This is hardly a comprehensive definition.3 In some states it would be
controversial since it appears to imply that enterprise zones should not
be located in new suburban greenfield locations. Nevertheless, we believe the definition goes to the crux of the original idea behind the enterprise zone movement in the United States and elsewhere. In the next
section of this chapter we will briefly cover the history of enterprise
zones in the United States. This will lead into a broader treatment of
how enterprise zones differ from other economic-development policy
instruments and the ideas behind the enterprise zone concept. In both
these sections we will expand on and attempt to justify this definition
(or understanding) of enterprise zones. This will provide us with some
criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of state-level enterprise zones,
criteria we will return to later in the book.

THE ENTERPRISE ZONE IDEA
In the United States, geographically targeted policy aimed at poor
and economically declining areas has been around at least since the
New Deal. After World War II the federal government became heavily
involved in supporting the revitalization of older inner-city areas. First
it was urban renewal; then came the various programs that were to become consolidated into the Community Development Block Grant
(CDBG) program, and later Urban Development Action Grants
(UDAGs) and several programs administered by the Economic Development Administration (EDA)—all meant to provide federal funding
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for the relief of blight and decay. Very often federal funds came in conjunction with state and local funding. For instance, Title IX (Special
Adjustment Assistance) funding from the EDA provided flexible planning and program grants to help localities overcome sudden and severe
job loss. In the case of the UDAGs, the focus was on leveraging private
investment, usually in older inner-city or downtown areas, using relatively limited amounts of federal funds. Many of the other programs
could be described in similar terms. Moreover, some states had funding mechanisms similar to the federal government’s that targeted economically blighted or depressed areas.
Enterprise zones differ from all these programs in concept. The
idea of the enterprise zone is usually attributed to a few British academics (particularly Peter Hall) and politicians who had become impressed, in the later 1970s, by the levels of local enterprise and entrepreneurship found in some east Asian economies, particularly Hong
Kong (Hall 1977, 1982). In 1978, Sir Geoffrey Howe, then a conservative Member of Parliament and later a minister with various portfolios
in Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government, coined the term. His
belief was that government should lessen its hold over the more derelict
parts of British cities. In effect, this would mean reducing government
regulation (particularly land-use regulation) and taxation (Butler 1991).
Underlying this proposal was the belief that east Asian economies were
so vibrant precisely because the hand of government there was so light.
The hope then was that a reduction in the burden of government in parts
of British cities would stimulate local enterprise and investment that
would otherwise be smothered.
Twenty years later it is still unclear whether there is a strong relationship between the burden of government and the level of entrepreneurship. Few today would see the earlier success of the Asian tigers as
a result of the small burden of government in those countries. Nevertheless, the enterprise zone idea proved potent both in the United Kingdom—where by 1981 a dozen enterprise zones had been designated—
and in the United States. Stuart Butler, an Anglo-American policy
analyst at The Heritage Foundation, a conservative Washington think
tank, is usually credited with popularizing the idea in U.S. policy circles.4 The idea attracted bipartisan interest, in particular from Jack
Kemp, then a Republican representative from New York, and from
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Robert Garcia, a liberal Democrat from the South Bronx. Together, in
1981, they cosponsored the first U.S. enterprise zone legislation.
Three points need to be made about this legislation. The first is the
wide range of groups who were attracted to the idea. The second is that
the legislation failed, not only because of opposition from both left and
right, but also because of opposition from some cabinet members in the
Reagan administration, even though enterprise zones were part of the
official Reagan administration policy as early as 1981.5 The third is
that the failure of the federal government to enact meaningful enterprise zone legislation created room for the states to pass their own enterprise zone bills.
Why did the enterprise zone idea attract bipartisan support? On the
Republican side the answer is fairly clear: enterprise zones were different from traditional inner-city policy. They did not involve the federal
government spending money on costly programs that seemed, at least
from the Republican perspective, to have failed. They involved a reduction in taxes and regulation. They relied primarily on private initiative. Moreover, in 1979 David Birch came out with his very influential
book—The Job Generation Process—which claimed that small firms
were responsible for most job generation in the United States. Soon after, academics and policymakers began to argue for government policies to stimulate or facilitate the formation of new businesses. Enterprise zones seemed to fit directly with such a goal. It is also true that
there were those on both the right and left who saw enterprise zones as
a way of promoting indigenous inner-city entrepreneurship (locals
creating local businesses employing local labor) instead of the more
traditional way of dealing with urban blight (attracting big firms to depressed neighborhoods using the traditional array of economic-development incentives).
Reasons for early liberal Democrat support for enterprise zones are
a little more difficult to discern—after all, enterprise zones involve a reduction of taxes and deregulation. Stuart Butler (1991) claimed that
there were two important reasons. First, many inner-city politicians had
come to the conclusion that traditional inner-city policy had failed their
constituents. Most notoriously, urban renewal was widely credited with
actually destroying inner-city neighborhoods. Second, enterprise zones
were the only policy game in town—traditional inner-city programs
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were most unlikely to expand during the early Reagan years. But it is
also true that many liberals supported enterprise zones because, at least
in the U.S. version, they tied economic development to community development and they appeared to prefer small firms to large firms. They
were pro big city (when some Democrats still saw this as an important
part of their political base) and pro poor. Moreover, enterprise zones
took an essentially optimistic view of the residents of depressed neighborhoods: given the opportunity, inner-city residents could be as entrepreneurial and hard working as the rest of Americans.
More than 20 years later, it is clear that many of these reasons for
support were decidedly flimsy, possibly even misguided. The proposed
federal enterprise zones would involve the federal government in very
considerable tax-credit expenditures. It is difficult to maintain there is
any substantive policy distinction between direct spending on program
y to achieve goal x and indirect spending through some tax credit z revenue loss to achieve goal x. The Birch report massively exaggerated
the role of small firms in job generation (Armington and Odle 1982;
Brown, Hamilton, and Medoff 1990). The biggest obstacle to new
business formation is unlikely to be taxes or regulation—most of the
evidence suggests that factors such as access to capital are of much
greater importance in the firm-formation decision.6 The jobs provided
by small firms are likely to pay less, have fewer benefits, and be less secure than those provided by big firms. Finally, using individual entrepreneurship as a way of dealing with individual unemployment is highly risky. New small firms, particularly those with little capital, tend to
fail at an exceptionally high rate.
The early federal enterprise zone legislation failed partly because
of bipartisan concerns over these and other issues,7 and partly because
of opposition from other federal departments, particularly the Treasury,
which argued that the federal tax system should be as neutral as possible. In essence the Treasury view maintained that special tax treatments for targeted industries or places distorted the economy and thus
made the United States poorer than it would otherwise be. The belief
that the tax code was not the place to make industrial-policy or socialpolicy decisions won the day, in spite of the fact that the 1981 federal
tax legislation was decidedly non-neutral (Fisher 1985).
State enterprise zones began as a result of federal activity. A few
states passed enterprise zone legislation in the early 1980s in the hope

Enterprise Zones and Economic-Development Policy 27

that this would increase their chances of being chosen for federal enterprise zone status (Beaumont 1991). “Thus the eligibility criteria of
most state measures mirrored those in the federal legislation . . . and
the tax, regulatory and other measures included in the legislation and
programs at the state level, broadly conformed to most people’s best
guess of a package likely to win applause from the federal officials administering an enterprise program” (Butler 1991, p. 39). The failure of
the federal legislation changed this; states were now free to experiment—in fact, the states have dominated the enterprise zone debate
from the failure of the early federal legislation to the passing of the
Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Community legislation during the first
Clinton administration. One result of this is that the enterprise zone
idea has become much more nebulous than it was in the late 1970s
and early 1980s. State zones differ on objectives, tools, and, thus, results. In some instances, enterprise zones are little more than geographically targeted versions of standard state and local economic-development programs.8 They are a way of packaging and marketing
traditional economic-development services to mainly suburban industrial parks. In many states, however, they are targeted in accordance
with the original enterprise zone idea, though even here there is confusion as to whether the zone should be merely an industrial or commercial area needing revitalization or a low-income area with people needing jobs.
To what extent are zones targeted at more depressed areas? By design, all of the 13 states in our sample for this book target their enterprise zones at distressed areas, at least to a degree.9 The criteria for
zone designation in the 13 states are summarized in Table 2.1; clearly,
there is considerable variation among the states. But does this targeting
show up “on the ground”? In earlier research on state and local economic development, we found that enterprise zone incentives, unlike
almost all other incentives, were more likely to be larger in higher-unemployment cities (Fisher and Peters 1998). This suggests that enterprise zone incentives, at least, are indeed targeted. However, probably
the best evidence on this issue comes from Greenbaum (2001), who has
examined zone siting decisions in the District of Columbia and nine
states: California, Florida, Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, New
York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Virginia. He finds unequivocal evidence that zones are sited in distressed neighborhoods.

Poverty, income, or
unemployment criteria
State

Must satisfy one

California

Must meet both
the income and
the unemployment criteria
(Waters zones)
Any of 3 criteria

Connecticut

Florida

Illinois

Not necessary

Multiple criteria; 2 of 8
relate to income or unemployment
Any 1 of 5 criteria; 3 relate to
income or
unemployment

Poverty
rate

Unemployment
rate

Other criteria

Population

1.5 times
national
average

1.5 times
national
average

UDAG program
eligibility
(Nolan zones)

At least
4,000

25%

2 times state
average

25% of population recipients of welfare

1.2 times state
average

Population
decline of 20%
1970–80 or
zone will result
in investment of
$100m. and
1,000 full-time
jobs

20%

Income

70% of households less than
80% of city
median income

Area
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Table 2.1 State Enterprise Zone Eligibility Criteria as of 1992

Indiana

Must meet both
the income and
the unemployment criteria

New York

Either zone or
county must
meet poverty
and unemployment standards

Ohio (Distress
Based)a

65% of households less than
80% of state
median income

20% (zone)
13%
(county)

Any 1 or 2 of 6
criteria; 3 relate
to income or unemployment

0.75 to 3.0
square
miles

1.5 times state
average

UDAG criteria,
or pervasive
poverty, unemployment,
and general
distress

4,000 to
32,000

1.25 times state
average

At least
2,000

1.25 times state Abandoned or
51% of
average
demolished
residents less
structures; 10%
than 80% of city
populamedian income
tion loss
1970–90; low
tax capacity
school district

At least
4,000

Up to 1
square
mile
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Missouri

2,000 to
8,0000

1.5 times
Population
70% of households less than national average decline of 10%
1980–90
80% of city
median income

Any 1 of 3
criteria; 2 relate to income
or unemployment

Kentucky

1.5 times state General distress
average

25% below
80% of
poverty
level

Must meet either
poverty or
unemployment
criterion

Poverty, income, or
unemployment criteria
State
Pennsylvania

Must satisfy one

Not necessary

Poverty
rate

City must be
“financially
disadvantaged”

Texas

Must meet the
unemployment
or the population-loss
standard, and 1
other criterion

Virginia

Any 1 of 3 criteria; 2 relate to
income or
unemployment

“low
income
poverty
area”

Income

Unemployment
rate

Other criteria

Multiple criteria; some
relate to income or unemployment
70% of resi- 1.5 times local, 9% population
state or naloss for
dents less than
80% of city or tional average 6-year period or
3% for 3 years;
state median
UDAG eligible;
income
property abandonment; tax delinquencies;
disaster area
1.5 times state
Industrial or
25% of resiaverage
commercial
dents less than
vacancy rate of
80% of city
20% or more
median income

Population

Area
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Table 2.1 (Continued)

Wisconsin

Must meet 2 of 6
criteria; 5 relate
to income or
unemployment

40% of residents less than
80% of state
median income

At least
4,000

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, State Enterprise Zone Update, 1992; enteprise zone materials obtained from
the states of New York, Ohio, Indiana, and Pennsylvania.
a
Ohio also allowed zones to qualify without showing distress, but restricted somewhat the use of incentives in these zones. All 6 Ohio zones in
our 13-state sample are distressed.
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1.5 times state UDAG eligible;
average
declining
property values; rate of
welfare recipiency 1.5 times
state average;
5% of
workforce
permanently
laid off
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The typical state enterprise zone program includes investment tax
credits (ITCs), job tax credits, sales-tax exemptions or credits, and
property-tax abatements. In our 1998 study of incentives in 24 states in
1992, we found that 22 of those states had enterprise zone programs, 20
of them active (Fisher and Peters 1998). Five of the 24 states provided
statewide ITCs, and 4 of these 5 provided more generous versions within enterprise zones. Another four states provided ITCs only in zones.
Similarly, four of the states provided statewide jobs tax credits, and two
of these provided more generous versions in enterprise zones. Another
14 states provided jobs credits exclusively to firms locating in zones.
Seven states provided a full or partial exemption of income taxes on
profits attributable to zone investment. Thus, state corporate income
tax credits were in general much more prevalent and more generous in
enterprise zones than statewide, and within enterprise zones, jobs credits were employed twice as often as investment credits.
Sales tax exemptions, on the other hand, were generally offered
statewide. Exemptions for sales taxes on manufacturing machinery
and equipment were permitted statewide in 19 of the 24 states; only 2
states restricted such exemptions to enterprise zones. The corresponding figures for fuel and electricity exemptions were 17 and 2. Four
states exempted from sales taxation virtually all personal property purchased for business use in an enterprise zone. Of the 22 states with enterprise zone programs in our 1998 study, 19 permitted local propertytax abatements in the zones, though in 13 of those 19 states abatements
were permitted outside zones as well. Of the 13 states that are the focus of this book, 4 did not allow abatements at all (or allowed them under such restrictive conditions that they were rarely used), 6 allowed
them anywhere (and they were generally applied throughout a locality), and 3 permitted them only within an enterprise zone (though in 1
of these, Ohio, zones are so prevalent—there are over 300 in the
state—that abatements cannot really be described as targeted to distressed areas). Local property-tax abatements, where they are allowed,
are always applied to real property improvements—new buildings, additions to buildings, or site improvements such as access roads. They
are not applied to land purchases. In states in which personal property such as inventories, vehicles, or machinery and equipment are subject to the property tax, abatements may apply to one or more categories of personal property as well. The typical abatement relieves a
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declining percentage of taxes each year for a number of years, usually
5 to 10.
In our 1992 sample of 112 cities, 44 contained enterprise zones.
The total incentive package available in these zones was, on average,
worth two to three times as much as the incentive package available in
the average city without an enterprise zone. Within the zones, enterprise zone incentives accounted for 35 percent of the total incentive
package on average, with substantial variation depending on firm characteristics. State incentives represented about two-thirds of the total
enterprise zone package, the remainder consisting of local incentives
(mostly property-tax abatements). It is significant that general incentives (available to non-enterprise zone firms) were two to three times as
generous in the enterprise zone cities as in the non-enterprise zone
cities. In other words, the cities that contained enterprise zones were
providing larger incentives citywide than the average city. The average
city with an enterprise zone had a 27 percent higher unemployment
rate, a 45 percent higher poverty rate, and an 85 percent higher proportion of blacks in the population than the average city without zones.
The average effective state-local tax rate in the 20 states with active
enterprise zones was measured by constructing a representative city for
each state, with a property-tax rate equal to the average or the median
for that state, and a property-tax-abatement program typical of the
cities in our sample for that state.10 The tax rate in these cities averaged
9.1 percent outside enterprise zones, but 7.3 percent within a zone. The
average state enterprise zone program thus reduced the state and local
tax burden on new investment by about 19 percent. Although effective
tax rates differ dramatically depending on firm characteristics, zones
had similar effects (in terms of the percentage reduction in the tax rate)
among firms. There was considerable variation among the 20 cities,
however. Outside enterprise zones, the effective tax rate was 5.6 percent in the lowest-tax city (averaged over the 16 firms we modeled) but
14.7 percent in the highest-tax city. With zone incentives included, the
tax rates among the states ranged from 3.7 percent to 13.2 percent. Tax
rates were lowered by enterprise zones, but the variation among states
remained high. Some states with high average tax rates, such as California, had very generous enterprise zone incentives, while other hightax states, such as Washington, had enterprise zone programs that did
very little to offset these taxes.
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Depending on how one looks at these things, this very brief history
suggests either a certain amount of policy confusion or a certain level
of policy experimentation. Nevertheless, excluding those cases in
which enterprise zones are merely a way of packaging and marketing
standard incentives, we can characterize enterprise zones as targeting
incentives at particular geographical areas, originally as a way of encouraging local indigenous enterprise in depressed neighborhoods, but
more recently as a way of encouraging new investment. The need to
target is usually justified in terms of the need to provide better access to
job opportunities for the un- and underemployed, though in many states
defining exactly where access to job opportunities needs to be improved is politically controversial. It is to these issues we now turn.

DOES THE ENTERPRISE ZONE CONCEPT MAKE SENSE?
SOME PRELIMINARY ISSUES
Are enterprise zones a good idea? It appears fairly straightforward
that targeting economic-development policy at the places and people
most in need of help must be the right way to do economic-development policy. Indeed, when we embarked on this project, that was our
belief. As we attempted to develop the arguments that would justify
this position, however, we found that the issues are anything but
straightforward.
We begin the discussion of those issues here by placing enterprise
zones in the wider context of economic-development policy, which has
been the target of much criticism over the past two decades. Economic-development policy has been widely charged with corporate welfarism and fiscal irresponsibility, among other things. Moreover, it is
commonly asserted that U.S. economic-development policy, when
evaluated from a national perspective:
• is a zero-sum game (economic-development policy has not generated net new American investment; it merely moves investment around), or
• has a negative net impact on the national economy (economicdevelopment policy distorts the workings of private location decisions),11 or
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• is fundamentally ineffective (incentives are too small to influence investment decisions).
Furthermore, many economists are doubtful that state and local development policies are effective even from a local perspective and even
if they do influence investment decisions. Economic development
tends to provide mainly place-based subsidies, encouraging investment
in particular localities. Most economists argue, however, that because
of the high level of mobility of U.S. workers, the localized (or place)
effects of policy are lost through in-migration. Creating jobs in a particular place x, will not necessarily lower the unemployment rate in x,
or even increase the labor-force participation rate there, because almost
all the new jobs will be taken by better qualified in-migrants (Foster,
Forkenbrock, and Pogue 1991; Marston 1985). These sorts of criticisms have been covered extensively in the literature—indeed, we dealt
with many of them in the last book we wrote on economic-development policy.12 Thus we will not review the literature here, except to
make a few broad comments that have relevance to the enterprise zone
issue.
Whether tax incentives amount to corporate welfare depends on
how one defines the latter term. If by welfare one means that the firm
receives more in government goods and services than it pays in taxes,
the charge of welfarism is fairly easily dismissed. While there are clear
fiscal differences among states and localities, the evidence suggests
that, on the whole, business pays far more in state and local taxes than
it receives in state and local services (Oakland and Testa 1996). Of
course, the extreme economic-development deals and incentives that
crop up in newspaper headlines fairly frequently may indeed amount to
corporate welfare for particular firms. Furthermore, as we report later
in this book, incentive packages can produce negative income tax rates
on new investment, so that the new plant is clearly being subsidized,
even if the firm as a whole is not.
Corporate welfare can, on the other hand, be defined more broadly—as tax expenditures benefitting business. The argument here is that
a tax credit or exemption is a deviation from the base tax system and is
therefore a tax expenditure, and so should be viewed in the same light
as a direct expenditure program. Just as the homeowner deduction for
mortgage interest can be characterized as one of the nation’s largest
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“welfare” programs, and one disproportionately benefitting the rich
(who nonetheless probably still pay more in taxes than they receive in
benefits from government), so too can an investment tax credit be
viewed as an economic-development subsidy to business, and hence as
corporate welfare, even if corporations still pay more in taxes than they
receive in benefits. The basis for this position is that the basic corporate income tax is part of the overall tax system based on the principle
of ability to pay and should not be evaluated as a benefit tax in the first
place, as is implied in the first definition of corporate welfare.
The issue of fiscal irresponsibility is more difficult to answer since
it is dependent on the variable managerial abilities of state and local
governments. Estimates we conducted for Ohio—one of the nation’s
better managed states—suggest that fiscal incentives, including enterprise zone incentives, nearly always cost states and cities more than
they benefit firms (Peters and Fisher 1999a). In other words, the incentives have a value-to-firm/cost-to-government ratio of less than one.13
Part of the reason for this is the interdependence of state and local taxes, on the one hand, and federal taxes on the other. A portion of the value of a state or local incentive will be captured by the federal Treasury
and usually also by other state (and possibly local) governments. The
much more extensive results we present in Chapter 5 confirm, for a
wider set of states, our Ohio findings—enterprise zones are seldom fiscally cost-effective. But value-to-firm/cost-to-government ratios, or
even the considerably more complex fiscal measures we develop in
Chapter 5, do not take into account the full costs and benefits of incentives. It is possible for the value-to-firm/cost-to-government ratio to be
less than one while the full benefit-cost ratio of the incentive is greater
than one. The reason for this is that the benefits included in any benefit-cost calculation will cover more than just the income enhancement
captured by the firm; they will also include the difference between the
wages offered to those employees working in the new plant and the
reservation wages of those workers, increases in the value of local
property as a result of the new investment, and so on.14
Unfortunately, there are few reliable, applied, and broadly applicable benefit-cost estimates of economic-development incentives. With
regard to enterprise zones, the benefit-cost studies that do exist suggest
that zones are cost-efficient. Rubin and Armstrong’s (1989) and Rubin’s (1991) evaluations of New Jersey enterprise zones, Rubin,
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Brooks, and Buxbaum’s (1992) study of Indiana zones, and the more
recent study of the Ohio program all indicated positive fiscal gains and
positive benefit-cost ratios (once certain assumptions are met), although all show considerable variation among individual zones.15
Less-formal estimates of the costliness of zones—attempts to calculate
zone costs-per-job—suggested moderate costs, at least compared to
other economic-development tools, although, again, there is evidence
of wide variability among zones (J. Papke 1988, 1989; Rubin and
Wilder 1989).
Unfortunately, all these studies are open to dispute. The results
rely on questionable estimates of the extent to which the existence of
the enterprise zones influences firm investment behavior. In the case of
Rubin’s (1991) important New Jersey study, Rubin was forced to survey firms to estimate the percentage of firms that actually responded to
zone incentives. This estimate was then used to prorate the input-output derived-benefit calculation. For reasons that should become clearer later in this book, such survey-based estimates should be treated with
some scepticism. Moreover, in all these studies, benefits and costs remain local—national consequences of zone incentives are essentially
ignored. Thus it appears to us that, at this point, the most convincing
benefit-cost analyses of economic development are purely hypothetical; they indicate the likely national benefit-cost situation, given a
number of assumptions about economic-development subsidies.
Given the results of these hypothetical benefit-cost models, it
seems that economic-development policy is neither necessarily cost-effective nor cost-ineffective. It all depends on how economic-development policy is managed. Bartik’s (1991) hypothetical cost-benefit
model has been widely quoted in the literature. If Bartik is correct, then
one of the major determinants of policy effectiveness is the extent to
which policy is targeted. He claims that economic-development policy
is more likely to be cost-effective and efficient when it is pursued in
economically depressed areas (measured by the unemployment rate)
and less likely to be efficient when pursued in economically buoyant
areas. One of the major reasons for this is a reservation wage differential between depressed and nondepressed areas. Typically the reservation wage—the lowest wage at which a person is willing to work—will
be lower in more-depressed areas and higher in less-depressed areas.
As a result, moving a $10.00-an-hour job from Omaha (a relatively
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nondepressed low-unemployment area with individuals with a relatively high reservation wage) to Detroit (a relatively depressed high-unemployment area with a relatively low reservation wage), while not creating a net new job from the national perspective, does result in a net
increase in the benefits that the job provides. This is because the economic benefit of the job—$10.00 minus the reservation wage—is
greater in Detroit than it is in Omaha.16 If this is true,
The net national benefits of increasing job growth in one local area
and reducing job growth in other areas thus depends on the relative unemployment rate of the local area that enjoys increased job
growth . . . from a national perspective, we should applaud economic development policies to increase job growth when these
policies are pursued by high-unemployment local areas, and deplore economic development policies to increase jobs when they
are pursued by low-unemployment areas. (Bartik 1991, p. 192)

Bartik has made similar points in more recent papers on economicdevelopment policy. Two inferences are clear. First, economic-development policy need not be zero-sum even when no net new jobs are
created. It all depends on what the job-recipient region (the region receiving the plant) looks like compared to the job-donor region (the region losing the plant). Second, the targeting of economic-development
policy at depressed regions (regions with high unemployment rates) is
appropriate and, all else being equal, is likely to be beneficial to the national economy.
We believe Bartik’s strong defense of targeting to be one of the
very best economic arguments in favor of the enterprise zone strategy.
However, this certainly does not mean that an enterprise zone strategy
focused on poor, high-unemployment, inner-city neighborhoods will
necessarily work or will necessarily be efficient economically. The
overall effectiveness and efficiency of a particular enterprise zone strategy will depend on a number of other factors, including such things as
how zones are designated, how many are allowed, the costliness of the
incentives used, the day-to-day management of the development strategy, whether incentives actually promote new investment, and so on.17
All Bartik’s results allow us to conclude is that targeting may make
economic sense—that a place-based economic-development strategy
may be effective—provided that the right sort of area is targeted.
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Part of the reason that Bartik’s benefit-costs results are positive is
that he is able to rebut that standard labor “mobility” argument. The
traditional economic argument against place-based economic development is that the U.S. labor force is highly mobile. According to
Marston (1985), over a typical four-year period, more than 13 percent
of the population moves between metropolitan areas. The new people
moving into an area are likely to swamp whatever new employment is
created in that area. Thus the vast proportion of new jobs created (or
locating) in an area will be taken by in-migrants. What is the effect of
economic-development policies on the original inhabitants of the area
who were unemployed? Not much! In fact, many have argued that
place-based economic development merely provides incentives for
people to move between areas and that it fails to resolve the employment needs of those who are un- or underemployed. The obvious conclusion is that employment-creating economic-development incentives
will have little or no long-term impact on a local area’s unemployment
and labor-force participation rates. Thus, targeting economic-development policy at enterprise zones will not work because all it will do is attract labor from elsewhere. Economic-development policy needs to be
people-based—if luring firms into an area will not help the economically disadvantaged, then the thing to do is directly improve the skills
and mobility of the economically disadvantaged.
There is evidence that mobility rates are not homogenous across all
demographic groups. Older people, people who have stayed in an area
for longer periods of time, minorities, and women all tend to be less
willing to move than the rest of the population and appear to be ready to
forego significant amounts of income in order not to move. Moreover,
the mobility of the rest of the population is anything but instant. People
need time to hear of the opportunities available in other areas, and they
then need to organize their move to those areas (selling their homes or
arranging sublets, arranging for the transportation of household goods,
arranging schooling for their children in the new area, finding a new
home and so on). The result is that if 100 jobs are relocated to city z, it
is most unlikely that all 100 jobs will be taken immediately by new inmigrants. Indeed, the delays involved in moving to a new labor market
mean that when new jobs are created in city z, city z’s un- and underemployed enjoy temporary but important labor advantages over poten-

40 Chapter 2

tial new worker in-migrants. City z’s un- and underemployed are
where the jobs are! Consequently, they are more likely to become employed. Of course, if this temporary advantage does not translate into a
longer-term labor effect, then the situation would still not be that hopeful for city z’s un- and underemployed. If, say, after six or nine months
the now newly employed locals were replaced by better-qualified labor
streaming into city z, then the delays involved in migrating would only
provide a fleeting advantage to the economically disadvantaged locals.
It appears from the empirical evidence that the job benefits conferred on some of the previously unemployed locals are long lasting.
Bartik (1991) hypothesized that the reason for this was that by working,
the newly employed locals increased their skills and human capital,
thereby making themselves more attractive as employees in the future.18 Clocking in on time and interacting with other employees and
the public build the basic employment skills that employers believe the
economically disadvantaged do not have. In fact, it appears that employment demand shocks have positive long-term employment, laborforce participation, and income effects. If all of this is true, enterprise
zones seem to make a lot of theoretical sense. All else being equal, economically disadvantaged locals derive long-term benefits from local
employment growth. The benefits of growth are not entirely taken by
new in-migrants. Moreover, targeting at economically disadvantaged
areas produces national economic benefits.
But why target enterprise zones? Or more specifically, why designate enterprise zones in older, inner-city neighborhoods? If metropolitan areas serve as single labor markets, why impose on business the extra costs of location in older inner-city neighborhoods? Why not have
enterprise zones in the suburbs and encourage the economically disadvantaged to commute to these suburban employment sites? According
to Dabney (1991), enterprise zones in older inner-city areas will nearly
always be more expensive locations from which to operate than new
greenfield sites. The reasons he offers are quite standard: inner-city locations have poorer infrastructure, are further removed from the noncongested parts of the federal highway system and from airports, have
poorer agglomeration economies, have more crime, and are less accessible to suburban labor. If all this is true—and there is every reason to
believe that it is—it may suggest a policy strategy of targeting economic-development incentives at depressed cities or metropolitan areas, but
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putting the enterprise zones in the most competitive part of those cities,
probably the suburbs. Government could then be seen as having three
separate roles: 1) making sure that these suburban areas are truly competitive for new investment; 2) developing policy instruments that encourage the economically disadvantaged to commute to the new jobs in
the suburbs or to move their residences closer to these jobs; and 3) creating policy instruments that encourage business to employ the economically disadvantaged.
In many ways, this sort of criticism takes us full circle. It is to ask
why those with fewer local employment opportunities do not commute
to places with more opportunities. And it is to ask: If there is some hindrance to commuting to or hiring at these suburban work sites, why not
deal with these problems directly (by increasing the accessibility of, or
by removing skill or even racial barriers to, employment) rather than
trying to resolve them only indirectly (by attempting to create jobs in
inner cities)?
Unfortunately there are no clear answers to these questions. The
most prominent theory of why un- or underemployed inner-city residents do not commute to buoyant suburban labor markets is the “spatial
mismatch hypothesis.” First developed by Kain (1968),19 the hypothesis makes some fairly straightforward claims about urban labor and
housing markets. Since the 1910s, but particularly after World War II,
industry has been moving from inner-city locations to suburban greenfield sites. The reasons for this range from the development of the
truck (making access to ports and railroad sidings less important), to
the use of the modern land-consuming single-story factory, to the building of the interstate highway system (benefitting suburban sites served
by the highway system), to the decentralization of labor to the suburbs,
to the desire to escape unionized and minority workers (traditionally
located in inner-city areas). Decentralization meant that inner-city areas lost employment opportunities. Moreover, the middle-class moved
out from these areas, with the result that the inner cities developed concentrated populations of economically disadvantaged people, particularly racial minorities. Such individuals found working at suburban
work sites difficult. Public transit was built, in the United States as
elsewhere, on the basis of moving workers downtown. Serving scattered suburban work sites from inner-city origins (so-called reverse
commuting) has proved difficult and costly to implement largely be-
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cause of the low-density nature of suburban work sites. Moreover, the
economically disadvantaged inner-city residents could not easily move
to suburban homes because of the cost of those homes and because of
long-standing racial discrimination in U.S. housing markets. Thus,
economically disadvantaged inner-city residents are effectively cut off
from buoyant suburban job markets. The results are lower levels of labor- force participation and higher levels of unemployment in innercity neighborhoods. This suggests that insofar as enterprise zones direct jobs to the economically disadvantaged inner city, they may help
overcome some of the constraints to employment experienced by innercity residents. We believe that this sort of argument is the crux of the
justification for traditional enterprise zones.
The problem with this argument is that it is not clear to what extent
the spatial mismatch hypothesis explains the underemployment of minority inner-city residents. A number of studies have shown that racial
discrimination in job markets and lack of skills (the so-called skills
mismatch) are much more important considerations than accessibility—that “race not space” is the cause of un- or underemployment of the
inner-city minority population. And even if it can be shown that
space—that is, accessibility—is an important problem, it is still not
clear that creating jobs in inner-city areas is the appropriate policy strategy. Transportation planners have for years been working on ways to
make reverse commuting more efficient. Moreover, the federal government has engaged in various experiments involving moving the residents of some disadvantaged inner-city neighborhoods to the suburbs.
The earliest of these was the so-called Gautreaux experiment in Chicago (Rosenbaum et al. 1991; Rosenbaum 1996). Behind this view is the
belief that economic-development policy should be people based not
place based—that it makes little sense to lure businesses to places they
would rather not be, while it makes a lot of sense to expand the economic opportunities available to people. If it is indeed possible to provide the inner-city minority population with full access—whatever this
means—to suburban employment opportunities, then why bother creating expensive inner-city jobs?
Defenders of enterprise zones have no easy answers to this question. Yes, even in those spatial mismatch studies which show that race
and skill level are the predominant causes of inner-city underemployment, accessibility to employment remains a non-negligible explanatory factor of underemployment. Yes, the Gautreaux experiment has had
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its problems (the children of those who were moved to the suburbs saw
a large improvement in their long-term economic well-being but not
their parents), and, because of political opposition, it has been very difficult to implement more widely.20 Yes, public transit-based reverse
commuting has not been a success and is likely always to be more expensive to operate than traditional transit. Yes, emptying out the inner
city of employable adults is likely to worsen the situation of those left
behind and further deprive inner-city neighborhoods of role models of
employed adults actively participating in traditional labor markets.
But it is not hard to think of policy alternatives that address these issues while still not relying on inner-city enterprise zones. With
enough federal input and funding, reverse commuting may become viable. Gautreaux-type programs could be designed so as to overcome
the objections of suburbanites and the reservations of inner-city residents. And so on. The point to make in favor of enterprise zones is
that these possibilities require thought experiments. Successful people-based alternatives to enterprise zones (a place-based policy mechanism) do not exist outside of a few experiments. This is not to say
that in the long run people-based strategies would not be better; we believe that the economics of the case suggest they would. But in the
meantime taking jobs to people is one of the few politically feasible
strategies available.
The upshot is that spatial targeting in the form of enterprise
zones—where the zones are created in depressed inner-city neighborhoods—may be an appropriate economic-development strategy. This
strategy is justified to the extent these two propositions are true: 1) the
spatial mismatch hypothesis explains a fair amount of the underemployment of inner-city residents, and 2) creating jobs locally is a more
viable strategy than expanding the journey-to-work mobility or access
to suburban housing of inner-city residents. Obviously, this is not a
strong defense of the enterprise zone strategy since it recognizes that
many of the arguments made in favor of enterprise zones are partial or
flawed, and that, at best, the enterprise zone strategy should be used to
complement other employment strategies. One final point needs to be
made here. We have been assuming that actual enterprise zones conform to this rationale—that they are in depressed neighborhoods in inner cities, in other words, that they are “targeted.” In fact, as we indicated earlier, in this book we focus on those states that do target their
enterprise zones.21
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ENTERPRISE ZONES AND GROWTH:
ARE ZONES EFFECTIVE?
As we argued in Chapter 1, the incentives provided in enterprise
zones are meant to increase the profitability of investing in a zone. This
should tilt the spatial factor surface in favor of enterprise zones—provided that the incentives offered in the zones are not capitalized into
land prices22—making them more desirable for investment and thus
more likely to grow. Do enterprise zones actually result in new local
economic growth?
As indicated earlier, a number of reviews of the enterprise zone literature have been conducted in recent years (Rubin and Richards 1992;
L. Papke 1993; Wilder and Rubin 1996); we will not repeat the details
of that work here. Instead, we will focus our attention on what appear
to be the most important results and on those issues we address in this
book. Studies of the effects of enterprise zones on investment or job
growth fall into three categories. First, there are studies of one or a few
enterprise zones, where measures of total gross or net employment
growth in the zone since zone designation are compared either to
growth rates in the zone area prior to designation or to growth rates during the same period of time in the metropolitan area as a whole or in a
comparable, but non-zone, area.
Dabney (1991) looked at the effect of enterprise zone incentives on
business location decisions, employing this growth-rate comparison
approach. He argued that enterprise zone incentives were unlikely to
make up for the significant locational disadvantages presented by inner-city enterprise zones. He argued that on most location factors—
costs of transporting materials, commuting costs, access to airports, infrastructure, and building functionality—enterprise zones did poorly.
Dabney then used analysis-of-variance procedures to determine
whether zone designation had an impact on rates of change in the number of business establishments. The analysis covered eight enterprise
zones in eight different states during three years prior and three years
after zone designation. He found that there was no significant difference in the rate of growth in the zones versus the rest of the zone city.
Rubin and Wilder (1989) studied the Evansville, Indiana, zone, established in 1983. During its first three years, there was a net increase
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in employment of 1,878. Using a shift-share analysis to decompose the
total job growth, Rubin and Wilder estimated that 325 of these jobs
would have occurred if the enterprise zone had grown just at the average rate of growth for the entire metro area, and another 123 jobs could
be attributed to the fact that the zone’s industrial composition in 1983
would have produced above-average growth. The remaining 1,430
jobs (76 percent of the total) are attributed to the comparative advantage of the zone.
Prior to designation, the Evansville zone area grew more slowly
than the metro area, yet it grew at more than five times the rate of the
metro area in the first three years after designation. This dramatic
change certainly begs for an explanation. Rubin and Wilder’s conclusion that a large part of this shift can be attributed to zone designation is
plausible, but, as they admit, cannot be established with any certainty
using their method. Areas do sometimes reverse their fortunes after an
extended period of decline; economic theory would tell us that capital
may return to an area when that decline finally reduces factor costs
(land and labor) to the point that the area is once again competitive.
The zone may simply have arrived at a fortuitous moment.
The second approach to the study of enterprise zone effects involves the study of either one or a few zones, in which measures of investment or job growth (gross or net) are supplemented by questionnaires administered to zone firms to determine the extent to which zone
incentives were perceived as important or decisive factors in their investment decisions. This literature has been extensively reviewed elsewhere (Wilder and Rubin 1996; Rubin and Richards 1992), and the
conclusions are not surprising: other factors are consistently rated more
important than zone incentives, but incentives may nonetheless make a
difference at the margin, when other factors, such as access and labor
costs, are equal. This, of course, begs the question that has been pursued by researchers for the past 20 years: just how large is the marginal
effect of a tax or incentive difference?
Finally, there are studies using econometric methods to explain differences in zone growth rates, cross-sectionally or over time. Erickson
and Friedman (1990b) studied 357 enterprise zones in 17 states. Average employment in these zones at time of designation was 4,776, and
subsequent gross job growth averaged 232 jobs (about 5 percent) per
year. These authors conducted a regression analysis to explain varia-
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tion in investment growth rates and job growth rates across a subset of
these zones. In their results, the number of zone incentives was positively and significantly related to both investment growth and gross job
growth in models that included a variety of policy-related variables. In
more complete regression models that also included other nonpolicy
variables thought to affect zone growth rates, the incentive variable remained positive but was not statistically significant. Unfortunately,
program counting is a very unsatisfactory method of measuring the value of an incentive package to a firm (Fisher and Peters 1997a). In addition, as Rubin and Wilder (1989) noted, the job data are imperfect since
they come from zone coordinators (who have an incentive to exaggerate) and since the figures do not net out job losses. There are significant
problems, in other words, with both the explanatory and the dependent
variables.
In an interesting variation on the econometric approach, L. Papke
(1994) studied the effects of enterprise zone incentives in Indiana on inventories, machinery and equipment purchases, and unemployment
claims filed. This approach focuses on the presumed ultimate goal of
enterprise zone incentives—the growth in investment and the reduction
in unemployment. Papke found that enterprise zone designation reduced unemployment claims filed at the area office by about 19 percent
to 25 percent, depending on the specification of the model. These are
surprisingly large effects which appear to be permanent, as well.
The Indiana incentives consist of a jobs tax credit, the exemption of
inventories from property taxation, and the exemption of profits attributable to new zone investment from the state income tax. The jobs
credit is typical of credits provided elsewhere; it is equal to 10 percent
of wages, but it has a ceiling of $1,500 per employee.23 The capital incentive is peculiar, however. In most other states, enterprise zone capital incentives are directed at plant and equipment; moreover, most
states exempt inventories from property taxation everywhere, thus rendering an inventory exemption in enterprise zones (as in Indiana) needless.24 Thus, Papke’s study provides a good test of the effects of jobs
credits on unemployment,25 but does not tell us much about the effects
of more typical capital incentives, most of which clearly lower the price
of capital goods and can be expected to have much larger substitution
effects than an inventory exemption and, hence, to have potentially
negative effects on employment.
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In related research, Papke (1993) used census block-group data to
compare the fortunes of zone residents between 1980 and 1990 with the
fortunes of residents of a randomly selected set of non-zone urban census tracts in Indiana during the same period. Here she was able to identify the rates of unemployment of the actual zone population (or at least
a close approximation) rather than for an entire unemployment claims
office. Unemployment rates of zone residents did fall during the 1980s
more than unemployment rates of non-zone areas did, but the difference was small. This suggests that new zone employment produces labor market benefits—measured by the reduction in areawide unemployment rates—but that much of the benefit accrues to non-zone
residents, directly or indirectly. Population in zone areas declined more
than in non-zones, and per capita incomes declined in zone areas but
rose in non-zone areas. Papke concludes that enterprise zones apparently have not made zone residents appreciably better off.
Unfortunately, Boarnet and Bogart (1996), using methods similar
to Papke’s, found no evidence that the New Jersey enterprise zone program had a positive effect on local employment, employment in various sectors, or property values. They concluded that the New Jersey
program was ineffective at improving the economic conditions around
the zones. As the authors noted, their findings may have had as much to
do with the nature of the New Jersey program compared to the Indiana
program as with the reproducibility of Papke’s findings.26 Moreover,
Greenbaum (1998), in a methodologically and empirically careful
study, examined the impact of state enterprise zones on both business
and housing market outcomes in six major states. The analysis was undertaken at the ZIP-code level, in part using the same SSEL data source
(though not the same data) we use later in this book. Greenbaum found
that while enterprise zones may create new business activity, these
gains tend to be offset by shrinking business establishments in zones.
The result is that overall zones have little impact on business outcomes.
He found that zones have no impact on overall employment growth
(but some impact on employment growth among new establishments).
Two other recent papers are important to mention. Engberg and Greenbaum (1999) found no positive impact on housing market, income, or
employment outcomes in six states. Bondonio and Engberg (2000)—
using estimates of the monetary value of incentives as well as specific
program features—found that neither the value of incentives nor pro-
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gram features matter, and that the zero impact on employment growth
was robust to a wide range of sensitivity analyses.
In Chapter 7 we deal with some technical aspects of the econometric literature in greater detail. Here, however, all we feel able to conclude is that—aside from the last few studies mentioned27—there has
been very little in the way of rigorous examination of the relationship
between enterprise zones and growth. And while there is a large volume of work on the more general issues of the impact of state and local
taxes and incentives on growth, even that research is not conclusive.
Indeed, we still do not know if—even less, to what extent—state and
local taxes in general affect growth. The problem with enterprise zones
is much worse, in part because the methodological problems of measurement are much greater and data are much more difficult to come by.
Given the paucity of enterprise zone studies, it seems highly unlikely
that a broad research consensus on the impact of enterprise zones on
growth will be possible for some time to come. The conclusions of the
extant literature do point in quite contrary directions; however, the vast
majority of the recent literature suggest that enterprise zones have little
or no positive impact on growth.

CONCLUSIONS
Although there have been promoters of enterprise zones in both the
Congress and the administration since the idea first took off, real federal involvement came late. This provided room for states to experiment
with zones, resulting in considerable variation among states. Thus, we
should expect some zones to work better than others. While many of
the arguments initially used to justify enterprise zones—in particular,
that they would become centers of entrepreneurship—seem decidedly
flawed a quarter of a century later, a consensus has developed that targeting economic-development policy at depressed, high-unemployment neighborhoods is an “appropriate” and “good” state strategy.28
Underlying this consensus are a number of theories about job search
and commuting behavior and the geography of new investment, many
of which we have discussed in this chapter. Probably the most important of the theories is the spatial mismatch hypothesis—the claim that,
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particularly minority, inner-city residents are spatially separated from
suburban job opportunities. Enterprise zones geographically located in
depressed inner-city neighborhoods can then be justified as a way of
overcoming the spatial mismatch for the underemployed urban poor.
As we indicated earlier in this chapter, there is reason to be skeptical
that spatial mismatch is the (main) cause of underemployment among
inner-city minorities. And even if it were, it is unclear that enterprise
zones are the best policy strategy. We return to these issues in Chapters 8 and 9. It is also unclear whether enterprise zones work—whether
they have any discernible influence on business location decisions and
thus on local employment. We return to this topic in Chapter 7. However, before we can deal with these broader issues we need a better understanding of the size and importance of enterprise zone incentives, the
likelihood that zone incentives will encourage the use of labor, and the
cost to government of zone incentives. It is to the first of these issues
that the next chapter turns.

Notes
1. Of these zones, 2,083 were in just two states—Arkansas and Louisiana—and another 227 were in Ohio. At the other extreme, seven states had three or fewer
zones. See Wilder and Rubin (1996).
2. There are also four “enhanced enterprise communities” in large cities, each eligible for $25 million in aid.
3. It leaves out many of the other goals of enterprise zones already mentioned, such
as neighborhood revitalization and community development.
4. See, for instance, his Enterprise Zones: Greenlining the Inner Cities, 1981.
5. In fact, meaningful enterprise zone legislation passed only during the Clinton administration, even though Jack Kemp had been Secretary of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) during the Bush presidency.
6. Early versions of the federal enterprise zone legislation would have provided tax
credits to investors who supplied capital to enterprise zone firms, which should
have had the effect of lowering the cost of capital for entrepreneurs. Moreover, a
jobs tax credit would have reduced the cost of labor, an important operating expense for start-ups.
7. Wilder and Rubin (1996) argued that there were five main academic or policy objections to enterprise zones. These arguments included 1) that incentives had little or no influence on business investment and location decisions; 2) that the incentives offered in enterprise zones would tend to benefit larger capital-intensive
firms and not the smaller labor-intensive firms which are more likely to create
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8.

9.

10.

11.

12.
13.

14.

15.

16.

new employment; 3) that zones would result in a worrying increase in the tax burden on non-zone businesses and residents; 4) that enterprise zones would result in
capital shifts into zones but not in new capital formation; and 5) that enterprise
zones would draw resources away from more direct ways of helping to solve urban problems. See variously Birdsong (1989), Clarke (1982), Estes and Hammond (1992), Glickman (1984), Goldsmith (1982), Hawkins (1984), Humberger
(1981), Jacobs and Wasylenko (1981), Ladd (1994), Levitan and Miller (1992),
Massey (1982), Mier (1982), Mounts (1981), Pierce, Hagstrom, and Steinbach
(1979), Rubin and Zorn (1985), Vaughn (1979), and Walton (1982). To these criticisms we would add those of the American Planning Association, which argued
that since land-use regulation did not cause blight, the relaxation of land-use controls was unlikely to remove blight. It should be clear that many of these objections are contradictory to one another.
It is worth noting here that some researchers place considerable importance on the
community-development component of zones, asserting that the more successful
zones are those that are better managed and that involve close ties between the
public and private sectors (Rubin and Richards 1992).
In Ohio, only a portion of state zones are truly targeted. We included only targeted zones in our national analysis—that is, zones that qualified due to economic
distress.
Here the effective tax rate (sometimes we call this the “tax burden”) is defined as
the difference between the present value of the cash flow from a new plant investment after all federal, state, and local income, sales, and property taxes, and the
present value of new plant cash flow in the absence of any taxes levied by the
state and locality in which the plant is located, divided by the present value of before-tax income attributable to the new plant. The calculation of tax rates is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
Economic-development policy is potentially negative-sum since it induces businesses to locate in places where they would otherwise not want to locate. Government interference in location decisions (through the tax code and incentives)
results in firms’ making location decisions which are inefficient from the viewpoint of the national economy.
See Fisher and Peters (1998). Bartik (1991) covered these issues in some detail.
This refers to the average value-to-firm/cost-to-government value for a particular
tax incentive. However, at the margin (in other words, for a particular unit modification or extension of a tax credit program) it is quite possible to generate a positive value-to-firm/cost-to-government ratio.
It is also true that costs in the benefit-cost calculation will be broader than in the
value-to-firm/cost-to-government calculation and will include the other costs of
servicing the new plant and its employees.
See Iannone (1999) for the Ohio study. Both the New Jersey and Indiana studies
relied on estimates from state input-output models for the benefit-cost calculations.
The evidence for these claims is fairly limited. See Fisher and Peters (1998).
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17. Indirectly, Bartik’s benefit-cost model does take these into account. See Wilder
and Rubin (1996) for a review of the literature on what makes enterprise zones effective. Also see Elling and Sheldon (1991).
18. This is sometimes referred to as the hysteresis hypothesis. For a more complete
treatment see Phelps (1972), but see Bartik (1991, pp. 76–78) for a treatment in
this context.
19. See also a more recent restatement and evaluation by Kain (1992).
20. See, for instance, Briggs (1997) and Moberg (1995).
21. Where states have both targeted and essentially untargeted zones, we focus on
those zones which are targeted.
22. In theory, locational advantages should be capitalized into the prices of immobile
resources, which obviously means land prices. In central cities with a partly captive labor force, however, they should also be capitalized into wages to some extent. Industrial buildings are often not very mobile or adaptable either. Understood this way, the spatial mismatch hypothesis is the thesis that the locational
disadvantages of central cities are “capitalized” into lower wages because labor is
not perfectly mobile. Furthermore, there is an implied argument that wages cannot sink low enough to restore competitiveness, so inner cities remain in a disequilibrium depression. To conclude that capitalization will occur fully and will
result in incentives having no effect seems to us erroneous, however. This would
be true only if the effects were equal for all potential land uses, if markets were
close to being perfectly competitive, and if all participants had nearly perfect information. None of these conditions is likely to hold. Our results (Fisher and Peters 1998 and Chapter 3 in this book) show widely varying tax rates and incentive
values by industry in any given zone. Which of the tax rates is capitalized into
land prices, assuming that buyers and sellers even know with much accuracy
what those rates are? If it is the highest incentive rate or lowest tax rate, because
land goes to the highest bidder, does this mean that other industries will no longer
find it profitable to locate there because the sectoral bias of taxes and incentives
has rendered land prices too high for any but the one favored sector? If this does
not occur (and the wide range of sectors still moving into zones suggests that it
does not), then even if land prices rise by some increment as a result of incentives,
some sectors will still experience a net gain.
23. Fisher and Peters (1998) found that the Indiana jobs credit was worth a little less
than the average jobs credit among 15 states with such credits; thus the size of the
employment effects found by Papke cannot be attributed to an unusually generous
jobs credit.
24. Among the 24 most industrialized states, only two fully tax inventories. Another
four tax inventories in part or at a lower rate. The remaining 18 exempt inventories.
25. Given the way the data were gathered, though, we do not know how much of the
reduction in unemployment occurred among zone residents rather than persons
elsewhere in the labor market. Papke also found important effects on zone inventories, but again it is possible her results are a consequence of the way in which
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inventory data were gathered. Firms may have an incentive to underestimate
their inventories before—but not after—the provision of an inventory exemption.
26. But Papke (2000) has tried to reproduce her earlier results, using a more historically complete data set.
27. Sheldon and Elling (1989), which we have not reviewed in this section, should
probably also be included in this group. In addition, we ignore analytical work
using alternative, nonstandard approaches such as shift-share analysis—for example, Rubin and Wilder (1989) and Dowall, Beyeler, and Wong (1994)—since
the methodology used there precludes analysis of the “causal” relationship between zones and growth.
28. See Anderson and Wassmer (2000) for a recent statement of this position.

3
How Valuable Are Zone
Incentives to Firms?
Any attempt to estimate the influence of economic-development
incentives on firms’ behavior must begin with an assessment of the value of those incentives to the firms. In this study we employ a computer
simulation model, TAIMez, to measure how the actual incentives in
place in each of the enterprise zones in our study would improve a
firm’s rate of return on an investment in a new manufacturing facility in
that zone. We begin the chapter with a brief description of how that
model works; a more technical discussion is presented in Appendix A.
By measuring the effect of taxes and incentives on a firm’s bottom
line, we are able to assess quantitatively the trends in economic-development policy in the 1990s and the differences among states and cities.
Did incentive competition, which became a significant part of economic-development policy at the state and local level in the 1970s, continue
through the 1990s? The answer is yes; among the 20 prominent manufacturing states that are included in TAIMez, the trend in the period
1990–1998 was overwhelmingly to reduce basic taxes on corporations
and to enact or expand both general and targeted incentives for new
business investment.
In the second section of this chapter we describe this trend in some
detail, comparing the value of general incentives to target incentives,
such as those available only within enterprise zones. While targeted incentives became more common during this period, there has been a
weakening of the targeting effect in many of the states.
In the third section of this chapter we focus on the value of incentives in the 75 enterprise zone cities that are the major focus of this
study. The trends in these cities during the period 1990–1994 mirrored
the trends discussed above to a large extent: incentives became more
generous, and nontargeted incentives grew more rapidly than targeted
(enterprise zone) incentives, so that the competitive advantage of zones
was weakened slightly. To put the magnitude of these incentives in perspective, we calculated the wage cut that would provide benefits to the
firm’s bottom line equivalent in value to the tax incentives available.
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We found that the incentive packages were equivalent to a 1.6 percent
to 7.1 percent cut in wages. One would probably not expect cost differentials of this magnitude to have large effects on location decisions.
In addition to the sample of 75 zones in 13 states, we also examine
incentives available in all Ohio cities with populations of 15,000 or
more, with and without enterprise zones. In the fourth section of this
chapter describes the value of general state incentives and enterprise
zone incentives in these Ohio cities.

HOW DOES ONE ACCURATELY MEASURE THE WORTH
OF ENTERPRISE ZONE INCENTIVES?
The TAIMez computer model is an implementation of the hypothetical-firm method. This approach to measuring the effect of taxes on a
firm’s profitability was pioneered by Williams (1967) and the Wisconsin Department of Revenue (1973). The method was extended and substantially improved by Papke and Papke (1984), KPMG Peat Marwick
(1994), and Fisher and Peters (1998), among others. The approach has
been used fairly widely in the past decade’s research on taxes, tax incentives, and even non-tax economic-development incentives.1
In essence, the hypothetical-firm method for measuring the value
of a state’s or city’s taxes or fiscal incentives is based on the process by
which firms make investment decisions. According to traditional location theory, a firm will evaluate alternative sites for new investment on
the basis of the profitability of the marginal investment in each location. Our measure of this effect is the internal rate of return (IRR) or,
alternatively, the long-term increment to cash flow, deriving from the
investment.
The TAIMez model calculates the effective state-local tax rate on
the income generated by new plant investment for a new plant in each
of 16 manufacturing sectors in each of 20 states and in each of the cities
within those states for which local tax data have been collected. We
have modeled the tax systems for these 20 states. The effective tax rate
in a particular state, say Indiana, is calculated by running the TAIMez
model twice. The first run computes the net present value (NPV) of the
incremental after-tax cash flow to the firm as a result of building a new
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plant in Indiana, but assuming that there are no state or local taxes on
the new plant in Indiana. The hypothetical firm has existing operations
in other states and pays state and federal income taxes on the income
generated by the new plant.2 The second run applies the Indiana state
and local tax system to the new plant, including local income, sales,
and property tax rates. The reduction in cash flow produced by Indiana
taxes represents the tax bite. This amount divided by the before-tax income generated by the new plant represents the effective tax rate.
Note that this rate includes the effects of deductibility: the additional Indiana taxes are deductible against federal income and so are
partly offset by lower federal income taxes. Furthermore, Indiana is
one of a few states that allow a firm to deduct income taxes paid to other states, so the model’s calculation of income taxes paid to other states
is deducted from Indiana taxable income. Local property taxes, which
are also deductible against Indiana income, further reduce Indiana income taxes.
The second run can include or exclude the various investment incentives offered in each state and property-tax abatements offered in localities in that state. State income tax incentives typically consist of investment tax credits (a percentage of the cost of buildings or machinery
and equipment or both), jobs credits (a dollar amount per new job),
training credits (a percentage of job-training expenses for new positions), or wage or payroll tax credits (a percentage of wages, or of payroll taxes withheld, for new positions). Tax incentives can also include
income exclusions, where some portion of the income generated by a
new facility in an enterprise zone is excluded from taxable income. Refunds of sales taxes on machinery and equipment or of local property
taxes also exist. Where states permit localities to abate a portion of the
property taxes on new manufacturing facilities or machinery, a typical
abatement schedule for that state (or the typical abatement schedule
employed in a particular city) is included in the model.
The value to the firm of a state and local incentive package, then, is
the amount the package adds to the profitability of a new investment in
that locality. The effect of the incentive package, as indeed the tax
regime more generally, depends on the characteristics of the firm.
Thus, it is important to construct various hypothetical firms, representing the characteristics of a typical firm in various manufacturing industries. Differences in the value of a given incentive are due to differ-
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ences among firms in profitability, in the relative importance of certain
kinds of assets, or in the ratios of jobs to assets. All else being equal,
one would expect machinery-intensive firms to respond more vigorously to property-tax exemptions or abatements for machinery and equipment, profitable firms to reductions in the rate of income taxation, energy-intensive firms to exemptions of sales tax on fuel and electricity, and
so on. The characteristics of the 16 manufacturing sectors included in
our model are described in Appendix A.
A multiyear analysis is essential. Taxes and incentives affect the
profitability of new investment not just in the initial investment year,
but for many years thereafter. Credits sometimes must be used in the
first year, but in other instances can be carried forward for up to 20
years. Property-tax abatements often provide the largest benefit the
first year, but may continue at some level for 10 years or more.
TAIMez employs a 20-year horizon, which is probably sufficient to
capture all the significant differences in state policy. We assume, in
other words, that the firm, in making a decision regarding investment
in a new plant, evaluates the project over a 20-year period. This may
in fact be longer than the typical firm actually employs. However,
with a 10 percent discount rate, the project returns in later years are
heavily discounted.

INCENTIVE COMPETITION IN THE 1990s
While this study focuses on incentive competition among enterprise zones during the period 1990–1994, this competition occurred
within a broader context of state competition that has been going on for
at least two decades and that continues unabated. Before examining the
value of enterprise zone incentives in the 75 cities sampled for this
study, we consider trends in the nature and magnitude of business tax
incentives of all kinds. We have used the TAIMez model to measure the
value of incentives and the effective tax rates on income from new
plant investment in 20 states from 1990 to 1998. These 20 states include the 13 states that are the main focus of this study; all are among
the 26 most industrialized states (in terms of manufacturing employment), including the top nine. These 20 states together accounted for
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75 percent of the manufacturing employment in the United States in
1995 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1997).
Table 3.1 shows the kinds of incentives available in each of the 20
states as of 1998. Twelve of the states had investment tax credits (ITCs)
available statewide by 1998; another five offered ITCs only within enterprise zones or the equivalent. Investment tax credits typically allow
firms to deduct from their state corporate income tax liability a credit
equal to some percentage of the cost of new manufacturing facilities
and machinery. Nine states offered a jobs credit statewide; another five
offered jobs credits only in enterprise zones. The jobs credits also allow a credit against income taxes, equal to a dollar amount per new job
created. Five states offered a credit for job-training expenses, and six
allowed a credit for a percentage of wages paid, or payroll or income
taxes withheld, for new jobs. Credits for sales taxes paid on goods purchased for the new plant, or for local property taxes paid on the new
plant, were available in five states, and five states excluded all or a portion of income generated within a zone from corporate taxable income.
Many of these credits became effective after mid 1990, and many
states also reduced corporate taxes across the board between 1990 and
1998. Table 3.2 shows the changes in basic tax systems and incentive
programs that occurred during that eight-year period. Fifteen of the 20
states reduced basic taxes between 1990 and 1998. Most common was
a movement toward greater reliance on the sales factor in state income
tax apportionment formulas; this tends to reduce, often very substantially, the income taxes paid by firms exporting out-of-state. Five states
moved from what was once the standard equal-weighted three-factor
formula to double-weighted sales (50 percent sales, 25 percent each
payroll and property), and—by increasing the sales fraction to 67 percent, 90 percent, or 100 percent—another three states moved closer to
the single-factor formula that has made the income tax system in Iowa
so attractive to manufacturing and other exporting firms. A firm with
substantial facilities and employees in Iowa (a state with a 100 percent
sales fraction), for example, could end up paying no Iowa corporate income taxes if all sales were destined for places outside the state, since
profits would be apportioned to Iowa based on a sales factor equal to
zero.
Fourteen states adopted new general incentive programs or made
existing programs more attractive; eight states adopted new targeted
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Table 3.1 Tax Incentives Available in 20 States, 1998
State
California
Connecticut
Florida
Illinois

Indiana

State incentivesa
ITC, EZ jobs credit, EZ sales-tax
credit
ITC; training credit; EZ income
exemption
ITC; EZ jobs and property-tax
credits
2 ITCs; EZ ITC; EZ jobs credit

Credit for up to 3.1% of new
employee payroll; EZ jobs credit

Iowa
Kentucky

ITC; jobs credit; EZ ITC
ITC; jobs credit; payroll credit;
training credit; EZ jobs credit; EZ
sales-tax exemption for M&E
Massachusetts ITC; Econ. Opportunity Area ITC
Michigan

Credits for corporate & personal
income taxes attributable to new
jobs; EZ exemption for all income
and property taxes
Minnesota
Sales-tax exemption for M&E; very
limited EZ credits
Missouri
ITC & jobs credit; EZ income
exemption; EZ ITC, training &
jobs credits
New York
ITC; EZ ITC and wage tax credit
North Carolina 2 ITCs; jobs credit; training credit
Ohio

ITC; jobs credit; EZ income
exemption, training credit, and
jobs credit
Pennsylvania Jobs credit; wages credit; EZ ITC
South Carolina Jobs credits; withholding tax credit;
Economic Impact Zone ITC
Tennessee
ITC; jobs credit

Local incentives
Abatements not
allowed
Abatements allowed
Abatements little used
Abatements allowed
but little used
outside of EZs
Abatements allowed
in Economic Revitalization Areas
Abatements allowed
Property-tax rate
reduction allowed
Abatements not
allowed
Abatements allowed

Abatements not
allowed
Abatements allowed

Abatements allowed
Abatements not
allowed
Abatements allowed
in EZs
Abatements allowed
Abatements allowed
Abatements not
allowed
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Table 3.1 (Continued)
State
Texas
Virginia
Wisconsin
a

State incentivesa

Local incentives

EZ property-tax refund; EZ sales-tax Abatements allowed
refund; EZ property deduction
Jobs credit; EZ income exemption;
Very limited
2 EZ ITCs; EZ jobs credit
abatements allowed
EZ ITC, jobs credit, & sales-tax
Abatements not
credit
allowed

EZ = enterprise zone or equivalent; ITC = investment tax credit; M&E = machinery
and equipment.

programs (enterprise zones in Iowa and Michigan) or made existing
programs more generous. Only six states increased any basic tax rates
and in three of these the increases were offset by other tax reductions.
Only three states tightened or scaled back general incentive programs;
another three discontinued their incentive programs but replaced them
with others, typically more generous. Thus, the overall trend has been
overwhelmingly to reduce basic taxes on corporations and to enact or
expand both general and targeted incentives for new business investment.
The importance of these tax changes can best be measured by their
effect on the overall state-local tax rate on new investment. Since enterprise zones are the focus of this study, we have calculated effective
tax rates in each state for two different kinds of locations: one in which
only the general statewide incentives are available, and one in which
the firm qualifies for enterprise zone or other geographically targeted
incentives.
Note that differences in state-local tax rates between 1990 and
1998 do not reflect differences in the average property-tax rate in each
state because of the difficulty of identifying such statewide averages for
1990. Instead, we used the same property-tax rate for each year; this
rate represents our best estimate of the average property-tax rate facing
industry in that state in the most recent year for which data were available, which was generally 1996, 1997, or 1998.3
Table 3.3 shows the effective state-local tax rates on income from a
new manufacturing facility in each of the 20 states in 1990 and 1998.
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Table 3.2 Major Tax and Incentive Changes in 20 States, 1990–1998a
State
California

Changesb

Sales-tax rate increased; apportionment increased to 50%
sales; jobs credit abolished; ITC enacted; sales-tax
exemption for manufacturing M&E
Connecticut
Surcharge on income tax eliminated; tax rate lowered; old
training credit and income exemption replaced with two
ITCs and new training credit
Florida
EZ credits reduced; sales-tax exemption for electricity
enacted
Illinois
Apportionment increased from 50% to 67% sales
Indiana
Payroll credit enacted; apportionment increased to 50% sales
Iowa
ITC and jobs credit enacted; enterprise zone program
initiated; manufacturing M&E exempted from property tax
Kentucky
Sales-tax rate increased; ITC enacted and then expanded;
payroll credit enacted and then reduced; EZ jobs credit
enacted; training credit enacted
Massachusetts ITC credit expanded; Economic Opportunity Area ITC
enacted; apportionment changed to move from 50% to
100% sales over five years
Michigan
Sales-tax rate increased from 4% to 6%; apportionment
increased to 50% sales and later to 90% sales, with
throwback eliminated; statewide credits for corporate and
personal income taxes, and renaissance zones (EZs)
instituted
Minnesota
Sales tax on replacement manufacturing M&E reduced
Missouri
Sales-tax rate reduced; ITC and jobs credits tightened;
training credit eliminated; income tax rate increased;
deduction for federal taxes reduced from 100% to 50%
New York
Tax rate lowered; surcharge phased out; ITC reduced
North Carolina Surtax eliminated; tax rate lowered; jobs credit expanded to
statewide and benefits increased; ITCs and training credit
enacted
Ohio
Property-tax credit ended; jobs credit and ITC enacted
Pennsylvania Apportionment increased to 50% sales; capital stock tax rate
increased and deductions increased; jobs credit enacted
South Carolina Apportionment increased to 50% sales; jobs credit increased;
withholding tax credit enacted; Economic Impact Zone
ITC enacted
Tennessee
Apportionment increased to 50% sales; jobs credit enacted

How Valuable Are Zone Incentives to Firms? 61
Table 3.2 (Continued)
State
Texas

Virginia

Wisconsin
a
b

Changesb
Sales-tax rate increased from 6% to 6.25% but tax on
manufacturing M&E eliminated; tax rate on capital
reduced, tax on income instituted; EZ property tax-refund
enacted
EZ income exemption increased; jobs credit enacted; EZ
ITCs enacted; EZ jobs credit enacted; EZ sales-tax refund
ended
Tax surcharge imposed; EZ program expanded

Changes effective after June 1990 and before July 1998.
EZ = enterprise zone or equivalent; ITC = investment tax credit; M&E = machinery
and equipment.

Tax rates are shown with only the basic tax system included (no investment or jobs incentives), with the tax system plus general incentives
only, and with all incentives available within an enterprise zone or the
like. We also show the percentage reduction in taxes accomplished by
the general incentives, and the further percentage reduction brought
about by enterprise zone incentives (compared to the situation with
general incentives only). All of the tax rates are weighted averages of
the tax rates calculated for each of the 16 manufacturing sectors, where
the weights are the sector shares of 1995 U.S. manufacturing employment.
There is striking variation in state and local tax rates among states,
and striking variation in the magnitude of various kinds of incentives,
as measured by the percentage reduction in tax rate accomplished by
the incentive. In 1990, 8 of the 20 states offered statewide tax incentives that reduced the total state-local tax rate by more than 10 percent.
By 1998, this number had increased to 13 states, with reductions of 20
percent or more in 9 of the 13. Targeted incentives were offered by 14
states in 1990 (and in 11 of the 14 these incentives further reduced tax
rates by more than 10 percent); all but 1 offered such incentives by
1998, and in 11 states targeted incentives provided further reductions of
20 percent or more. The median basic tax rate was reduced from 8.5
percent in 1990 to 7.9 percent in 1998; larger reductions in the median

Table 3.3 Effective State-Local Tax Rate on Income from a New Manufacturing Plant in 20 States, 1990 and 1998a
1990
Effective tax rate (%)

1998
% reduction in rate

Effective tax rate (%)

% reduction in rate

% change in effective
tax rate 1990–1998

State

With
With
With
After
With
general & Due to
Due to After
With
general & Due to
Due to After
With
general &
basic general
targeted
general
targeted basic general
targeted
general
targeted basic general
targeted
taxes incentives incentives incentives incentives taxes incentives incentives incentives incentives taxes incentives incentives

Calif.
Conn.
Fla.
Iowa
Ill.
Ind.
Ky.
Mass.
Mich.
Minn.
Miss.
N.C.
N.Y.
Ohio
Pa.
S.C.
Tenn.

9.3
9.5
8.0
5.3
5.9
13.8
7.7
7.8
10.0
9.2
8.8
7.1
6.3
10.6
8.9
8.9
8.1

9.3
9.5
8.0
4.0
5.5
13.8
6.7
7.4
8.0
7.9
6.0
6.0
3.8
10.5
8.2
5.5
7.9

8.7
6.1
6.4
4.0
4.4
8.9
–3.0
7.4
8.0
7.9
5.3
5.9
3.4
7.6
6.5
5.5
7.9

0.3
0.0
0.0
24.2
6.5
0.0
12.4
6.2
20.8
14.2
32.6
15.3
39.6
0.9
7.8
37.7
2.7

6.8
36.3
19.8
0.0
20.0
35.6
144.8
0.0
0.0
0.0
11.2
1.8
9.5
27.8
20.3
0.0
0.0

9.0
8.1
7.6
2.9
5.5
13.6
8.0
7.1
7.5
8.1
9.3
7.0
6.1
10.0
9.3
8.4
7.8

8.0
7.2
7.6
2.0
5.1
10.8
4.5
6.0
5.4
7.6
6.5
5.9
3.4
7.8
7.3
0.8
7.1

7.1
4.5
6.1
2.0
4.0
5.9
0.3
5.2
0.6
7.6
5.4
5.8
2.6
5.1
6.3
0.1
7.1

11.1
11.0
0.0
28.6
6.9
20.0
44.0
14.6
28.0
5.7
30.3
15.3
44.8
22.3
21.0
90.3
9.0

10.9
37.9
19.4
2.0
21.4
45.5
93.2
13.1
88.4
0.0
17.5
1.1
22.1
33.7
14.5
83.9
0.6

–4.0
–15.1
–5.7
–46.4
–6.2
–2.0
3.6
–10.1
–25.4
–12.0
5.8
–2.2
–2.4
–5.5
4.2
–5.8
–4.0

–14.5
–24.4
–5.7
–49.5
–6.6
–21.6
–33.7
–18.2
–32.1
–3.4
9.3
–2.1
–10.8
–25.9
–10.7
–85.3
–10.2

–18.2
–26.4
–5.2
–50.5
–8.3
–33.7
nmb
–28.8
–92.1
–3.4
1.5
–1.3
–23.3
–31.9
–4.2
–97.6
–10.7

Tex.
Va.
Wis.
Median
a

b
c

11.4
7.1
6.0

10.6
7.1
6.0

8.9
6.2
4.0

6.9
0.0
0.0

16.3
12.1
32.5

10.4
7.1
6.1

9.6
7.0
6.1

7.7
4.5
4.0

7.3
1.6
0.0

20.1
35.6
33.5

–8.7
0.0
1.6

–9.1
–1.6
1.6c

–13.2
–27.9
–0.0c

8.5

7.6

6.3

6.7

11.6

7.9

6.7

5.2

14.9

20.8

–4.8

–10.8

–18.2

Effective tax rate is the reduction in the net present value (NPV) of the cash flow from a new plant due to state and local income, sales, and property taxes in the new plant state, divided by the NPV of the pre-tax income generated by the plant. Pre-tax income is measured before all federal,
state, and local taxes; NPV is measured over 20 years. The reduction in cash flow is calculated by comparing project cash flow after actual taxes
and incentives in the new plant state and after federal and other state taxes, with cash flow assuming the same plant location but with only federal
taxes and taxes in other states. The tax rates shown are weighted averages of the tax rates calculated for firms representative of 16 two-digit SIC
code sectors, where the weights are the sector shares of 1995 U.S. manufacturing employment.
nm = not meaningful (because earlier tax rate was negative).
Significant at the 5% level.
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effective tax rate occurred when general incentives were included
(from 7.6 percent to 6.7 percent) and when targeted incentives were
added (from 6.3 percent to 5.2 percent). Both of the latter reductions
are significant at the 5 percent level.
Has there been any convergence among these 20 states in terms of
their tax rates on new investment, and what role have incentives played
in reducing or increasing variability among states? In 1990, both general and targeted incentives actually increased the variability in tax
rates among these 20 states, as measured by the variance in rates. In
other words—and contrary to the claims of others (Eisinger 1988)—incentives were not by and large offsetting unusually high basic tax rates
but were in fact reducing tax rates that were already below average. By
1998, the variability in basic tax rates among states had increased (although this increase was not statistically significant), but incentives no
longer increased this variability. Thus, tax rate and incentive competition continued through the 1990s with no indication that this was producing convergence; the process resembled a game of leapfrog, with no
state apparently content to be merely average.
Another way of examining the value of incentives to firms is to calculate the dollar value per job created. This is typically the way incentive package deals are reported in the press. This measure makes comparisons among industrial sectors more meaningful, since our assumed
plant sizes vary across sectors. TAIMez calculates the present value of
the increased cash flow produced by a given set of incentives over a 20year period; this incentive value can then be divided by the number of
employees in the new facility.
Table 3.4 shows the value of incentive packages per new job, averaged across the 16 industrial sectors as before. In half the states, general incentives were significantly increased (by $468 or more per job) between 1990 and 1998. In another eight states, general incentives were
unchanged or changed only slightly (less than $100 per job in either direction). In only two states do we show a substantial reduction in incentives; and in both cases this is deceptive, being a matter of a tax rebate becoming less valuable because the underlying tax was reduced or
eliminated.4
In 8 of the 20 states, targeted incentives were expanded between
1990 and 1998 by $440 per job or more, measured as the additional cash
flow generated by targeted incentives, over and above the value of the
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generally available incentives. This was led by Michigan’s extremely
generous Renaissance Zone program, Massachusetts’s new Economic
Opportunity Area ITC, significant expansions of several zone credits in
Virginia, and South Carolina’s Economic Impact Zone ITC.5 In another
six states, there were very modest expansions ($113 per job or less) or no
change at all.6 In four states, there was a substantial reduction in the value of targeted incentives, and in another two, modest reductions.
The reductions in targeted incentives were most notable in Kentucky, where the very generous rural job credit was cut by about onethird and where the additional value of this rural targeted program was
diminished by enactment of an urban counterpart (which we model as a
general incentive because it applies in every county that does not qualify for the special rural tax break). Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and
Ohio did not reduce enterprise zone incentives but did institute significant statewide investment and training credits. When states leave targeted programs unchanged but enact or expand general statewide incentives, they diminish the competitive advantage of enterprise zones,
rural counties, or the like. This is because incentives are not usually
strictly additive; the new statewide incentive may simply be a less generous version of the targeted one (so that a 10 percent EZ ITC, for example, then operates like a 6 percent add-on to a 4 percent statewide
ITC) or because total credits cannot exceed state tax liability, so that the
firm is unable to fully use the targeted credits on top of the new
statewide credits. Our measure of the value of targeted incentives in
Table 3.4, it must be remembered, measures the additional advantage
the state has conferred on certain geographic areas.
What appear to have occurred in these 20 states in the 1990s are
two contradictory trends: 1) some states have embarked on new enterprise zone programs, or increased the competitive advantage of existing zones or other targeted areas;7 2) other states have weakened the
advantage of geographically targeted areas by reducing targeted incentives or, more commonly, by expanding nontargeted incentives. Perhaps more importantly, the trend in many states with long-standing enterprise zone programs (or the equivalent) has been to increase the
maximum number of such zones allowed. This further weakens the targeting effect of zone programs, as a larger and larger portion of the
state falls under the “targeted” program. Among 14 major manufacturing states with enterprise zone programs as of 1992, zone proliferation

Value of incentives per job, 1990

State
Calif.
Conn.
Fla.
Iowa
Ill.
Ind.
Ky.
Mass.
Mich.
Minn.
Mo.
N.C.
N.Y.
Ohio
Pa.
S.C.
Tenn.

Value of incentives per job, 1998

Additional
General plus value of
General
targeted
targeted
General
incentives incentives incentives incentives
37
0
0
2,055
661
0
1,654
842
3,566
2,249
4,760
1,910
4,148
164
1,059
5,571
378

1,393
5,785
2,294
2,055
2,461
8,872
15,580
842
3,566
2,249
5,998
2,069
4,533
5,361
3,990
5,571
378

1,356
5,785
2,294
0
1,800
8,872
13,926
0
0
0
1,238
159
384
5,197
2,931
0
0

1,731
1,479
0
1,284
659
3,485
5,640
1,725
3,582
799
4,683
1,897
4,616
3,417
3,117
11,487
1,166

Change in value 1990–1998

General Additional
plus
value of
targeted
targeted
General
incentives incentives incentives
3,528
6,027
2,188
1,319
2,459
12,413
11,575
3,110
10,553
799
6,748
1,940
5,632
8,103
5,092
12,391
1,281

1,797
4,549
2,188
36
1,801
8,928
5,936
1,385
6,971
0
2,065
43
1,015
4,686
1,975
904
115

1,694
1,479
0
–772
–2
3,485
3,986
882
16
–1,450
–77
–13
468
3,253
2,058
5,915
789

General Additional
plus
value of
targeted
targeted
incentives incentives
2,135
242
–106
–736
–2
3,541
–4,004
2,268
6,987
–1,450
750
–129
1,099
2,742
1,103
6,820
903

441
–1,237
–106
36
1
56
–7,990
1,385
6,971
0
827
–116
631
–510
–956
904
115
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Table 3.4 The Value per Job of Incentives to Manufacturing Firms in 20 States, 1990 and 1998 (in dollars)

Tex.
Va.
Wis.

1,350
0
0

4,026
1,045
3,151

2,676
1,045
3,151

1,292
98
0

4,538
3,809
3,263

3,246
3,710
3,263

–59
98
0

511
2,763
113

570
2,665
113

Median
Mean

951
1,520

3,358
4,061

1,297
2,541

1,728
2,608

4,173
5,338

2,020
2,731

283
1,087

827
1,278

84
190
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NOTE: Figures represent the present value of the increased cash flow over 20 years accruing to the firm because of the package of tax incentives available in that state for a new manufacturing facility. All figures are weighted averages of the values for the 16 manufacturing
sectors modeled. The table shows how 1992 manufacturing firms would have fared under 1990 versus 1998 tax law. For a discussion of
how these numbers should be interpreted in light of inflation between 1990 and 1998, see Appendix A.
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had occurred to some extent by the time of this study in 9: Connecticut
(6 zones originally authorized in 1982, but the number had expanded to
20 by 1996), Indiana (expanded from 15 to 20 zones between 1992 and
1996), Missouri (33 authorized in the original 1982 legislation, but the
limit was expanded to 62 in 1989–1991), New Jersey (number of zones
expanded from 10 to 27 between 1992 and 1997), New York (from 19
in 1992 to 40 by 1997), Ohio (from 227 in 1992 to 317 by 1997), Pennsylvania (from 45 to 57 between 1992 and 1995), Texas (from 103 to
208 between 1992 and 1997), and Virginia (6 zones allowed in 1982
law, but authorization increased to 19 by 1989, and to 46 by 1997 ).8
The number of zones was constant, or nearly so, during the 1990s in
California, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, and Wisconsin.
If we focus only on state corporate income taxes, we find another
trend in the 1990s: it became increasingly possible for new investment
to face negative income tax rates. Negative taxes can be produced in
three ways. First, the state may allow new plant investment or jobs
credits to be applied to a firm’s total state income tax liability, not just
the additional liability generated by the new plant. If the firm has a tax
nexus and a tax liability in the state prior to building a new plant there,
then credits that exceed the additional taxes caused by the plant can be
applied to the firm’s taxes on existing operations, so that the firm’s total
state tax bill is below what it would have been in the absence of the
plant. The tax rate on new plant income is thus negative. Fourteen of
the 20 states studied here had general credits with total state tax liability as the ceiling (usually with carryforward of unused credits); only 4
had credits where the ceiling was the tax attributable to the new facility. Ten of the 20 states had targeted incentives with a ceiling equal to
the total state tax; 8 had targeted incentives limited by the state tax attributable to enterprise zone operations.9
Second, negative corporate rates can occur when the state corporate tax credits are based in part on the state personal income taxes paid
by new employees, and these credits are refundable. This is the case
with Ohio’s Job Creation Tax Credit, Indiana’s EDGE program, Michigan’s certified credit under the Michigan Economic Growth Authority
(MEGA) program, and South Carolina’s Withholding Tax Credit. The
firm can receive a payment from the state instead of a tax liability.
Negative rates occur because we assume that employees pay 100 percent of their individual income taxes, so that when the firm receives a
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credit for the individual taxes paid by new employees, the credit offsets
corporate income taxes.
Third, exporting firms in states with single-factor apportionment,
or with apportionment formulas that approach 100 percent of sales, can
experience negative tax rates on new investment. This is because the
construction of a new plant may have very little effect on the firm’s
gross income tax liability since the additional in-state payroll and property do not affect the apportionment formula, and in-state sales may be
unchanged. So a very low sales factor (we are assuming a firm that exports to national markets) would be applied to a somewhat larger total
firm taxable income as a result of the new plant, producing a very modest increase in state tax, but the state’s incentives for the new plant
could easily exceed the additional tax.
In 1990, negative income tax rates were easily produced in Iowa
(all 16 sectors) and Texas (12 sectors)—in both cases due to single-factor apportionment—and in Kentucky (16 sectors), due to generous
credits combined with a statewide tax ceiling. They were less likely to
occur in Florida, New York, and Wisconsin, and rarely or never in any
of the other states (see Table 3.5). By 1998, negative tax rates were
produced in 4 or more sectors in 11 of the 20 states. In addition to Iowa
and Kentucky, negative taxes on new plant income occurred frequently
(in at least 13 of the sectors) in Michigan, Ohio, and South Carolina,
due to refundable withholding tax credits. In 6 states, 4 to 9 of the 16
sectors experienced negative tax rates, generally due to credits with
statewide tax ceilings. If these trends continue, the corporate income
tax, at least as it applies to new investment, is in danger of disappearing
as a significant revenue source.

TAXES AND INCENTIVES IN 75 CITIES, 1990–1994
We turn our attention now to the 75 cities with enterprise zones, located in 13 states, that are the focus of this study. We computed the effective state-local tax rate on the income from a new plant for each
zone and each of the 16 sectors in TAIMez. The model computes the
before-tax cash flow generated by the new plant, and then measures the
after-tax cash flow, both over 20 years. The tax rate is the state-local
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Table 3.5 Negative State Corporate Income Tax Rates on New
Plant Investmenta
1990

1998

State

Number
of sectors
with negative
tax rateb

Average
rate in
these
sectors (%)

Number
of sectors
with negative
tax rate

Average
rate in
these
sectors (%)

Conn.
Fla.
Iowa
Ind.
Ky.
Mass.
Mich.
Mo.
N.Y.
Ohio
S.C.
Tex.
Va.
Wis.

0
7
16
0
16
0
0
1
5
0
0
12
0
3

NA
–1.2
–0.3
NA
–8.7
NA
NA
–0.1
–1.4
NA
NA
–0.9
NA
–0.8

2
5
16
4
15
1
16
1
6
13
16
9
5
4

–0.2
–0.9
–0.5
–1.0
–4.7
–0.1
–8.0
–0.1
–2.8
–2.1
–5.0
–2.0
–2.6
–0.6

NOTE: NA = not applicable.
a
State average local property-tax rates and abatement terms were assumed. For each
state we used the most generous combination of incentives available. Negative tax
rates did not occur for any sector in either year for the six other states in the study:
Calif., Ill., Minn., N.C., Tenn., and Pa.
b
The number of sectors is out of 16 possible.

tax bite as a percent of before-tax cash flow. In order to present an
overall picture of tax rates and incentives in these cities, we calculated
the weighted average tax rate among the 16 manufacturing sectors for
each city. We then calculated a simple average of the city tax rates for
each of the 13 states. (There were 6 cities in 10 of the states, 5 in the
other 3 states.) The average effective state-local tax rate on new manufacturing investment for each state, with and without incentives, is
shown for 1990 and 1994 in Table 3.6. The table also shows the highest and lowest rates among the 75 individual cities.
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In 1990, the highest tax rate was about four to seven times the lowest tax rate among these cities (depending on which incentives were included). General incentives actually widened the gap between high and
low and increased the variance among the 75 cities; enterprise zone incentives, on the other hand, reduced the disparity among cities. In
1994, the variance among cities had increased, either with basic taxes
only or with general incentives included. However, zone incentives
had an even larger effect in reducing disparities.
In 11 of the 13 states in 1990, zone incentives produced larger reductions in tax rates than did the general incentives available in those
states. In 6 states, general incentives were trivial or non-existent; in
only 4 did they provide more than a 10 percent reduction in taxes.
Zone incentives, on the other hand, produced larger than 10 percent reductions in all but 2 of these states. By 1994, however, general incentives had become much more generous. Zone incentives had increased
as well, but by then only 8 states provided larger percentage tax breaks
with their zone incentives than with their general incentives. The zone
advantage weakened somewhat on average.
In the 75-city analysis actual local property-tax rates are modeled
for three years—1990, 1992, and 1994. These comparisons thus reflect
changes in the total state-local tax burden, whereas our 20-state comparisons held average local property-tax rates constant and thus focused on changes in state policy. What we find in the city analysis is
that the expanded state tax incentives were in part compensating for rising property taxes. Effective state-local tax rates without incentives increased, on average, in 11 of the 13 states between 1990 and 1994.
With general incentives included, increases were produced in only 8 of
the 13, and this number is further reduced to 6 when enterprise zone incentives are added. The average city saw about a 6.5 percent increase
in basic taxes, no real change in taxes after general incentives, and a 3.6
percent reduction in tax rates with zone incentives included.
The pattern of increases in incentives can be seen more clearly in
Table 3.7, where we show the dollar value of incentive packages per
job created. The increases in just the four-year period 1990 to 1994 are
very sizeable. The average general incentive package among the 75
cities rose from $1,276 to $2,199, a 72 percent increase. The additional value of zone incentives increased on average from $2,352 to $2,849,
a 21 percent increase. General incentive packages increased measura-

Table 3.6 Effective Tax Rates on New Manufacturing Investment in 75 Cities (Weighted Average for 16
Manufacturing Sectors)a
1990
Effective tax rateb

1994
% reduction in rate

Effective tax rate

Percent change, 1990–94
% reduction in rate

Effective tax rate

With
Due
Due
With
Due
Due
With
After
With
general
to
to
After
With
general
to
to
After
With
general
basic general
& zone
general
zone
basic general
& zone
general
zone
basic general
& zone
taxes incentives incentives incentives incentives taxes incentives incentives incentives incentives taxes incentives incentives
Average by statec
Calif.
9.2
Conn.
7.6
Fla.
8.1
Ill.
6.1
Ind.
13.5
Ky.
7.7
Mo.
9.7
N.Y.
7.6
Ohio
9.7
Pa.
9.0
Tex.
9.3
Va.
6.9
Wis.
6.9

9.2
6.1
8.1
5.7
13.5
6.5
7.0
4.3
9.6
8.5
8.8
6.9
6.9

8.9
4.8
6.5
4.7
9.8
5.5
5.9
3.9
6.5
6.8
7.6
6.2
5.7

0.3
20.1
0.0
6.3
0.0
15.1
27.8
43.1
0.8
5.5
5.4
0.0
0.0

3.4
21.9
19.8
18.1
27.2
16.1
16.1
8.4
32.7
19.6
12.9
10.4
16.9

8.9
8.9
8.3
6.2
15.2
8.1
10.4
6.9
9.8
10.6
11.1
7.0
7.3

7.4
6.8
8.3
5.8
12.5
5.1
7.7
3.6
8.8
10.1
10.5
7.0
7.3

6.8
5.7
6.7
4.7
7.4
4.0
6.1
2.8
5.6
8.2
9.0
6.1
5.3

17.3
23.5
0.0
6.2
17.9
37.6
26.2
48.2
10.1
4.8
5.6
0.0
0.0

7.7
16.6
19.3
17.9
40.8
19.9
20.8
20.9
36.2
18.8
14.0
12.3
27.8

–3.2
17.5
2.8
0.9
12.6
5.2
7.8
–8.4
1.1
18.0
19.6
1.4
6.2

–19.7
12.4
2.8
1.0
–7.6
–22.7
10.1
–16.7
–8.3
18.8
19.4
1.4
6.2

–23.2
20.1
3.4
1.2
–24.8
–26.2
3.9
–28.1
–13.1
20.0
17.9
–0.7
–7.8

Among the 75 cities
Highest 19.9
Mean
8.6
Lowest
5.2
Variance 0.05
a

b

c

19.9
7.8
2.9
0.07

11.1
6.4
2.5
0.04

57.3
9.5
0.0

45.7
17.3
0.0

22.8
9.1
5.2
0.08

20.1
7.8
2.1
0.07

11.7
6.1
1.4
0.04

62.3
15.2
0.0

52.8
21.2
7.6

54.8
6.5
–15.8

56.0
0.0
–26.0

70.2
–3.6
–50.5

Effective tax rate is the reduction in the net present value (NPV) of the cash flow from a new plant due to state and local income, sales, and property
taxes in the new plant state, divided by the NPV of the pre-tax income generated by the plant. Pre-tax income is measured before all federal, state, and
local taxes; NPV is measured over 20 years. The reduction in cash flow is calculated by comparing project cash flow after actual taxes and incentives
in the new plant state and after federal and other state taxes, with cash flow assuming the same plant location but with only federal taxes and taxes in
other states.
The tax rates shown are weighted averages of the tax rates calculated for firms representative of 16 two-digit SIC code sectors, where the weights are
the sector shares of 1995 U.S. manufacturing employment.
There are either five or six cities in each state. The statistics for the 75 cities show the city with the effective tax rate averaged across the 16 sectors
and the like, not the single sector with the highest rate.

Value of incentives per job, 1990

General
incentives
Average by stateb
Calif.
37
Conn.
2,644
Fla.
0
Ill.
660
Ind.
0
Ky.
1,975
Mo.
4,562
N.Y.
5,419
Ohio
136
Pa.
744
Tex.
856
Va.
0
Wis.
0

General
plus zone
incentives
709
4,787
2,297
2,348
6,681
3,652
6,445
5,803
5,590
3,674
2,619
871
1,867

Value of incentives per job, 1994

Additional
value of
zone
General
incentives incentives
672
2,143
2,297
1,687
6,681
1,677
1,883
384
5,454
2,929
1,763
871
1,867

2,682
3,547
0
661
3,485
5,462
4,635
5,597
1,268
782
1,055
0
0

General
plus zone
incentives
3,634
5,370
2,301
2,347
12,769
7,143
7,346
6,615
6,800
4,019
3,432
1,045
3,237

Change in value 1990–94

Additional
value of
zone
General
incentives incentives
952
1,822
2,301
1,686
9,284
1,681
2,710
1,017
5,533
3,238
2,377
1,045
3,237

2,645
903
0
1
3,485
3,486
73
178
1,132
37
199
0
0

General
plus zone
incentives

Additional
value of
zone
incentives

2,925
583
4
–1
6,088
3,491
900
811
1,211
345
812
174
1,370

280
–320
4
–1
2,603
5
827
633
79
308
613
174
1,370
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Table 3.7 The Value of Incentives per Job Created to Manufacturing Firms in 75 Cities, 1990 and 1994 (in dollars)a

Among the 75 citiesc
Highest
7,285
Mean
1,276
Lowest
0
a

b
c

15,930
3,628
0

15,930
2,352
0

7,359
2,199
0

22,678
5,048
1,045

19,193
2,849
720

3,576
924
–278

10,758
1,420
–255

7,273
497
–461
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Figures represent the present value of the increased cash flow over 20 years accruing to the firm because of the package of tax incentives
available in that state for a new manufacturing facility. All figures are weighted averages of the values for the 16 manufacturing sectors
modeled.
There are either five or six cities in each state.
The statistics for the 75 cities show the city with the effective tax rate averaged across the 16 sectors and the like, not the single sector with
the highest rate.
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bly in 9 of the 13 states, as did zone incentives (though they were a different 9 states).
These average incentive values do not seem that large when compared to the incentive packages reported in the press. The average total
package was just $3,628 per job in 1990 and $5,048 in 1994, though the
highest award had risen to $22,678 per job by 1994. It is not uncommon to find reports of special deals for auto firms in excess of $100,000
per job (often including discretionary, non-tax incentives, which are not
included in the TAIMez estimates). Such comparisons are not valid,
however. Our figures represent the present value of an incentive package’s effect on the firm’s after-tax cash flow. Local incentives increase
both state and federal income tax liability, and state incentives increase
federal taxes. The combined effect is that the net value of a tax reduction in any one year is only around 60 percent of the gross value; it is
invariably the gross value (the cost in lost revenues to state and local
governments) that is reported in the press. Furthermore, the press reports the undiscounted sum of lost revenues over some period of years,
whereas we discount future benefits at 10 percent. Both state tax credits and local property-tax abatements are spread over a number of
years, sometimes up to 20 years, so that discounting has a large effect
on the measured value of incentives.
If one-time incentive packages were put into an appropriate accounting framework, such as the TAIMez model, the value per job
would be considerably less than what is reported. To illustrate these effects, we show in Table 3.8 the value of two incentive packages: one for
an instruments plant in Hartford, Connecticut, the other for a chemicals
plant in Utica, New York. We show the two major components, state
income tax credits and local property-tax abatements, in three ways: 1)
as a simple undiscounted sum of the gross incentive amounts for each
of 20 years, 2) as a net present value (the gross amounts discounted at
10 percent), and 3) as the net discounted value to the firm, taking into
account state and federal income tax effects. The real value of the incentive package to the firm was only 45 percent of the gross undiscounted sum in Hartford and only 33 percent in Utica.
Among the 75 cities, half had at least one sector for which the total
incentive package exceeded $10,000 per job, and 14 cities would have
granted at least one sector more than $20,000 per job. Incentives of this
magnitude are equivalent to a gross undiscounted value in the range of
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Table 3.8 Gross Cost of Incentives Versus Value to the Firm

Measure
Dollars (000)
State income tax credits
Undiscounted sum
Gross NPVa
Value to firm
Property-tax abatements
Undiscounted sum
Gross NPV
Value to firm
Total
Undiscounted sum
Gross NPV
Value to firm
Percent of undiscounted sum
State income tax credits
Gross NPV
Value to firm
Property tax abatements
Gross NPV
Value to firm
Total
Gross NPV
Value to firm
a

Hartford, Conn.
Instruments plant
(100 employees)

Utica, N.Y.
Chemicals plant
(75 employees)

975.5
636.2
439.6

2,296.9
1,028.6
710.7

704.4
523.2
315.6

437.4
311.9
189.4

1,679.9
1,159.4
755.1

2,734.3
1,340.5
900.1

65
45

45
31

74
45

71
43

69
45

49
33

NPV = net present value.

$20,000 to $60,000 per job, which is not trivial in comparison to the reported packages offered to some firms in the past 10 years.
Another way of getting at the question of incentive size and importance is to consider the size of the wage premium that a given incentive
package would just offset. Wages are a much larger component of
costs than are taxes (about 14 times as large, on average), and wage
rates can vary substantially from one place to another. Wages might be
only slightly higher in a particular locale, but a large percentage reduc-
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tion in taxes would be required to offset the wage disadvantage. To put
it another way, if wage differentials of $1.00 an hour or more are common when manufacturers compare sites, then an incentive package that
provides the equivalent of a 10-cent wage reduction is unlikely to exert
a significant influence on location decisions; tax differences will be
swamped by wage differences.
Again using TAIMez, we calculated the hourly wage differential at
a new plant location that would provide the firm with the same present
value of cost savings over 20 years as the incentives available at that location. These equivalent wage reductions were, for the most part, in
the range of $0.10 to $1.50 per hour, with considerable variation both
by state and by sector, as can be seen in Table 3.9. If we look at the average of all the 13 states for each of the sectors, we find that the incentive packages were equivalent to a 1.6 percent to 7.1 percent cut in
wages. A relatively small wage premium would be sufficient in many
locations to wipe out the advantages created by the incentive packages
there. As a result we do not think it likely that incentives have much
impact on the location of new business investment; other spatially variable factors, like labor and transportation costs, will tend to dominate
location decisions. Indeed, our econometric analyses of this issue, presented in Chapter 7, confirm that enterprise zone incentives have little
impact on the location of business investment.

TAXES AND INCENTIVES IN OHIO CITIES, 1990–1994
In addition to the analysis of five or six enterprise zones in each of
13 states, we have also analyzed incentives in all 104 cities in Ohio
with a population of 15,000 or more. In the early 1990s, the state of
Ohio was quite liberal in its rules permitting establishment of enterprise zones. As a result, many cities with little or no economic distress
established zones, thereby being allowed to grant tax abatements to
new industrial plants. These nondistressed zones increased substantially in number up until July of 1994, when new ones were no longer
allowed. Between 1990 and 1994, 15 more cities (among the 104 total) created enterprise zones, but only one qualified under the distress
criteria.

Table 3.9 Wage Equivalent of General and Zone Tax Incentives, 1994, Averaged by State for 75 Cities (The Hourly Wage
Reduction That Is Equivalent in Value to the Total State-Local Incentive Package over 20 Years)
Apparel
Rubber
&
Wood FurniChemi&
Food textiles prod.
ture Paper Printing cals
plastic Leather
SIC 20 SIC 23 SIC 24 SIC 25 SIC 26 SIC 27 SIC 28 SIC 30 SIC 31
Hourly wage ($)
10.89 6.69
9.59
9.32
Average wage reduction equivalent ($)
Calif. 0.19
0.14
0.08
0.11
Conn. 0.28
0.27
0.28
0.24
Fla.
0.12
0.13
0.19
0.17
Ill.
0.15
0.09
0.07
0.11
Ind.
0.68
0.64
0.47
0.52
Ky.
0.32
0.31
0.22
0.24
Mo.
0.37
0.27
0.28
0.29
N.Y.
0.31
0.31
0.51
0.35
Ohio 0.42
0.38
0.24
0.30
Pa.
0.22
0.20
0.19
0.21
Tex.
0.23
0.15
0.09
0.14
Va.
0.10
0.07
0.10
0.10
Wis.
0.20
0.15
0.12
0.16
Mean
0.28
0.24
0.22
0.23
Percenta 2.5
3.6
2.3
2.4
a

Stone,
FabriTransporclay & Primary cated Indust. Elect.
tation
Instruglass metals metals mach. equip. equip.
ments
SIC 32 SIC 33 SIC 34 SIC 35 SIC 36 SIC 37 SIC 38

15.19

11.60

16.80

10.86

7.49

12.82

15.96

12.59

13.85 11.73

18.22

13.65

0.54
0.62
0.32
0.31
1.25
0.95
0.99
0.90
0.86
0.50
0.41
0.10
0.44
0.63
4.1

0.11
0.19
0.14
0.07
0.52
0.22
0.23
0.25
0.25
0.13
0.11
0.10
0.14
0.19
1.6

0.45
0.89
0.32
0.33
1.23
1.07
1.11
1.57
0.85
0.67
0.39
0.10
0.46
0.73
4.3

0.54
0.65
0.32
0.31
1.32
0.93
0.97
0.75
0.88
0.51
0.45
0.10
0.48
0.63
5.8

0.18
0.33
0.22
0.08
0.65
0.34
0.32
0.37
0.38
0.18
0.15
0.10
0.14
0.26
3.5

0.31
0.49
0.32
0.18
0.84
0.59
0.64
0.70
0.57
0.35
0.29
0.10
0.29
0.44
3.4

0.58
0.65
0.16
0.31
1.74
0.96
0.98
0.72
1.01
0.52
0.49
0.10
0.44
0.67
4.2

0.39
0.58
0.31
0.26
1.36
0.69
0.77
0.66
0.71
0.50
0.35
0.10
0.30
0.54
4.3

0.40
0.60
0.24
0.21
1.53
0.80
0.72
0.62
0.74
0.40
0.36
0.10
0.31
0.54
3.9

0.26
0.33
0.08
0.13
1.02
0.44
0.40
0.35
0.48
0.24
0.19
0.05
0.20
0.32
1.8

0.46
0.87
0.24
0.34
1.81
1.14
1.03
0.99
1.00
0.69
0.47
0.10
0.45
0.74
5.4

Mean wage reduction as a percent of hourly wage.

0.61
0.91
0.23
0.36
2.25
1.35
1.22
1.00
1.11
0.67
0.52
0.10
0.48
0.83
7.1

80 Chapter 3
Table 3.10 Tax Rates and Incentive Value in 104 Ohio Cities,
1990 and 1994
City (population 15,000 or more) having

Variable
1990
Number of cities
Average city characteristics
Population
Property-tax rate (real
property)a (%)
Local sales tax rate (%)
Local income tax rate (%)
Effective tax rate (%)
Basic taxes only
With general state incentives
With all incentives
Value of incentive package per
job ($)
General state incentives
Local zone abatements
Total incentive package
1994
Number of cities
Average city characteristics
Population
Qualify for 13.5% ITC
Property-tax rate (real
property)a (%)
Local sales tax rate (%)
Local income tax rate (%)
Effective tax rate (%)
Basic taxes only
With general state incentives
With all incentives

No
Nonenterprise distressed Distressed All
zone
zone
zone
cities
54

32

18

104

29,474
5.8

29,370
4.9

146,360
5.2

49,672
5.4

1.2
1.5

1.0
1.6

0.7
1.8

1.1
1.6

10.68
10.59
10.59

9.54
9.46
6.82

9.85
9.77
7.01

10.19
10.10
8.81

163
0
163

135
4,601
4,737

140
4,809
4,949

150
2,248
2,399

39

46

19

104

26,326
4
5.9

27,863
11
5.4

150,395
13
5.6

49,672
28
5.6

1.3
1.7

1.1
1.6

0.9
1.9

1.1
1.7

10.59
9.54
9.54

9.90
8.91
6.06

9.96
8.97
6.20

10.17
9.16
7.39
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Table 3.10 (Continued)
City (population 15,000 or more) having

Variable
Value of incentive package per
job ($)
General state incentives
Local zone abatements
Total incentive package
a

No
Nonenterprise distressed Distressed All
zone
zone
zone
cities

1,336
0
1,336

1,268
4,963
6,230

1,268
4,824
6,092

1,293
3,076
4,370

Net tax rate (after various tax reduction factors are applied) as a percent of assessed
value for commercial and industrial real property. Since assessment ratio is 35% for
real property in Ohio, the effective rate as a percent of market value would be 35% of
this rate.

Table 3.10 shows the incentives available in Ohio cities of 15,000
or more in 1990 and 1994 by three categories: cities without an enterprise zone, cities with a zone that did not meet distress criteria, and
cities with zones established under the state’s criteria for economic distress. The distressed-zone cities are much larger on average than the
cities in the other two categories, but surprisingly the non-zone cities
have the highest local tax rates (before and after incentives are taken
into account). This is true considering both the simple local property,
sales, and income tax rates, themselves, and the effective state-local tax
rates calculated by our model. Tax rates in the distressed-zone cities
were just slightly higher than tax rates in the nondistressed cities.
Abatements had a dramatic effect in lowering effective overall tax rates
in the enterprise zone cities.
The state of Ohio enacted much more generous state incentive programs after 1990, but these were available throughout the state rather
than targeted at enterprise zones. (The state of Ohio does allow corporate income tax credits for enterprise zone firms, but these are so rarely
used that we did not include them in our TAIMez simulations.) Because
of the new statewide incentives, net effective tax rates in all categories
of cities declined significantly between 1990 and 1994, despite slight
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increases in property-tax and local income tax rates overall. If one
were to characterize Ohio’s tax incentive strategy based on these numbers, it would be to use state tax relief to lower business taxes throughout the state and let localities, whether distressed or not, compete
against one another using local property-tax abatements, which in fact
are worth more than five times as much as the state tax credits.

CONCLUSIONS
Incentive competition within the sample of enterprise zone cities
that are the focus of most of this book is part of a broader and continuing trend toward increased use of tax incentives by state and local governments. Among 20 prominent manufacturing states, the trend in the
period 1990–1998 was overwhelmingly to reduce basic taxes on corporations and to enact or expand both general and targeted incentives for
new business investment. In 1990, 8 of the 20 states offered statewide
tax incentives that reduced the total state-local tax rate by more than 10
percent. By 1998, this number had increased to 13 states, with reductions of 20 percent or more in 9 of the 13. Fourteen states offered some
kind of targeted incentives in 1990; 19 of the 20 offered such incentives
by 1998, and in 11 states targeted incentives provided further reductions of 20 percent or more. The increasing generosity of incentives
has led to the possibility of negative tax rates on new investment in a
number of states. Furthermore, there is no indication that this tax and
incentive competition is producing convergence in net tax rates; the
process resembles a game of leapfrog, with no state apparently content
to be merely average.
Two contradictory trends appear to have occurred in these 20 states
in the 1990s: 1) some states have embarked on new enterprise zone
programs, or increased the competitive advantage of existing zones or
other targeted areas; 2) other states have weakened the advantage of
geographically targeted areas by reducing targeted incentives or, more
commonly, by expanding nontargeted incentives. Perhaps more importantly, the trend in many states with long-standing enterprise zone programs (or the equivalent) has been to increase the maximum number of
such zones allowed. This further weakens the targeting effect of zone
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programs, as a larger and larger portion of the state falls under the targeted program. Among 14 major manufacturing states with enterprise
zone programs as of 1992, zone proliferation has occurred to some extent in 9.
The 75 cities that were the focus of much of this book were located
in 13 states from among the 20. The trends in these states during the
period 1990–1994 mirrored the trends discussed above to a large extent: incentives became more generous, and nontargeted incentives
grew more rapidly than targeted (enterprise zone) incentives, so that the
competitive advantage of zones was weakened slightly. The average
general incentive package among the 75 cities rose from $1,276 to
$2,199 per job, a 72 percent increase. The additional value of zone incentives increased on average from $2,352 to $2,849 per job, a 21 percent increase. The expanded state tax incentives were in part compensating for rising property taxes. Effective state-local tax rates without
incentives increased, on average, in 11 of the 13 states between 1990
and 1994.
Another way of putting the magnitude of these general and enterprise zone incentives into perspective is to calculate the hourly wage
differential at a new plant location that would provide the firm with the
same present value of cost savings over 20 years as the incentives
available at that location. If we look at the average across the 13 states
for each of the sectors, we find that the incentive packages were equivalent to a 1.6 percent to 7.1 percent cut in wages. A relatively small
wage premium would be sufficient, in many locations, to wipe out the
advantages created by the incentive packages there. Thus it is unlikely
that incentives have much impact on the location of new business
investment.

Notes
1. See, for instance, L. Papke (1987) and J. Papke (1988), both using the AFTAX
model; Brooks et al. (1986); Laughlin (1993); Tannenwald (1996); and Peters and
Fisher (1999a). For new applications of the method, also see Tannenwald,
O’Leary, and Huang (1999).
2. In this instance, payments of taxes to other states are represented as payments to
the “median state.” See Appendix A and Chapter 3 of Fisher and Peters (1998).
3. Local tax rates for each enterprise zone city for 1990, 1992, and 1994 were ob-
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4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

tained, in many cases directly from each city; it was the statewide average rate that
was difficult to determine several years after the fact since most states do not calculate such a rate.
The only general incentive in 1990 in Iowa was property-tax abatement, a large
portion of which was for property taxes on machinery and equipment (M&E). By
1998, M&E had been exempted from property taxes altogether (which we considered a change in the basic tax system since it is not tied to new investment or job
creation) so that the value of abatements was reduced, there being much less to
abate. In Minnesota, a significant general incentive is the complete exemption of
manufacturing M&E from sales tax when it is associated with new investment; but
when the sales-tax rate on manufacturing M&E, including replacement equipment,
was reduced from 6.5 percent to 2.0 percent, the value of the exemption was lessened because there was much less sales tax to exempt. An examination of Table
3.3 reveals that there was actually only one state, Missouri, where the effective tax
rate after general incentives increased due to a tightening of incentive programs.
Table 3.4 shows a sizeable increase in the value of targeted incentive programs in
Missouri. This occurred not because the parameters of the enterprise zone program
were changed, but because basic income taxes were increased, so that the income
exemption was more valuable and the credits were more likely to be fully used
since the ceiling (Missouri income taxes) was raised.
Iowa’s new enterprise zone program appears in our analyses to be of little value on
average because it simply relaxes eligibility criteria for existing incentives for a
firm locating in a zone; the principal effect is that small plants, and those with lower-paying jobs, are eligible only within zones. Most of our representative firms already qualified.
It should be noted that Pennsylvania has enacted the new Keystone Opportunity
Zone Program, with very generous incentives, but that took effect in 1999, too late
to be reflected in our 1998 effective tax rate comparisons.
These figures are from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
1992; database developed by John Engberg; and the Virginia and Texas state Web
sites.
Three states appear on both lists since they have multiple credits with different
ceilings.

4
How Taxes and Incentives Favor
One Industry over Another and
Capital over Labor
Enterprise zone incentives are invariably touted as a device to stimulate the creation of jobs, usually without regard to the industry providing those jobs. While localities do sometimes attempt to recruit plants
in particular sectors, the incentives themselves are typically applied
equally to all industrial facilities (certainly to all manufacturing plants,
and perhaps to wholesale trade and other sectors as well). Implicit in
those incentives, however, is an industrial policy of sorts. Tax systems
and incentive programs always advantage some kinds of firms and disadvantage others. Economic-development professionals at the state or
local level are probably unaware of biases embedded in state and local
tax systems and in zone incentives in favor of certain industries. Furthermore, tax incentives may lower the cost of capital or of labor or of
both or of neither. As a result, they may not provide strong incentives
to expand employment, despite the stated program goals, but instead
may encourage the substitution of capital for labor.
In this chapter we first explore how the zone incentive programs in
the 75-city sample favor certain manufacturing industries. If localities
are going to continue to offer tax incentives in the belief that they have
a significant effect on firm decisions, they should do so in ways that are
more likely to further their stated policy objectives. If the state tax system and local property taxes tend to discourage investment by firms in
certain industries, that should be known so that the incentive system
can be designed to counteract those effects, if that is appropriate. Overall, we found that the average city in our study imposed a tax rate on its
most favored industry that was only 38 percent of the tax rate on its
least favored industry. In many cities, the difference was extreme.
In the second section of this chapter we examine how enterprise
zone incentives encourage the use of labor or of capital. If the goal of
the enterprise zone program is to stimulate employment, incentives
should unambiguously encourage firms to employ more, not fewer,
85
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workers. What we find, however, is quite the opposite: there is a strong
bias in favor of capital built into the incentive systems in most, but not
all, states.

FAVORED INDUSTRIES
When we looked at the 75 enterprise zone cities in our sample, we
found considerable variation in terms of the industrial sectors that were
taxed most lightly and most heavily. It is quite common, in fact, for the
most heavily taxed sector in a given city to be facing a state-local tax
rate two or three times the tax rate on the least-taxed sector within that
city. Furthermore, one does not find the same industries always being
taxed more lightly or more heavily in different cities. In Illinois cities,
for example, the paper industry tends to be taxed most lightly and the
leather products industry most heavily. In California cities, on the other hand, rubber and plastics firms tend to face the lowest tax rates,
while printing and publishing firms face the highest. It is doubtful that
these differences are a desired outcome—the result of deliberate policy—in those two states.
The variation in effective tax rates is due primarily to differences
among industries in terms of profitability, asset composition, and the
relative importance of capital and labor, and to differences among localities in terms of the relative importance of income, sales, and property taxes, the makeup of the property-tax base, and the nature of tax incentives. More profitable firms are at more of a disadvantage in cities
in which state (and occasionally local) taxes on corporate profits predominate. The relative importance of inventory, plant, and equipment
in the firms asset structure can be very important; firms with a high proportion of real property (buildings and land) are disadvantaged in
places with high property-tax rates or no tax abatements, while firms
with substantial inventory are disadvantaged by states that subject inventories to the property tax. More-capital-intensive industries are advantaged by incentives tied to capital investment, while more-labor-intensive industries are advantaged by incentives tied to job creation.
To assess the magnitude of the variation in tax rates by industry
within cities, we simply determined the state-local tax rate (after incen-
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Table 4.1 Variation in Tax Rates within Cities in 13 States

State
California
Connecticut
Florida
Illinois
Indiana
Kentucky
Missouri
New York
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Texas
Virginia
Wisconsin
Overall average
a

Tax rate for the
highest taxed
sector (average
among cities)

Tax rate for the
lowest taxed
sector (average
among cities)

Lowest rate as
a percent age
of highest rate

9.7
8.7
11.4
6.9
12.2
6.1
11.0
5.2
8.0
10.6
13.1
10.7
7.9

4.8
3.5
2.7
3.4
3.4
2.9
3.2
–0.9
3.7
6.8
5.9
3.4
3.7

50
40
24
49
28
47
29
nma
46
64
45
32
47

9.3

3.6

38

nm = not meaningful.

tives) for each of the 16 industries for each city, and compared the highest rate with the lowest rate within each city. Table 4.1 shows the extent to which tax rates vary by industry within the same city; shown
here are the average rates on the highest-taxed sector and the average
rates on the lowest-taxed sector, averaged among the cities in each
state. Overall, the average city imposed a tax rate of 3.6 percent on its
most-favored industry, which was only two-fifths of the tax rate of 9.3
percent imposed on its least-favored industry. (Results for each of the
75 cities are shown in Appendix Table F.3.)
If tax rates do affect location decisions, then what determines the
competitiveness of a particular city for a particular industry is not the
absolute tax rate, but that city’s tax rate compared to tax rates on that
industry in other cities. A city could impose its lightest tax burden on
the food industry but still have a high tax rate compared to how other
cities tax food manufacturers. To examine the competitiveness issue,
we ranked the 75 cities by tax rate for each of the 16 sectors. Then we
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identified, for each city, the sector that was most competitive (in other
words, the one with the best ranking among the 75 cities by tax rate)
and the sector that was least competitive (worst ranking). For example,
in Fort Wayne, Indiana, printing and publishing firms faced a tax rate of
1.0 percent, which was low enough to rank that city 4th; only 3 cities
among the 75 taxed that industry more lightly. Rubber and plastic
products manufacturers, on the other hand, faced a tax rate of 6.7 percent in Fort Wayne (almost 7 times the rate on printing firms), which resulted in a ranking of 46th; approximately 60 percent of the 75 cities
taxed rubber and plastics firms at a lower rate. The tax rates for the remaining 14 sectors resulted in Fort Wayne being ranked somewhere between 4th and 46th. Thus, a blanket assertion that a particular city is
“very competitive in terms of taxes” may not mean much; it may be
quite competitive for some sectors and out of the running for others.
The results of these ranking calculations are summarized by state in
Table 4.2. In some states (Florida and Illinois, for example), the state
tax system appears to dominate, there being little variation among the
cities within the state in terms of the best- or worst-ranked sectors or in
terms of city rankings. (This can also be due to similarity in local tax
burdens, of course.) In most states, however, variation in local tax rates
and property-tax abatement policies is substantial and plays a significant role in determining which sectors are taxed more or less heavily.
We simply present the average of the cities in each state (Table 4.2); results for each of the 75 cities can be found in Appendix Table F.3.
There is sufficient variation within cities in most states that any city
can be fairly competitive for at least one or a few sectors. As Appendix
Table F.3 shows, in all states but California and Texas, there was at
least one of our sample cities with a sector ranked in the top 20 percent
(1–15). Altogether, 38 of the 75 cities had a sector ranked 15 or better,
and 53 of the 75 had at least one sector ranked in the top 40 percent (30
or better). On the other hand, there were 11 cities (mostly in Pennsylvania and Texas) with all sectors ranked in the bottom 40 percent.
Cities in those states simply do not have enough leverage on the overall
state-local tax rate to overcome a disadvantageous state tax system.
Property taxes are fairly high and cities are constrained in what they
can do as far as abatements are concerned. All California cities have a
best sector in the middle 20 percent; there is little variation in propertytax rates and no allowance for local abatements.
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Given the implicit and probably unintended industrial policy implied by these varying tax rates, a state and city’s average tax rate (for
all sectors) may not be a particularly useful indicator of the citys tax climate for a specific industrial sector. A city might derive most of its
growth from a small number of sectors, and it is possible that a city’s
growth is explained by the tax rates for the sectors in which that city
has the greatest comparative advantage (at least in terms of ranking by
taxes) rather than an overall average rate. For this reason, some of our
analyses of the effects of tax rates on zone growth in Chapter 7 are conducted by sector—we investigate whether sectoral tax rates explain
sectoral growth.

INCENTIVES TO EXPAND LABOR VERSUS CAPITAL
Much of the discussion of enterprise zones seems to assume that all
incentives can be expected to stimulate the creation of jobs. As L. Papke (1993) points out, however, this is not the case. Incentives may affect factor prices, and incentives that lower the price of capital goods
have both an output effect (whereby production and employment increase because costs are lowered) and a substitution effect (whereby
capital is substituted for labor). If the substitution effect is stronger, a
capital incentive could reduce employment.
To determine whether a particular incentive lowers the price of labor or of capital it is not enough to determine whether the incentive is
nominally tied to one factor or the other. For example, a credit equal to
$1,000 per job may or may not lower the price of labor, and a credit for
investment in machinery may or may not lower the price of capital. In
order to understand how this could be, we will start by categorizing tax
incentives for business firms in the same way that one categorizes intergovernmental grants—that is, distinguishing lump-sum from matching grants. Tax incentives are, after all, functionally equivalent to
grants to firms; they operate through the tax system instead of the expenditure system.
First, there are capital credits or abatements that operate as matching
grants—incentives that lower the price of capital goods—such as salestax exemptions for the purchase of machinery and equipment, invest-

Most-competitive sectors

Least-competitive sectors

Cities

Average
rank

Florida
Illinois

Rubber and plastics
Primary metals
Apparel
Leather
Leather
Paper

3
3
5
1
6
6

41
37
15
31
11
10

Indiana

Printing and publishing

6

27

Kentucky

Fabricated metals
Electric equipment
Transportation equip.
Leather
Fabricated metals
Lumber & wood
Food
Apparel
Food
Transportation equip.

2
2
1
4
1
4
1
1
5
1

10
10
1
24
2
5
1
2
17
41

State
California
Connecticut

Missouri
New York

Ohio

Sectors

Sectors

Cities

Average
rank

Printing and publishing

6

61

Printing and publishing
Four others
Primary metals
Leather
Apparel
Rubber and plastics
Three others
Leather
Apparel
Primary metals
Paper
Two others
Food
Leather
Transportation equip.
Leather
Apparel

2
4
6
4
2
3
3
2
2
1
3
2
4
1
1
4
2

37
45
61
40
50
65
65
22
53
19
46
60
9
59
2
58
57
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Table 4.2 Favored Industries

Pennsylvania

Texas

Wisconsin

3
2
1
6

51
39
7
58

Apparel
Leather
Food
Rubber and plastics
Paper
Primary metals

4
1
1
2
2
1

22
29
5
15
21
25

Lumber and wood
Leather
Two others
Apparel
Primary metals
Two others
Paper
Stone, clay, and glass

2
2
2
2
2
2
4
2

73
53
75
72
73
70
50
59

Lumber and wood

5

46

NOTE: For each state, table shows the number of cities for which the given sector was their most competitive sector, and
the average rank for that sector among those cities. Cities were ranked within each sector based on the state-local tax rate
after all incentives. A rank of 1 indicates the most competitive city for that sector (the lowest tax rate among the 75
cities).
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Virginia

Paper
Primary metals
Food
Chemicals
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ment tax credits, and property-tax abatements. Since the incentive is a
percentage of the cost of capital, the larger the capital expenditure, the
larger the total incentive. The public sector matches private capital
spending—albeit through a “tax expenditure” rather than an outright
grant. Second, there are jobs credits that operate as labor matching
grants—incentives that lower the price of labor—such as corporate income tax credits equal to a dollar amount per job or a percentage of
wages, and job-training programs that underwrite a portion of the initial
cost of labor. Third, there are general incentives that also function as
matching grants—incentives that simply reduce taxes and raise profits
and therefore effectively reduce all factor prices proportionately—such
as exemptions of all or a portion of the profits from operations in an enterprise zone from income taxation. Fourth, there are other incentives
that are like lump-sum grants because they do not vary with plant size or
employment levels or profits. Free access roads would be an example.
Table 4.3 shows the relative importance of the first three kinds of
state and local tax incentives in our sample of 75 cities in 13 states as of
1994. State jobs and capital credits are credits against the firms state
corporate income tax. Jobs credits are labor-matching grants (a percent
of wages or dollar amount per job that increases with the number of
jobs, or a share of job-training costs). State capital credits are typically
an investment tax credit or a credit for sales or property taxes paid on
purchases of machinery and equipment associated with new plant investment. Local property-tax abatements reduce the price of buildings
and machinery. The state capital credits and local abatements together
constitute the capital-matching grants. The category “other state incentives” consists of those that function as general matching grants—exemption of all or a portion of the income from a new plant from corporate income tax, for example.
California and Virginia are the exceptions among these 13 states in
that 100 percent of their incentive packages in 1994 consisted of jobs
credits. In the other 11 states, jobs credits represented less than onethird of the total package; in 10 of the 11, total capital credits made up
at least two-thirds of the package. (Connecticut’s largest incentive consisted of enterprise zone income exemptions; it was the only state with
the majority of its package in the “other” category.) Thus, even within
enterprise zones, where job creation is ostensibly the primary program
objective, capital incentives dominate.

Table 4.3 State and Local Tax Incentives in 75 Cities, Averaged by State, 1994
Gross value to the firm of incentives, per joba ($)

Distribution of incentive package (%)

Calif.
Conn.
Fla.
Ill.
Ind.
Ky.
Mo.
N.Y.
Ohio
Pa.
Tex.
Va.
Wis.

1,376
574
73
113
5,453
157
489
2,981
1,852
317
0
1,513
602

a

0
0
3,278
1,559
0
4,548
1,690
3,820
0
4,686
2,126
0
3,223

0
2,988
0
1,969
13,490
566
3,775
3,091
9,122
940
1,702
0
0

0
2,988
3,278
3,529
13,490
5,114
5,465
6,911
9,122
5,626
3,827
0
3,223

0
4,581
0
0
0
424
1,741
62
0
0
0
0
872

1,376
8,143
3,350
3,641
18,942
5,694
7,694
9,955
10,974
5,942
3,827
1,513
4,696

100.0
7.4
2.2
3.5
32.5
2.8
6.7
30.7
17.6
5.4
0.0
100.0
12.8

0.0
0.0
97.8
47.8
0.0
82.1
23.2
39.3
0.0
80.2
62.9
0.0
68.6

0.0
33.6
0.0
48.7
67.5
9.3
46.1
29.4
82.4
14.3
37.1
0.0
0.0

0.0
33.6
97.8
96.5
67.5
91.3
69.3
68.7
82.4
94.6
100.0
0.0
68.6

0.0
59.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
5.9
23.9
0.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
18.6

Weighted average for 16 manufacturing sectors. Values are calculated including all tax incentives, available generally and only within enterprise zones. Gross value is the net present value of the credit or abatement without taking into account the effect on federal income taxes or other state income taxes.
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State

State State
Total
Other
Total
State State
Total
Other
jobs capital
Local
capital
state
incentive jobs capital
Local
capital
state
credits credits abatements incentives incentives package credits credits abatements incentives incentives
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This is not the end of the story, however. Many of the capital and
labor matching grants are closed-ended. That is, they have a statutory
ceiling on the total allowable credit. Firms bumping against that ceiling in effect receive a lump-sum grant rather than a matching grant because further increases in investment or employment produce no increase in the credit; there is no factor price effect at the margin.
Typically, the credits are one-time credits taken in the year the new investment is placed in service; they are not refundable (though they may
be carried forward) and the ceiling is therefore the firms tax liability before credits (or, in some instances, 50 percent of its tax liability).
This is not a trivial category. Table 4.4 shows the instances in
which one of our representative firms was constrained by a job or capital credit ceiling. Here we distinguish between credits allowed generally and those available only for firms locating in an enterprise zone. We
consider cities averaged by state and not as individual cities since we
are dealing only with state income tax credits. A zero under “value of
credits” indicates that a credit was available on paper, but the firm received no benefit from it either because the credit was substitutive
rather than additive with another (more generous) credit or because another credit had consumed the entire sum available under the ceiling. A
blank under “value of credits” indicates that no such credit existed in
that state in 1994. When the average percent of credits used is less than
100 percent, then for at least some sectors, jobs credits there operate as
lump-sum grants because wages are not reduced at the margin.
Among these 13 states, there were 17 job credit programs in operation in 1994. In 7 of the 13 states, there was at least one jobs credit
program that operated as a true matching grant for all 16 firms. In 4 of
the 7, these were enterprise zone, not general, incentive programs (Illinois, New York, Virginia, and Wisconsin). In 4 states (Connecticut,
Florida, Kentucky, and Missouri), the jobs credits usually operated as
lump-sum grants (in at least 11 of the 16 sectors). Texas had no job
credit program, whereas Californias enterprise zone jobs credits were
fully utilized in 10 of the 16 sectors. Clearly, it cannot be assumed that
the mere existence of jobs tax credits implies employment-inducing effects. Among the 17 programs, 4 provided no benefits and another 5
operated as lump-sum grants for all or some of the sectors modeled.
Only 4 of the 13 states had true capital matching grants (Wisconsin,
Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Texas). In all four cases, they were for en-

Table 4.4 Utilization of Capital and Labor Credits in 75 Cities: Firms Locating in an Enterprise Zone, Averaged
by State, 1994
Value of credits per joba
Capital credits

Labor credits

Capital credits

Number of sectors with unused credits
Labor credits

Capital credits

State

General

Zone

General

Zone

General

Zone

General

Zone

General

Zone

General

Zone

Calif.
Conn.
Fla.
Ill.
Ind.
Ky.
Mo.
N.Y.
Ohio
Pa.
Tex.
Va.
Wis.

0
574
—
—
5,044
0
0
—
1,852
317
—
—
—

1,376
—
73
113
409
157
489
2,981
0
—
—
1,513
602

—
—
—
965
—
4,548
0
141
—
—
—
—
—

0
—
3,278
595
—
—
1,690
3,680
—
4,686
2,126
—
3,223

0.0
95.6
—
—
100.0
0.0
0.0
—
100.0
100.0
—
—
—

84.1
—
6.4
100.0
100.0
40.2
12.8
100.0
0.0
—
—
100.0
100.0

—
—
—
98.2
—
48.2
0.0
7.9
—
—
—
—
—

0.0
—
44.0
100.0
—
—
12.8
48.6
—
96.1
100.0
—
100.0

16
11
—
—
0
16
16
—
0
0
—
—
—

6
—
14
0
0
11
16
0
16
—
—
0
0

—
—
—
2
—
13
16
15
—
—
—
—
—

16
—
15
0
—
—
16
14
—
1
0
—
0

NOTE: For these simulations, all available credits, inside and outside of enterprise zones, were applied.
a
Weighted averages across 16 manufacturing sectors. A blank cell indicates that the incentive was not available; a zero indicates the
credit was available but could not be used, either because other credits took precedence and used all of the credit available up to the
ceiling (the gross tax before credits) or because the firm had to choose between credits and so took only the more generous one.
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Labor credits

Percent of credits useda
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terprise zone firms only. Four states (Connecticut, Indiana, Ohio, and
Virginia) offered no capital credit program, and a fifth (California) offered a program that could not be used by our firms. The remaining
four states (Florida, Kentucky, Missouri, and New York) provided credits that operated as lump-sum grants for capital for at least 13 of the 16
sectors modeled.
In summary, 4 of the 13 states provide, at the state level, a set of incentives that clearly lowers the price of labor without an offsetting capital-matching grant: Indiana, New York, Ohio, and Virginia. In these
four states, there is an open-ended labor matching grant worth $1,500
per job or more on average, and no capital grants (or, in the case of New
York, only closed-ended capital grants). Three other states have a clear
capital bias: Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Texas. In these states there is
one or more capital grants that is open-ended for virtually all sectors
and that provides $1,500 or more per job; the labor incentives are nonexistent or inconsequential (averaging $100 to $300 per job). Wisconsin has both labor and capital matching grants, but the latter are worth
about five times as much per job. In the other 5 states, grants are lumpsum in form for many or all sectors, providing no clear reduction in labor or capital prices at the margin.
When local incentives are brought into the picture, the capital bias
becomes clear, as we saw in Table 4.3. Property-tax abatements are not
limited by a firms income tax liability and operate always as capital
price-reducing grants. They are also very substantial in amount. In Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Texas they reinforce the capital bias; they neutralize or overwhelm the pro-labor state incentives in Indiana, New
York, and Ohio; and they introduce a strong capital bias to the otherwise ambiguous incentive systems in Connecticut and Missouri. Thus,
even within enterprise zones, the system of state and local incentives is
more likely to favor the substitution of capital for labor than vice versa.
Outside of zones, only two states (Ohio and Indiana) provide incentive
systems favoring labor (both states reserve property-tax abatements for
enterprise zones or urban revitalization areas). Connecticut, Illinois,
Kentucky, Missouri, New York, and Texas provide capital incentives
exclusively or predominantly.
The possible effects of incentives on a firms choice of technology,
and the relative use of capital and labor in the production process, depend not on the dollar amount of incentives but on changes in the prices
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of capital and labor. We can estimate these price changes for each of
the 16 manufacturing sectors and each of our 75 enterprise zone cities
using the TAIMez model. To calculate the reduction in the price of capital, we first calculate the total cost of capital (plant and equipment) to
the firm in the absence of incentives. We define this as the sum of the
annual depreciation and interest expense associated with the new plant
capital investment, plus property taxes paid on plant and equipment.
We then take the present value of these capital expenses over the 20year time horizon assumed in our model.1
Total capital expense is equal to the price of capital times the quantity of capital. The net present value of capital incentives represents a
potential reduction in capital expense over 20 years. With quantity of
capital held constant, the percentage reduction in capital expense is also
the percentage reduction in the price of capital. Thus we need not measure price or quantity directly. Similarly, the total cost of labor is defined as the present value of annual new plant payroll. The percentage
reduction in the price of labor is calculated by dividing the net present
value of labor incentives by the net present value of total labor expense.
The results of these calculations are shown in Table 4.5. Since
most of the variation is due to differences among states and sectors, we
show the results averaged by state. That is, for each state we calculated
the average price reduction for each sector among the five or six cities
in that state. Table 4.5 shows the results in two ways: the weighted average for the 16 sectors, and the range of results—the sector with the
smallest percentage reduction and the sector with the largest percentage
reduction. Since all the incentives reduce the price of labor or capital,
we show the percentages as positive numbers, representing the size of
the reduction. In making these calculations, we included only those incentives that were fully utilized and that therefore lowered factor prices
at the margin. That is, for each sector and city, if the firm could not use
100 percent of a given incentive, we in effect defined the incentive as a
lump-sum grant instead of a labor or capital incentive.
The effects of labor incentives on the price of labor are quite small.
In only 2 states does the average price reduction exceed 1.0 percent,
and the maximum price reduction among the 16 sectors never exceeds
3.0 percent in any state. Capital incentives, on the other hand, have
very substantial price effects in several of the states. The average price
reduction among sectors exceeds 5.0 percent in 8 of the 13 states, and
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Table 4.5 The Effect of Incentives on the Prices of Capital and
Labor, 1994 (Averages by State for 75 Enterprise
Zone Cities)
Reduction in price (%)
Average in 16 sectors

Range for 16 sectors

State

Capitala

Laborb

Capitala

Laborb

Calif.
Conn.
Fla.
Ill.
Ind.
Ky.
Mo.
N.Y.
Ohio
Pa.
Tex.
Va.
Wis.

0.0
4.5
1.0
5.7
18.0
3.2
5.5
7.2
13.4
9.8
5.5
0.0
5.1

0.5
0.1
0.1
0.1
2.6
0.0
0.0
1.5
0.9
0.2
0.0
0.8
0.3

0.0–0.0
2.9–6.7
0.0–21.2
3.9–8.9
9.5–34.5
0.4–21.7
3.6–8.6
3.0–36.1
8.5–29.5
2.0–20.9
3.6–10.1
0.0–0.0
0.7–6.5

0.0–1.4
0.0–0.3
0.0–1.1
0.0–0.1
2.6–2.8
0.0–0.4
0.0–0.0
0.9–2.3
0.9–0.9
0.1–0.3
0.0–0.0
0.3–1.3
0.2–0.6

a

b

Net present value (NPV) of fully utilized capital credits divided by NPV
of the total cost of capital (annual depreciation, interest, and property taxes), all net of state, local, and federal income tax effects.
NPV of fully utilized jobs credits divided by NPV of payroll, net of state,
local, and federal income tax effects.

the maximum exceeds 20 percent for at least 1 sector in 6 states. The
maximum exceeds 5.0 percent in all of the states except the 2—California and Virginia—where there are no capital incentives.
Empirical studies of manufacturing have generally shown a high
degree of substitutability between capital and labor (for example,
Berndt and Christensen 1973; Huang 1991). As the price of capital
goods falls relative to wages, firms do indeed adopt more capital-intensive methods of production, substituting capital for labor. The effect of
incentives, as we have shown, is precisely to lower the relative price of
capital (in 11 of the 13 states studied). The output effect of cheaper
capital (due to a lowering of costs and hence a lowering of product

How Taxes and Incentives Favor One Industry over Another 99

prices and increasing product demand) may be substantial, with the increased output leading to increased use of both capital and labor. The
size of this effect will depend on the elasticity of demand—how much
a price reduction increases sales. However, since the substitution effects are also likely to be substantial, the net effect of capital subsidies
may be to reduce the demand for labor rather than increase it. Indeed,
a study of the very large capital subsidies provided for manufacturers in
Northern Ireland from 1955 to 1983 concluded that the substitution effect was larger than the output effect; capital subsidies led to higher investment but lower employment levels than would have existed in their
absence (Harris 1991).
Why is this important? Surely if incentives do cause an increase in
investment in zones, there will in fact be an increase in jobs there—perhaps not as large an increase as there would have been with incentives
that clearly favored labor, but an increase nonetheless. The problem
with this argument is that it ignores the fact that incentives go to firms
that would have located or expanded in the zone even without incentives—noninduced investment—as well as to firms for whom the incentives were decisive. The substitution effect of incentives will operate on all firms; furthermore, as will be discussed in subsequent
chapters, it is likely that incentives are not decisive for most firms.
Thus even small job reductions in each noninduced firm through capital substitution could offset, or more than offset, the employment gains
for the zone from those few firms induced to change location to the
zone, because the noninduced firms are likely to be much more numerous.2

CONCLUSIONS
Among the 75 enterprise zone cities in our sample, we found considerable variation in terms of the industrial sectors that were taxed
most lightly and most heavily. Overall, the average city imposed a tax
rate on its most favored industry that was only 38 percent of the tax rate
on its least favored industry. Furthermore, there is sufficient variation
within cities in most states that any city can be fairly competitive for at
least one or a few sectors. In all states but California and Texas, there
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was at least 1 of our sample cities with a sector ranked in the top 20 percent (1–15). On the other hand, there were 11 cities (mostly in California, Pennsylvania, and Texas) with all sectors ranked in the bottom 40
percent. Cities in those states simply do not have enough leverage on
the overall state-local tax rate to overcome a disadvantageous state tax
system.
All this amounts to implicit industrial policies, with states and
cities providing favored tax treatment to a few industrial sectors. Our
major concern here is that it is very likely that little or no thought has
gone into the industrial policy consequences of most states’ and cities’
tax systems. Industrial policy has developed almost by default, as a byproduct of decisions taken about other state and local policy issues.
This is not to argue, however, that state and local tax policy can ever be
entirely sector-neutral; it is hard to imagine how any change to a state
or city’s tax code would not favor some specific firms and disfavor others. But we doubt that it is wise for government—federal, state or local—to be in the business of picking industrial winners and losers “in
the dark.”
The tax incentives in place in the enterprise zones in our sample of
75 cities have a clear bias in favor of capital in all but 2 of the 13 states.
The effects of labor incentives on the price of labor are quite small. In
only 2 states does the average labor price reduction exceed 1.0 percent,
and the maximum price reduction among the 16 sectors never exceeds
3.0 percent in any state. Capital incentives, on the other hand, have
very substantial price effects in several of the states. The average capital price reduction among sectors exceeds 5.0 percent in 8 of the 13
states, and the maximum exceeds 20 percent for at least 1 sector in 6
states.
Given the significant substitutability between capital and labor in
manufacturing reported in empirical studies, it is likely that this capital
bias in incentives would cause firms to adopt more capital-intensive
methods of production. This substitution of capital for labor would occur in all firms benefitting from the subsidies, including those for which
location decisions were unaffected. If this substitution effect were
large enough, it is possible that the net effect of zone incentives would
be to lower employment rather than to increase it. Furthermore, labor
incentives are usually expressed in terms of a fixed dollar amount per
new job or as a percentage of wages up to a ceiling. The ceiling is gen-
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erally below typical manufacturing wage rates so that the incentive is
equivalent to a lump sum per job. Thus, the employment incentives
that do exist do not encourage the creation of more-skilled or betterpaid jobs. They encourage quantity rather than quality. The credit as a
percent of payroll is maximized when employees are hired near the bottom of the wage scale.
If the principal objective of enterprise zone policy is to stimulate
job creation, capital incentives should be replaced with pure labor
“matching grants” that simply provide firms a percentage reduction in
the wage rate. Any ceiling on wages eligible for such a credit should be
high enough to retain incentives to hire more higher-wage skilled
workers (where that is appropriate, given the targeted labor pool). Of
course, part of the appeal of capital incentives may be that local government officials equate capital growth with an expansion of the local
property-tax base. Whether capital incentives, or incentives generally,
do in fact produce a net gain in local revenues is the focus of the next
chapter.

Notes
1. We calculate capital costs as the present value of annual expenses rather than as the
acquisition cost of plant and equipment because we want to compute after-tax
costs, and it is these annual expenses for depreciation, interest, and property taxes
that are dedicated for state and federal income tax purposes. Annual expenses also
take into account the cost of replacement machinery and equipment during the 20year horizon and permit a consistent treatment of labor and capital costs in terms of
the time period, given the varying lives of different kinds of capital. That is, depreciation measures the capital actually “used up” during the period, if we assume
that tax depreciation rates approximate economic depreciation.
2. One is tempted to ask: How could a capital subsidy be too small to affect a location
decision but large enough to change the choice of technology? The answer is that
capital costs are one among many factors that vary substantially by location and
thus may be swamped by these other factors when firms make location decision.
The choice between more or less capital-intensive technologies, on the other hand,
is generally thought by economists to be made simply on the basis of the relative
prices of capital and labor.

5
The Fiscal Effects of Incentives
Although the primary public justifications for business incentives
generally, and enterprise zone incentives as well, are the attraction of
capital investment and the creation of jobs, expansion of the propertytax base is an important secondary objective. The Ohio enterprise zone
program, for example, specifies three separate objectives: 1) to expand
employment in the state, 2) to increase business investment in the state,
and 3) to increase the state and local tax base. As long as policymakers
believe that incentive programs have positive effects, however small,
on all three objectives, there is little reason for them to question
whether such programs should continue. The programs appear to have
no cost. Positive fiscal effects are routinely documented by development officials who assume (and for the most part honestly believe or at
least prefer not to doubt) that all jobs benefitting from incentives would
not have existed in the state but for those incentives. If the fiscal effects
are negative, however, as some research suggests (Bartik 1994),1 then
policy analysts should assess whether or not the tax costs per job are
outweighed by the benefits of increased employment.
In this chapter we investigate whether tax cuts—in the form of incentives tied to new investment—are likely to generate fiscal gains.
We conclude that, in the majority of states that we modeled, it is unlikely that state and local governments will gain tax revenues from the
incentive programs that they offer within enterprise zones. In some
states, however, zone incentives consist entirely of state income tax
credits; while these credits probably produce a revenue loss for the
state, if they have any effect at all on job creation within enterprise
zones, then local governments will gain tax base and revenue. At the
other extreme are states in which the major zone incentives consist of
local property-tax abatements; here the net fiscal effect is likely to be
that local governments forego substantial revenue, though in so doing
they may increase state corporate income tax receipts slightly.
We also examine the structure of incentives; many, but not all,
places “front-load” their incentives, providing most of the benefits in
the first few years after a new plant is built or an existing one is ex103
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panded. Is this a smart approach, or would back-loading generate more
revenue? The answer, it turns out, is counterintuitive: a constant, permanent reduction in taxes on new zone establishments makes more fiscal and economic sense than larger initial tax breaks that are phased out
over several years.

THE FISCAL EFFECTS OF TAX CUTS GENERALLY
Whether the fiscal effects of business tax cuts are positive or negative depends on how economic growth is affected by differences in
state and local taxes. Economists measure the sensitivity of growth to
tax changes by a ratio called the “elasticity,” which is simply the percentage change in business activity (investment, employment) divided
by the percentage change in taxes. The more business activity responds
to differences in taxes, the larger will be the elasticity. Some researchers have concluded that the elasticity of investment with respect
to interstate or intermetropolitan differences in taxation is between –0.2
and –0.4; in other words, the percentage change in business activity
will be 20 percent to 40 percent of the percentage change in taxes.2 A
tax cut in one state or metropolitan region will not cause very much
economic activity to shift to that state or region. Bartik (1994) takes
the middle of this range, –0.3 , which implies that a 20 percent tax cut,
for example, would produce a 6 percent increase in investment and jobs
(6% / –20% = –0.3). He then notes that the revenue effect of a tax cut
can be estimated from the following equation:
R
Revenue change =  (1 + 1/E),
J

where E is the elasticity of economic activity with respect to taxes and
R/J is average revenue per job prior to the tax cut. (See Appendix C for
a derivation of this formula.) With a national average business tax revenue per job of $1,620 and an elasticity of –0.3, a new job would generate on average about $3,780 in revenue losses as a result of tax cuts.
What would it take for localities to break even? The answer, from
the above equation, is an elasticity of business activity with respect to
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tax cuts equal to 1. The right-hand side of the equation then becomes
zero: there is no change in revenue, which means the incentive is fiscally neutral. If E is less than 1, the revenue change will be negative; if it
is greater than 1, a tax cut will increase revenues. Since there is substantial evidence that the interstate or intermetropolitan elasticity is
much less than 1 (Bartik (1991) puts the upper limit at 0.6), it is probably safe to conclude that these kinds of tax cuts will cost state and local
governments revenue.
Why losses? Because it is, as a practical matter, impossible for one
locality or state to successfully target tax cuts only at firms that would
otherwise have located in another locality or state. As a result, tax cuts
end up going to firms that would have made the same location decision
without the tax cut, thus generating tax losses. Since location decisions
are not greatly affected by the tax cuts, the revenue gains from firms
that were induced to move or stay in the region will not be large and
will be more than offset by the revenue losses from other firms that also
had their taxes reduced.
Most of the research on the effects of taxes on growth has measured the effects of differences in the average level of taxation and
therefore predicts the effects of across-the-board reductions in taxes.
Nonetheless, we can conclude that, under certain conditions, the sensitivity of economic growth to tax incentives granted only for new investment will be in the same range of –0.2 to –0.4. This is a valid inference for the long-run effects of a certain class of incentives: those
that are structured as a permanent tax cut on the income from new investment. An example of such an incentive would be a complete exemption of newly acquired (but not existing) machinery and equipment
from the property tax. The incentives then represent constant and permanent cuts in taxes on the new investment. Eventually, all, or nearly
all, business property in that locality will be “new” property benefitting
from the tax incentive and the distinction between an across-the-board
tax cut (such as, immediately exempting all machinery and equipment,
old and new) and an incentive will have disappeared. Thus, in the long
run the incentive will have the same effect on growth, and the same effect on state and local revenue, as the immediate across-the-board tax
cut.
Our research enables us to estimate the average long-run fiscal effect of tax cuts among the 75 enterprise zone cities in our sample. The
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average direct state and local tax revenue (before incentives) across the
16 manufacturing sectors and 75 cities was about $3,050 per job per
year. This implies a net state-local revenue loss of about $7,120 per
year for each new job attributable to the tax cut, if we apply Bartik’s
formula and assume the interstate or intermetropolitan elasticity for incentives is –0.3. This will be a reasonable estimate for an across-theboard tax cut or a permanent incentive that will eventually become the
equivalent. Our estimate is higher than Bartik’s earlier estimate because our research shows a substantially higher gross revenue per job
in manufacturing than Bartik’s national average revenue per job across
all business sectors of $1,620.
Thus far we have confined our analysis to the effects of taxes or incentives on the redistribution of business activity among states or metropolitan regions. This is the question that most research has addressed, and it is arguably the appropriate policy question as well.
Enterprise zones are a state policy for solving the problems of distressed areas of certain cities within the state; it makes sense to evaluate
the policy from the perspective of the collective cost of the tax incentives to the state and to local governments. There will be net revenue
gains, then, only if the zone incentives succeed in attracting sufficient
jobs from outside the state; interstate or intermetropolitan elasticities
are thus appropriate.
One could, however, pose the local policy question as well: Are
there local revenue gains from a reduction in local taxes? Such gains
could come about from a redirection of investment within a metropolitan area or within the state, as well as from the attraction of capital from
out of state. As for the elasticity of investment with respect to differences in tax rates within a metropolitan area, we have much less evidence to go on. Bartik (1991) reviewed seven intrametropolitan studies,
but three of the seven studies compared suburban sites only and thus
may tell us nothing about the effects of taxes on the competitive position
of a central city relative to its suburbs.3 Among the remaining four, the
tax elasticities ranged from –0.8 to –2.5. Few relevant articles have been
published since 1991. Luce (1994) studied 340 municipalities in the
Philadelphia region and found an average elasticity of sectoral employment with respect to property taxes of –0.6, and to wage taxes of –0.4.
Luce also argues that the elasticities of –1.5 to –2.0 reported in the earlier studies are substantially overstated. Mark, McGuire, and Papke
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(2000), on the other hand, found elasticities of a little over –2.1, relating
total employment growth in the Washington, D.C., region with sales tax
rates and personal property tax rates, but found no significant relation to
real property taxes or corporate income taxes.
There is thus only limited, inconsistent, and disputed evidence of
the magnitude of tax effects among places within a metropolitan area,
though in general the elasticities seem to be larger than those found between states or regions. It is true that these larger elasticities are consistent with location theory, which would predict that tax differences
will be more important in determining location choice when other factors such as wage rates, energy costs, and access to markets and inputs
are similar across localities, as they are likely to be within a metropolitan region. Still, there are only these six intrametropolitan studies to
rely on, and none of them looked at enterprise zone sites per se or measured the effects of tax incentives (as opposed to overall tax levels or
simply average tax rates).

MODEL ESTIMATES OF THE FISCAL
EFFECTS OF INCENTIVES
The conclusion drawn above—that on average among our 75 enterprise zone cities, state and local governments collectively stand to lose
in the long run about $6,750 per year per new job from tax incentives—
is of limited applicability for a variety of reasons. We will consider
each of these qualifications in some detail and then provide results from
simulations of incentives using TAIMez that provide a more accurate
picture of the actual workings of incentives.
First of all, the annual fiscal effects of incentives are the same as
the annual fiscal effects of across the board tax cuts only in the long
run. Eventually all investment will be new investment, but in the
meantime there will be a period of many years during which incentives
will be less costly because much of the existing industrial activity will
be paying its full freight in taxes. This will be true even for incentives
in the form of permanent tax cuts for new firms or new investment.
Second, most tax incentives are neither constant from year to year
nor permanent. Property taxes on new capital are almost always abated
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for a limited number of years (typically 3 to 10) and at a declining rate.
Income tax credits are granted for the year in which investment or job
creation takes place, with unused credits (which may be a small or a
large share of initial credits) carried forward for a limited period—typically not more than 10 years.
Third, there is some reason to believe that incentives have different
effects on net growth than across-the-board tax cuts of the same magnitude. Incentives that are tied to new establishments or expansions of
existing establishments will have no effect on existing firms’ decisions
to remain in the community without expanding (in many instances the
site will not permit expansion, and the firm may not need more capacity anyway) versus building a new lower-cost facility elsewhere.
Across-the-board cuts, on the other hand, do improve the competitive
position of the locality vis-à-vis greenfield sites elsewhere and so could
plausibly reduce exit rates. It may be the case that actual firm deaths
have little or nothing to do with taxes, but the loss of business activity
is driven to a major extent not by firm deaths but by branch plant closings (which may be accompanied by branch plant births elsewhere) and
plant relocations. Furthermore, symmetry requires that if tax differences induce plant relocations they must affect out-migration rates and
in-migration rates equally, since every migration is a move out as well
as a move in.
We will return to the question of how taxes or incentives might affect establishment exit rates (and therefore job-loss rates) in the discussion of policy alternatives at the end of this chapter. For now, we want
to investigate in detail the other question raised above: how the time
pattern of tax incentives matters. The timing of state and local enterprise zone incentives is complex and varies greatly from place to place.
This suggests that a detailed simulation of their effects may produce
useful insights. The TAIMez model developed for this research does
simulate actual incentives year by year and thus can be used to illustrate the fiscal effects on state and local government, as well as the effects on a firm’s rate of return on new investment.
The TAIMez model calculates, for each representative firm and
each locality, the gross property taxes that the firm would pay each year
for the first 20 years after a new plant is built, based on the value of its
taxable property each year and a constant local property-tax rate. It
then calculates the size of the abatement it would receive each year

The Fiscal Effects of Incentives 109

from the local government being modeled. The model also measures
the increased state and local sales taxes paid on purchases of machinery
and equipment for the new plant and on purchases of fuel and electricity for the new plant, taking into account any special exemptions or
credits for enterprise zone firms. Finally, it calculates the increase in
state and local income taxes paid by the firm as a result of the increased
taxable income generated by the new plant (including the effects of deducting from taxable income the net local property taxes on the new
plant), and then deducts all state credits resulting from the new plant investment. The result is an estimate, year by year for 20 years, of the increase in state and local taxes, with and without tax incentives, as a result of the representative firm’s investment.
The model’s fiscal results do not include any secondary effects,
such as increased personal taxes paid by in-migrants taking jobs at the
new facility or by the previously unemployed, or increased taxes paid
by other businesses that may experience a growth in sales and employment as a result of the new economic activity generated by the new
plant. Nor does the model take into account any of the increased state
and local public service costs that would follow from such secondary
effects, as well as directly from the new plant itself, that could offset
much of the revenue gains.4 It thus measures only the direct revenues
from the firm itself.
Since taxes and incentives will vary from year to year, we present our results by collapsing the 20-year stream of revenues into
one figure: the present value of that stream (discounted at 10 percent).
For the average state and city in our sample, the tax system—without
incentives—would result in about $26,000 in additional state and local tax revenue over a 20-year period for every new job that arrives
in the zone. The package of state and local incentives available in the
average enterprise zone, on the other hand, is worth about $7,800 per
job. The net gain in state-local revenue for each job that was induced
by the incentives would be the $26,000 in gross taxes less the incentive package, or $18,200. Each new job that was not incentive-induced would cost the state and local governments the $7,800 in wasted incentives.
These average revenue gains and losses conceal considerable variation across states and cities. In Table 5.1 we show more detailed results of our simulations. These results are averaged in two ways: First,
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Table 5.1 State and Local Direct Revenue Gains per New Job for
Investment Induced by Incentives
State taxes
Corporate
income
Average by state
Calif.
9,396
Conn.
5,039
Fla.
1,207
Ill.
6,924
Ind.
5,748
Ky.
4,249
Mo.
2,273
N.Y.
2,522
Ohio
7,055
Pa.
15,495
Tex.
1,535
Va.
5,184
Wis.
3,070
Among the 75 cities
Highest
21,543
Mean
5,448
Lowest
912

Local taxes

Sales

Total

Property

Sales and
corporate
income

2,383
1,493
2,670
1,224
1,244
1,766
2,921
995
979
1,493
2,504
685
2,451

11,778
6,532
3,876
8,148
6,992
6,015
5,195
3,517
8,034
16,988
4,039
5,870
5,521

6,948
9,700
15,474
4,856
14,997
5,016
10,547
4,354
8,168
4,621
21,556
11,524
9,361

695
0
185
131
0
1,347
2,164
881
2,071
7,125
770
196
49

7,643
9,700
15,659
4,987
14,997
6,363
12,711
5,235
10,239
11,746
22,327
11,720
9,410

2,921
1,729
685

23,036
7,177
1,907

22,776
9,837
2,226

13,153
1,202
0

23,590
11,039
2,973

Total

NOTE: These figures represent the present value of revenues gained with 1994 taxes
and incentives over the first 20 years after the firm’s investment that triggers the incentives; they represent the weighted average across 16 sectors and the discount rate is
10 percent.

for each of the 75 cities we computed a weighted average of the 16
manufacturing sectors; then, for each state, we computed a simple average of the weighted averages for five or six cities in the state. To
illustrate the range of results, Table 5.1 also shows the highest, the
mean, and the lowest weighted average among the 75 cities. (Appendix Table F.4 shows the sectoral, as well as city, variation.) The highest
net revenue per induced job among all 16 sectors and 75 cities was

The Fiscal Effects of Incentives 111

$86,675, while the lowest was –$2,045 (see Appendix Table F.4). (In
Chapter 3 we explain how incentives can create negative tax rates for
the firm, which is also how they produce negative net revenue for state
and local governments.)
The net revenue gains from induced investment are only half of
the picture. Some plants would have located or expanded in the city in
question even in the absence of incentives, and for every noninduced
job there is a loss of revenue measured by the cost of the state and local incentives. Table 5.2 summarizes the fiscal effects. The revenue
losses consist of the state income tax revenues foregone due to investment and jobs credits, and local property-tax abatements. The average
incentive package among the 75 cities was $7,793 per job, but in the
most generous city the average package among the 16 sectors was
$35,036. Appendix Table F.4 shows the sectoral as well as city variation: the maximum revenue loss across all sectors and cities was
$70,423 per job, while the smallest loss was $656. These revenue loss
figures represent the gross value of the incentive package (before the
effects of income tax deductibility) but still discount the benefits at
10 percent over 20 years. Without discounting, the largest packages
would rival those publicized for some of the major auto plant competitions.
At first glance, our fiscal results as summarized in Table 5.2 appear
to indicate that a fiscal surplus is quite plausible. The average induced
job produces a substantial revenue gain of approximately $18,200, and
this will be offset by a revenue loss of only about $7,800 for each noninduced job. Whether the states or cities come out ahead by offering
incentives depends, however, on the proportion of all new manufacturing jobs that are actually induced by the incentives. For example, using
these average figures for gain and loss per job, the fiscal effect on state
and local government would be negative if there were three noninduced
jobs for every induced job—and losses would equal three times $7,800,
which exceeds the $18,200 gain.
Can we estimate the net fiscal effect for the average city among the
75 by applying the “consensus” elasticity of –0.3 as we did earlier? We
have previously argued that this is an appropriate elasticity for measuring the long-run annual effect of incentives in the form of permanent
tax cuts on new investment. But here we have estimates of the shortrun revenue effects (over the first 20 years) of incentive programs that

Induced investment:
Revenue gained per job

Non-induced investment:
Revenue lost per job

State
Average by state
Calif.
11,778
Conn.
6,532
Fla.
3,876
Ill.
8,148
Ind.
6,992
Ky.
6,015
Mo.
5,195
N.Y.
3,517
Ohio
8,034
Pa.
16,988
Tex.
4,039
Va.
5,870
Wis.
5,521
Among the 75 cities
Highest 23,036
Mean
7,177
Lowest
1,907

Incentives as % of gross taxes

Local

Total

State

Local

Total

State

Local

Total

7,643
9,700
15,659
4,987
14,997
6,363
12,711
5,235
10,239
11,746
22,327
11,720
9,410

19,421
16,231
19,535
13,134
21,989
12,378
17,905
8,753
18,273
28,734
26,365
17,590
14,931

10,771
10,194
4,557
8,596
11,201
9,377
6,192
9,385
8,907
20,498
3,660
6,697
7,767

6,067
1,493
2,670
1,224
1,244
7,833
5,516
995
979
1,493
3,724
685
2,451

6,948
12,687
15,474
6,825
28,487
5,582
14,322
7,445
17,290
5,561
23,258
11,524
9,361

176,947
0
18,481
13,055
0
133,915
352,775
88,117
204,619
712,477
114,419
19,582
4,902

1,683,786
1,168,690
722,677
982,003
1,244,488
1,720,988
1,170,778
1,038,043
988,623
2,199,054
738,454
738,257
1,021,735

871,785
1,268,715
1,565,862
695,567
2,848,673
692,139
1,784,998
832,666
1,933,591
1,268,548
2,440,196
1,172,009
940,959

23,590
11,039
2,973

43,476
18,216
4,902

12,803
4,635
1,513

29,583
3,158
–8

35,036
7,793
1,513

78.2
40.1
17.0

65.8
19.5
–0.1

68.2
29.6
6.5

NOTE: These figures represent the present value of revenues gained and lost per new job with 1994 taxes and incentives
over the first 20 years after the firm’s investment that triggers the incentives; they represent the weighted average across
16 sectors and the discount rate is 10%. Weighted average new plant employment across 16 sectors is 127.
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Table 5.2 Summary of State and Local Fiscal Effects per New Job in 75 Cities
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provide benefits that are generally concentrated in the first 10 years.
The elasticity is nonetheless useful, provided we are willing to accept
the following—quite reasonable—assumption: that firms making plant
investment decisions employ a limited time horizon and a discount rate
reflecting the cost of capital. We assume a time horizon of 20 years and
a 10 percent discount rate. An incentive that reduces the present value
of the firm’s tax burden on the income from the new plant over this time
horizon by 25 percent, then, will have the same effect on the firm’s investment decision as a permanent reduction in annual taxes of 25
percent.
The elasticity of –0.3, which measures the sensitivity of new investment to a cut in business taxes, can be used to estimate the proportion of new jobs induced by the tax cuts versus those that are not. It can
be shown that the percent of new jobs that are induced is equal to the
elasticity times the percentage cut in taxes (see Appendix C). What we
find is that, for the average industry in the average city in our sample of
75, incentives represented an approximated 30 percent tax cut (see
Table 5.2); therefore, new jobs that were induced by incentives would
equal only about 9 percent (0.3 times 30 percent). For every 100 gross
new jobs each year, there would be just 9 that were induced by incentives. Over the next 20 years, these 9 jobs would generate a revenue
gain of $163,800 (9 times the average $18,200 gain per job). The remaining 91 jobs created the same year would produce a revenue loss of
$709,800 over that same time period (91 times the average $7,800 loss
per noninduced job). The net state-local revenue loss is therefore
$546,000, or about $60,700 per new induced manufacturing job. Converting this to an annual flow, state and local governments would lose
about $7,130 each year for each job gained.5 Interestingly, this is quite
close to our earlier estimate of the long-run effect of permanent incentives: $7,120 per year per new job.
But do state and local governments also use a 20-year horizon and
a 10 percent discount rate? What is the appropriate way for them to
evaluate the decision to adopt an incentive program—its long-term annual effect in equilibrium, the present value over a fairly long time
horizon like 20 years, or a shorter-term annual effect? This becomes a
particularly important issue when we realize that the decision for the
community or state is quite different from the decision for the firm.
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While it makes sense to assume that a firm applies standard capital
budgeting techniques to a single plant-location decision, the city is
making a decision about the long-run consequences of a policy change
that is going to affect the capital budgeting decisions of many firms
over a period of many years, and for each firm there are multiyear fiscal
effects. Thus, for the community we must model not only the time pattern of the revenue and incentive flows per firm, but the time pattern of
firm arrivals and departures, births, and deaths.
To learn more about the fiscal effects of incentives, we developed a
simple simulation model. We assume that each locality is initially in a
steady state with 10 percent birth and death rates; that is, for every 100
initial establishments, 10 establishments are born or move in each year,
and 10 die or move out.6 We also make an assumption about the distribution of establishment lives, because some establishments will generate revenue gains or losses longer that others. A death rate of 10 percent implies an average life expectancy of 10 years; we assume that
deaths are approximately normally distributed around the tenth year after birth, and that by the fifteenth year all establishments have died.
(We are using the term “death” here as a short cut for both actual establishment deaths and establishment relocations out of the community.)
Under these assumptions about births and deaths, revenue gains
and losses will have reached a plateau by year 15 after incentives are
adopted. This is because, by this year, the level of employment will
have reached its new equilibrium level, and the distribution of establishments in their first, second, or third year since birth (and so on) will
remain constant thereafter. As a result, the distribution of establishments receiving various incentive amounts appropriate to the year since
the investment was made will also be constant: the same number of
new establishments arrives each year receiving first-year incentives,
while the same number disappears each year after receiving year-15 incentives. This assumption does affect the results; the longer the assumed life span, the longer it takes to reach establishment equilibrium,
which will affect the distribution of fiscal gains and losses over time.
To illustrate how fiscal losses and gains approach a plateau over
time, we constructed Figure 5.1, which shows the year-by-year fiscal
gains and losses for a Texas city with typical local property-tax rates
and with typical tax abatements in its enterprise zone. In this example,
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we assumed that all new establishments arriving in this city after adoption of the incentives are fabricated metals plants. We also assumed
that establishment births are, in fact, quite sensitive to tax rates; that is,
we assumed an elasticity of –1.0, so that the 23 percent tax cut produced by state and local incentives in this Texas enterprise zone would
increase economic activity by 23 percent. Even with this assumption,
the state and local incentives produce a net loss of state and local revenue every year after incentive adoption. The net fiscal effect would
settle at an annual loss of $431 per induced job by year 15, and the net
present value of the fiscal effects over the first 20 years would amount
to a loss of $7,227 per induced job. For state and local governments to
break even over the first 20 years in this scenario, establishment births
would have to increase by more than the 23 percent cut in tax rates on
new investment. In all likelihood, establishment births would increase
by much less.
The time pattern of incentives depicted in Figure 5.1 is fairly typical for the states and sectors we modeled. Table 5.3 shows the breakeven elasticity (in absolute value) for the 13 states and for 8 sectors (the
8 that accounted for most of the establishments in our enterprise zone
sample). Again, break-even is defined not on an annual basis but in

Figure 5.1 Annual Fiscal Effects of Incentives for a Fabricated Metals
Plants in a Texas City

SIC

Sector

20
Food and kindred products
23
Apparel and other textile prod.
27
Printing and publishing
28
Chemicals and allied products
30
Rubber and misc. plastics prod.
34
Fabricated metal products
35
Industrial machinery
36
Electric & electronic equipment
Average elasticity
Front-loading of incentivesb

Calif. Conn. Fla.
1.25
1.16
1.28
1.26
1.26
1.18
1.18
1.36
1.24
0.69

1.48
1.45
1.53
1.46
1.49
1.49
1.49
1.50
1.49
0.78

1.20
1.25
1.25
1.27
1.20
1.23
1.27
1.27
1.24
0.66

Ill.

Ind.

Ky.

Mo. N.Y. Ohio

Pa.

Tex.

Va. Wis.

1.35
1.41
1.36
1.35
1.35
1.40
1.39
1.39
1.38
0.78

1.29
1.20
1.30
1.31
1.28
1.23
1.19
1.19
1.25
0.64

1.24
1.34
1.23
1.20
1.19
1.21
1.23
1.22
1.23
0.65

1.30
1.31
1.30
1.30
1.30
1.30
1.30
1.30
1.30
0.76

1.43
1.47
1.45
1.46
1.44
1.45
1.46
1.47
1.45
0.81

1.30
1.31
1.31
1.34
1.30
1.33
1.31
1.29
1.31
0.67

1.18
1.27
1.31
1.18
1.06
1.12
1.20
1.20
1.19
0.75

1.08
1.06
1.05
—a
1.06
1.08
1.06
1.07
1.07
0.53

1.32
1.35
1.33
1.34
1.32
1.34
1.36
1.37
1.34
0.71

1.25
1.33
1.33
1.21
1.19
1.27
1.27
1.26
1.26
0.67

NOTE: Elasticity is defined as the percentage increase in annual establishment births (induced births over total births) divided by the percentage decrease in taxes attributable to the average state and local incentive package. Fiscal break-even occurs when the present value of
state-local revenue gains from growth induced by incentives over the first 20 years after incentives are enacted equals the present value of
state-local revenue losses from granting incentives to establishments that would have located there anyway, over the same 20 years. Estimates are based on average local property tax rates and tax abatements by state, with all general and enterprise zone incentives applied.
a
Unable to calculate.
b
Front-loading of incentives is the ratio of the present value of the incentive package over 20 years to the undiscounted sum of those incentives over 20 years; the index ranges from a value of 0.16 (all incentives received in year 20) to 1.00 (all incentives received the first year).

116 Chapter 5

Table 5.3. Elasticity of Establishment Growth Required for Fiscal Break-Even for Selected Manufacturing Sectors in
the Thirteen States, 1998 Taxes and Incentives
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terms of the present value of revenue over the first 20 years after adoption of incentives. The overall average break-even elasticity was 1.29;
thus a 20 percent tax cut would, for example, have to produce a 25.8
percent increase in economic activity. The higher the break-even elasticity, the less likely it is that the real sensitivity of economic activity to
taxes exceeds that break-even level. The lowest average break-even
elasticity was 1.07 in New York, which is also the state with the least
front-loaded incentives. We will explore in the next section why frontloading makes break-even less likely.

WHY FRONT-LOADING INCENTIVES
IS A COSTLY STRATEGY
The conventional wisdom appears to be that incentives should be
front loaded—more generous in early years and eventually phased
out. By granting temporary abatements or one-time credits rather than
permanent reductions in taxes, governments appear to believe that they
are minimizing their revenue losses. Eventually, the argument goes,
these firms we have attracted will be paying the full freight in local taxes, and it will be worth the temporary loss in revenue to get the permanent gain.
To test the conventional wisdom, we created a measure of the degree of front loading: the ratio of the discounted value of incentives
over 20 years to the undiscounted value. Where incentives are provided entirely in the first year, the front-loading measure is equal to 1.0,
which is its maximum value. Were incentives provided entirely in year
20 (entirely backloaded), discounting at 10 percent would produce a ratio of 0.16, which is the lowest value the front-loading index can assume. Incentives equal in value each year for 20 years would produce
an index value of 0.47. The front-loading measure ranged from 0.53 in
New York (only slightly front-loaded) to 0.81 in Pennsylvania. Our
simulations show that the states with more front-loaded incentives
tended to require a higher elasticity to produce fiscal break-even. The
break-even elasticity for a sector and the front-loading of incentives for
that sector are, in fact, highly correlated. Overall, the correlation is
0.82. In other words, the more incentives are front-loaded, the greater
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must be the response of investment to tax cuts if the locality is to break
even, and the more likely the incentives will generate a net loss of revenue.
What is it about New York’s incentives that makes them less frontloaded? First of all, there is a ceiling on investment tax credits equal to
the firm’s total state tax liability. Second, the general investment tax
credit is sizeable but could rarely be used fully in the early years, so
that many firms took full advantage of the 15-year carryforward. The
additional enterprise zone credits have a lower ceiling (50 percent of
state tax liability), but an unlimited carryforward. Thus, the generous
incentives combined with long carryforwards and a low ceiling on annual use (for zone credits) means that incentives are, in effect, spread
over the entire 20-year period.
Why do our simulations of the fiscal effects of incentives yield a
wide range of break-even elasticities, unlike the results of Bartik’s
equation, which indicates a break-even elasticity of –1.0 regardless of
the magnitude of the tax cuts (see our Appendix C)? To understand
this, consider first what the simulation produces if we model a constant
and permanent reduction in taxes on new investment. Here we find
that the break-even elasticity calculated in our model simulation is exactly equal to the theoretical value of –1.0, and that government exactly breaks even in year one and in every year after that. But when
we simulate real-world incentives in which the percentage tax reduction varies from year to year, we find that most incentive systems are
front-loaded and that this tends to generate fiscal losses in the first
years after incentives are adopted. This is because we assume gross
establishment growth in the absence of incentives (which accords with
the real world, even in enterprise zones), and this non-induced growth
begins to produce losses immediately. Furthermore, the net revenue gains from induced jobs may be minimal, or even negative, in the
early years. As a result, the net fiscal effect is negative in most states
early on. Since the positive net benefits come only later, they are more
heavily discounted when we employ a present value decision criterion.
Why is the conventional wisdom about the front-loading of incentives wrong? The problem is that the conventional view ignores the
fact that establishments do not live forever. By front-loading, one is increasing the odds that a given establishment will get most or all of the
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potential incentives but will pay full freight for only a few years, or
none at all; by the time the incentives are phased out, many establishments will have died or moved on to start the incentive pattern over
again in another community. As we will see in Chapter 6, there is a
large amount of establishment turnover in the enterprise zones we studied. The average death rate was actually a little higher than the 10 percent assumed in our fiscal simulation model.
The conventional view makes the mistake of focusing on the life
cycle of one establishment instead of looking at the annual flows of establishments—induced and noninduced—into and out of the community. Every year, those businesses that arrived in previous years are paying more and more in taxes as the incentives phase out. But every year
new establishments arrive, and existing ones expand—paying very little taxes. When one considers the community as a whole rather than a
single business, it is clear that the large up-front costs are not one-time
“investments,” but continuing drains on resources.
To further reinforce this point, suppose a community were considering a choice between two incentive strategies: 1) a permanent exemption of 25 percent of the taxable income attributable to new enterprise
zone operations, or 2) a 34.6 percent tax abatement each year for only
the first 10 years. The net present value of these two incentives over 20
years is identical at a discount rate of 10 percent: both represent a 25
percent reduction in taxes over that period. In our simulation model,
which assumes that firms make project decisions based on a 20-year
horizon, both incentives would produce the same increase in jobs.
With an assumed elasticity of –1.0—so that the 25 percent tax cut in
both instances generates a 25 percent increase in the annual flow of
new establishments—the first alternative just breaks even for the community, while the front-loaded version generates net fiscal losses every
year following the adoption of incentives. For the 20-year period, the
community loses $3,446 per induced job, in present value. Interestingly, the annual fiscal effect in equilibrium (by year 15) for the temporary
34.6 percent abatement is also negative: $508 per induced job. In other words, it is not just discounting that accounts for the negative fiscal
consequences of front-loading; it is also the continual arrival of new establishments taking the full benefit of early incentives, combined with
the continual exit of older firms that had been paying the full tax, or
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close to it. Because the average firm in our simulation remains in the
community only 10 years, though, the average firm never ends up paying the full property-tax rate.

THE TOTAL FISCAL EFFECTS FOR A ZONE
To better appreciate the significance of the fiscal effects of tax incentive policy, it is useful to consider the likely magnitude of total revenue losses for an average enterprise zone. To estimate these losses, we
simulated a zone that grants front-loaded incentives in the form of a
34.6 percent tax cut each year for 10 years, with no further incentives
after that. As we noted earlier, such a tax incentive is equivalent, in
present value terms, to a 25 percent permanent tax cut, approximately
the size of the tax reduction in the average enterprise zone in our study.
We assumed a zone initially containing 100 manufacturing establishments, each employing 30 people on average, and annual establishment
birth and death rates of 10 percent. These numbers are also fairly representative of the sample zones, as we will see in the next chapter.7 If
we then assume an elasticity of –0.3, there would be approximately 24
jobs, out of the 324 gross jobs created annually, that would be induced
by the incentives.
In the first year after adoption, with 324 new jobs appearing that
year, the incentives would produce about $176,000 in lost state-local
tax revenue. In the second year, those same 324 jobs would produce
the same net losses again, and an additional 324 jobs would appear and
generate a like amount. Thus the annual losses would continue to increase, since incentives provided to jobs created in one year continue to
generate losses as long as those jobs remain in the community and remain qualified for the incentives (which, in our example, means for 10
years), and each year incentives are provided to a fresh batch of new
jobs as well (mostly noninduced). By the time equilibrium in employment is attained in year 15—at a level 243 jobs greater than would have
existed without incentives (about 8 percent of the 3,000 initial jobs)—
the annual revenue losses for the zone total about $1.5 million, and they
continue at that level indefinitely. This represents a great deal of mon-
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ey to be spent annually on economic development in a single zone, a
point to which we will return in the book’s concluding chapter.

CONCLUSIONS
In the majority of states that we modeled, it is unlikely that state
and local governments collectively will gain tax revenues from the incentive programs they offer within enterprise zones. This conclusion is
based on previous research showing that business activity is simply not
sufficiently influenced by tax differences, that other location factors are
more important. As a result, much of the cost of incentives is wasted;
incentives end up subsidizing investment that would have occurred
anyway because it was driven by non-tax location considerations. The
tax revenues lost on these noninduced investments are likely to exceed
the revenue gains from the few establishments for which the incentives
do in fact tip the balance in favor of the zone location. The magnitude
of these revenue losses could be very sizeable; in an average zone in
our study, state-local government would lose in the neighborhood of
$1.5 million per year as a result of offering a typical incentive package,
under a reasonable assumption about the sensitivity of growth to taxes
(though we argue later that even this assumption is probably too generous, and the losses would be even greater).
The fiscal effect can be quite different for the state as a whole than
for the cities with enterprise zones. Let’s consider, first, the four states
in which the state provides tax credits to zone firms but the localities do
not offer property-tax abatements in zones, or where such abatements
are very limited or rarely used—California, Florida, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Due to their front-loaded incentives, it is not likely that these
states (with the possible exception of California) will gain revenues
from offering zone credits. This is particularly true given that the credits are not statewide, but are quite localized. Thus, even where the incentives are effective in drawing establishments into a zone, these establishments might otherwise have located elsewhere in the same state;
if so, there will be no gain in the tax base for the state. For the localities, on the other hand, the incentives have no tax cost since they are en-
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tirely state-financed. Furthermore, the zones benefit from any investment drawn to the zone, whether from out of state or from a neighboring city. In these four states, therefore, the state is financing a program
that cannot produce local fiscal losses, but would produce local gains if
incentives were to have any effect on local activity.
At the other extreme, consider Indiana and Ohio, states in which
there are both state and local zone incentives, but in which the local
property-tax abatements cost two to five times as much, on average, as
the state tax credits. Here, state enterprise zone policy is to encourage
local governments to engage in costly competition with one another for
jobs and tax base. The local abatements are not only costly but heavily
front-loaded, which increases the likelihood that they produce a net fiscal drain on local government. When the local incentives do succeed in
attracting capital to the zone (by which we mean that the state incentives alone would not have been sufficient), they also succeed in generating new tax revenue for the state, if that capital was attracted from out
of state. The latter effect is more likely to occur in Ohio, where there
are over 300 “zones,” and in any state where local tax abatements are
allowed with or without an enterprise zone and have thus become commonplace. In such states, it is likely that local abatements simply lower the property-tax rate on industry in that state in general, making the
state a more attractive location and possibly producing an increase in
state revenue, but at considerable local expense.
In this chapter we also found, surprisingly, that the conventional
preference for temporary and front-loaded incentives, on the grounds
that this is the way to increase the fiscal benefits in the long run, actually makes the situation worse. The more front-loaded the incentives,
the less likely the state or locality is to gain revenue by offering incentives. There is one further policy implication: the cheapest way for
state and local governments to induce a given percentage increase in
the gross rate of growth of establishments or jobs in an enterprise zone
is to provide a simple, constant, permanent reduction in taxes on new
zone operations. The state could, for example, simply exempt from
income taxation some fraction of the taxable income attributable to
a firm’s new operations in a zone.8 While the prospect of a fiscal surplus is still dim, this strategy will at least minimize drains on the state
treasury.
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Eventually, such a permanent exemption on new zone income will
become equivalent to an across-the-board tax cut on all zone businesses. An across-the-board cut has an advantage over tax relief to investment or jobs: the exemption benefits existing establishments as well as
new ones. Surely job retention should be an important part of any strategy for maintaining and expanding the economies of depressed areas,
at least as important as the attraction of new plants. The exemption
should help lower exit rates as well as increase birth rates and, as such,
should be more effective than an investment incentive.
Some states do recognize the importance of retaining existing businesses and grant incentives for job retention as well as job creation. It
is difficult for a locality to target such incentives at firms that really
would not stay but for the incentives, however which weakens the argument that such an approach is cheaper than an across-the-board cut
because it is never wasted. Furthermore, a strict job-retention incentive
sends rather perverse signals to firms: the locality is offering a financial
reward for firms to think seriously about moving somewhere else, and
in fact to come up with alternative locations that are more favorable for
their business.
To the extent that the quality of local public services is also a factor
in location decisions, it would be better state policy to provide tax incentives through the state corporate income tax system rather than encouraging (or requiring) financially strapped cities to compete with one
another (and in larger cities, for zones to compete with other zones and
non-zones in the same city) by adopting property-tax abatements that
will in all likelihood produce a net drain on the local treasury. This is
another argument for a state enterprise zone policy that takes the form
of a state corporate income tax exemption for zone income and disallows local abatements altogether.
In the next chapter we shift focus and look at the economic performance of zones, particularly establishment turnover. We find that actual turnover has not been that different from what we assumed in this
chapter. We also compare zone performance to that of our 13 sample
states. Once this has been done we are finally in a position to generate
our own estimate of the elasticity of growth with respect to enterprise
zone incentives (Chapter 7). We find this to be much smaller than what
we assumed in this chapter. Thus, the fiscal losses described in this
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chapter should be taken very much as best-case estimates—actual fiscal
losses are likely to be much greater.

Notes
1. There is some research which shows positive fiscal effects. See, for instance, Rubin (1991).
2. These represent Wasylenko’s (1997) estimate and about the middle of Bartik’s
(1991) range, both figures cited earlier. It should be noted that in his 1991 book
Bartik argued that there is some reason to believe that these elasticities are too
high, given the kinds of wage elasticities researchers have found and the relative
importance of wages versus taxes in a firm’s cost structure. In Chapter 7 we develop our own taxes/growth elasticities which suggest that the Bartik-Wasylenko consensus elasticities are much too optimistic.
3. Bartik’s 1991 review included seven other studies that did not allow for the calculation of elasticities; most of these found only marginally significant tax coefficients or dropped the tax variable because its effect appeared to be nil. Of the three
suburb-only studies, elasticities ranged from +0.62 to –4.43.
4. These secondary effects are notoriously difficult to measure. The conventional
wisdom, supported by some research but still controversial, is that industrial and
commercial development generates direct fiscal surpluses and residential development generates direct fiscal losses, because the majority of service costs are attributable to residents rather than property, whereas it is the property that pays the taxes. In the long run, of course, we know that growth in the aggregate “pays for
itself” in the trivial sense that local budgets remain balanced, and this comes about
as job growth begets population growth, and the tax base grows with service demands. But the long-run fiscal consequences of growth must also take into account
changing demands for services and changing cost conditions (economies or diseconomies of scale, changing factor prices) associated with the growth of tax base
and population. Whether a particular industrial project should be charged with a
share of all of the consequences following from its small contribution to the future
growth of the community, and how these consequences should be measured and
apportioned, is not at all clear. What is clear is that, to the extent that communities
count on direct fiscal surpluses from nonresidential property to cover the “deficits”
associated with most residential development (all but high end), tax incentives that
turn fiscal surpluses into deficits for manufacturing property represent a reduction
in the community’s ability to finance growth in general. In other words, it is important to focus on the direct revenue gains or losses because the indirect effects
(from induced population growth) are likely to be negative, as are the direct public
service costs.
5. The irregular annual flow is first converted to a present value by discounting the
20-year stream at 10 percent. We then calculate the equivalent annuity—the equal
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annual payment over 20 years at 10 percent that is equivalent to the present value
amount.
6. These assumptions about birth and death rates are close to the reality of zones. See
the establishment turnover results in Chapter 6.
7. The average employment size was calculated by using the average distribution of
establishments across the three employment-size classes for the sample zones, and
assuming 10 employees for firms in the 1–19 employment-size class, 50 in the
20–99 class, and 200 in the 100+ size class.
8. Connecticut, Missouri, and Virginia do exempt a portion of zone income from state
income taxation, but they do so only for 10 years. Michigan exempts 100 percent
of income and property taxes for as long as the renaissance zone exists, but these
zones are scheduled to expire between 2006 and 2011.

6
Manufacturing Growth and
Decline in Enterprise Zones
One is tempted to think of enterprise zones as narrowly drawn areas of concentrated poverty and unemployment within large older
cities, areas with an industrial base that has been declining for decades
and continues to erode year by year. It is a struggle to get new establishments to locate in such places, and incentives are employed in an attempt to overcome the inherent locational disadvantages—aging infrastructure, crime, and an unskilled workforce. The economy is stagnant
at best, with little going on save the predictable announcements of yet
another firm shutting down or heading for greener pastures. In this
chapter we investigate whether one aspect of this image—industrial
stagnation—of enterprise zones squares with reality. This allows us to
draw some preliminary conclusions about the economic growth consequences of the enterprise zone strategy. This latter issue is then pursued in greater methodological detail in the next chapter.
In order to conduct the analyses for this chapter and the next, we
obtained data on the number of manufacturing establishments by sector, ZIP code, and employment size and matched ZIP codes with zone
boundaries as best we could. We were then able to estimate the growth
or decline in the number of manufacturing establishments in our sample of enterprise zones from 1989 to 1995, considering births and
deaths, and moves into and out of the zones. We found a surprisingly
large amount of activity in both directions. While the zones did exhibit net declines in the number of establishments, these declines were
modest (at an average rate of about 1.2 percent per year) and came
about because the very substantial rates of entry of new establishments
were offset by slightly larger rates of exit.
We also found a fairly high degree of sectoral diversity within most
of the enterprise zones. Most were not dependent on just one or two
manufacturing sectors at the beginning of the study period, and in most
the new establishments arriving during the six-year period represented
a variety of sectors.
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A second question addressed in this chapter is whether or not zones
fared significantly worse than the state economies of which they were a
part, and whether they appeared to have a comparative disadvantage in
attracting or retaining establishments in more capital-intensive and
higher-wage sectors. We compared establishment turnover in the zones
with establishment change in the 13 states in our study during the same
period. We found that zones do, indeed, exhibit larger rates of net decline than the states as a whole, but the difference is not dramatic on average. There were clearly identifiable sectors in which the zones did
relatively better or worse than the states; the zones did suffer greater
declines in the more capital-intensive sectors, though not necessarily in
higher-wage sectors.
Finally, an examination of trends over time indicates that the economic expansion that began in the early 1990s left its mark on enterprise zones. The number of establishments expanding employment,
relative to the number reducing jobs, increased noticeably during the
latter part of the time period (1993–1995), and may well have continued to increase in the latter 1990s.

THE MANUFACTURING ESTABLISHMENT DATA
The data used to examine the patterns of manufacturing growth and
decline consist of establishment counts from the U.S. Bureau of the
Census’s Standard Statistical Establishment List (SSEL). This list is an
integral part of the economic censuses, such as the five-year census of
manufactures, and is the primary source of the summary statistics on
establishments, employment, and payroll published in County Business
Patterns (e.g., U.S. Bureau of the Census 1997). The database covers
establishments of all domestic employer and non-employer business
firms and is updated annually. Prior to 1994, however, non-employers
(many proprietorships and partnerships) were represented in the database only for economic census years (those ending in 2 or 7). Thus our
data for the two-year periods between 1989 and 1995 include only establishments with employees. The number of omitted establishments is
unlikely to be significant in the case of manufacturing, which is the focus of our study. In Appendix D we discuss the SSEL data in detail.
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In order to obtain a finer geographic scale than the usual county
level of reporting, we ordered a special run by ZIP code. Employment
or payroll data at such a scale would be largely unreportable due to disclosure problems; since we asked only for establishment counts, however, there were no disclosure problems—we have 100 percent of the
establishments. This is one of the central advantages of the SSEL database for our analyses. Establishments were categorized by three employment-size classes: 0–19, 20–99, and 100 or more. The data were
obtained by two-digit SIC code; within the manufacturing division,
there are 20 industries represented. There are three data sets, one for
each of three time periods: 1989–1991, 1991–1993, and 1993–1995.
At the time of analysis, 1989 was the first year the linked SSEL data
were available and 1995 was the last year for which data could be computed.
Within each ZIP code, industry, size class, and time period, each
establishment was classified in one of seven status groups; these are
defined below, using 1989–1991 for illustrative purposes. These status
groups are based in part on a determination of whether or not the
establishment existed in the ZIP code in the first year and/or the last
year of the period. The existence of an establishment in a particular
ZIP code is defined by the presence of payroll at any time during the
year. For establishments that existed in the ZIP code at the beginning
and the end, three groups are defined depending upon the change in
employment during the period. The seven status groups are as follows:
Births: Establishments that had no payroll in that ZIP code or any
other ZIP code at any time during 1989 but that did have payroll
in that ZIP code at some time during 1991.
Deaths: Establishments that had payroll in that ZIP code at some
time during 1989 but had no payroll in that ZIP code (or anywhere else) at any time during 1991.
In-movers: Establishments that had payroll in that ZIP code at
some time during 1991 but that were located in a different ZIP
code in 1989.
Out-movers: Establishments that had payroll in that ZIP code at
some time during 1989 but that were located in a different ZIP
code in 1991.
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Expansions: Establishments that had payroll in that ZIP code at
some time during both 1989 and 1991 and that had more employees in March 1991 than in March 1989.
Contractions: Establishments that had payroll in that ZIP code at
some time during both 1989 and 1991 and that had fewer employees in March 1991 than in March 1989.
Constant: Establishments that had payroll in that ZIP code at some
time during both 1989 and 1991 and that had the same number
of employees in March 1991 as in March 1989.
The seven categories are mutually exclusive. Establishments in the
expansion and contraction categories are not counted in any of the other categories, for example. For in-movers and out-movers, we do not
determine whether their employment expanded or contracted during
the two-year period. In all cases except births, the employment-size
category is based on employment as of March 1989; for births it is
March 1991.
For analysis purposes, we usually combine births and in-movers
into one category. For multi-establishment firms, the census distinction
between a new establishment and one that has changed location is
somewhat arbitrary. If an old establishment closes and a new one is
built elsewhere, the firm decides whether the new plant will be reported
to the Census Bureau as a new establishment or as the same establishment in a new location. The same considerations argue for combining
deaths and out-movers into a single category. Conceptually, the factors
influencing new branch plants and relocated branch plants should be
the same. Though we would expect a different set of factors to explain
firm (as opposed to branch plant) births, we cannot identify from this
dataset the new establishments that are also new firms.
The existence of an establishment in a particular ZIP code at the beginning and/or the end of a period determines the status categorization,
and existence is defined as the presence of payroll at any time during
the year. As a result, births and moves in for the first period,
1989–1991, are establishments that were not present in 1989 but were
born or moved in some time during the 24 months of 1990 and 1991.
Similarly, the births and moves in for the second period are those that
occurred during 1992 and 1993, and for the third period, during 1994
and 1995. Deaths and moves out by period, on the other hand, are
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those that occurred during the years 1989 and 1990 (since a firm that
exited in 1991 would still have been counted as present at some time
during that year), 1991 and 1992, and 1993 and 1994. This must be
kept in mind when interpreting tables comparing gross gains and losses
in establishments; the time periods do not exactly coincide.
Expansions and contractions are determined by comparing establishment employment in March 1989 to March 1991; in March 1991 to
March 1993; and in March 1993 to March 1995. They are slightly
overcounted since they include some establishments that should properly be classified as births or deaths instead. The reasons for this problem and the procedure used to adjust expansion and contraction rates
are discussed in Appendix D. The data presented in this chapter are the
adjusted rates. Finally, enterprise zones are never coterminous with
ZIP boundaries. Our method for translating enterprise zones into ZIP
regions is discussed in Appendix E.

ESTABLISHMENT DIVERSITY AND TURNOVER
IN THE ENTERPRISE ZONES
The 64 zones in our study exhibited surprisingly large rates of
gross establishment growth, as can be seen in Table 6.1. In this table
we have computed averages in two ways: for all zones and for all except the two largest, Cleveland and Milwaukee, which skew the averages. The average number of manufacturing establishments in a zone
by the second measure was 111 at the beginning of the period, and the
average number of establishments moving into or being born in the
zones during the six-year period 1990–1995 was 67, which represents a
60 percent gross growth in establishments. This represents a growth of
about 11 establishments per year for the average zone, or about a 10
percent annual growth rate.
As would be expected, the deaths and out-migrations exceeded the
births and in-migrations in the majority of zones (41 of the 64). The
average number of deaths and moves out was 75 (again considering all
zones except the two largest), and this amounted to a 67 percent rate of
gross decline over the six years, 1989–1994. This translates into a loss
of 12.4 establishments per year for the average zone, or about an 11

Establishments in
mid 1989
City (zone)a
Pharr, Tex.
Evansville, Ind.
Porterville, Calif.
El Paso, Tex.
Fort Wayne, Ind.
Massillon, Ohio
Newport News, Va.
Beloit, Wis.
South Bend, Ind.
Owensboro, Ky.
Fort Worth, Tex.
Pekin, Ill.
Elyria, Ohio
St. Joseph, Mo.
Joplin, Mo.
Hammond, Ind.
Springfield, Mo.
Kankakee, Ill.

Number
12
67
32
140
158
66
57
64
163
65
144
29
187
86
105
81
241
74

Births and moves
in 1990–1995

Deaths and moves
out 1989–1994

Net
change

Sectorsb

Number

Sectorsb

Ratec

Number

Ratec

Ratec

10
7
9
8
5
8
9
6
4
7
7
7
7
7
6
6
7
8

22
65
23
190
121
64
53
30
116
59
124
18
113
50
82
41
137
32

6
7
7
9
6
7
6
5
6
9
9
8
8
10
7
8
8
11

191.3
96.7
72.4
136.0
76.6
97.3
93.0
47.1
71.1
90.4
86.1
61.5
60.6
58.5
77.9
50.8
56.9
43.4

12
43
14
153
83
50
43
21
95
51
108
16
104
46
78
38
129
30

104.3
63.9
44.1
109.5
52.5
76.0
75.4
32.9
58.2
78.2
75.0
54.7
55.8
53.8
74.1
47.1
53.6
40.7

87.0
32.7
28.3
26.5
24.1
21.3
17.5
14.1
12.9
12.3
11.1
6.8
4.8
4.7
3.8
3.7
3.3
2.7
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Table 6.1 Sectoral Diversity and Gross Rates of Establishment Growth and Decline in 64 Enterprise Zones, by
Zone, 1989–1995

44
152
142
37
45
227
61
163
244
220
70
254
57
104
205
84
82
119
82
126
96
1,583
155
51
624

9
4
5
10
8
5
8
5
6
6
7
8
9
8
6
7
6
4
5
5
5
5
7
6
6

26
123
65
28
27
102
40
99
149
97
34
184
17
68
123
45
57
57
56
55
44
588
105
28
270

5
4
8
7
6
6
8
6
8
5
9
5
10
8
7
10
6
4
8
5
8
5
7
5
8

58.8
81.2
45.9
75.7
60.7
44.9
65.3
60.9
61.1
44.1
48.4
72.5
29.8
65.4
60.1
53.7
69.5
47.9
68.1
43.8
45.8
37.2
68.0
54.9
43.3

25
122
65
28
27
105
42
106
161
108
38
201
21
76
140
52
64
69
65
70
57
820
129
36
369

56.5
80.5
45.9
75.7
60.7
46.2
68.6
65.2
66.1
49.1
54.1
79.2
36.8
73.1
68.4
62.1
78.0
58.0
79.0
55.8
59.4
51.8
83.5
70.6
59.1

2.3
0.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
–1.3
–3.3
–4.3
–4.9
–5.0
–5.7
–6.7
–7.0
–7.7
–8.3
–8.4
–8.5
–10.1
–10.9
–12.0
–13.5
–14.7
–15.5
–15.7
–15.9
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Norwich, Conn.
Lexington, Ky.
Kansas City, Mo. (#2)
Petersburg, Va.
Portsmouth, Va.
Racine, Wis.
Lafayette, Ind.
Cincinnati, Ohio (#2)
Lancaster, Pa.
Canton, Ohio
Alton, Ill.
Los Angeles (Pacoima), Calif.
Auburn, N.Y.
Amarillo, Tex.
San Antonio, Tex.
Utica, N.Y.
Fond Du Lac, Wis.
Muncie, Ind.
Warren, Ohio
New Britain, Conn.
Moline, Ill.
Cleveland, Ohio
Green Bay, Wis.
Troy, N.Y.
Milwaukee, Wis.

Establishments in
mid 1989
City (zone)a
Pittsburgh, Pa.
Philadelphia, Pa.
Covington, Ky.
Hartford, Conn.
Fort Lauderdale, Fla.
Syracuse, N.Y.
Clearwater, Fla.
Pasadena, Calif.
Scranton, Pa.
Maywood, Ill.
Hamden, Conn.
Jacksonville, Fla.
New York (Harlem), N.Y.
Meriden, Conn.
Chester, Pa.

Number
87
43
61
24
145
207
70
75
156
135
198
303
26
111
58

Births and moves
in 1990–1995

Deaths and moves
out 1989–1994

Net
change

Sectorsb

Number

Sectorsb

Ratec

Number

Ratec

Ratec

7
5
5
6
5
5
6
8
5
7
8
9
5
6
10

45
26
30
11
117
104
63
58
62
37
90
129
16
40
15

6
6
7
9
7
6
6
5
7
6
9
6
3
8
7

51.6
60.1
49.2
45.4
80.8
50.3
90.0
77.9
39.7
27.5
45.5
42.6
62.1
36.0
25.8

59
33
40
15
141
139
78
74
96
75
148
221
25
79
36

67.6
76.3
65.6
61.9
97.4
67.2
111.4
99.3
61.5
55.7
74.7
72.9
97.1
71.2
61.8

–16.0
–16.2
–16.4
–16.5
–16.6
–16.9
–21.4
–21.5
–21.8
–28.2
–29.3
–30.4
–35.0
–35.1
–36.1
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Table 6.1 (Continued)

Averaged
All zones
Excluding two largest zonese
a
b

d

e

7
7

78
67

7
7

55.0
60.2

91
75

63.9
67.2

–9.0
–7.0

Listed in descending order by rate of net change.
The number of sectors significantly represented, defined as a sector with at least 5% of the total number of establishments in that zone
in 1989, or 5% of the total number of establishment births and moves in, 1990–1995. There are 16 total sectors.
Rate = percent of establishments in mid 1989.
This is a weighted average, which is the same as a simple average except in the case of the rates. For example, the average rate of
“births and moves in” is calculated by dividing total births and moves in for all zones by total number of establishments in 1989.
Cleveland and Milwaukee were much larger than any of the other zones and together accounted for 24% of the establishments in
1989, 17% of the births and moves in, and 21% of the deaths and moves out. They were dropped from this average to avoid their
skewing the results.
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142
111
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percent annual rate of shrinkage for the median zone. But since the
number of new establishments was almost as large, the average zone
saw a net loss of only about 8 establishments over the six-year period,
representing an annual rate of net decline of about 1.2 percent. There
was enormous variation among zones, however: 20 of the 64 zones actually experienced a net gain in manufacturing establishments, and in 6
of these cases the gain was in excess of 20 percent over the six-year period. At the other extreme, 10 zones suffered net losses of 20 percent or
more.
Most enterprise zones in our sample exhibited a substantial degree
of diversity in terms of the number of different manufacturing industries with a presence in the zone. Table 6.1 shows the number of different manufacturing sectors (at the two-digit SIC code level) with a significant representation in each zone.1 A sector was considered to have
a significant presence if it accounted for at least 5 percent of the total
number of establishments in the zone. In all but 4 of the zones, there
were at least 5 of the 16 sectors represented, and in 19 of the zones,
there were 8 or more sectors. Furthermore, if instead we counted all
sectors with at least one establishment, we would find that in all but 10
zones at least 13 of the 16 sectors were present. This reflects a surprising degree of diversity. It also reflects the fact that some zones are
quite large, drawn to include a major portion—if not all—of the city’s
industrial land.
Sectoral diversity was also present among the new establishments.
The median number of sectors significantly represented among the
births and moves in (accounting for at least 5 percent of the total) was
seven; all but five zones saw new establishments representing five or
more different sectors.
Looking at the 64 zones as a whole, was the growth or decline in
establishments concentrated in certain industrial sectors, and were the
new establishments of the same employment-size classes as the exiting
establishments? If the entrants were small and the departures large, the
employment effects of the net decline would be much larger than the
average 7 percent reduction in establishments shown in Table 6.1. Establishment entries and exits by manufacturing sector and by establishment employment size are shown in Table 6.2. The number of births
and moves in during these six years was quite large relative to the initial size of the manufacturing sector, particularly for the smallest-size

Table 6.2 Establishment Turnover by Employment Size and Sector in 64 Enterprise Zones, 1989–1995
Total establishments in Births and moves
mid 1989
in 1990–1995
SIC

0–19 20–99 100+ 0–19 20–99 100+ 0–19 20–99 100+ 0–19 20–99 100+

Food and kindred products
241
Apparel and other textile prod.
215
Lumber and wood products
228
Furniture and fixtures
183
Paper and allied products
58
Printing and publishing
1,148
Chemicals and allied products
211
Rubber and misc. plastics prod.
194
Leather and leather products
27
Stone, clay and glass products
198
Primary metal industries
126
Fabricated metal products
718
Industrial machinery
1,079
Electric & electronic equipment
173
Transportation equipment
110
Instruments and related prod.
137
All sectors
No. of establishments
Distribution (%)

Net change

177
105
76
60
111
302
125
147
18
102
105
461
373
114
49
65

155
47
12
24
58
107
61
47
13
20
79
160
141
90
52
40

167
200
222
145
50
719
149
150
26
147
69
394
661
123
93
81

5,046 2,390 1,107 3,398
59.1 28.0 13.0 72.8

79
75
23
34
38
114
41
61
8
32
40
146
136
78
59
20

30
19
4
6
6
25
12
21
8
4
25
30
34
34
20
12

184
243
224
171
47
894
159
157
19
158
86
495
710
150
102
106

100
100
32
42
41
154
41
91
7
43
41
181
162
68
32
28

53
18
6
6
12
31
10
19
14
5
20
46
49
34
16
23

–17
–43
–2
–26
4
–175
–11
–7
7
–10
–17
–101
–49
–28
–8
–24

–21
–25
–9
–8
–3
–41
–1
–30
1
–11
–1
–35
–26
10
26
–8

–24
0
–2
–1
–5
–6
1
2
–6
–2
4
–16
–15
–0
4
–11

981
21.0

288 3,904 1,165 363 –506
6.2 71.9 21.4 6.7 66.2

–184
24.0

–75
9.8
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20
23
24
25
26
27
28
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Sector description

Deaths and moves
out 1989–1994

138 Chapter 6

class. The number of deaths and moves out exceeded the number of
births and moves in, in 14 of the 16 sectors (all but SIC codes 31 and
37), but not by that much. (These rates are not strictly comparable
since gross gains are for 1990–1995 and gross losses for 1989–1994.)
Clearly, though, if one focuses only on the net loss or net gain in number of establishments one misses most of what is going on: new plants
are constantly emerging to replace older ones that disappear, and the
gross changes in both directions are five to eight times as large as the
net change in most sectors.
Can we infer that the percentage loss of employment due to establishments entering and exiting the zones was similar to the net percentage loss of establishments? The last row of Table 6.2 shows the percentage distribution of establishments by establishment employment
size. While the smallest establishments accounted for 59 percent of all
establishments in 1989, they accounted for a much larger portion of the
entering and exiting firms. Of the new establishments, 72.8 percent
were in the smallest class, compared to 71.9 percent of the exiting establishments. The largest employment-size class accounted for 6.2 percent of the gross growth, but 6.7 percent of the gross shrinkage. Thus,
exiting establishments were on average slightly larger than entering establishments. The loss of manufacturing employment from entries and
exits over the six-year period (excluding expansions and contractions
of firms with a continual presence), therefore, was likely to be a little
more than the median 8 percent net loss of establishments.2
Overall gains or losses in jobs will be determined not only by establishments entering and exiting the zones, but also by those that remain in the zones and expand or contract employment. Table 6.3
shows the number of establishments expanding or contracting employment over each two-year period as a percentage of the total number of
establishments that were in the zone at the beginning of the period, by
SIC code. The smallest establishments were much less likely to expand
or contract than those in the two larger-size classes, in part because they
were much more likely to die or move out, instead (as shown in Table
6.2). But the smallest establishments expanded a little more often than
they contracted. For the large-size classes (particularly the 100+ category), the percent contracting exceeded the percent expanding. Overall, of the establishments existing at the beginning of a two-year period
in these 64 zones, about one in three expanded employment within two
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years, and about one in three reduced employment. About one in five
died or moved out.
Clearly the behavior of establishments remaining in a zone has a
great deal to do with whether jobs in the zone increase or decrease.
Without knowing the magnitude of the job expansions and contractions, however, we do not know whether these job changes are more or
less important than the job changes resulting from establishments’ exiting and entering. However, given the substantially higher rates of contraction among the larger firm sizes, it is likely that the net effect of expansions and contractions in these zones has been further erosion in the
job base, beyond the more than 8 percent attributable to net loss of establishments.

SECTORAL CHANGE AND THE COMPARATIVE
ADVANTAGE OF ZONES
Which sectors accounted for the largest share of establishments in
these enterprise zones, and which ones accounted for the largest share
of establishment growth or shrinkage? It turns out that three sectors—
printing and publishing (27), fabricated metal products (34), and industrial machinery (35)—accounted for 52.5 percent of the manufacturing
establishments in these zones in 1989, as shown in Table 6.4. These
same sectors accounted for about half of the births and moves in as
well, and about half of the deaths and moves out. These same three
sectors also accounted for the bulk of the net decline in establishments;
the net loss of 222 establishments in printing and publishing alone represented 29 percent of the overall net loss of 765 establishments in
these 64 zones.
Which were the fastest growing or most rapidly declining sectors?
Table 6.4 also shows gross annual rates of growth (births and moves
in), rates of decline (deaths and moves out), and rates of net decline in
establishments for each sector. The three sectors that dominated the
initial set of establishments in 1989 were among the seven slowest
growing in percentage terms. The sectors experiencing the highest
percentage rates of birth and in-migration were 23 (apparel), 24 (wood
products), 25 (furniture), 31 (leather), and 37 (transportation equip-

Expansion rates by employment size

Contraction rates by employment size

SIC

0–19

20–99

100+

All

0–19

20–99

100+

All

20
23
24
25
26
27
28
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

27.6
23.2
27.6
26.5
36.6
24.2
28.4
34.1
33.5
29.4
32.4
32.4
30.7
28.8
31.1
29.6

40.9
29.0
32.6
29.0
43.8
34.9
39.4
43.7
34.6
37.2
41.4
41.3
38.8
35.9
34.1
42.3

40.6
40.3
33.7
34.0
45.2
39.6
39.9
31.3
21.5
37.9
38.8
38.0
39.9
32.6
35.0
35.5

35.3
26.8
28.6
27.7
42.2
27.3
33.8
37.8
31.8
32.2
37.1
36.0
33.3
31.7
32.9
33.9

26.7
22.0
22.9
26.2
21.1
26.7
22.7
23.2
22.4
24.2
26.1
28.3
27.1
25.5
24.6
26.9

36.3
36.8
48.4
47.7
40.5
42.7
45.1
35.9
46.0
43.2
41.3
42.3
41.8
40.4
46.3
40.6

45.6
46.4
41.2
57.6
46.9
48.4
52.8
53.8
22.5
51.2
49.8
50.9
46.3
54.4
54.2
38.9

34.8
29.1
29.4
34.0
37.4
31.3
34.5
31.8
30.6
31.5
37.2
35.7
32.0
36.7
36.7
32.5
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Table 6.3 Average Percent of Establishments Expanding or Contracting Employment per
Two-Year Period in 64 Enterprise Zones, 1989–1995

All

28.7

38.6

38.1

32.6

26.0

41.5

49.0

33.2

Manufacturing Growth and Decline in Enterprise Zones 141

NOTE: These rates are adjusted to eliminate estimated overcounting of expansions and contractions. Rates are
calculated using a denominator equal to the estimated number of establishments in existence as of mid March of
the first year of the period (1989, 1991, or 1993). These cannot be converted to annual rates. Suppose, for example, that out of 10 establishments at the beginning, 2 expanded the first year and a different 2 the second year;
the two-year rate would be 40 percent at most (if the first 2 did not revert to their original size the second year).
But if it was the same 2 establishments that expanded both years, then the two-year rate would be 20 percent. So
all we can infer from the two-year rate is that the percent expanding in an average year would be somewhere between the two-year rate and half of the two-year rate.

Establishments
in mid 1989

SIC

Sector description

20
23
24
25
26
27
28
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Food and kindred products
Apparel and other textile prod.
Lumber and wood products
Furniture and fixtures
Paper and allied products
Printing and publishing
Chemicals and allied products
Rubber and misc. plastics prod.
Leather and leather products
Stone, clay and glass products
Primary metal industries
Fabricated metal products
Industrial machinery
Electric & electronic equipment
Transportation equipment
Instruments and related prod.

Births and moves in
1990–1995

Deaths and moves
out 1989–1994

Net change
1989–1995

Percent Average
Percent Average
Percent
Percent Average
of
annual
of
annual
of
of
annual
rateb Number total
ratec
Number total Number total
ratea Number total
573
368
315
268
227
1,557
398
388
57
320
310
1,339
1,593
378
211
242

6.7
4.3
3.7
3.1
2.7
18.2
4.7
4.5
0.7
3.7
3.6
15.7
18.6
4.4
2.5
2.8

276
293
249
185
94
857
201
232
42
183
133
570
831
235
172
114

5.9
6.3
5.3
4.0
2.0
18.4
4.3
5.0
0.9
3.9
2.8
12.2
17.8
5.0
3.7
2.4

8.3
13.4
13.5
12.0
6.5
9.4
8.4
10.1
12.8
9.2
7.3
7.2
8.8
10.2
12.6
8.4

337
361
262
220
99
1,079
211
267
40
206
147
722
921
253
150
157

6.2
6.6
4.8
4.1
1.8
19.9
3.9
4.9
0.7
3.8
2.7
13.3
4.7
2.8
2.9

10.0
16.3
14.1
14.1
6.9
11.7
8.9
11.6
12.2
10.2
8.0
9.1
9.7
11.0
11.1
11.3

–61
–68
–13
–35
–5
–222
–10
–35
2
–23
–14
–152
–90
–18
22
–43

8.0
8.9
1.7
4.6
0.7
29.0
1.3
4.6
–0.3
3.0
1.8
19.9
11.8
2.4
–2.9
5.6

–1.7
–2.8
–0.6
–2.2
–0.4
–2.3
–0.4
–1.5
0.6
–1.1
–0.7
–1.8
–0.9
–0.8
1.5
–2.9
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Table 6.4 Sectoral Composition of Establishment Growth and Shrinkage in 64 Enterprise Zones, 1989–1995

All sectors
a

b

100.0

4,667

100.0

9.2

5,432

100.0

10.7

–765

100.0

–1.5

Growth rates are calculated by dividing the number of births and moves in during a two-year period by the estimated number of establishments in existence at the end of the first year of the period (1989, 1991, or 1993), dividing by two (to get an annual rate), and averaging over the three periods.
Shrinkage rates are calculated by dividing the number of deaths or moves out during a two-year period by the estimated number of establishments in existence at the beginning of the first year of the period (1989, 1991, or 1993), dividing by two (to get an annual rate), and averaging over the three periods.
For the net change in number of establishments, the rate is simply the average growth rate minus the average death rate.
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ment). These are “traditional” low-technology sectors. They—with
the exception of 37—also displayed the highest rates of gross decline
(deaths and moves out as a percentage of initial establishments).
Leather products and transportation equipment were the only sectors
showing a net gain.
If we consider the net change in number of establishments (births
plus moves in minus deaths and moves out), we find that five sectors
accounted for 78 percent of the total net loss of 765 establishments in
these 64 enterprise zones from 1989 to 1995: 20 (food), 23 (apparel),
27 (printing), 34 (fabricated metal products), and 35 (industrial machinery). As shown in Table 6.4, the sectors that showed the highest
overall rates of net loss (net change in establishments as a percent of
the number in 1989) were 38 (instruments), 23 (apparel), 27 (printing),
and 25 (furniture), in that order. The sectors that grew over this period,
31 (leather) and 37 (transportation equipment), did not account for
many establishments to begin with and produced a net gain of only 24
establishments between them. Sectors 26 (paper) and 28 (chemicals)
also had a modest presence but only a very slight decline (15 establishments total). Overall, the net rate of decline was about 1.5 percent per
year. Over the six years, this represented a net loss of about 9 percent
of the establishments that existed at the beginning of the period.
How did the enterprise zones fare compared to the states in which
they were located? Table 6.5 compares the gross birth and death rates
in the 64 enterprise zones with birth and death rates for the 13 states as
a whole (minus the sampled enterprise zones). Overall, the birth rates
in zones were significantly smaller than in the state economies generally—5.8 percent per year versus 8.5 percent per year—and this was true
for each sector except 31 and 37.3 The states as a whole also experienced somewhat higher death rates than did the zones, and this was the
case in all but one of the 16 sectors. This is probably because higher
birth rates are strongly associated with higher death rates, perhaps in
part because some sectors are simply more volatile and hence generate
higher birth and death rates, but no doubt also in part due to the simple
fact that higher birth rates produce more potential corpses and thus
higher death rates.
For the 13 states as a whole, there was a net loss of only 2.4 percent
of the establishments over the six-year period. Three of the 16 sectors
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experienced net growth, and just 2 sectors experienced a net decline in
excess of 1.0 percent per year: 25 (furniture) and 31 (leather), both
small sectors to begin with (see Table 6.5). In the zones, 8 of the 16
sectors declined by more than 1.0 percent per year. This six-year period, in other words, saw relative stability in the manufacturing sector in
the 13 states that we examined, with small rates of growth in some sectors offset by small rates of decline in other sectors. On the other hand,
enterprise zones within these states experienced relatively pervasive
decline, though not at a particularly high rate; this net decline was produced through very substantial growth rates being offset by slightly
larger rates of shrinkage.
One might expect that the sectoral composition of births in the
zones would differ significantly from that of the states as a whole. Given that enterprise zones are thought to contain concentrations of lowerskilled workers, and given that zone incentives are more skewed toward labor than capital, one would expect to see relatively more
activity in labor-intensive and low-wage sectors in the zones. To explore this issue, we determined how each sector contributed to the overall net loss of establishments in the 64 zones and in the 13 states over
the six-year period 1989–1995. For example, sector 25 (furniture) experienced a net loss of 35 establishments in the enterprise zones in the
aggregate, taking into account the net effect of births, moves in and out,
and deaths (see Table 6.4). These 35 represented 4.6 percent of the total net loss of 765 establishments in the zones. In the remaining portions of the 13 states, on the other hand, sector 25 accounted for 695 of
the 4,133 total net decline in establishments, or 16.8 percent.4 Thus the
zones fared much better than the states as a whole in attracting new establishments or preventing the closing of existing establishments in this
sector, at least relative to other sectors.
The sectors were then ranked by the difference between the zone
and state percentage shares (see Table 6.6); a positive number indicates
that the zones did better than the states as a whole, while a negative
number indicates that the zones performed less well than the states.
(Note that where a sector experienced a net gain instead of a loss, the
percentage contribution to the overall loss is negative.) The six sectors
shown in the top portion of Table 6.6 together accounted for 96 percent
of the total shrinkage of establishments in the 13 states, but only 53 per-

For the 64 enterprise zones

SIC

Sector description

Average
annual
birth
rate

20
23
24
25
26
27
28
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

Food and kindred products
Apparel and other textile prod.
Lumber and wood products
Furniture and fixtures
Paper and allied products
Printing and publishing
Chemicals and allied products
Rubber and misc. plastics prod.
Leather and leather products
Stone, clay and glass products
Primary metal industries
Fabricated metal products
Industrial machinery
Electric & electronic equipment
Transportation equipment

5.5
9.6
9.5
8.0
3.9
5.8
5.6
6.8
8.5
5.0
4.3
4.1
5.3
7.0
8.8

For remainder of the statesa

Average
annual
death
rate

Annual
net
change
rate

Average
annual
birth
rate

Average
annual
death
rate

Annual
net
change
rate

6.4
12.1
9.2
9.1
3.6
7.4
5.2
7.2
7.3
6.1
5.0
5.4
5.8
7.3
7.8

–1.8
–3.1
–0.7
–2.2
–0.4
–2.4
–0.4
–1.5
0.6
–1.2
–0.8
–1.9
–0.9
–0.8
1.7

7.7
16.5
10.8
9.6
5.3
8.5
6.8
7.1
8.0
6.6
5.9
6.1
7.0
9.0
8.7

7.7
16.5
10.6
11.4
5.4
9.0
6.4
6.5
10.5
7.2
6.3
6.7
6.9
8.6
9.4

–0.1
–0.1
–0.0
–2.1
–0.3
–0.7
0.2
0.6
–2.9
–0.7
–0.5
–0.9
–0.1
0.2
–1.0
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Table 6.5 Births, Deaths and Net Change in Number of Establishments by Sector in 64 Enterprise Zones
and 13 States, 1989–1995

All sectors
a

5.8

6.7

–1.5

8.5

8.7

–0.4

The figures for the 13 states are calculated by subtracting from statewide totals the totals for the 64 enterprise zones in our
sample. Note that although we cannot calculate move-in or move-out rates by state (because moves include all moves from
one ZIP code to another, not just from one state to another), we can calculate net change by state, because moves between
ZIP codes within a state will cancel out.
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% of total net decline in
establishments over
six-year period
In the 64
zones

In remainder
of 13 states

Pct. pt.
difference:
states –
zones

4.6
–2.9
19.9
3.0
–0.3
29.0

16.8
7.6
25.6
8.2
4.5
33.6

12.2
10.5
5.8
5.2
4.8
4.6

Totalb
Weighted averagec
Zones do about the same
33
Primary metal industries
26
Paper and allied products
24
Lumber and wood products

53.3

96.4

43.1

1.8
0.7
1.7

2.9
1.5
0.8

1.0
0.8
–0.9

Totalb
Weighted averagec

4.2

5.1

0.9

SIC

Sector name

Zones do relatively better than states
25
Furniture and fixtures
37
Transportation equipment
34
Fabricated metal products
32
Stone, clay and glass products
31
Leather and leather products
27
Printing and publishing

Capital
per
workera
($)

Average
annual
wage
($)

41,893
61,850
116,686
99,311
31,308
33,495

19,391
37,898
26,188
26,656
15,584
24,122

66,071

25,458

181,192
169,425
27,007

33,199
31,597
19,939

83,137

24,662
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Table 6.6 The Comparative Advantage for Enterprise Zones

Totalb
Weighted averagec
Total for all 16 sectors
a
b
c

1.3
2.4
5.6
8.9
11.8
8.0
4.6

–1.6
–2.3
0.6
2.6
5.4
0.9
–7.1

–3.0
–4.7
–5.0
–6.3
–6.4
–7.1
–11.7

42.5

–1.5

–44.0

100.0

100.0

153,610
177,904
150,489
34,238
101,698
68,930
173,115

34,944
24,392
28,397
13,905
28,814
22,643
22,593

109,916

24,901

0.00

Property, plant, and equipment per worker.
Totals for percent of net decline.
The weight for a sector is that sector’s share of total establishments in mid 1989 in the corresponding group of sectors,
for the 13 states.
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Zones do relatively worse than states
28
Chemicals and allied products
36
Electric & electronic equipment
38
Instruments and related prod.
23
Apparel and other textile prod.
35
Industrial machinery
20
Food and kindred products
30
Rubber and misc. plastics prod.
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cent of the shrinkage in the zones; these are the sectors in which the
zones appear to have an overall comparative advantage. At the bottom
of the table are seven sectors that accounted for 43 percent of the
shrinkage in the zones, but only 1.5 percent in the states (on average
they grew elsewhere in the 13 states); these are the sectors in which
zones appear to have a relative disadvantage.
Are there systematic differences between the sectors in which the
zones did relatively better than the states and the sectors in which they
did relatively worse? To explore this question, we looked at two industry characteristics: capital intensity and wages. Table 6.6 shows the
level of capital intensity for each sector, as measured by the value of
property, plant, and equipment per worker, and the average annual
wage of production workers; for each group of sectors we then calculated a weighted average (see table footnote). These figures are national averages, of course, and thus are merely suggestive of the actual capital intensity or wage rates for the particular firms found in our 64 zones
and 13 states.
On the basis of these average figures, there is no appreciable difference in the typical wages in the sectors in which the zones do relatively
well versus the sectors in which the zones do relatively poorly. The
zones appear to have a comparative advantage in one of the highest
wage sectors, transportation equipment, which actually grew in number
of establishments within the zones during the period 1989–1995. On
the other hand, zones also did relatively well in two of the lowest wage
sectors, furniture and leather products. If one focuses instead on capital intensity, however, distinct differences appear. The sectors in which
the zones fare best in net terms have distinctly lower capital per worker
than the sectors in which zones do the poorest. Of the six sectors with
the greatest average investment in capital per worker ($150,000 or
more), the zones performed poorer than the states in four of the six, and
about the same as the states in the other two.
Although enterprise zones are sectorally diverse and have experienced rapid turnover in many sectors, they are still clearly focused on
“old economy” industries. This is not surprising given the overall purpose of enterprise zones and the nature of the targeted labor pool. Nevertheless, it raises concerns about the long-term industrial viability of
zones.
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EFFECTS OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC EXPANSION
Thus far we have presented data for the entire time period,
1989–1995. During the first of the two-year periods, 1989–1991, the
economy was sliding into recession, while the second period, 1991–
1993, saw the beginnings of recovery, which then continued throughout
the rest of the decade. Figure 6.1 displays the rates of growth and decline, and the percentage of establishments expanding and contracting,
for each of the three periods. (See Appendix Table F.5 for the actual
numbers, by employment-size class.) In terms of births and deaths, the
three periods are very similar. However, the middle period, when the
economy was moving out of a recession, showed much higher numbers
moving both into and out of zones than the period before or after, and
this was true for all establishment sizes.
The most striking trend evident in Figure 6.1 is that the percent of
establishments that remained in the zone and expanded increased with
each two-year period, while the percent that remained but reduced employment declined. Expansion rates exceeded contraction rates by a
wide margin in the most recent period, and this was especially true for
the two smaller-size classes (see Appendix Table F.5). It is quite possible that in the 1993–1995 period there was net employment growth in
existing establishments in these zones sufficient to offset, or more than
offset, the job losses due to exits exceeding entries. If these most recent
trends continued through the economic expansion of the latter 1990s,
the overall job base in these zones could have been restored to the level that obtained in 1989, prior to the recession. This is purely speculative, of course, but the data suggest that such a result is plausible.

CONCLUSIONS
Enterprise zones do not appear to be the stagnant backwaters of the
economy, as often assumed. They contain a surprising amount of diversity, in terms of manufacturing sectors with a presence in the zones,
and a surprising amount of movement of establishments into and out of
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Figure 6.1 Establishment Change in 66 Enterprise Zones (9,094 total establishments in 1989)
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the zones. The average zone among the 64 we studied started out with
about 111 manufacturing establishments distributed across 6 or 7 sectors in 1989, and in the ensuing six years experienced an influx of about
11 manufacturing establishments each year through births or migrations from elsewhere. But the average zone also lost about 12.4 establishments each year, and thus was left with a net decline in manufacturing establishments, though at a rate of only about 1.2 percent per year.
The gross rates of growth are significant for the estimation of fiscal effects, for it is the influx of new establishments, not the net change, that
drives incentive expenditure, at least to the extent that new establishments require investments in facilities and equipment.
The economic performance of enterprise zones must be placed
against the backdrop of the larger economy, of course. When compared
with the remaining portions of the 13 states of which our 64 sample
zones are a part, the zones did indeed perform more poorly than those
states, as one would expect. The six-year period 1989–1995 saw relative stability in the manufacturing sector in the 13 states we examined,
with small rates of establishment growth in some sectors offset by
small rates of decline in other sectors. Manufacturing establishment
numbers declined more rapidly within the zones than within the states
in almost all sectors, the notable exception being transportation equipment.
We assessed the zones’ comparative advantage or disadvantage for
types of manufacturing. We compared sectors in which zones did relatively better than the states (six sectors that accounted for 96 percent of
the state decline, but only 53 percent of the zone decline), and sectors in
which zones did relatively worse (accounting for 43 percent of zone decline, but actually increasing for the states). There was no clear difference between the two groups of firms in terms of national average
wages paid in those sectors. But zones appeared to have a pronounced
disadvantage in attracting and retaining the more capital-intensive sectors of manufacturing. This is at least consistent with the nature of incentives in zones: they are more likely to favor labor than are other
nontargeted incentives. Still, we would be surprised if incentives had
much to do with the apparent zone comparative advantage in more labor-intensive sectors. Slack labor markets are a more plausible explanation, given the very meager value of labor incentives in terms of their
wage equivalent (see Chapter 3) and given the very limited ability of
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labor incentives to reduce wage costs at the margin (see Chapter 4). It
is also clear that manufacturing in enterprise zones remains concentrated in “old economy” sectors.
When trends were examined over time, there was a pronounced improvement in the manufacturing sector as the economy pulled out of
the recession of the early 1990s. In particular, the number of firms expanding employment greatly exceeded the number contracting employment in the third period, 1993–1995, when the expansion was really
getting underway. The likelihood is that this continued in the latter
1990s.
What the essentially descriptive analysis of this chapter leaves out
is the “causal” connection between enterprise zones and growth. While
we know that enterprise zones saw considerable establishment turnover
during the first half of the 1990s, and that enterprise zones performed
more poorly than their containing states during that period, we still do
not know whether the incentives offered in zones have had any impact
on economic growth in those zones. It is to this issue that we now turn.

Notes
1. We looked at 16 of the 20 two-digit industries, omitting those in which significant
geographic mobility was clearly lacking, such as petroleum refining. See Appendix A (especially Table A.1) for a description of the sectors.
2. It should be noted that the employment-size class of firms is based on the number
of employees in March of the first year of the period, with the exception of births
(establishments that did not exist in the first year). Thus a death or exit of a plant
in the largest-size class means that, for example, an establishment that had over
100 employees in March 1989 and then died or moved out of the zone in 1990 or
1991 will be recorded as the loss of a large firm in our database. We do not know
how many employees it had when it actually closed or moved, and it may well
have shrunk between March 1989 and the date of closing to the point that it was a
small firm when it finally closed. Nonetheless, we show it as the loss of a large
firm, which appropriately reflects the significance of the job loss for that period of
time; showing it as the loss of a small firm would not do so.
3. Move-in and move-out rates at the state level are not shown because the SSEL data
are at the ZIP code level, so that a plant that moves from one ZIP to another within
the same state is nonetheless recorded as a move in and as a move out for that state.
Thus the state move-in rates overstate the actual extent of moving into the state,
and the state move-out rates overstate the extent of plants moving out of the state.
The data do not identify the origin ZIP code for a move in or the destination ZIP
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code for a move out, so it is not possible to determine the extent of within-state
moves. We assume that this problem is minimal at the zone level, since the typical
zone will involve a very small number of ZIP codes.
4. We cannot use the data showing moves in or moves out at the state level because
(as noted in the prior footnote) the data do not allow us to distinguish a move from
one ZIP to another within the state from a move into the state. However, we can
combine the two figures to arrive at net moves in or out, since moves within the
state will cancel out and we will have an accurate net outflow or inflow. Thus the
net-change figures for the states and the zones are comparable.

7
Enterprise Zones, Incentives, and
Local Economic Growth
In the previous chapter we looked at broad growth trends in enterprise zones. In this chapter we try to answer a more specific question:
Can enterprise zones reasonably be expected to generate local economic growth? Our intention then is to draw some broader conclusions
about the overall effectiveness of enterprise zone policy. The first part of
this chapter discusses some of the broader issues relating to the modeling of taxes and growth and reviews the results of previous econometric
studies of the effects of taxes in general, and enterprise zones in particular, on growth. In the second section, we review some of the technical
issues involved in building an econometric model; this is followed by a
description of how we dealt with the major methodological issues in
constructing our own series of statistical models of taxes and growth. In
the final section, we provide our econometric results, based on two separate analyses. The first relies on our sample of 65 enterprise zones in 13
states. The second is a more spatially focused analysis of 104 enterprise
zone and non-enterprise zone communities in Ohio.
Before proceeding any further it is worth reiterating two points.
First, from the national perspective, it is unclear whether incentives, including enterprise zone incentives, actually result in—or cause—entirely new growth, rather than merely shifting investment spatially. In
this chapter, growth means growth in the particular localities in our
study; we do not prejudge the wider question of the effect of incentives
on net growth for the nation as a whole. Second, to the extent that they
are not capitalized in land prices, enterprise zone incentives reduce the
costs associated with a new business investment and thus increase the
income derived from that investment. As we argued in Chapter 2 (see
note 22), it is most unlikely that incentives are fully capitalized. Later,
in Chapter 3, we provided estimates of the income advantage afforded
by an enterprise zone location and the savings from enterprise zone incentives compared to another important location cost—wages. We
found that enterprise zone incentives were fairly small when translated
into wage equivalents—so small, in fact, that even quite limited local
157

158 Chapter 7

variation in wage rates could easily wipe out the business income advantages conferred by incentives. Thus our non-econometric evidence
suggests that it is likely that zone incentives influence business location
and investment decisions only in exceptional circumstances.
When we began writing this book, we had expected to find confirmation, at the enterprise zone level, of what has become the current
consensus in the taxes and growth literature—that taxes and tax incentives have positive, but modest, effects on local growth. Our results do
not confirm this position. Indeed, both our national and Ohio models
show that enterprise zone incentives have no appreciable impact on local establishment growth. Given one of the important (non-econometric) findings of Chapter 3 (that the local benefits of incentives could be
easily wiped out by local differentials in labor costs), and given the recent econometric literature on enterprise zones (more than half of
which suggests that enterprise zone incentives have little impact on local growth), our results should not be surprising. Nevertheless, we feel
it incumbent on us to say that since the extant literature on enterprise
zone incentives and growth is still small, it would be foolish to claim
that the models we present in this chapter are the final word on the relationship between enterprise zone incentives and local economic activity. They are not.

MODELS OF TAXES AND GROWTH—
BACKGROUND ISSUES
At heart, the relationship between enterprise zones and economic
growth is merely a part of a much broader, well-studied problem: the
relationship between state and local taxes—including tax incentives—
and economic growth. We will begin our discussion of modeling by
looking at how researchers have approached the broader issue and only
then move on to the particular case of enterprise zones.
Econometric Models and Alternative Approaches
While politicians and a few policy analysts have been happy to
view the relationship between taxes and growth quite simplistically—
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seeing whether low-tax states have high levels of growth—most academics looking at this issue have employed various econometric modeling methods. The reason the econometric approach dominates academic work on the connection between state and local taxes and growth
is probably partly institutional—applied economists dominate the
field—and partly substantive. Given that so many factors could cause
local economic growth, attempting to identify the impact of any single
factor raises the old counterfactual issue: “Was growth a function of
this particular factor x or some other less visible factor y?” In principle,
the statistical techniques on which econometric models are based allow
the researcher to hold constant other important factors and thus to be
able to focus on particular important policy factors, one at a time.
Consider this example. Some high business tax states—for instance, California—have, at times, experienced long periods of growth.
Correlating growth and taxes in such states would lead to the conclusion that high taxes cause high growth and, presumably, low business
taxes cause low growth. This conclusion is almost certainly wrong because it fails to account for the other factors causing growth, including
high population growth, defense spending, high levels of entrepreneurialism in some fast-growing industries, and so on. In order to see the
“true” relationship between state and local business taxes and California’s economic growth, we have to be able to control for these other
factors. Indeed, the central difficulty encountered by econometric researchers in the area of taxes and growth is how best empirically to account for—or model—these other factors.
In order to better understand the usefulness of econometric models
in the study of taxes and growth, it would be helpful to consider the
problems associated with alternative non-econometric approaches to
this issue. Four broad categories of alterative approaches can be identified: 1) surveys of business opinion on taxes; 2) case studies of the
impact of particular taxes and incentives on growth; 3) general equilibrium models; and 4) hypothetical firm models.1 Business surveys have
a number of well-documented problems: response rates tend to be very
low; those not directly involved in new investment or relocation decisions may be the ones to fill out the survey instrument, significantly distorting results; respondents have an incentive to lie about the importance of taxes (and incentives) in their decision-making process since
business executives have a material interest in lower taxes. Moreover,
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it is difficult to know what the ranking of different factors—which most
surveys require of respondents—may actually mean in practice. The
problems here are both behavioral—how well such things are remembered—and theoretical—to what common denominator are, say, environmental rules, tax regimes, community support for business, and so
on, to be reduced? The net result of these problems is that it is extremely difficult to use the survey method to resolve what we have
called the “counterfactual problem”—measuring factors one at a time,
each time holding all other factors constant.
The ultimate problem with the case-study method is much the
same. Work in this tradition—and a large amount of work on enterprise
zones has been in this tradition2—takes a region to which some tax and
incentive policy measure has been applied and then compares growth
levels before and after the application. The obvious problem is that if,
say, Los Angeles were doing poorly in 1990 and well in 1999, and there
had been some lessening of the business tax burden in the intervening
years, jumping to the conclusion that the tax change caused renewed
growth would be premature, possibly entirely false. As we indicated
earlier, other factors may have caused that growth. Indeed, in the case
of California, it is clear that other factors were the important ones.
In better examples of the case-study method, some attempt is made
to control for the counterfactual problem. For instance, the basic casestudy technique may be combined with a survey attempting to determine how many firms actually responded to a change in tax regime
(see, for instance, Rubin 1991). Or shift-share techniques are used to
try to eliminate, or hold constant, growth caused by other factors and
thus identify “unusual,” “unexpected,” local growth (see, for instance,
Rubin and Wilder 1989). However, the shift-share method is, for this
purpose anyway, crude. The so-called differential-shift (or regionalshift) term—the term that measures the level of “unusual” growth—
then accounts for all other local factors, only one of which is the change
in taxes.3 Thus the term contains too much to be used as a control for
all other causal factors.4
While there appears to be agreement that the relationship between
state and local taxes and growth would best be examined in the broader
framework of some general (and spatial) equilibrium model, since this
would allow a much more comprehensive coverage of the forces interacting with the local economy, the practical and empirical difficulties
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associated with doing this have discouraged much use of the method
(Morgan, Mutti, and Partridge 1989; Isard et al. 1998). Certainly, no
applications of this technique to American enterprise zones exist,
though we expect this situation to change over the next few years.
The final non-econometric approach to studying the relation between taxes and growth—one that we and a few others have adopted—
is to attack the problem from an entirely different angle: to measure
what a particular tax or incentive does for a particular firm’s income.
For instance, one could measure the extent to which an investment tax
credit raises an investment’s internal rate of return as we do in Chapter
3. The counterfactual problem can then be resolved two different ways.
First, tax costs can be compared to precise estimates of other important,
spatially variant factor costs borne by the firm. We have tried to do this
in some previous work as well as in Chapter 3 of this book: compare
tax costs to labor costs.5 Although this method has much to recommend it, a number of problems exist. While there is no theoretical reason why other nonlabor costs could not be compared to tax costs, in
practice they have not been. Indeed, the practical difficulties here are
large, so large we are not sure that this is an entirely viable strategy.
Moreover, this method suffers from a problem latent in the other methods, but most clearly visible here. Taxes are paid in return for state and
local government goods and services. There is no control for the worth
of these goods and services to individual firms. One could imagine creating a model that contained such a control, but again the practical difficulties are enormous.
It is hard to know how important the public service problem is.
There is some evidence that firms massively overpay state and local
taxes compared to the benefits they receive from government (Oakland
and Testa 1996). If this is indeed true then there is less damage to be
done by merely focusing on the tax end. It is also likely that in making
new investment and location decisions, business—after assembling a
set of locations that meets its most important locational needs—responds more to the current state and local tax regime than to expectations of state- and city-produced goods and services.6
Probably the best way of dealing with the counterfactual problem is
to put the tax results of a hypothetical firm model into the right-hand
side of an econometric model of taxes and growth. The additional factors that need controlling may then be represented by other right-hand
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side variables: labor costs (productivity-adjusted), access to markets,
the quality of government goods and services, and so on. A few researchers have adopted just such a strategy (Steinnes 1984; L. Papke
1987; Tannenwald and Kendrick 1995; Tannenwald 1996), as indeed
we do later in this chapter.
The Contradictory Findings of Econometric Studies
Early surveys of the literature suggested that, at best, state and local
taxes have only a minor influence on business location decisions (Due
1961; Oakland 1978). Various reasons continue to be given for this
seemingly counterintuitive proposition, but the most persuasive are:
• State and local taxes account for such a small share of spatially
variable business costs that their influence is swamped by other
larger costs, such as labor and transportation.
• Federal taxes massively reduce the actual variability of state and
local taxes.
• State and local tax differences reflect differences in the quality
and quantity of state and local government services.
More recent reviews of the literature tend to be increasingly positive on
the impacts of state and local taxes on location decisions and growth.
Newman and Sullivan’s (1988) influential review, which paid special
attention to issues of model specification, concludes: “The most recent
studies, employing more detailed data sets and more refined econometric techniques, have generated results which cast some doubt on the received conclusion that tax effects are generally negligible” (Newman
and Sullivan 1988, p. 232). Then in 1991, Bartik published a most
comprehensive review of the post-1979 literature and concluded that
there was growing consensus that state and local taxes have a small but
significant influence on location decisions. Moreover, Bartik was prepared to say what that consensus was. Averaging the results of a very
large number of studies:
The long-run elasticity of business activity with respect to state
and local taxes appears to lie in the range of –0.1 to –0.6 for intermetropolitan or interstate business location decisions, and –1.0 to
–3.0 for intrametropolitan business location decisions. That is, if a
small suburban jurisdiction within a metropolitan area raises its
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taxes 10 percent, it can expect in the long run a reduction in its
business activity from 10 to 30 percent. If an entire metropolitan
area or state raises its taxes by 10 percent, the estimated long-run
effect would be a reduction of business activity between 1 percent
and 6 percent. (Bartik 1991, p. 43)

The reasons for the development of a research consensus on a link
between taxes and growth have got to do with technical improvements
in the literature—a point Newman and Sullivan (1988) also made—and
with the increasing homogenization of other spatially variable factor
costs across the U.S. Wasylenko’s (1997) more recent review for the
Boston Federal Reserve generally supports Bartik’s claims although
Wasylenko cautions that the results appear to be dependent on the data
sets used, time periods covered and the variables included in the estimating equations. In a review of the literature on the effect of non-tax
incentives on growth, also for the Boston Federal Reserve, we argue
that while the research uniformly shows a statistically and substantively significant link between non-tax incentives and growth, these results
may be entirely spurious given that they are all dependent on fairly dubious data sets (Fisher and Peters 1997a).
Other respected researchers in the field remain unconvinced by the
“consensus position” and the matter remains anything but settled
(McGuire 1992, 1997; Netzer 1997). Crucial issues are the variability
of elasticity estimates, findings with regard to specific tax incentives
appearing to contradict those for general taxes, and skepticism that the
tax models capture the way firms make investment and location decisions (see also Ady 1997). Certainly, the best and most numerous studies are at the interstate and intermetropolitan level, but even here the
elasticities (the actual measure of the effect of taxes on growth) are not
large. On the other hand, the intrametropolitan studies are very few in
number, and the results are all over the landscape. Frankly we are
skeptical that a 33 percent business tax cut would induce a 100 percent
increase in business activity, which Bartik claims is a credible upper
limit on the effect.
The econometric literature that focuses on taxes and incentives in
enterprise zones, as opposed to the effects of taxes generally, is small.
As with the survey method, some of the early statistical work focused
on issues of correct zone management where the relationship between
enterprise zones and growth is only implicit. Elling and Sheldon
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(1991), for instance, developed models looking at enterprise zone success—the number of firms qualifying for zone benefits by investing in
the zone—in four states: Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, and Ohio. They
found enterprise zones to have been largely ineffective, and argue that
“business cost-reduction tools”—in other words, tax incentives—were
of little consequences to zone success because “they are so widely
available and, hence, do little to differentiate a zone from any other location in the eyes of relocating firms” (Elling and Sheldon 1991, p.
151).7 The most successful zones they found were where what they
call a “pure” zone strategy—tax incentives—had been complemented
by more traditional economic development support (technical assistance, location and site analysis, and so on). Insofar as they reflect on
the relationship between enterprise zones and growth, Elling and Sheldon’s conclusions are open to question. Their measures of taxes and incentives (as well as regulatory relief) are by current standards poor indeed, and their models—leaving out, as they do, almost all traditional
location factors—suggest mis-specification for our purposes.
Erickson and Friedman (1990a) were the first to address the enterprise zone-growth issue directly.8 They looked at two measures of zone
success: first, jobs created or saved by firms investing in the zones after
designation; and second, the number of firms investing in the zone after designation. Exogenous variables included 1) a number of policy
variables meant to define how zones were administered, 2) a crude incentive variable—the number of verified incentives offered by the
state, 3) a set of welfare variables reflecting zone designation and incentive criteria, but usefully also measuring the economic distress of
zone residents, and 4) various control variables (population and area of
the zone, and employment change in the surrounding MSA or county).
In both the establishments and the jobs equations, the incentive variable was statistically significant and very positive. These conclusions
are clearly at odds with Elling and Sheldon’s and suggest that incentives offered in enterprise zones do generate local growth. Unfortunately, it would be unwise to put too much store by these results. Besides the problems associated with the way the incentive variable was
measured, the jobs and establishments figures come from the reports of
zone managers. There is every reason to believe that such a data set is
highly unreliable.
As we indicated in Chapter 2, Leslie Papke (1994) has done some
of the most convincing and sophisticated work in this area. She ana-
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lyzed the Indiana enterprise zone program. Her research is notable for
the geographical spatial scale of the data, the care taken in model building, and the incentive and “growth” variables analyzed—changes in the
levels of machinery and equipment and inventories investment, and unemployment claims. The first two variables were defined at the Indiana
taxing-district level and unemployment by claims made to local unemployment claims offices. Although there are serious questions about
the reliability of her three outcomes data sets, her work represents one
the best attempts to separate out the enterprise zone from its surrounding communities. Papke then estimates a number of different specifications of her model (all of which include jurisdictional fixed effects).
Papke’s most consistent findings are that zone designation leads to
1) a decline in machinery and equipment, 2) an increase in inventories,
and 3) a decrease in unemployment claims of about 19 percent in the
year after designation. Papke (1994, pp. 43–44) notes that since the
most valuable Indiana incentive applies to the stock of inventory
(which is otherwise subject to high Indiana property-tax rates), the first
two findings may represent a shift “in the composition of assets from
depreciable property toward inventories.” The third finding suggests
very substantial employment effects. Related work by Papke (1993) on
the census blocks composing the Indiana zones appears to validate her
econometric results—for instance, unemployment fell more in zones
than non-zones—although the “zone effects estimated with the census
data [were] weaker than those estimated econometrically” (L. Papke
1993, p. 60).
However, more recent studies, done with as much care as Papke’s,
do not support her conclusions. Boarnet and Bogart (1996), using
methods similar to Papke’s, found no evidence that the New Jersey enterprise zone program resulted in increased economic activity. Admittedly, Boarnet and Bogart caution that the Indiana and New Jersey programs are very different and the differences in findings could reflect
this fact. However, Greenbaum (1998), in a very well-designed study,
examined the impact of state enterprise zones on both business and
housing market outcomes in six major states. The analysis was undertaken at the ZIP-code level, in part using the same SSEL data source
(though not the same data) that we used in the previous chapter and use
again in this one. He found that while enterprise zones may create new
business activity, these gains tend to be offset by shrinking business establishments in zones. The result is that overall zones have little impact
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on business outcomes. He finds also that zones have no impact on
overall employment growth (but some impact on employment growth
among new establishments).
Most recently, Bondonio and Engberg (2000) found that, as predictors of growth, neither the monetary value of enterprise zone incentives
offered nor the particular features of enterprise zone programs mattered
very much. This is confirmed by Greenbaum and Engberg (2000), who
found that enterprise zones have little positive impact on housing market, income, or employment outcomes. Thus the majority of the recent
literature comes down on the side of enterprise zones having little or no
impact on growth.
The variation in the conclusions among these studies may have
many causes. The differences may reflect divergence in effectiveness
across states. As likely is that the variation reflects the difficulties of
measurement, the discussion of which will occupy much of this chapter. There are no perfect data sets, and there is continuing debate on appropriate methodology. Nevertheless, the important point here is that
the variation in conclusions suggests policy caution.

BUILDING ECONOMETRIC MODELS
OF TAXES AND GROWTH
It should be clear by now that econometric studies of taxes and
growth are controversial and that the results of these studies are not in
agreement. Leaving aside the broader issue of the appropriateness of
the methodology, there are a number of complex technical issues which
each econometric study of this question must successfully address. It is
to these technical issues that we now turn.
Broader Methodological Issues
As supporters of the survey technique like to point out, business location decisions are complex (Calzonetti and Walker 1991). For instance, it is now well understood that a firm’s location decision will actually encompass a sequential set of decisions at increasingly refined
geographical scales. A firm may, for instance, first focus on a region of
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the country with particularly good access to markets, energy costs and
so on; then may choose a subregion on the basis of a set of other variables, such as labor costs, unionization, and possibly state taxation;
then narrow the location decision down to the metropolitan level (possibly focusing on highway access), then the city level (possibly looking
at local taxes among other things), and then within a set of cities, various actual sites.9 This poses two major problems for typical econometric models. 1) There are a vast number of potential costs that firms may
respond to; how a particular firm responds to a particular cost is likely
to depend on that firm’s particular factor composition. 2) The sequential decision-making process may mean, for instance, that a state with
very low taxes is excluded from the selection process because it did not
make the first “regional” cut. Some researchers do not believe it is currently possible to capture these complexities in econometric equations.
Likewise, while most econometric models try to explain aggregate
economic activity in an area—such as net changes in employment,
state product, and so on—the estimating equations tend to focus on
only one aspect of aggregate local growth—the location of new branch
plants.10 But aggregate local growth is made up of a number of business decisions apart from the location of new branch plants—plant expansions, contractions, closings, and restructuring and small business
start-up decisions. Each of these components of aggregate economic
change will have its own, partially unique, set of determinants.
Finally there is the concern that many of the key factors influencing
either aggregate local growth or the location of new branch plants may
not be amenable to empirical measurement. Public services, wages,
taxes, and state and local regulation of business are typical examples.
Although the federal government publishes a number of different wage
data series, the econometric problem is that, in the best of worlds,
wages would need to be adjusted for productivity and possibly the cost
of supplying certain mandated benefits, such as unemployment insurance.11 With regard to public services, we need to measure outputs: the
quality and quantity of the services produced. Unfortunately, there are
few uncontroversial output measures, and public service inputs—the
costs of providing services—are a poor guide to outputs. Even if they
were a better guide, the quantity and quality of public goods and services are functions not only of current spending but also of historical
spending (roads and bridges being a good example of this). With re-
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gard to taxes, one needs to be able to measure the real tax burden on
firms, and there is solid evidence that tax burdens do not correlate with
state business income tax rates or even with so-called effective tax rates
(J. Papke 1995; Fisher and Peters 1998). Finally, state and local regulation of economic activity is an area only recently receiving the attention it deserves, and issues such as local land-use and zoning controls
are almost entirely absent from the econometric literature.
As the discussion in Chapter 3 indicates, we believe there are ways
of resolving the measurement of business taxes. These do require massive effort, but the result is a much more sensitive—though not perfect—measurement of business taxes. We believe the other difficult
factors are also amenable to comprehensive measurement, although
much of the work, particularly in the area of state and local regulation,
still needs to be done.12 We do not undertake that work in this book.
Technical Issues of Model Structure
There is broad agreement on the major technical questions that
models of taxes and growth must address. But providing convincing
answers to these issues within an empirical modeling setting is anything but a simple task. Besides resolving the issues raised above,
models of state and local taxes and growth must also be able to control
for so-called fixed effects, the endogeneity of some explanatory variables, and the durability of both capital and agglomeration economies.
Simply put, in state and local taxes/growth models, fixed-effect controls are designed to account statistically for the unobservable characteristics of regions or states or cities, characteristics that may affect
growth but that are not captured by the other variables in the equation(s). Typically, this requires creating regional (or state or city) dummy variables. Failure to do this will result in omitted variable bias—essentially, the impact of the omitted variables will show up in the
estimated parameters of the included explanatory variables.
The relationship between the dependent variable (some measure of
growth) and the explanatory variables is often causally complex. For
instance, all else being equal, lower wages in an area would tend to increase the growth in that area. But higher growth would tend to increase the demand for labor and thus wages would increase, and so on.
Other explanatory variables found in taxes/growth models, particularly
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policy variables, often cause the same problem. In particular, low taxes may induce growth, but growth in the industrial tax base may in turn
permit reductions in the property-tax rate. The problem—endogeneity—is that the explanatory variables are having causal effects on the
dependent variable, and vice versa. It can be shown that failure to deal
with this problem will result in both biased and inconsistent parameter
estimates. In the case of the effect of taxes on growth, there will be a
tendency to exaggerate the negative impact on growth. One possible
solution to this problem is to find instrumental variables that replace the
offending endogenous variables in the estimating equations.
Also, an area’s economic climate today will tend to be correlated
with its climate yesterday, or a year ago, or two years ago. The reason
for this is that both capital and agglomeration economies are durable.
Thus a good part of the explanation of why city x is growing during period t is its growth in period t–1. Typically, some lagged measure of
economic growth is used to control for this problem.
Special Modeling Problems Posed by Enterprise Zones
Over and above the technical issues just described, constructing a
rigorous model of taxes and growth at the level of the enterprise zone
poses serious empirical problems. Enterprise zones are usually subcounty, subcity regions. They tend not to be coterminous with tracts or
sets of tracts (although they are almost always coterminous with sets of
blocks). Most economic data are published at the county level, and
even at this level, the requirements of privacy mean that in many smaller- and medium-sized counties, much data cannot be made public.
Some economic data are indeed published at the ZIP-code level (County Business Patterns, for instance), but here the issues of privacy are
that much worse, with much less useful data resulting. Moreover, from
research and policy points of view, enterprise zones exist both in cities
and in contradistinction to those cities. In the best of worlds the researcher would want to be able to compare the economic performance
of the enterprise zone with the city in which it exists. But many of the
factors that are commonly used to explain business location decisions
are impossible or difficult to measure at the subcounty or subplace level. The fixed-effects estimation method can be very useful here since
any characteristic of an enterprise zone that is constant over the period
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of the analysis—local infrastructure, labor, distance to markets, and so
on—is controlled for by the individual enterprise zone effects. Unfortunately, where the fixed-effect controls used are regional, as they are in
the analyses presented later in this chapter (for the national analysis,
they are state specific), this is not possible.
Labor market data pose both theoretical and empirical difficulties.
Labor markets—and thus the productivity and cost of labor—are usually seen as being defined by Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)
boundaries. Indeed, MSAs are constructed, in part, out of commuting
flow data. If labor markets are, in fact, defined by MSA boundaries,
then labor (supply) differences between city and the enterprise zone
markets may be illusory. But there is evidence—admittedly limited—
from both the spatial mismatch and the gender and employment literatures which suggests that for some workers, functional labor markets
are defined very narrowly and are certainly much smaller than MSAs.
For instance, in a series of studies based on Worcester, Massachusetts,
labor markets, Hanson and Pratt (1990, 1991, 1995) found that some
blue-collar employees traveled very limited distances to their work
sites; job-search behavior was consistent with this distance. Part of the
reason for this appears to be that sometimes information about work
opportunities does not flow freely; rather, it is disseminated by informal
and often restricted social networks.
Early work in the spatial mismatch paradigm suggested that close
access to buoyant job markets has important positive impacts on jobsearch behavior, labor-force participation, and employment rates and
wages (Clark and Whiteman 1983).13 If this is true then it is possible
that taxes/growth models should be able to distinguish enterprise zone
labor markets from city labor markets.14 And if the latter is true, then
further practical problems arise. There is little useful labor market information published at the subcounty and subplace level; furthermore,
what information there is poses the sort of geographical issues we discuss in Appendix E (for instance, although there are ZIP-code region
labor force data,15 ZIP-code regions are not coterminous with enterprise zones).
Other right-hand-side factors bring further problems. Given the
original intent of enterprise zones, one would expect them to be in older, inner-city areas. One would expect such areas to be more likely to
have older, more decrepit infrastructure, older factories, and so on
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(Dabney 1991). Thus enterprise zones should tend to be at some disadvantage compared to newer suburban industrial areas. If one is to measure the effect that particular enterprise zone tax credits have on local
growth, then one must be able to control for the quality and quantity of
enterprise zone infrastructure, or more generally, the quality and quantity of enterprise zone public services. The problem is that even outside
of enterprise zones, there is no entirely acceptable way of measuring
the quality and quantity of local or even regional infrastructure. Indeed, there were a number of research projects during the 1990s devoted entirely to this issue.16 In subplace regions, such as enterprise zones,
where records are seldom kept, the situation is that much worse.
Another important factor is access to markets. In many standard
taxes/growth models this is reduced to differences in transportation
costs incurred at various sites. Again, if the issue is the difference between the enterprise zone and the city, then the question is to what
extent the transportation costs in the enterprise zone are higher than in
the rest of the city. In an ideal world one would measure the average
transportation cost to each major (or possibly every) market, using a
geographic information system that would have the entire U.S. road
network programmed into it. The true cost differential between transporting a good from site A in city x to its various markets and transporting the good from enterprise zone site B in city x could then be calculated. But this has never been done in the context of econometric
models of growth and taxes. Our market information is too poor and
the computerized network models too underdeveloped.
Given these problems, it is common to approach the transportationcost issue in a considerably cruder manner. For instance, how far from a
highway on-ramp is the enterprise zone compared to non-enterprise
zone industrial sites in the city? In early versions of the research we undertook for this book, in fact, we used precisely such a measure. The
problem is that even a cursory look at the road networks of most cities
indicates that in medium-sized and larger cities access to the single closest on-ramp massively distorts real-world transportation choices. It also
results in some serious anomalies. One Ohio enterprise zone we include
in our intraregional model had fairly good access to a four-lane highway
on-ramp, but this highway peters out before connecting to any other
four-lane highway. So the question cannot be: Does the enterprise zone
have better access to an on-ramp? Rather, it should be: Does the enter-
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prise zone provide better or worse access to the wider transportation infrastructure available? The latter question is not easily answered. One
further point here. For factories that transport their goods far or transport their goods in the snowy North where there is considerable variability in road speeds and thus transportation time, a mean five- or tenminute disadvantage getting onto the highway system may have a
marginal or non-existent impact on final business location choices.
Similar sorts of problems obtain for the other factors that are sometimes included in tax and growth models. The upshot is that while
there are difficult statistical issues that need to be dealt with, there are
also a range of more mundane empirical issues that hamper our ability
to build such models.

THE STRUCTURE OF OUR MODEL
The SSEL Data and Constraints on Spatial
and Temporal Comparisons
The SSEL data that are used to create the dependent variables in
our econometric models of growth, while having a number of important advantages over other data sets, impose a certain structure on our
models. The data are at the ZIP-code-region level—they are not for individual firms. Thus, we are unable to model the location decisions of
individual firms with the result that our analysis takes a fairly traditional regional cross-section form. The data are organized into three periods: 1989–1991, 1991–1993, and 1993–1995. At the time we requested special census runs from the Bureau of the Census, 1989 was the
first year for which linked, longitudinal SSEL data were available,
while 1995 was the last year that would be available in time for completion of this research project. Therefore, historical models, with areas that were not enterprise zones becoming enterprise zones during
one of the three periods, were impossible to construct for the national
sample (although this was possible for our Ohio sample).
Our national model compares 65 enterprise zones in 13 states to
each other, not to the cities in which they exist. Each data point is an
enterprise zone. The model is intended to answer the question: Do
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zones with greater tax advantages experience more rapid growth in
manufacturing establishments than zones with relatively disadvantageous tax and incentive regimes? Such a model does not allow us to
say whether designation of a zone generates growth apart from the incentives offered in the zone. We look at the effect of enterprise zone incentives on growth, but not at the effect of enterprise zone designation
(or the effects of other local development activities that may go on
within zones).
Two methodological questions arise. First, regression analysis requires that the sample universe be “real.” Do enterprise zones represent such a universe, or are they so varied across states that they should
not be classed as a single policy tool? If we were considering all U.S.
state-level enterprise zones, this problem would indeed pose serious
obstacles to our research. We have chosen states, however, with programs that accord as a whole with the traditional zone approach, especially the focus on geographic targeting (we exclude states in which
zones are little more than delivery mechanisms for standard state economic development policy). For instance, we have not included
Louisiana with its thousands of zones since these clearly represent an
entirely different sort of policy beast. We have included Ohio—which
has a large number of nontargeted zones—but for our national model
we include only those Ohio enterprise zones that qualify under economic distress criteria and thus are the recipients of special targeted incentives. Moreover, the whole point of the TAIMez model is to reduce
various sorts of incentives to a common denominator, one that is both
theoretically sound and methodologically feasible: the impact of incentives on business income. Thus we believe we do have a coherent universe for our regressions.
Second, since we do not have control groups in our national models
(areas that are not zones or were not zones for some of the time during
the analysis period that we compare our sample to), are we not just doing a traditional cross-sectional tax model, but with even less variation
in the tax variable than traditional tax models? Essentially, there are
four related criticisms here:
• Our models are not really enterprise zone models, but merely
traditional cross-sectional tax models of the sort commonly
found in the taxes/growth literature.
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• There is likely to be less variation in effective tax rates among
enterprise zones than among states or cities.
• Our models lack a spatial control group—areas that we compare
our enterprise zones to.
• Our models lack an historical control group—we do not compare zone performance after designation to performance prior to
designation.
With regard to the first two criticisms, while it is true that our national models do not measure zone effects per se—but the effects of
variation in zone incentive levels—this is still an interesting and important issue. This is so because the broad tax effects on growth that have
been found throughout the United States do not necessarily apply to enterprise zones. The major reason for this is that the “locational negatives” of zones may effectively neutralize zone incentives. Zone incentives may very well have effects different from those predicted by
broader tax models. Moreover, contrary to the claims of Eisinger
(1988) and others, incentives do not work to mitigate spatial variation
in basic tax structure across states and cities, but rather to exaggerate
the variation (Fisher and Peters 1998).
With regard to the criticism that we lack a spatial control group,
there is reason to be skeptical about econometric attempts to compare
zones to non-zones. In the states we analyze, enterprise zones have
been selected for a range of specific policy reasons. They are not random policy experiments. Thus a case could be made that no true comparison regions exist. If this is correct then direct comparison of zones
and non-zones may result in selection bias. Moreover, generating controls would have been a massive task. In all but a few cases, zones are
shaped perversely; given the shape of ZIP-code regions, coherent
zone/non-zone regions are close to impossible to construct.17 Note,
however, that in our Ohio models we do have both zone and non-zone
communities in our sample. In this case the comparison is appropriate
since the Ohio models are not restricted (and could not be restricted) to
targeted zones.
With regard to lack of historical controls and the failure to look at
the differences in enterprise zone areas prior to and after designation,
two further points need be made. Generating historical controls (say,
pre- and post-designation) was impossible for the national sample, giv-
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en the SSEL data we used. This data set has other attributes that make
it particularly useful in evaluating the performance of zones (for instance, completeness even when sectorally disaggregated). Furthermore, over anything but the shortest term, we doubt that firms respond
merely to zone designation. Rather, they respond to the benefits that
designation brings, that is, zone incentives. Thus, focusing on incentives is at least as methodologically appropriate as comparing zones to
non-zones.
An important concern, however, is that it is possible that enterprise
zones may be more than the incentives offered and that firms do react to
“mere” designation. Some studies of enterprise zone effects have
found that designation is more important than the incentives offered
(U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 1986).
In a survey of the recent literature, Wilder and Rubin (1996, p. 481)
wrote:
Virtually every study has found that employment and investment
activity increased in most zones after program implementation.
However, there was seldom a simple or direct relationship between the new economic activity and the development incentives.
Some studies found that many qualified zone firms had not taken
advantage of incentives, yet had engaged in new or expanded activity. This outcome . . . reflects a more indirect effect of enterprise zones: that is, that the business community takes the mere
existence of the zone as a signal that the city and state have made
a commitment to the zone area. That perceived commitment has a
positive influence on decisions about investment and location.

If this is true, then enterprise zone designation acts as a marketing
device (Wolkoff 1992) and plays a symbolic role serving as an indicator of the local business climate and commitment by the public sector
(Wilder and Rubin 1996, p. 482). Designation indicates to business
that incentives will be offered, that land-use issues will be dealt with
more promptly, and so on. The evidence on this issue is anything but
settled. Certainly, many of the studies covered in Wilder and Rubin
(1996) did not fully separate designation from incentives—however,
many of those that did found that incentives were substantively important, even if only at the margin of location and investment decisions.18
And most location theory suggests that insofar as firms react to state
and local fiscal regimes, it is differences in actual tax costs that are im-
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portant. All in all, we felt concerns over the designation/incentives issue need to be addressed directly. Thus we constructed a set of models
for 104 Ohio cities able to distinguish between zones and non-zones,
and including areas which became zones during one of our three time
periods. In these models, zone designation enters into the equation separately from the financial benefits of zones (taxes and tax incentives).
Of the 104 cities in our Ohio sample (drawn from cities over 15,000
population), 50 had one or more zones in 1990, 57 in 1992, and 65 in
1994. That is, 15 cities established zones between 1990 and 1994.
There were 51 zones in the 50 cities in 1990, 60 zones in 1992, and 68
zones in 1994.
Again, the Ohio analyses are conducted at the ZIP-code level and
growth data are from the SSEL. The analysis is restricted to Ohio because that is one of the few states in the nation that collects and publishes comprehensive local tax data. Also, Ohio has well over 200
zones, making this sort of analysis feasible. Note, however, that zones
are not being compared to the cities in which they exist—rather, Ohio
zone cities are being compared to non-zone cities. More often than not,
in Ohio cities with enterprise zones nearly all land zoned for industry is
contained by the zone. Many of the cities in the Ohio sample, in fact,
consist of a single ZIP-code region. For the sake of comparability we
try to keep our Ohio model as close as possible to our main model. The
Ohio models draw on a sample that covers cities without zones, cities
with targeted zones, and cities with nontargeted zones.
The Question of Panel Data
For both our national and Ohio equations we have cross-sections
(N = 65 different locations for the national model, N = 104 for the Ohio
model) and panels or time periods (t = 3). In order to improve the efficiency of the parameter estimates, it is common practice to pool crosssections with time periods, giving nearly 189 cases for our national
sample, for instance.19 Pooling raises questions of model structure,
however. If one can be certain the regression parameters will remain
constant across cross-sections and panels, then a simple pooling of cases is appropriate—this is sometimes referred to as the “constant coefficients” model (Sayrs 1989). Unfortunately, in state and local taxes/
growth models, there is seldom good reason to assume such constancy.
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One alternative is the addition of spatial and temporal fixed effects.
Earlier in this chapter, as part of a more general discussion of the structure of tax/growth models, we indicated the usefulness of geographical
fixed effects in accounting for unobserved state or local characteristics
that may affect growth. Pooled models with spatial or temporal fixed
effects are sometimes called covariance models20 and have the advantage of permitting equation intercepts to vary by space and time.21 Covariance models have been widely utilized in the taxes/growth literature. Provided the standard assumptions about the disturbance term are
met, ordinary least squares estimates of parameters will be unbiased
and consistent but not efficient (except when t is large).
Unfortunately, covariance models also have their problems. The
addition of large numbers of dummy variables will decrease a model’s
degrees of freedom and, thus, its statistical power. One consequence of
this is that researchers often specify models that include only cross-sectional fixed effects, ignoring temporal fixed effects (Isard et al. 1998,
p. 189; Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1998, p. 253). For much the same reason, in the taxes/growth literature (and indeed in the following analysis), regional rather than cross-sectional fixed effects are sometimes
used. Another problem is that the space and time dummy variables are
substantively meaningless.
A third alternative is a “random effects” model, or some variation
on this. In this approach, the error term of a cross-sectional panel model (εit) is broken into three components: cross-sectional error (ui); time
error (vt); and a combined error component (wit). Unlike the covariance
model, where the time and cross-section dummies represent essentially
our lack of knowledge about the impact of time and geography, in the
random effects model our lack of knowledge—the error specific to time
and cross-section—is described directly in the (first two) components
of the disturbance term. This gives rise to the central advantage the
random effects model has over the covariance model—it uses up fewer
degrees of freedom and thus is statistically more powerful. However,
the method requires that the error term components not be correlated
with the explanatory variables in the model. If that assumption is not
met, parameter estimates may be inconsistent. Generalized least
squares procedures are often used for parameter estimation, although, if
one is prepared to assume normal distribution of the error components,
the maximum likelihood method may be preferred. It should also be
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noted that there are variations on the covariance and random effects
models (see Hsiao 1986); moreover, there are a number of alternative
ways of dealing with pooled data sets, including structural equation
models (Sayrs 1989).
Although there are statistical tests comparing the power of models
using these three methods, the appropriateness of the model used will
also depend on the data at hand and the explanatory needs of the analysis. For our main national model we present estimates based on the covariance or fixed effects model although we also ran various constant
coefficients and random effects (using maximum likelihood estimators)
models. We focus on our fixed effect results since we doubt that the
constant parameter assumption of the constant coefficient model can be
met,22 and we doubt that the error components of the random effects
model are indeed uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. Also,
the limited number of time periods suggests that without time intercepts the random effects model is inappropriate. Later in this chapter
we mention certain multi-equation models used to analyze issues of potential variable simultaneity. Here the use of the random effects model
is considerably more difficult to implement and does not provide preferred solutions over the simpler but more robust OLS models (Hsiao
1986; Sayrs 1989). Overall then, we believe the fixed effects models to
be our strongest.

RESULTS
Our national base model was run for all 65 enterprise zones (in 13
states) in our national data set for three time periods. The model was
run for all of manufacturing with the dependent variable the rate of
growth of new establishments in the enterprise zone—technically, the
new births and moves in expressed as a percent of the number of establishments at the beginning of the period.23 We report parameters from
the ordinary least squares fixed effects estimates. Not reported here are
the time and state24 intercepts of the fixed effects models. The Ohio
models generally mirror the national models.
Independent variables in our models fall into four groups: 1) proxies for major spatially variant costs—wages, market access, electricity,
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public services, and agglomeration; 2) taxes and incentives and enterprise zone designation; 3) measures of the demographic characteristics
of enterprise zones—race, poverty, unemployment, and skills; and 4)
appropriate controls, including a measure of earlier growth. The main
variables used in both the national and Ohio models are summarized in
Table 7.1; note that not all variables are used in all equations. In the
Ohio models variables irrelevant at the intraregional level (for instance,
transportation costs to national markets) have been removed, and various other controls necessary for the structure of the model have been
changed.
In the national models, each record is an enterprise zone, where an
enterprise zone is defined as a set of ZIP codes. Where possible and appropriate, ZIP-code level data from the Census of Population, County
Business Patterns, and the SSEL databases were aggregated to construct enterprise zone level characteristics. The aggregation was performed in a Geographic Information System on the standard enterprise
zone boundary definition file, as described in Appendix E. Some data
were available only at a broader geographic scale than the ZIP or enterprise zone—in these cases no aggregation was necessary.
With the exception of unemployment rate, all the demographic
characteristics of enterprise zones are measured at the ZIP-code level—the percentage African American, the percentage in poverty, and
the percentage of the population with degrees. This is appropriate
since the demographic variables are meant to describe the peculiar
neighborhood characteristics of enterprise zones. On the other hand,
the major cost variables are measured at a number of different spatial
scales, the precise scale depending on the quality of the data available
and on the nature of the cost. Wages rates are set in broader metropolitan labor markets, not at the neighborhood level. Moreover, reliable wage data require going to the county or MSA scale. Public service expenditures are set at the city level, although the neighborhoods
that comprise an enterprise zone may have previously suffered from
city service neglect. Unfortunately, more spatially disaggregated service data are not available. Electric rates for industrial users are generally the same throughout the service territory of a given electric utility; in most cases, the cities in our sample fell entirely within one
service area, so that electric rates for zones could be determined unambiguously.
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Table 7.1 Variables Used in Models
AGGLOMERATION

DISTRESS
EDUCATION

ELECTRIC

GROWTH

INFRASTRUCTURE

MARKET ACCESS

POVERTY

PREVIOUS GROWTH

RACE

SERVICES

TAXNET

UNEMPLOYMENT

WAGE

MSA or county population from Census of Population,
1990.
Distress categorization for some Ohio zones.
Proportion of adult population with college degree, by
ZIP, weighted average for zone, Census of Population,
1990.
Average cost of electric power for industrial users, by city,
1990, 1992, 1994.
Births and moves in for time period t, divided by total
establishments at beginning of the time period t, by ZIP,
weighted average of enterprise zones, SSEL.
Proportion of housing built before 1939, by ZIP, weighted
average for enterprise zone, Census of Population,
1990.
Proportion within 500 miles, calculated by county,
calculated from city centroid, divided by 1,000,000.
Proportion of individuals in poverty, by ZIP, weighted
average for zone, Census of Population, 1990.
Proportion change in manufacturing employment in the
MSA for preceeding three years (1986–1989 for the
1989–1991 period, for example).
Proportion African American, by ZIP, weighted average
for zone, 1990.
Per capita city expenditure on highways, police and fire
protection, 1991–1992.
Calculated tax rate, net of incentives, by firm in sector or
weighted average of sectors for manufacturing,
calculated by TAIMez for 1990, 1992, and 1994.
Average annual unemployment rate in surrounding county
for the beginning-of-period year 1989, 1991, or 1993.
County average hourly wage for all manufacturing; 1987
used for periods 1 and 2; 1992 used for period 3. Where
no county wage data are available MSA wage is
substituted.
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Our proxy for market access is given by the population within a
day’s drive (500 miles) of the enterprise zone. By definition, agglomeration economies25—essentially, the productivity advantages that accrue
to larger places—occur at the broader MSA or county level. Our proxy
for the quality of enterprise zone infrastructure—the percent of housing
built before 1939—is measured at the ZIP-code level. This is appropriate since there is evidence that the poor quality of neighborhood infrastructure is a significant location deterrent to new investment in enterprise zones. Finally, our measurement of both establishment births and
moves in and effective tax rates is at the enterprise zone level.
In Table 7.2 we provide descriptive statistics for the main variables
in the national base model. For the average zone in our national sample, 23 percent of the population is African American, 19 percent are in
poverty, and 20 percent of adults have a college degree. The county or
MSA unemployment rate was around 6.5 percent and the wage rate
$11.56. The ZIPs that comprised the enterprise zones were old—close
to a third of the housing units were built before 1939. The average zone
was within a day’s drive of around 72 million Americans and was in a
metropolitan area of over 1 million people. The effective tax rate after
Table 7.2 Descriptive Statistics of Variables in National
Base Model
Variables
AGGLOMERATION

(millions)

EDUCATION
ELECTRIC
GROWTH
INFRASTRUCTURE
MARKET ACCESS
POVERTY
PREVIOUS GROWTH
RACE
SERVICES
TAXNET
UNEMPLOYMENT
WAGE

Mean

Std. dev.

1.44
0.20
5.52
0.19
0.30
72.08
0.19
–0.02
0.23
301.37
0.06
6.56
11.56

2.05
0.05
1.81
0.08
0.16
28.18
0.08
0.08
0.23
94.10
0.02
2.64
2.42
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all incentives was around 6 percent and the growth rate of establishment births and moves in was around 19 percent per two-year period.
However, the metropolitan areas in which the enterprise zones existed
had seen a net decline in manufacturing employment over the three
years preceding our measurement year.
Table 7.3 summarizes the results for the main national models
while Table 7.4 provides elasticity estimates derived from these results.
GROWTH (the growth rate of establishment births and moves in) was dependent. We find no evidence that more generous enterprise zone incentives or lower net tax rates result in increased growth. Indeed, the
intercept for TAXNET (the net state-local tax rate, after incentives) consistently has the wrong sign—if the taxes/growth literature is to be believed, higher taxes should result in lower growth, not higher growth.
The t value on the TAXNET parameter estimate is not statistically significant. Moreover, the estimate is substantively unimportant. A 1 percent

Table 7.3 Results from National Base and Sectoral Modelsa
National base model
Variable
GROWTH,

Estimate

t

Estimate

t

0.005
0.344
–0.001
–0.232
0.000
0.129
0.079
–0.088
0.000
0.277
0.006
–0.002

1.19
2.92
0.14
0.48
0.05
1.28
1.00
2.57
0.04
0.76
2.37
0.65

0.004
0.342
0.008
–0.159
–0.008
0.060
0.202
–0.038
0.000
0.213
0.000
–0.002

0.80
3.09
1.49
2.98
1.32
0.62
2.79
1.00
1.40
0.82
0.00
0.67

dependent

AGGLOMERATION
EDUCATION
ELECTRIC
INFRASTRUCTURE
MARKET ACCESS
POVERTY
PREVIOUS GROWTH
RACE
SERVICES
TAXNET
UNEMPLOYMENT
WAGE

n
Adj. R2
a

National sectoral model

Fixed-effect intercepts are not reported

193
0.44

605
0.27
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Table 7.4 National Base and Sectoral Models,
Elasticity Estimates
Variable
AGGLOMERATION
EDUCATION
ELECTRIC
INFRASTRUCTURE
MARKET ACCESS
POVERTY
PREVIOUS GROWTH
RACE
SERVICES
TAXNET
UNEMPLOYMENT
WAGE

National
base model

National
sectoral model

0.03
0.35
–0.02
–0.37
0.01
0.13
–0.01
–0.10
0.05
0.09
0.20
–0.11

0.03
0.37
0.22
–0.27
–0.31
0.06
–0.02
–0.05
–0.13
0.07
0.00
–0.12

increase in taxes is likely to result in only a 9/100 percent increase in
growth. Thus, a full doubling of taxes increases growth by only 9 percent. The mean two-year growth rate in our sample zones was 19 percent so a 100 percent increase in taxes would increase the growth rate
(in births and moves in) from 19 percent to just under 21 percent. In
other words, in the typical zone with around 100 existing establishments, a full doubling of taxes would result in an additional two new
births or moves in. A more realistic 10 percent tax change would result
in no visible net change in growth in establishments. Moreover, even a
dramatic 20 percent tax change would still be too small to alter the expected number of new business births or move-ins.
We varied the tax variable in a number of ways. In some models, a
TAIMez-derived measure of the size of tax incentives was used to replace TAXNET; in others, two tax variables were entered into the equation
separately: 1) a TAIMez measure of basic taxes before incentives, and
2) the value of incentives expressed as a tax rate reduction. These
changes did not alter our results: there was no indication that the size of
enterprise zone incentives alone, basic taxes alone, or incentives and
basic taxes in combination are statistically or substantively important to
the rate of births and moves in.
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In Chapter 4 (and elsewhere) we argued that taxes have important
sectoral effects. All else being equal, firms that use a greater proportion
of equipment in their production processes will have more to gain from
property-tax abatements, firms that use more labor will have more to
gain from jobs credits, and so on. It is thus quite possible that state and
local enterprise zone incentives will not work evenly among industrial
sectors. The national—and later, Ohio—sectoral models allow us to
analyze this issue. The models include the necessary controls for industrial sector (we do not present parameter estimates for sectoral controls). Unfortunately, at this disaggregated level, there are sectors for
which there were no establishments in a particular zone at the beginning of a period; therefore calculation of the dependent variable,
GROWTH, would result in an attempted division by zero. We modified
our growth variable accordingly: for the calculation of the modified
GROWTH, the denominator was total establishments at the end of the time
period. Sectors in some enterprise zones (“zone sectors”) had zero
ending establishments; such records were necessarily excluded from
our models.
Focusing on sectors raised a number of other concerns. Many zone
sectors saw no birth or move-in activity with the consequence that the
GROWTH distribution was heavily skewed toward “0.” Moreover, there
were a number of zone sectors with high GROWTH values merely because
they started out with very few establishments in that sector. A zone sector that began with only one business, saw one birth from t to t+1, and
thus ended up with two businesses, would have a growth rate of 100
percent. But a firm that started with 10 zone sector businesses would
have to have added 10 businesses to achieve the same 100 percent
growth rate. Since we had decided not to use a “counts” model because
enterprise zones differ so greatly in size, our solution was to limit the
analysis to zone sectors that had more than 10 businesses at the beginning of each time period and that had seen some growth activity.
The national sectoral estimates from the fixed effects models are
given in Table 7.3. As before, TAXNET has the wrong sign and is far from
being statistically significant. The elasticity estimate from the national
sectoral model is surprisingly similar to that of the national base model—0.07 compared to 0.09 (see Table 7.4). As with the national base
model, replacing TAXNET with our various alternative measures of taxes
and incentives had no important impact on the resulting estimates.
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Most of the non-tax variables behaved in consistent ways for the base
and sectoral models. For instance, higher wages (WAGE), a higher percentage of African Americans (RACE), and older infrastructure (INFRASTRUCTURE) have a consistently negative effect on growth in all models.
The estimate of the agglomeration variable (AGGLOMERATION) is uniformly tiny and insignificant. The percentage of residents with degrees (EDUCATION) is consistently, positively, and significantly associated with
growth.
Two other points need be made about the sectoral model. We noticed that the sectoral model worked much better for some sectors than
others, so we decided to combine sectors with similar tax rates, collapsing the 16 sectors into 7, thereby reducing the problems with small
numbers of establishments in particular zones.26 The TAXNET estimate
remained positive, very small, and statistically insignificant. We were
concerned about the impact of our “beginning size threshold” of 10 on
the results.27 Increasing the threshold to 15 or decreasing it to 5 had almost no effect on the TAXNET coefficient (though increasing it to 15
greatly improved the R2 of the model). Removing the threshold entirely increased the estimate. But the substantive effect on estimates of
likely growth was tiny.
Our conclusion is that enterprise zone incentives have no discernible positive effect on new economic activity. In fact, a very small
negative effect is discernible in all our models. This is not entirely surprising, given the results of the econometric literature on enterprise
zones and growth (where around half of the studies show very little or
no impact), given the size of actual incentives (Chapter 3), and given
the locational difficulties many zones must overcome (in Chapter 6 we
concluded that zones were performing more poorly than their containing states). Moreover, these econometric results support the conclusions we reached in Chapter 3—based on our hypothetical-firm analysis—about the likely effects of zones incentives on firm behavior.
There we concluded that most of the time enterprise zone incentives
were probably too small to matter.
A number of other methodological issues remain:
• Are the models any good at analyzing the components of new
establishment growth and of overall establishment growth?
Many traditional taxes/growth models use net establishment
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growth or employment growth as the dependent variable. These
numbers are used because they are more easily available. As we
illustrated in the previous chapter, though, a small net establishment change figure is often the result of large gross changes in
opposite directions; and it is gross growth that receives the incentives. Moreover, location models tend to be appropriate to
only some of the components of overall establishment or employment change. The main reason here is that location models
focus on relocations and starts—thus the independent variables
in these equations are more appropriate as predictors of births
and moves in, than as predictors of expansions, contractions,
deaths, or moves out.
Finally, like location models, much of the economic-development literature has been concerned with the issue of relocations, euphemistically called the “war between the states.” An
advantage of our data set is that the individual components of
growth are explicit.
We also ran models with alternative dependent variables:
overall growth in establishments, rate of expansions, rate of contractions, rate of constants, rate of deaths, and rate of moves out.
With the exception of the expansions equations—where the sign
on TAXNET was correct (negative) and the parameter was statistically significant though still small—all equations performed
much worse than the base models. This should caution against
the use of overall establishment or employment change as a
proxy for relocations into an area in tax/growth models.
• To what extent are the results of the base models dependent on
the ZIP-code definitions of enterprise zone boundaries? We discuss our algorithms for translating enterprise zone boundaries
into ZIP-code regions in Appendix E. As we indicate there, the
result is a “liberal” selection of ZIP-code regions. Consequently, in some of the selected ZIPs, only a small portion of the sampled ZIP-code regions were actually in enterprise zones. We
tried making our decision rules more rigorous (20 percent, 50
percent, and 70 percent of the ZIP region had to be in an enterprise zone). One consequence of this was that the number of
ZIPs in our model declined drastically, as did the total number of
enterprise zones (some zones are smaller than a single ZIP). Un-
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surprisingly, our models performed poorly. There was no case
where the TAXNET parameter was negative, statistically significant, and substantively important.
• Do the base models suffer from simultaneity bias? As we indicated earlier in this chapter, in models like ours variables such as
wages, unemployment, and incentives may be endogenous.
Greater growth will increase demand for labor and thus increase
wages, reduce unemployment, and possibly reduce the desire to
provide incentives. We have attempted to avoid all simultaneity
bias by measuring all explanatory variables at the beginning of
each growth period. For the 1989–1991 and 1991–1993 panels,
wages were measured for 1987, for the 1993–1995 panel, 1993.
Unemployment was measured for the first year of each panel,
and taxes and incentives for the middle year of the panel (although set legislatively in the first year). Thus, simultaneity
should not be an important problem.
It could be argued that the time frames we use are fairly arbitrary, however, and that “causally” some broader growth time
frame may be determining some historically broader setting of
tax incentives. In theory this could explain the sign of the TAXNET
estimate. For instance, it is conceivable that higher levels of
longer-term growth will result in a smaller public appetite for
economic-development expenditures. Under this scenario it
would be a history of strong growth that is causing the relatively
high level of taxation and low level of incentives, and poor
growth low taxation and high incentives. Given the way we
constructed the tax and incentive variables (using the TAIMez
model), we do not believe this to be the case.28 Nevertheless, to
test simultaneity we developed two-stage least squares (2SLS)
models with one or all of TAXNET, INCENTIVE, and WAGE endogenous. Although the TAXNET parameter declined in size, its performance in the 2SLS equations was consistent with the analysis
above.29
Most of the location-theory literature suggests that taxes and incentives will have a much greater effect at the intraregional level rather
than the interregional level. The reason for this is that many locational
costs are less spatially variable within regions than among regions, thus
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accentuating the impact of those costs, such as taxes, which do show
considerable intraregional variation. Empirical estimates of growth
elasticities with regard to taxes are much greater intraregionally than
interregionally, but there are fewer intraregional studies and thus this
conclusion is not well established (Wasylenko 1997; Bartik 1991).
We developed one intraregional data set—for Ohio. In the national models, only targeted Ohio zones were included; however, for the intra-Ohio models we were forced to include both targeted and nontargeted zones. To account for this difficulty, the Ohio models also include a
DISTRESS variable—this is the state designation for targeted enterprise
zones in troubled areas. Ohio provides firms locating in these distressed zones a larger incentive package than is available in nondistressed zones. As we indicated in the discussion of the sample, the
Ohio data set also includes non-zone areas.
Table 7.5 provides results for two of our Ohio models. As indicated
above, the Ohio models are very similar to the national models. In both
these Ohio models, the denominator for GROWTH was the number of
firms at the beginning of the period. For the sectoral model we selected industrial sectors with more than 10 enterprises in the zone at the beginning of the period. Since our Ohio models are also designed to focus on the issue of designation, in some models (not reported here)
TAXNET was replaced by a dummy (DESIGNATION) indicating whether the
zone was designated during one of the three time periods. This was
meant to capture whether zone designation per se was important for
growth. Unfortunately, the correlation between DESGINATION and TAXNET
was very high and thus it was deemed inadvisable to include both variables in any single model. As with the national models, we also investigated whether replacing TAXNET with measures of basic taxes and incentives would alter the results.
Our Ohio results mirror our national results surprisingly closely.
TAXNET, the measure of the size of taxes net of incentives, remains positive in both the Ohio base and Ohio sectoral models. In neither are the
results statistically significant, and in both the estimates are substantively tiny. Indeed, the Ohio TAXNET parameter estimates were very similar to the national estimates. Replacing TAXNET with DESIGNATION results
in a negative estimate on that variable (also insignificant and substantively small). That is, zone designation results in very slightly lower
growth. This is consistent with the estimate for TAXNET. In other words,
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Table 7.5 Results From Ohio Base and Sectoral Modelsa
Ohio base models
Variable
GROWTH,

Estimate

t

Estimate

t

0.000
0.009
0.240
–0.002
–0.314
0.300
–0.168
–0.031
0.242
–0.006
0.000

0.26
0.47
3.42
–0.40
–4.52
1.97
–1.53
–0.51
0.64
–0.98
0.03

0.000
0.032
0.164
–0.001
–0.107
0.073
–0.132
–0.035
0.241
0.002
–0.003

0.00
0.01
0.07
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.10
0.04
0.26
0.01
0.00

dependent

AGGLOMERATION
DISTRESS
EDUCATION
ELECTRIC
INFRASTRUCTURE
POVERTY
PREVIOUS GROWTH
RACE
TAXNET
UNEMPLOYMENT
WAGE

n
Adj. R2
a

Ohio sectoral model

300
0.24

710
0.10

Fixed-effect intercepts are not reported.

these two variables suggest that neither enterprise zone designation nor
enterprise zone incentives increase local growth.
The value on the DISTRESS parameter is very small indeed and not
statistically significant. Given Dabney’s (1991) argument about the
difficulty enterprise zones have in making up for their inherent locational negatives, one would expect that once TAXNET has been controlled
for, DISTRESS would have a negative sign. It does not. At least in Ohio,
the targeting of zone incentives appears not to make much appreciable
difference to growth.
As with the national models, replacing TAXNET with separate measures of basic taxes and incentives had no impact on the results. The
statistically significant variables in both the Ohio models were similar
to those in the national models. Older infrastructure resulted in less
growth, and a greater percentage of the population with degrees resulted in more growth. The sectoral model performed poorly—nevertheless, all variables (including TAXNET and DISTRESS) but two had the same
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sign as they did in the Ohio base model. Variations on the measurement and taxes and incentives did not alter the results in any important
ways. The upshot is that there is no evidence from Ohio that enterprise
zone incentives result in greater growth.
We also ran a constant coefficient version of our national base
model, and random effects versions of the national base and sectoral
models. For reasons we discussed earlier in this chapter, we do not believe the assumption of these alternative models can be sustained. Nevertheless, if the results of these alternatives were radically different
from those of the fixed-effects estimates, there might be some cause for
concern. In the national base models, the signs on all variables remain
the same for the fixed-effects, constant-coefficients, and random-effects
estimating techniques. Naturally, parameter estimates and their
t-scores did vary for the models. For the national sectoral models, all
variables but two kept the same sign, but these two variables (MARKET
ACCESS and SERVICES) have very small and statistically insignificant parameters in both models. Otherwise, the fixed-effects and random-effects estimates produced very similar results.

CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER DISCUSSION
The consensus position in the taxes/growth literature over the past
two decades is that taxes have a small but nevertheless significant negative impact on economic growth. Work on discretionary incentives,
such as grants and loans, has generally reached conclusions similar to
the taxes/growth results—more incentives lead to greater growth.
However, the research on enterprise zones, with few exceptions, has
not found much evidence that zones or zone incentives result in more
growth. Our simulations presented in this chapter accord with most of
the recent enterprise zone literature. We found that enterprise zones are
not effective engines of economic expansion.
Why would the findings for general state and local taxes and for
discretionary incentives not also be true for enterprise zones? After all,
from an economic-development point of view, enterprise zones are
merely a set of targeted tax (and discretionary) incentives. Various
sorts of answers can be given to this question, none of them definitive.
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First, many of the zones are in older, distressed, inner-city neighborhoods. As Dabney (1991) has argued, such places suffer from a number of important locational deterrents—high levels of crime, poor infrastructure, poorly skilled workers, and so on—and it is unlikely that tax
incentives alone will make up for these negatives.
Second, enterprise zone incentives are mostly just too small to affect firm behavior. As we showed in Chapter 3, the income benefits
provided by zone incentives can be wiped out by fairly small local differentials in wages. Of course, in some places enterprise zone incentives are so generous that it is likely they are successful in generating
growth. We cannot prove it but we are strongly inclined to believe that
the Michigan Renaissance Zone’s munificence ensures that it can’t help
but be effective, though at great cost in state and local tax revenue. A
few other states have very generous enterprise zone regimes. Consequently, the income difference for a firm between the most-generous
and least-generous sites can be substantial. But for the most part the
tax advantages of enterprise zone status are not huge and the differences in tax generosity among different enterprise zones (or between
enterprise zones and non-zone areas) are usually quite small. While enterprise zones probably do work in the extreme cases, it is entirely unsurprising that they do not have much effect on growth overall.
The argument of the last paragraph should not, however, be taken
to imply that states would be wise to increase massively the generosity
of their enterprise zone programs. As the results in Chapter 5 show,
such a strategy could be fiscally deleterious. As long as the elasticity of
economic activity with respect to taxes is less than one, incentives will
generate fiscal losses, and the larger the incentives the larger the total
losses per zone. Moreover, if all states upped their incentive ante, the
relative competitiveness of any one state’s incentives would necessarily decline.
Third, there is reason to be skeptical of the consensus position that
general (that is, non-enterprise zone) taxes and incentives do have an
important impact on growth. A significant minority of researchers in
the field do not believe the matter has been settled. Much of the work
on which the consensus is based is itself flawed and reproducibility of
results remains an issue.
As we have said, our results generally conform to those in most of
the econometric literature on enterprise zones. But are our results reli-

192 Chapter 7

able? By the standards of the literature, our analysis is comprehensive.
We do not limit our analysis to programs in a few “model” states. The
study is undertaken at two geographical levels. Where appropriate, it is
disaggregated sectorally. The dependent variables used are in line with
those recommended as best practice—we do not merely look at overall
growth but measure the specific components of that growth (births,
moves-in, deaths, expansions, and so forth) that are the theoretical focus
of most models. Likewise the database we use is complete (no records
were removed to maintain privacy) and the data are, by the standards
common to the literature, highly disaggregated spatially. As far as we
are aware, we are among the first to use this database in a taxes/growth
analysis. Moreover, we use what is probably the best and most comprehensive measurement of the impact of enterprise zone incentives on firm
income available today (the estimates from the TAIMez model). And we
have used a variety of statistical procedures—many not reported in this
book—all with fairly consistent results. We have investigated likely
sources of empirical and specification error in our model. The most
worrying of these is clearly the impact of the algorithms used to translate
each enterprise zone into a series of ZIP-code regions. Nevertheless, the
results have remained broadly consistent.
Our conclusions do not prove that a substantively strong positive
relationship between enterprise zone incentives and growth does not
exist; much more research will be necessary to establish that incontrovertibly. Furthermore, our modeling effort is open to a number of important technical and empirical criticisms—and our answers to these
criticisms are unlikely to convince all in the field. But our conclusions
certainly provide no support for the idea that enterprise zones generate
new growth in targeted areas. What we don’t know is whether or not
enterprise zone incentives that were targeted appropriately, were managed correctly, and were quite large could be effective.
The next chapter focuses on a related question: Do enterprise zones
improve the access to employment opportunities of targeted populations? It is conceivable that although enterprise zones don’t create new
employment growth, they are nevertheless worthwhile because they
encourage business to use the sorts of labor cohorts (the unemployed,
those loosely attached to the labor force, those out of the labor force,
and so on) that would otherwise be avoided.
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Notes
1. None of this work should be confused with the multitude of academic and policy
studies that has tried to investigate the cost-effectiveness of individual taxes and
incentives. These latter studies, while often relying on estimates of the effect of
taxes and incentives on growth, do not address the relationship between taxes and
growth directly.
2. See, for instance, Part Two of Green’s (1991) edited volume on enterprise zones.
3. In other words, the differential-shift term aggregates all growth or decline that
cannot be explained by the performance of the national economy and by the sectoral mix in the local economy.
4. The case-study method can be dramatically improved through the use of experimental or quasi-experimental research designs. Unfortunately, these are extremely difficult to develop in an economic development policy setting, though Isserman (1999) presents a discussion and implementation of some of these
techniques.
5. For comparisons of tax costs to labor costs see Fisher and Peters (1997a) and
Fisher and Peters (1998, Chapter 5). Hunt (1985) and Hunt and O’Leary (1989)
have used this method to measure other non-tax costs experienced by business.
See also Tannenwald, O’Leary, and Huang (1999).
6. Debate still continues as to whether business even responds to state and local taxation. For instance, see Wasylenko (1997) and the discussion that followed this
paper: Bartik (1997), Duncan (1997), McGuire (1997) and Ady (1997). For earlier, and very good, discussions of the technicalities of this debate, see Bartik
(1991) and Newman and Sullivan (1988). Underlying this research are a set of
serious theoretical questions about the relationship between business taxes and
goods and services firms receive for paying those taxes and about the way firms
choose among sites. For a summary of this debate see Kenyon (1997). For more
theoretical accounts of the competition between jurisdictions, see Shannon
(1991), Oates and Schwab (1991) and Netzer (1991).
7. See also Sheldon and Elling (1989).
8. See also Erickson and Friedman (1991).
9. See Blair and Premus (1987), Chapman and Walker (1990), and Ady (1997). In
this case, we are actually focusing on a new branch plant location decision which
is obviously only part of what determines the aggregate level of business activity
in an area.
10. Part of the reason for this is that since its inception location theory has tended to
emphasize the more tractable problem of new plant locations. Certainly, there are
many exceptions to this claim. See, for instance, Bartik (1989) regarding small
business start-ups.
11. See Tannenwald, O’Leary, and Huang (1999) for an important attempt to do this
for unemployment insurance.
12. In this regard see the recent reviews of the literature on public services and
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13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

growth (Fisher 1997) and regulation and growth (Tannenwald 1997). Also see
Tannenwald, O’Leary, and Huang (1999) on the application of the hypotheticalfirm method to other costs and Wasylenko’s (1997) brief but very useful discussion of the dependent and explanatory variables used in the econometric models
of taxes and growth.
These points are confirmed by more recent studies, for instance Holzer and
Ihlanfeldt (1996) and Mayer (1996), although there is still considerable debate
here. We take up this issue again in Chapter 8. Some of the most interesting literature in this area has focused on gender, spatial mismatch, and employment.
For a recent review, see MacDonald (1999).
In fact, in the next chapter we show that enterprise zones do draw on wider metropolitan level labor markets, so that distinguishing between the two is probably
inappropriate. Nevertheless, this remains an important theoretical issue.
Supply data are from the ZIP-code publications of the Census of Population and
Housing, demand data from the ZIP-code publications of County Business Patterns and the Census of Manufacturers.
For a broad discussion of the state of the literature on the impact of public services and infrastructure on growth, see Fisher (1997). There is also a very useful,
short discussion on Bartik (1991) on the difficulties involved in measuring the impact of infrastructure on economic development.
The perversity of enterprise zone boundaries presents a huge problem in creating
spatial controls. One could not simply compare enterprise zones to cities; enterprise zones would have to be compared to other similar geographical units. This
would require that all enterprise zones in the system be digitized (a very timeconsuming task) in order to ensure the non-zone regions are truly non-zone and
provide appropriate comparisons. It would also require defining what a similar
geographical unit is.
There are also problems adopting various simplifications to overcome these
problems: either using the area just outside the sample zones, or using other similar areas—say, blighted old industrial areas—in the sample cities. Unfortunately, areas just outside the sample ZIPs are often rural with little or no manufacturing and thus are inappropriate comparison regions. Moreover, it is nearly always
impossible to find appropriate alternative ZIPs within (or even partly within) a
city’s boundaries. The reason is simply that except for the very biggest cities in
our sample, there are just too few ZIPs per city (we found this to be true even of
cities as big as St. Louis).
What are similar geographical units? Appropriate comparison ZIPs would
have to have a similar industrial structure and similar demography. Typically,
factor analysis would be used to generate industrial/demographic profiles of enterprise zone ZIPs, and then the resulting factors could be used in the selection of
comparison ZIPs. Early in this project we attempted to do just this, focusing on
bigger cities (at this stage in the project we were contemplating using a matchedpair methodology). But even in big cities, there were too few enterprise zone
ZIPs to generate adequate factors. Use of simple industrial/demographic profile
indices rather than factors did not improve the situation. The indices tended to re-
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18.
19.
20.
21.

22.
23.
24.
25.

26.

27.
28.

29.

flect the policy concerns (and indeed designation criteria) of the state enterprise
zone legislation. Thus, similar ZIPs also tended to be actual designated enterprise
zones.
Of the regression studies covered, see Erickson, Friedman, and McCluskey
(1989) and Sheldon and Elling (1989).
“Nearly” because one enterprise zone in our example came into being only during
the third period and another three only during the second period.
They are also referred to as “least squares dummy variable” (LSDV) or “fixed effects” models.
A comprehensive treatment of analysis with cross-sectional panel data is provided by Hsiao (1986). Other useful guides are provided by Greene (1997) and
Sayrs (1989). For a more general treatment, see Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998).
Certainly the large error sum of squares change suggests opting for the fixed effects model over the constant coefficients model.
For reasons we mentioned in the last chapter, the distinction between birth and
moves in is somewhat arbitrary.
In the model reported, we use regional (state) fixed effects.
We assume that the effects of localization economies (the effect of the mass of activity within a particular sector or closely allied group of sectors) will be caught
by our measure of urbanization economies (the effect of the overall size of the local economy).
The seven combined sectors were as follows: 1) SIC 27, 2) SIC 20 and SIC 26, 3)
SIC 24 and SIC 23, 4) SIC 25 and SIC 32, 5) SIC 28 and SIC 34, 6) SIC 30 and
SIC 37, and 7) SIC 35 and SIC 36 and SIC 38. Sectors were grouped by effective
tax rate because other measures of similarity between sectors would average out
divergence in tax effects.
For modeling purposes, the requirement that there be some growth activity was
retained.
The reason for this is that TAIMez measures the tax burden on the firm, not legislative decisions about rates, incentives, apportionment, and so on (the tax structure). The size of the model could be taken as indirect proof of the numerically
complicated relationship between the tax burden and the tax structure.
We also built preliminary structural equation models that looked not only at the
impact of enterprise zones on growth, but also on the causes of incentive generosity. While the results of these models have not been good, they have not led us to
alter our conclusions on the impact of enterprise zone incentives on growth.

8
Enterprise Zones and
Access to Employment
Thus far we have described the incentives available to firms locating in enterprise zones, what these incentives are worth to relocating
firms, the effect of these incentives on the investment behavior of
firms—in particular, the likelihood that labor will be substituted for
capital, the cost of those incentives, and, finally, the impact of enterprise zone incentives on growth. Essentially, for much of this book we
have focused on whether enterprise zones are likely to get businesses to
modify their investment behavior in ways which might produce particular, potentially socially useful, outcomes. However, even if an enterprise zone has been successful with regard to these outcomes, the enterprise zone strategy may still not have been successful overall. As we
argued in Chapter 2, for enterprise zones to fulfill their original promise, they must also provide the economically disadvantaged with improved access to these new jobs. In other words, creating jobs may not
be enough; besides, there are other, probably more efficient, economicdevelopment tools aimed at job creation. Enterprise zones must be able
to create appropriate job opportunities for those who currently have difficulty in the labor market.
In Chapter 2 we argued that the traditional understanding was that
providing access to jobs for targeted populations required the creation
of enterprise zones close to those populations. However, by the late
1990s it was clear that most states believed that this was not enough;
the favored enterprise zone strategy was by then enlarged to include enhancing access through incentive instruments that give targeted groups
some special employment advantage, usually by offering more generous incentives for hiring disadvantaged persons or zone residents.
Other strategies exist—for instance, leaving enterprise zones to focus
simply on employment creation while improving the access of disadvantaged groups through changes in transportation policy or housing
policy or through improved job-placement services.1 The latter approach moves the access question out from enterprise zone design into
other areas of policy and thus is beyond the scope of this research.
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Nevertheless, the belief that enterprise zones need not address access
issues directly raises important questions about the relevance of much
enterprise zone policy; we come back to this issue in the conclusions to
this chapter and again in the final chapter.

WHY ACCESS MATTERS
When the enterprise zone idea was first developed, the issue of job
access was understood to mean that employment should be provided
locally—close to or within the areas of economic decline. Enterprise
zones should create jobs in (or, more correctly, relocate jobs to) the
right sort of places, usually depressed inner-city areas. Underlying this
idea was the belief—usually justified by reference to the spatial mismatch hypothesis—that inner-city unemployment was due, in part, to
two related processes and one broad transportation constraint:
• For most of the twentieth century, but particularly after World
War II, business relocated out of inner-cities and into the suburbs, effectively reducing the accessibility of work to inner-city
residents.
• Discrimination in housing markets limits the ability of minorities to move to growing suburban locations.
• Reverse commuting from residences in inner-city locations to
suburban work sites is difficult for government or the public sector to organize, is less efficient than commuting downtown, and
is thus expensive. Moreover, given the extra time involved in
reverse commuting (using public transit), reverse commuting
usually involves some welfare loss for users.2
However, there is reason to be skeptical that spatial access alone—
or even in major part—explains higher levels of inner-city unemployment and lower levels of labor-force participation. Some important
early work suggested that racial discrimination in labor markets is a
much more potent reason for inner-city unemployment than the dislocation of low-income residences and low-skilled jobs (Ellwood 1986),3
although this situation is complicated by the strong possibility that the
location decisions of firms are driven, in part, by the racial preferences
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of executives and customers (Mieszkowski and Mills 1993). Some recent empirical examinations of the impact of proximity to jobs provide
little or no support for the “strict form”4 of the spatial mismatch hypothesis (Cutler and Glaeser 1995; Taylor and Ong 1995; O’Regan and
Quigley 1996; Zhang and Bingham 2000).5 However, the situation is
anything but settled and conclusions depend on the precise form of the
spatial mismatch hypothesis being evaluated. For instance, Holzer and
Ihlanfeldt (1996, p. 79) showed that “employers’ proximity to black
residences and to public transit both increase the likelihood that they
will hire black employees” and saw this as consistent with spatial mismatch. But they also argued that improving the access of inner-city minorities to suburban work sites would not necessarily improve employment and earnings if other barriers to employment continue to exist.
Two of the other barriers widely cited in the literature are the so-called
skills-mismatch—inner-city residents may not have the skills appropriate to the needs of employers—and discrimination in labor markets.
Along similar lines, Immergluck (1998) found that job proximity has a
significant but modest effect on neighborhood employment rates, but
he also found that educational attainment and race—essentially the
skills mismatch and labor market discrimination—have much greater
effects.
Consequently, it now looks as though interpreting job access in
terms of the enterprise zone location is unnecessarily limiting. Merely
reducing the distance between targeted groups of people and jobs may
have a comparatively small impact on either unemployment rates or labor-force participation rates if the major determinants of these rates lie
elsewhere. Moreover, labor markets are bigger, indeed usually much
bigger, than enterprise zones, although it is true that low-income and
low-skilled workers tend to have geographically smaller labor markets
(Theodore and Carlson 1996; Hanson and Pratt 1995). Thus, there
should be no surprise in finding many of the residents of enterprise
zones working outside of the zones, and residents of non-zone neighborhoods, including homeowners in far-off middle-class suburbs, commuting into the zones for employment. But if the spatial location of
jobs is less important, then some other way must be found to give targeted populations special access to the jobs created in the enterprise
zones. Various possibilities exist, although the most common method
is to tie enterprise zone business incentives to the employment of tar-
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geted individuals. In the next section we explore how this is done in
the states we studied.

TARGETING IN ENTERPRISE ZONE
JOBS CREDIT PROGRAMS
Eleven of the 13 states we have analyzed have jobs credit programs
for firms locating in an enterprise zone, and all 11 target those credits in
one way or another, either to zone residents or to population groups that
are in some way economically disadvantaged. Table 8.1 shows the nature of the targeting for each state over the period 1994 through 1998
(unless otherwise noted, the targeting criteria remained the same over
this period). Indiana is the only state that restricts credits to new hires
who are residents of the enterprise zone, though two states (Virginia
and Wisconsin) provide larger credits for zone residents than for other
new hires. Four states (Illinois, Kentucky, Ohio, and Wisconsin) restrict credits to employees who fall into one or more categories of economic disadvantage, such as welfare recipients, the unemployed, or
those eligible for JTPA (Job Training Partnership Act) services. New
York provides credits for all new hires, but allows larger credits for
those who are economically disadvantaged. Four states (California,
Connecticut, Florida, and Missouri) provide credits for new hires who
are either zone residents or fall into one or more categories of economic disadvantage.6 Missouri has a second credit program that requires
that at least 30 percent of new hires be either zone residents or economically disadvantaged, but if this threshold is exceeded, the firm receives
credits for all new hires.
Overall, 7 of the 11 states with targeted jobs credits reward firms
that hire zone residents; 10 of the 11 reward firms that hire persons suffering some kind of economic disadvantage. The reward may be in the
form of eligibility for any credits at all or in the form of larger credits
(usually two or three times as large) for those who meet the targeting
criteria. Thus, targeting of jobs credits appears to overcome to a degree
one argument against enterprise zones as a strategy for improving the
welfare of low-income zone residents, the argument that the labor market is much larger than the zone so that the creation of jobs in enterprise
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zones will not do much to increase the employment prospects of zone
residents. Even the targeting at the economically disadvantaged entails
de facto targeting of zone residents to the extent that economic disadvantage is concentrated in the enterprise zone.
There are some major caveats to this conclusion, however. The
first is that capital (and other) incentives tend to dominate labor incentives, as shown in Chapter 4. Firms are presumably attracted by the total incentive package, but if the jobs credit component is only a small
part of the package, the jobs credit may be viewed as irrelevant. The
second is that the targeting of jobs credits is effective only if firms are
able and willing to use them. The Ohio jobs credit, for example, is fairly generous as such credits go ($3,000 per job), but fewer than 10 percent of firms locating in enterprise zones take advantage of the credits
(Ohio Enterprise Zone Annual Report). One reason may be the onerous
task of certifying eligibility under one of five criteria, employee by employee. The other reason may be that at least 25 percent of new hires
must meet the eligibility criteria for the firm to receive any credits at
all; this threshold may be too difficult for most firms to attain readily
and they may judge that the credits are not worth the cost of restricting
their hiring criteria. In Connecticut, at least 50 percent of new employees must be either zone residents or federal Joint Training Partnership
Act (JTPA) eligible for the firm to receive any credits. This is a very
high threshold.7
Third, jobs credit targeting increases job offers to zone residents
only to the extent that it changes firm behavior. The firm is rewarded
for hiring members of targeted groups even if those persons would
have been hired anyway. Take an average jobs credit of $2,000 per job,
and an average manufacturing wage of about $25,000 annually or
$12.00 per hour (the median among our 16 representative firms). Let’s
assume the credit is fully utilized in the first two years; then it effectively reduces wage costs for the first two years by 4 percent, which is
equivalent to a cut in the hourly wage rate of about 48 cents. The question is: How many targeted individuals become attractive hires at a
wage of $11.50 for the first two years (which could be viewed as a sort
of training wage) who would not have been hired at the standard wage
of $12.00? To make a difference in hiring decisions, the 50-cent wage
differential must be enough to overcome employers’ assessments of
productivity differences. If zone employers are indifferent between

State

Program

Calif.

Hiring credit

Conn.

Job grants

Fla.

Jobs tax credit

Ill.

1299D Jobs tax credit

Ind.
Ky.

Employee credit
Employee credit

Mo.

New & expanded business
facility credits in an EZ

Targeting
Credit only for new hires who are 1) eligible for JTPA or GAIN; 2) residents of a
high-density unemployment area or Targeted Economic Area; 3) economically
disadvantaged persons; 4) disabled; 5) ex-offenders; 6) Native Americans; 7)
eligible for SSI, AFDC, GA or food stamps; or 8) displaced workers.
Credit only for eligible new hires: those who are 1) residents of the enterprise
zone or 2) JTPA eligible. At least 50% of new plant employees, or 150
employees, must be eligible for firm to receive any credits.
In 1994: Credit only for new hires who are 1) residents of the enterprise zone, 2)
AFDC recipients, or 3) JTPA participants. After 1994: All new hires are
eligible but larger credits are awarded to those earning under $1,500 per
month, and the largest credits are awarded to 1) employees earning under
$1,500 if at least 20% of all employees are zone residents, and 2) participants
in a welfare-to-work program.
Credit only for new hires who are dislocated workers or economically
disadvantaged individuals. Firm must hire at least 5 eligible employees.
Credit only for new hires who are residents of the enterprise zone.
Credit only for new hires who are AFDC recipients or persons unemployed for
90 days or more.
Qualified employees: 1) zone residents, 2) those unemployed at least 3 months,
and 3) recipients of public assistance. At least 30% of new hires must be
qualified employees for the firm to be eligible for any credits; if this threshold
is met, all new hires get a basic credit, and additional credits are awarded for
qualified employees.
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Table 8.1 Demographic Targeting in Enterprise Zone Jobs Credit Programs in 13 States, 1994–1998

Training credit
Wage tax credit

Ohio

Employee training credit

Pa.
Tex.
Va.

None
None
Job grants (1995 or later)

Wis.

Jobs credit

Credit only for new hires who are zone residents or the difficult to employ.
Targeted employees: all those who are paid at least 135% of the federal
minimum wage and 1) are eligible under JTPA or the Work Opportunity
Credit program, 2) are recipients of public assistance, or 3) have income
below the poverty level. All new hires get basic credit; double credit for
targeted employees.
Credit only for new hires who are qualified employees: Resident of county for
one year; or resident of county six months and 1) JTPA eligible; 2)
unemployed; 3) recipient of AFDC, general assistance, or disability
assistance; or 4) handicapped. At least 25% of new hires must be qualified
employees for the firm to be eligible for any credits.

All new hires are eligible. Larger credits awarded for zone residents. At least
40% of new hires must either be zone residents or have family income (prior
to employment) below 80% of the area median income.
Credits only for eligible employees: 1) referrals by a voc rehab program, 2)
economically disadvantaged Vietnam-era veterans, 3) economically
disadvantaged youths age 18–23, 4) SSI recipients, 5) GA recipients, 6)
youths in a coop education program from economically disadvantaged
families, 7) economically disadvantaged ex-convicts, 8) AFDC work incentive
employees, 9) persons unemployed as a result of a business closing or mass
layoff, and 10) dislocated workers. Economically disadvantaged means having
income below 70% of the Bureau of Labor Statistics lower living standard.
Additional credit for zone residents.

NOTE: EZ = Enterprise Zone or the equivalent; JTPA = federal Job Training Partnership Act; GAIN is a California employment program for welfare recipients; SSI = Supplemental Security Income; GA = general assistance; AFDC = Aid to Families with Dependent Children (replaced by TANF).
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Mo.
N.Y.
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hiring members of the targeted group and hiring others, then of course
a small wage differential could have a large effect. On the other hand,
it is easy to imagine that there are real or perceived productivity differences that would be valued at far more than 50 cents to most zone
employers.
Finally, the jobs credits apply only when employment is expanded
as a result of building a new plant. As targeted employees leave, there
is no incentive to replace them with new employees who are members
of targeted groups. Thus, any short-run gain in jobs for zone residents
produced by targeting probably disappears in the long run. It also may
be that excessive targeting causes firms to discount the value of the jobs
credits when making expansion or location decisions because of the increased uncertainty with regard to the extent to which the firm will benefit. The imposition of thresholds no doubt exacerbates this problem;
one can imagine that firms considering a Connecticut zone discount the
job grants entirely.

ENTERPRISE ZONES AND COMMUTING BEHAVIOR
Do enterprise zones improve spatial access to employment opportunities? As far as we are aware, this question has received close to no
empirical attention in the enterprise zone literature. The accessibility
of employment opportunities to economically disadvantaged persons,
however, is a very well researched problem. Moreover, in the recent
past the problem has been analyzed in increasingly sophisticated ways,
using origin-destination data sets allowing the residences of employees
to be digitally connected to their places of work. For instance, O’Regan and Quigley (1996) used the Census Transportation Planning
Package (CTPP) data for Newark, New Jersey, to measure the impact
of job accessibility on, among other things, youth idleness. They found
little impact. In our research, accessibility was measured using the
standard gravity/entropy models from the commuting literature8—essentially, the impact of distance between residences and places of work
(controlling for appropriate occupations) was quantified and treated as
a constraint on mobility. Sen et al.’s (1999) work on the matching of
welfare clients to job openings in the Chicago area does much the
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same. Since current geographic information system (GIS) technology
allows dynamic connection between journey-to-work origins (homes)
and destinations (work sites) using real transportation networks (roads,
cars, and buses), it is likely that matching models will become considerably more refined over the next few years, with a significant improvement in our understanding of how people perceive and react to
accessibility of employment.
The problem with enterprise zones is that the standard models used
to measure accessibility are not entirely appropriate, and advances in
GIS models of commuting are unlikely to change this situation. In
O’Regan and Quigley’s (1996) and Sen et al.’s (1999) research, there
are distinct jobs and job seekers. The problem is finding out whether
the distance between the two poses a hindrance to the job seekers’ finding and taking the available jobs. Likewise, in recent research looking
at potential work opportunities for welfare recipients in Boston, the distances between the welfare recipients and the jobs available to them are
measurable (Lacombe 1998). In principle then, if one were studying
job access for some targeted group, one would simply want to know if
reduced distance increased the probability of getting a job. In the case
of enterprise zones, if there were a significant distance effect (say for
zone residents), then providing jobs within the zone should increase
employment. To investigate this, one needs to define: 1) the employment opportunities provided by the enterprise zone; and 2) the population at which they are targeted.
With regard to the first issue, it is clear that only the new, induced
jobs—the jobs that would not be there but for the existence of the enterprise zone incentives—should be counted. Noninduced jobs would
exist in the zone anyway and therefore do not provide any new accessibility advantage. Unfortunately, further difficulties arise here. It is unclear what should count as induced employment. As we argued in the
previous chapter, most econometric studies of enterprise zones find little or no inducement. Leaving aside this issue and presuming that zone
incentives do indeed lead to new growth, at least some of the growth in
the zone will likely derive from transfers from elsewhere in the city that
contain the zone. If the city is a better approximation of the local labor
market than the enterprise zone itself, transfers of jobs into a zone from
the non-zone parts of the containing city will not increase the total
number of job opportunities available to targeted job seekers. But if
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spatial proximity is important for the employment of targeted job seekers (in other words, if the geographical size of the labor market for the
targeted job seekers is very small), then to the extent that firms are
moving into a zone from elsewhere in the containing city, they may indeed provide new job opportunities. From an accessibility perspective,
in the first instance, intracity moves into enterprise zones should not
count as induced jobs; in the second instance, they should.
In Chapter 2 we gave estimates from the taxes/growth literature on
the elasticity of employment growth with respect to taxes. In the previous chapter we gave our own, specifically enterprise zone, estimates of
investment elasticity with respect to tax incentives available in enterprise zones. Our estimates, which are in line with most of the recent
econometric research on enterprise zones, indicate that enterprise zone
incentives have at best a tiny positive impact on induced investment in
zones and, thus, presumably on induced employment in zones. Note
that our national estimates use the liberal second definition of induced
investment (intracity moves are counted in) and thus may overstate the
actual impact since at least some of the growth in an enterprise zone
will derive from transfers from elsewhere in the containing cities.
Thus, it is likely that the number of truly induced jobs in an enterprise
zone is very small indeed.
Finally, who are the job seekers to be targeted? Are they all those
who live in the enterprise zone? Surely this definition is too geographically conservative (residents of poor neighborhoods surrounding the
enterprise zone are excluded) while being too demographically liberal
(wealthy enterprise zone residents are included). Are all those “targeted populations” as defined by the state statutes and local ordinances enabling the existence of the enterprise zone? If a metropolitan area describes the true geography of a labor market, then the research question
is whether the enterprise zone reduces the commuting distance of targeted individuals in the MSA. We could then go on to define targeted
individuals in various ways (say, for instance, those with an annual income of less than $12,000). However, if poorer, less-skilled people experience much smaller geographical labor markets (and in Chapter 2
we argued that the claim that they did underpinned early arguments for
enterprise zones), then the targeted population must either reside in, or
at least be close to, the enterprise zone. Complicating matters, a few
zones have very few residents.

Enterprise Zones and Access to Employment 207

Given these difficulties, we decided not to build full commuting
models for each enterprise zone but merely to answer a series of fairly
simple, but nevertheless important, questions:
• What proportion of jobs available in enterprise zones are taken
by enterprise zone residents (and correspondingly, what proportion of enterprise zone jobs are taken by nonresidents)?
• What proportion of employed enterprise zone residents actually
work in the zone (and correspondingly, what proportion of
working enterprise zone residents travel out of the zone to find
employment)?
The answer to the first question indicates the extent to which enterprise
zone jobs have been “infiltrated” by others in the metropolitan labor
market. In other words, it gives some idea of how truly targeted a zone
is. The answer to the second question indicates whether enterprise
zones are part of a truly local labor market. Needless to say, it is possible that an enterprise zone will attract few of its own residents but may
nevertheless capture labor from poor neighborhoods surrounding the
enterprise zone. In this case, the level of non-enterprise zone “infiltration” would appear large and the enterprise zone would appear to be
unsuccessful. In reality, however, the opposite would be true. Therefore, it is important to know where the infiltration comes from; if it is
mainly from distant—and presumably wealthier—suburbs, then the enterprise zone is failing to provide greater local accessibility to jobs; if it
is from close-by—and presumably poorer—communities, then the enterprise zone may be succeeding.
In preliminary studies for this chapter, we developed maps for each
of a small sample of enterprise zones, showing both the flow of employees into the zone from every commuting subregion (Traffic Analysis Zone, or TAZ) of the metropolitan area (these are sometimes called
“desire line” maps) and the average earnings of residents in each of
these subregions. In a fairly consistent pattern, these maps showed that
enterprise zones attract employees from far and wide and that many of
the commuters into enterprise zones reside in wealthy suburban areas.
Because these maps are too complex to present in this book, we provide
two summary measures here for each zone: the average distance to
work of all workers in the metropolitan area,9 and the distance to work
of those employed in enterprise zones. If enterprise zones were indeed
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attracting local workers, one would expect the commute distance of enterprise zone workers to be considerably shorter than that of all workers in the wider metropolitan region.10
Before presenting our results we need to make a few comments on
the data and our analysis of it. The answers we provide for these two
sets of questions are far from being as comprehensive or rigorous as we
would like: partly this is a result of the data set itself and partly it is a
result of the small number of enterprise zones in our commuting subsample. The analysis in this chapter relies on the CTPP, a reorganization of the decennial Census of Population and Housing data, allowing
households (commuting origins) to be connected, via commuting matrices, with places-of-work (commuting destinations).11 For our purposes, the main deficiency in the CTPP is that, although we can get
complete summary demographic data on residents of a particular TAZ,
or employees working in a particular TAZ, we cannot get occupation or
income data cross-classified by TAZ of residence and TAZ of employment. That is, we don’t know much about zone residents who work in
the zone and how they differ from zone residents who work outside the
zone, and how these groups differ from non-zone residents who work
in the zone. The results presented in this section are therefore far from
being conclusive. Better evidence will require future model building
based on individual data records of commuters into and out of enterprise zones, data sets that do not now exist.
Commuting Into and Out of Enterprise Zones
In most of the enterprise zones in our commuting subsample, a fairly small proportion of residents actually worked in the zone—averaged
over the 14 zones, just under 10 percent (see Table 8.2). In other
words, about 90 percent of zone residents commuted elsewhere in the
metropolitan region for employment. Naturally, these numbers varied
among zones. The Beloit zone managed to employ over 30 percent of
its residents while the South Bend zone kept only 2.6 percent. The reasons for this have to do with the relative sizes of zones, the proportion
of the city’s industrial land that is covered by the zone, the extent of a
match between the skills of zone residents and the skills demanded by
zone employers, the targeting of zone jobs at zone residents, and, finally, the algorithms we used to translate enterprise zone boundaries into
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TAZ regions (see Appendix E). The fact that 90 percent of zone residents on average work outside the zone certainly does not support the
argument that zone residents find work only within a very constrained
geographic area. Of course, it may still be the case that there is a sizeable subset of zone residents who are currently jobless and who are
more spatially constrained than those who are employed.
Averaged over the 14 zones, zone residents took about one-fifth of
the jobs offered in the zone. Again this percentage varied considerably.
In Springfield, Missouri, close to 35 percent of jobs were taken by residents, but in South Bend, Indiana only 11.7 percent were. Overall, the
vast majority (four-fifths) of jobs were taken by commuters into the enterprise zones. Moreover, these commuters came from far and wide.
In Table 8.2, distance is measured using the following equation:
(1)

∑ DijCij
MCD =  ,
C

where MCD is the weighted mean commute distance, D is the zone
centroid to zone centroid distance between each TAZ pair, i being the
origin or residence zone and j being the work zone, and Cij the number
of commuters living in i and working in j. C without the subscripts is
the total number of commuters in the system. This calculation makes
use of the most geographically precise commuting data in the CTPP,
the origin-destination matrices.
In exactly half of the zones in the subsample, those who worked in
enterprise zones actually had longer commutes than those who worked
elsewhere in the region. Another three zones had employees with
weighted average commuting distances within a tenth of a mile of the
average for the region. Unsurprisingly, Beloit—the zone able to provide the highest percentage of its residents with zone jobs—had the
biggest difference between average distance to work of zone and nonzone workers. Zones are not attracting workers from a highly localized
labor market.
Since workers experience the friction of distance in terms of time,
not the miles traveled (even less the miles between zone centroids), it is
possible that our results misrepresent the true accessibility of zone jobs.
To test this we built a standard time-to-work regression for each zone in
our sample (see Appendix H for a detailed description of this model

City

Zone residents
employed
in zone (%)

Zone jobs
taken by zone
residents (%)

Distance to work,
all workers in
transportation
region (miles,
weighted average)a

Beloit, Wis.
Canton, Ohio
Evanville, Ind.
Fort Wayne, Ind.
Green Bay, Wis.
Jacksonville, Fla.
Lexington, Ky.
Milwaukee, Wis.
Muncie, Ind.
Pittsburg, Pa.
Porterville, Calif.
South Bend, Ind.
Springfield, Mo.
Syracuse, N.Y.

30.4
11.7
5.6
3.0
5.5
10.1
14.8
6.3
7.8
4.4
6.6
2.6
15.5
10.2

26.2
29.9
15.5
13.2
13.4
31.5
30.1
15.1
19.6
19.7
21.9
11.7
34.2
27.5

4.8
5.0
4.9
4.9
4.0
8.4
4.2
6.6
3.4
6.9
7.3
4.8
5.8
6.4

a

Distance to work,
enterprise zone
employees (miles,
weighted average)a
2.3
5.4
4.5
4.8
3.1
8.6
4.2
6.9
3.5
7.5
6.4
5.0
5.9
6.3

Mean miles to work (MCD) is calculated by the distance from zone centroid to zone centroid for each zone pair and weighted by actual commuters between each zone pair.
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Table 8.2 Employment in Enterprise Zones by Residence and Distance to Work of Zone Employees
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and further results for an earlier sample of zones). In these regressions
commute time was the dependent variable, and the income (or occupation) of workers, the mode of transportation to work, and whether the
work site was an enterprise zone or not were all independent. Since
zone residents tend to be poorer than the rest of the metropolitan population, and will therefore be more likely to use slower public transit, a
control for transportation mode is crucial; since the literature suggests
that better-paid and more-skilled workers are prepared to commute
longer distances, a control for income (or occupation) is also necessary.
We found further evidence for our earlier conclusion: even when taking
into account the time effects of transportation mode and income, in almost all cases zone workers had a longer commute time than non-zone
workers.12
In summary, the vast majority of zone residents actually worked
outside of the zone and the vast majority of zone jobs were taken by
non-zone residents. Where did those commuting into zones live? In
most instances, the homes of zone workers were nearly as dispersed
across the metropolitan area as the homes of those who worked outside
of the zone. It does not appear that jobs created within zones offer
much in the way of a local accessibility advantage to residents of zones.
Why are enterprise zones attracting workers from afar and employing so few of their residents? At this stage we have only speculative answers to this question. It is likely that the truth of the claim that
labor markets for lower-skilled workers are quite spatially limited has
been massively exaggerated. For example, the recent commuting literature suggests that minorities—who are often overrepresented
among lesser-skilled workers—often travel further to work than nonminorities (MacDonald 1999). Over and above arguments about the
size of labor markets, it is probably the case that, controlling for industry, the range of skills demanded in enterprise zones is little different from the range of skills demanded in the rest of the metropolitan
area. It would be very surprising indeed if the residents of enterprise
zones—who tend to be poorer and less educated than the rest of the
population—were able to supply the full range of labor skills demanded by firms located in the enterprise zones. Moreover, the zones we
have looked at tend to focus on manufacturing, whereas many of the
jobs requiring lesser skills are in other sectors, particularly services.
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We should not be surprised to find that many of the residents of enterprise zones commute to lower-skill jobs more abundantly available in
other parts of the city.

CONCLUSIONS
Do enterprise zones enhance the accessibility of work for disadvantaged workers and job seekers? Enterprise zone programs attempt
to do this in two ways: by placing zones in areas where disadvantaged
workers are concentrated, in the hopes that spatial proximity by itself
will increase employment of such persons, and by tying job incentives
(for zone firms or for all firms) to the employment of disadvantaged
workers. Almost all state enterprise zone legislation calls for the tying
of some portion of available jobs credits to “disadvantaged” workers
and job seekers. But as we saw in Chapter 4, jobs credits on average
make up a relatively small proportion of incentives offered in enterprise zones. Thus the actual percentage of potential credits tied to or
targeted at disadvantaged persons is very small indeed. Moreover,
there is some evidence that firms may avoid using incentives which require the employment of disadvantaged persons. If this is so, it should
come as no surprise that the targeting apparent in state zone legislation
is much less obvious when looking at the employees working in enterprise zones. We doubt that the tying of jobs credits to the employment
of disadvantaged persons has increased the accessibility of employment for those persons very much.
In this study we have focused on states that enforce some level of
spatial targeting through the criteria for establishing zones; in other
words, we have focused on states that presume job proximity is important. There are other states that allow zones in areas that are not depressed but give bigger incentives if the zone is near targeted populations. There are also states in which enterprise zones are little more
than delivery mechanisms for standard state incentives without any
particular geographical focus. Even where there is proximity between
zones and disadvantaged persons, however, it is still unclear if the disadvantaged gain any special accessibility to employment opportunities.
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First, incentives create very few additional jobs in zones. Second, enterprise zones function in the context of much broader regional labor
markets; many, or even most, of the jobs will go to persons residing
outside the zone. Finally, it is unclear whether the spatial mismatch hypothesis explains much of inner-city unemployment and labor-force
participation.
Many individuals commute into and out of the enterprise zone for
employment. Of those commuting in, many appear to come from
wealthier neighborhoods and suburbs. In the cases we examined, enterprise zones were as likely as not to have more long-distance commuters than non-zone areas of the city-region. Thus, it is hard to see
that spatial proximity of jobs has provided much in the way of increased accessibility. Again we need to emphasize that the analysis
presented in this chapter is quite preliminary. Our results are based on
a very small sample of enterprise zones and the data we use are not rich
enough to define comprehensively the accessibility provided by enterprise zones.
As we mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, there are other
ways of providing accessibility. It is possible that declining inner-city
locations are poor places for business to develop. Some have argued
that in comparison to greenfield suburban sites, these places are racked
by poor infrastructure, high crime, and so on (Dabney 1991). If this is
true, it may be better to abandon efforts to increase the spatial proximity of jobs and targeted persons and to resolve the issue of accessibility
to employment in a more comprehensive way. Better job placement
services would be a start; these would better disseminate information
about suburban job opportunities to inner-city residents. Better transitbased reverse commuting would be another help, allowing inner-city
residents to get to suburban jobs. Residential programs that move people out of the inner-city and place them in suburban locations may be
another useful, if highly controversial, option. Helping overcome
racial stereotyping (and geographical stereotyping) would almost certainly help. We have looked at none of these strategies in this book, but
it is clear to us that the accessibility of employment to economically
disadvantaged people has not been resolved by enterprise zones and
that other policy approaches need to be tried. In the conclusion we return to these issues.
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Notes
1. Hughes and Sternberg (1992) argued for the provision of “job mobility” through
transportation and job-placement services. For instance, public transit that enabled reverse commuting would improve the accessibility of suburban jobs, appropriate placement programs would allow inner-city residents, spatially removed from buoyant job markets, to “hear” about suburban job openings. Others
are skeptical of the ability of either public transit or placement approaches to
overcome employment barriers and have argued instead for “residential mobility”
programs, such as the Gautreaux housing experiment in Chicago (Rosenbaum et
al. 1991; Kain 1992). Rosenbaum (1996) argued forcefully that residential mobility programs have a much greater chance of reducing a wider range of labor
market barriers to minority employment than traditional approaches. For instance, potential employers may take a suburban address as a positive indicator of
future work performance, compared to an inner-city address.
2. For the original statement of the spatial mismatch hypothesis, see Kain (1968).
Also see the papers developing the hypothesis, in particular, Gordon, Kumar, and
Richardson (1989), Jencks and Mayer (1990), Blackley (1990), Holzer (1991),
Holzer and Vroman (1992), Ihlanfeldt (1994), and Holzer and Ihlanfeldt (1996).
Also see Kain’s (1992) restatement. For work on the constraint, see Peterson and
Vroman (1992) and Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1998).
3. Audit studies provide the most compelling evidence of hiring discrimination
against blacks. See Fix and Struyk’s (1994) review.
4. Glaeser (1996) distinguished between the loose form of the spatial mismatch hypothesis (segregation by race and income affects employment outcomes) and the
strict form (location matters because of transportation distance to work). We
doubt that any of the evidence here contradicts the loose form.
5. Also see Cooke (1997), who found that proximity to intrametropolitan job opportunities has no effect on African-American labor-force participation, but it does
have a positive effect on labor-force participation among white married mothers,
for instance. Part of the difficulty with the spatial mismatch hypothesis is that
there appears to be significant gender differentiation within individual race categories. See McLafferty and Preston (1996) for a statement of this issue.
6. California targets residents of a high-density unemployment area or Targeted
Economic Area, rather than the enterprise zone per se.
7. In fact, we assumed in our TAIMez simulations that no firms qualified for the jobs
credit in Connecticut.
8. Gravity or entropy models are widely used as a way of understanding spatial accessibility. See Appendix G for a discussion of these models in this context.
9. Note that for convenience we use “transportation region” and “metropolitan area”
interchangeably. For the purposes of this section the distinction between these
two regions is unimportant. Nevertheless, transportation regions as defined by
the Bureau of Transportation Statistics and Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs)
are not identical entities.
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10. Enterprise zones tend to be in or near central cities. Here TAZ regions—the local
unit of geographical analysis in this section—tend to be smaller; thus zone-tozone (commute) distances are shorter. Consequently, one would expect that, on
average, those working in enterprise zone TAZs would have shorter commuting
distances than other workers. Thus, if enterprise zones do provide some special
accessibility advantage, commuting distances for those working in enterprise
zones should be even shorter.
11. The CTPP does three unique things: 1) it uses Traffic Analysis Zones (TAZs),
which are small commuting regions, as the basic unit of geography; 2) It includes
a reorganization of Census data so that the characteristics of persons and households by their place-of-work is obtained; and 3) It includes commuting flow matrices of beginnings (origins) and ends (destinations) for the journey-to-work.
The data are used mainly by traffic planners and engineers for forecasting traffic
flows, but they may also be used to analyze a range of other policy-oriented commuting issues. See, for instance, O’Regan and Quigley 1996.
12. Unfortunately, the data used in these regressions are from Part II—the place of
work data—of the CTPP. The reason for this is that the CTPP does not provide
information on the occupation or income of those residing in a particular zone and
working in a particular zone. See Appendix H for more information on the regressions.

9
Conclusions and Policy
Recommendations
Enterprise zones remain the principal, if not the only, form of urban
policy at the state level in the majority of U.S. states; in fact, their use
expanded in the late 1990s. Is this a trend to be applauded or decried?
We begin this chapter by reviewing the principal findings of our research on enterprise zones. We then revisit the policy issues raised in
the first two chapters and reexamine them in light of our research. Are
enterprise zone incentives in fact a useful policy instrument for raising
the incomes of the poor, enhancing city economic development, or redeveloping depressed neighborhoods? We conclude the chapter with
recommendations for improving state enterprise zone programs.

A REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS
What are the Most Common Enterprise Zone Incentives and How
Much are They Worth?
The typical package of incentives available to firms locating in an
enterprise zone consists of an investment credit and a jobs credit under
the state corporate income tax, and local property-tax abatements.
Among 20 of the most industrialized states, the average incentive package increased in value from $4,061 per job in 1990 to $5,338 per job in
1998, where value is measured by the increase in the present value of
the 20-year cash flow attributable to investment in a new plant. Looking at just the 13 states that had substantial enterprise zone programs in
place by 1990, the average package among our 75 sampled cities was
worth $5,048 per job in 1994. Among the 75 cities, half had at least
one sector for which the total incentive package exceeded $10,000 per
job, and 14 cities would have granted at least one sector more than
$20,000 per job. Incentives of this magnitude are equivalent to a gross
undiscounted value in the range of $20,000 to $60,000 per job, which is
217
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not trivial in comparison to the reported packages offered to some firms
in the past 10 years.
Another way of getting at the question of incentive size and importance is to consider the size of the wage premium that a given incentive
package would just offset. If we look at the average across the 13 states
for each of the sectors, we find that the incentive packages were equivalent to a 1.6 percent to 7.1 percent cut in wages. A relatively small
wage premium would be sufficient, in many locations, to wipe out the
advantages created by the incentive packages there. Thus one would
not expect incentives to have large effects on location decisions when
they appear small relative to wages—the major factor cost for manufacturing firms.
How Do Enterprise Zone Incentives Compare to More Widely
Available State and Local Incentives?
The total incentive package values reported above included both
incentives available only within enterprise zones and incentives available anywhere in the state. On average among the 20 states, the enterprise zone incentives per se accounted for 63 percent of the total package in 1990, but only 52 percent by 1998. Looking just at the 75-city
sample, the enterprise zone share fell from 65 percent in 1990 to 56
percent in 1994 (though in 3 of the 13 states, zone incentives represented 100 percent of the package). General incentives have been increasing more rapidly than enterprise zone incentives. Still, for the typical
manufacturing firm, the incentive package more than doubles if the
firm chooses an enterprise zone location over a non-zone location in the
same state.
While on average states are attempting to confer a substantial competitive advantage on enterprise zones through more generous incentives, there were two contradictory trends in the 1990s among the 20
states: 1) some states embarked on new enterprise zone programs, or
increased the competitive advantage of existing zones or other targeted
areas;1 2) other states weakened the advantage of geographically targeted areas by reducing targeted incentives or, more commonly, by expanding nontargeted incentives. Perhaps more importantly, the trend in
many states with long-standing enterprise zone programs (or the equivalent) was to increase the maximum number of such zones allowed.
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This further weakened the targeting effect of zone programs, as a larger and larger portion of the state fell under the “targeted” program.
Are Larger Incentives Compensating for Higher Taxes?
Competition among states and localities for manufacturing investment has led to reductions in basic state taxes as well as increases in
state and local incentives. The importance of these tax and incentive
changes can best be measured by their effect on the overall state-local
tax rate on new investment. The overall trend in the 1990s has been
overwhelmingly to reduce basic taxes on corporations. Among the 20
states, the median basic tax rate was reduced from 8.5 percent in 1990
to 7.9 percent in 1998. Larger reductions in the median effective tax
rate occurred when general incentives were included (from 7.6 percent
to 6.7 percent) and when targeted incentives were added (from 6.3 percent to 5.2 percent).
Has there been any convergence among these 20 states in terms of
their tax rates on new investment? The short answer is “No.” In 1990,
incentives were not, by and large, offsetting unusually high basic tax
rates but were in fact reducing tax rates that were already below average. By 1998, the variability in basic tax rates among states had actually increased, but incentives no longer added to (or subtracted from) this
variability. Thus, tax rate and incentive competition continued through
the 1990s with no indication that this was producing convergence; the
process resembled a game of leapfrog, with no state apparently content
to be merely average. The most striking evidence of this is the prevalence, by 1998, of negative tax rates on new investment: not only did
the construction of a new plant, and the generation of sales and income
from it, fail to generate additional tax liability to the state in which the
plant was located, but the plant actually reduced the firm’s existing tax
liability to that state in many instances because new plant credits exceeded the entire new plant tax.
Do Enterprise Zone Incentives Appear to Favor
Particular Industrial Sectors?
Some states have relatively high corporate income tax rates, while
others are noted for high local property-tax rates; income tax credits
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may favor labor or capital, and the property-tax base may tax only real
property or most forms of personal property as well. This variation in
state-local tax systems, combined with variation among manufacturing
firms in terms of profitability, capital intensity, and asset composition,
produces wide variation in effective tax rates on a given industry across
our 75 city sample, and wide variation within cities in terms of effective rates imposed on one sector versus another. All but 4 of the 16 sectors end up as the most-competitive sector (in terms of effective tax
rate) for at least one of the cities, while all but 4 end up as some city’s
least-competitive sector. Within a given city, it is quite common for the
most heavily taxed sector to be facing a state-local tax rate two (or even
three) times the rate on the least-taxed sector.
All this amounts to implicit industrial policies, with states and
cities providing favored tax treatment to a few industrial sectors. Our
major concern here is that it is very likely that little or no thought has
gone into the industrial policy consequences of most states’ and cities’
tax systems. Industrial policy has developed almost by default, as a byproduct of decisions taken about other state and local policy issues.
Do Enterprise Zone Incentives Favor Labor over Capital?
One would assume that job creation is the predominant objective of
enterprise zone programs, given the concern with higher rates of poverty and unemployment in zone areas. State tax policy, on the other hand,
generally may simply be aimed at “economic development,” where investment is the primary objective (with more jobs assumed to follow, of
course). This is borne out to a limited extent by the pattern of state tax
incentives in the 13 states that are the focus of this study: jobs credits
are a little more likely to be provided in enterprise zones than to be provided generally throughout the state.
It is more instructive to look at incentives that actually lower the
price of labor at the margin versus incentives that lower the price of
capital at the margin, since some incentives that appear to do so, do not
in many instances, functioning instead as lump-sum grants to the firm.
Looked at in this way, we found that 4 of the 13 states provide, at the
state level, a set of incentives to zone firms that clearly lowers the price
of labor without an offsetting capital-matching “grant.” Four other
states have a clear capital bias. In the other five states, state credits pro-
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vide no clear reduction in labor or capital prices at the margin. When
local incentives—property-tax abatements, primarily—are brought into
the picture, however, the capital bias becomes quite strong.
The possible effects of incentives on a firm’s choice of technology,
and the relative use of capital and labor in the production process, depend not on the dollar amount of incentives but on changes in the prices
of capital and labor. We estimated these price changes for each of the
16 manufacturing sectors and each of our 75 enterprise zone cities. The
effects of labor incentives on the price of labor are quite small. In only
two states does the average price reduction exceed 1.0 percent, and the
maximum price reduction among the 16 sectors never exceeds 3.0 percent in any state. Capital incentives, on the other hand, have substantial
price effects in several of the states. The average price reduction
among sectors exceeds 5.0 percent in 8 of the 13 states, and in 6 states
the maximum exceeds 20 percent for at least 1 sector. Our results show
that overall there is a clear bias of incentive systems in favor of capital
in all but 2 of the 13 states.
Given the significant substitutability between capital and labor in
manufacturing reported in empirical studies, it is likely that this capital
bias in incentives will cause firms to adopt at least somewhat more capital intensive methods of production. This substitution of capital for labor could occur in any firm benefiting from the subsidies, including
those whose location decisions were unaffected. If this substitution effect is large enough, it is possible that the net effect of zone incentives
is to lower employment rather than to increase it.
Do Enterprise Zone Incentives Produce a State
or Local Fiscal Surplus?
The case for providing tax incentives for investment in enterprise
zones would be stronger if it could be shown that states or localities experience a net gain in revenues as a result of the incentive program, at
least in the long run. The increased revenues could be used to upgrade
infrastructure or education systems or to provide job training, thus augmenting the development effects of the direct job creation. If fiscal
losses occur, on the other hand, the opposite is true: incentives weaken
the ability of government to provide the public services that businesses
depend on, directly and indirectly.
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Our research indicates that the direct revenue effects of enterprise
zone incentives are very likely to be negative, and rather strongly so. In
the average enterprise zone city, among our sample of 75, each job that
is actually induced by the zone incentives would generate about $7,200
in net additional revenue to state government (in present value terms
over 20 years) and another $11,000 in local revenue. On the other
hand, the state would lose about $4,600 for every new job that was not
attributable to incentives (because some growth would have occurred
anyway), and localities would lose about $3,200 for each noninduced
job. The key to determining fiscal break-even is identifying the percentage of new jobs that were in fact created only because of the incentives—the induced jobs as a percentage of all new jobs. In the average
city, as long as this percentage was more than 30 percent, state and local government combined would come out ahead. The problem is, research (ours and others) suggests that the percentage is likely to be
much lower than 30 percent. If the elasticity of jobs with respect to taxes is about –0.3, the inducement percentage would be about 9 percent
and the annual net state-local revenue loss would be about $7,130 per
induced job in our average city. These losses would mount over time as
gross job growth causes more incentive spending each year. The eventual effect of a typical set of zone incentives for the average-sized zone
in our sample would be a total state-local revenue loss (for the zone as
a whole) of about $1.5 million annually.
While it appears unlikely that enterprise zone incentives will produce fiscal gains for state government, or for a state’s localities in the
aggregate, it is possible that local incentives produce local gains. This
is because there is reason to believe that incentives have a greater effect
moving investment around within a metropolitan area than from one
state or metro area to another. Shifts in location within a metropolitan
area would produce no net gain for the state or for localities collectively, but the city that gains business could gain fiscally. This depends on
how sensitive intrametropolitan location decisions—in particular, decisions to locate in a central city enterprise zone versus a suburban greenfield site—are to differences in local tax rates, about which we know
very little.
The conventional wisdom favors granting firms temporary and declining tax credits or abatements. Eventually, the argument will go,
these firms we have attracted will be paying the full freight in taxes,
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and it will be worth the temporary loss in revenue to get the permanent
gain. This assumption ignores the fact that establishments do not live
forever. By front-loading, one is increasing the odds that a given establishment will get most or all of the potential incentives but will pay full
freight for only a few years, or none at all; by the time the incentives
are phased out, many establishments will have died or moved on to
start the incentive pattern over again in another community. Our research shows in fact that governments will lose more revenue the more
they front-load their incentives. A permanent tax cut on new investment or jobs is more likely to produce positive revenues than a temporary cut with the same power to create jobs (in other words, with the
same value to the firm over some decision-making time horizon). The
most cost-effective incentive program, in terms of revenue loss or gain
per new job, is a back-loaded one. The argument for back loading is
strengthened by the fact that it rewards firms for staying in the community, instead of rewarding them just for arriving, and so may increase
the average time over which new establishments, and the jobs they
bring, benefit the community.
Did the Manufacturing Sector in the Enterprise Zones
Shrink during the 1989–1995 Period?
When we examine the 13 states as a whole, we find that the sixyear period 1989–1995 saw relative stability in the manufacturing sector, as measured by changes in the number of manufacturing establishments. Small rates of net growth in some sectors were offset by small
rates of net decline in other sectors. On the other hand, enterprise zones
within these states experienced relatively pervasive decline, though at a
modest rate. This net decline in manufacturing establishments was produced not just by steady attrition, however. New plants were constantly emerging to replace older ones that disappeared, and in most sectors
the gross changes in both directions were five to eight times as large as
the net change. The average zone among the 64 we studied began the
period with about 111 manufacturing establishments distributed across
six or seven sectors. Each year, in the average zone, about 11 manufacturing establishments were born or moved into the zone, but about 12.4
establishments died or moved out. The net effect was a decline in establishments at an average rate of only about 1.2 percent per year. Of
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the 64 zones, 20 actually experienced a net gain in manufacturing establishments; on the other hand, 10 zones suffered net losses of 20 percent or more over the six-year period.
Establishments exiting the enterprise zones (through deaths or
moves out) were, on average, just slightly larger than entering establishments. The percentage loss of manufacturing employment over the
six-year period due to net loss in establishments was therefore likely to
be a little more than the percentage loss of establishments. Zone employment is also greatly affected by the job expansions and contractions of existing firms that remain in the zone. Overall, of the establishments existing at the beginning of a given two-year period in these
64 zones, about one in three expanded employment within the two
years, and about one in three reduced employment. (About one in five
died or moved out.)
Larger establishments were much more likely to contract than
smaller establishments, however, so it is likely that the net effect of
expansions and contractions in these zones was further erosion in the
job base, beyond the more than 9 percent attributable to net loss of establishments. When one examines expansions and contractions by
time period one finds a striking trend, however: the percent of establishments that remained in the zone and expanded increased with each
two-year period, while the percent that remained but reduced employment declined. Expansion rates exceeded contraction rates by a wide
margin in the most recent period, 1993–1995, especially for the two
smaller-size classes. It is quite possible that in the 1993–1995 period
there was net employment growth in existing establishments in these
zones sufficient to offset, or more than offset, the job losses due to exits exceeding entries. Whether this trend continued as the national
economic expansion continued through the 1990s is open to speculation.
There is a surprising amount of sectoral diversity in the enterprise
zones. In all but 4 of the zones, there were at least 5 of the 16 sectors
significantly represented, and in 19 of the zones, there were 8 or more
sectors. (A sector was considered to have a significant presence if it accounted for at least 5 percent of the total number of establishments in
the zone.) In part, this reflects the fact that many zones are quite large,
drawn to include a major portion—if not all—of the city’s industrial
land. The median number of sectors significantly represented among
the births and moves in (those accounting for at least 5 percent of the
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total) was 7; all but 5 zones saw new establishments representing 5 or
more different sectors.
We assessed the zones’ comparative advantage or disadvantage for
types of manufacturing. We compared sectors in which zones did relatively better than the states (six sectors that accounted for 96 percent of
the state decline, but only 53 percent of the zone decline), and sectors in
which zones did relatively worse (accounting for 43 percent of zone decline, although these sectors were actually increasing for the states).
There was no clear difference between the two groups of firms in terms
of national average wages paid in those sectors. (This analysis is based
on national average wages by two-digit SIC code, however, not on actual wages for the particular establishments moving into and out of
these zones or these states, so these results should be viewed with
caution.) But zones appeared to have a pronounced disadvantage in attracting and retaining the more capital-intensive sectors of manufacturing. Moreover, zones are dominated by traditional—that is, non-technology—manufacturing sectors, particularly printing and publishing
and fabricated metal products. Zones appeared to have a comparative
disadvantage in electronic equipment, instruments, and chemicals.
This may not bode too well for long-term zone growth.
Do Enterprise Zones Create Local Economic Growth?
If zone incentives are to be effective, then they must be sizeable
enough to influence geographic investment decisions. Averaged across
the 13 states for each of the sectors, we found that the incentive packages were equivalent to a 1.6 percent to 7.1 percent cut in wages. So in
many locations a relatively small wage premium would be sufficient to
wipe out the advantages created by the incentive packages there. With
the exception of some extreme cases, therefore, one would not expect
incentives to have large effects on location decisions. Our statistical
models of enterprise zone incentives and growth bear out this deduction. At best the evidence shows that enterprise zones have little or no
impact on the growth of establishments. It is almost certain then that
they have as little impact on employment growth. Our conclusions
here are in line with much, but not all, of the econometric work on enterprise zones and growth.
Why are enterprise zone incentives not affecting growth? Part of
the explanation probably lies in the fact that many zones are in older,
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distressed, inner-city neighborhoods. Such places suffer from a number of important locational deterrents—high levels of crime, poor infrastructure, poorly skilled workers and so on—and it is unlikely that tax
incentives alone, small as they usually are, will make up for these negatives. In other words, in growing places enterprise zones may do little
more than reinforce growth trends, but in distressed places they are seldom likely to be large enough to make a huge difference. This suggests
that enterprise zone incentives could be effective if they were targeted
appropriately, were managed correctly, and were large.
In some places enterprise zone incentives are so large that it is
probable that they are successful in generating growth. For instance,
we are strongly inclined to believe that Michigan’s Renaissance Zone
program is so generous that it is effective. A few other states also have
very generous enterprise zone regimes. Considering our entire sample,
however, the incentive differences between the most generous and least
generous sites were often substantial. But for the most part, the tax advantages of enterprise zone status are not huge and the differences in
tax generosity among different enterprise zones are quite small. While
enterprise zones probably do work in the extreme cases, it is entirely
unsurprising that they do not have much effect on growth overall.
It is also important to recognize that the likely effectiveness of very
generous incentives such as Michigan’s comes at a high cost. As long
as the elasticity of economic growth with respect to taxes is less than
one, and there is reason to believe it is much less than one (for interstate
location decisions), incentives generate net revenue losses, and the
larger the incentives, the larger the losses (for a state and its localities in
the aggregate). To understand how this works, recall that larger incentives will indeed mean that a larger share of the establishment growth in
a locality is induced by those incentives; but the larger the incentives,
the less the locality gains from each induced establishment, and the
more it loses in revenues by granting incentives to firms that would
have located there anyway.
Do Enterprise Zones Improve the Accessibility
of Work for Targeted Workers?
Our answers to this question are decidedly preliminary. Nevertheless, two broad conclusions may be drawn. Tying the provision of busi-
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ness incentives to the requirement that recipient firms hire targeted
workers appears not to have been a success. These requirements usually apply only to jobs credits, and jobs credits are typically only a small
part of provided incentive packages. Moreover, it is possible that firms
may avoid using incentives with strong “tying” provisions.
Improving access by locating zones in targeted areas also seems to
be problematic. Enterprise zones attract workers from far and wide. In
most of the enterprise zones we looked at, the majority of jobs were taken by commuters from outside. Indeed, commute time of those working
in enterprise zones is often longer than the average for those working
elsewhere in the containing regions. This suggests that spatial proximity between home and work does not necessarily improve the accessibility of jobs. Moreover, there is good reason to be skeptical that transportation costs—between home and work—are a major cause of higher
levels of unemployment and lower levels of labor-force participation in
inner-cities. Thus it is a mistake to believe that the location of enterprise
zones in older inner-city neighborhoods will improve the employment
opportunities available to inner-city residents.

ARE ENTERPRISE ZONES A USEFUL
ECONOMIC-DEVELOPMENT TOOL?
Our work points to a basic confusion in the enterprise zone concept. Enterprise zones are seen as instruments for increasing business
investment, creating jobs, and enhancing the tax base. But to what
end? Is the objective merely to enlarge the economic base of the city—
that is, are enterprise zones just another name for local economic development, or another way for “the urban growth coalition” to direct
resources to capital investment? If so, one would permit enterprise
zones to be drawn quite large and to incorporate the major industrial
sections of the city, whether inhabited by lower-income persons or not;
furthermore, one might allow enterprise zones outside of cities, in suburbs or rural areas. This in fact appears to be the implicit purpose in
some state enterprise zone programs (most notably Ohio’s), where the
spatial targeting is limited to only some zones, individual zones sometimes include much of the city, and zones have proliferated.
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Or is the objective to raise the incomes of the residents of depressed or inner-city neighborhoods? This certainly appears to be the
goal of enterprise zones in those states in which zones are narrowly
drawn, zones are limited in number, and zone eligibility is predicated
on a showing of neighborhood distress. Here the idea is that proximity
to work opportunities is essential to reducing the unemployment rates
and boosting the labor-force participation rates of people who live in
those neighborhoods, thus increasing their income. Buttressing this
idea is the spatial-mismatch hypothesis—that the suburbanization of
investment has reduced the work opportunities of inner-city minorities.
If this is the objective, then one must confront the fact that there are
many strategies for raising incomes, including programs to enhance access to suburban jobs, programs to improve access to suburban housing, and programs to increase the employability of residents, not to
mention income transfers and social services. Where are the public’s
limited resources best spent—on a jobs-to-people strategy through
zone incentives or on other approaches?
Finally, enterprise zones may be seen as part of a neighborhood redevelopment policy. In many cities the zone is just one more program
layered on top of existing neighborhood-based programs operated by
the city, by local churches, by community development corporations,
or by other nonprofit organizations, often through alliances with the
private sector. The zone tax incentives—which are often provided to a
wide range of businesses, including retail and service establishments—
are part of a broader, neighborhood-based approach to revitalizing depressed areas that might include such things as job training, social services, housing rehabilitation, infrastructure improvements, education
reform, and commercial redevelopment. Our research is certainly not
meant to be a criticism of such broad-based community development
strategies. Rather, we ask the question: Are enterprise zone incentives
that are aimed at basic economic sectors, such as manufacturing, a useful and important component of such a strategy? Again, the question
should be: Where are the community’s limited resources best spent—
on incentives to attract manufacturing establishments or on other programs more directly and clearly affecting the quality of inner-city
neighborhoods?
Let us focus our attention on enterprise zones as a distinctive strategy involving spatially targeted incentives aimed at creating jobs in de-
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pressed neighborhoods, rather than zones as just another name for general economic development. The relevant questions then become: Do
zone incentives create jobs in such places, and if so, at what cost? Do
these jobs raise the employment rates and income levels of low-income
residents of the neighborhood? And most importantly, given the cost of
creating a job in a zone that goes to a low-income zone resident, could
these public funds be better spent in other ways? If we can answer
these questions we will have addressed the neighborhood development
issue as well: if zone incentives have any role to play here it is because
higher income levels would support a larger local commercial sector
and better-quality housing and schools.
The accessibility of economically disadvantaged populations to
employment could be enhanced in a number of ways besides bringing
jobs to the inner city.2 Better job-placement services, for example,
would let the residents of inner-city neighborhoods know about suburban job opportunities. Run properly, placement services could enhance
access to such jobs by reducing the transaction costs and prejudices of
suburban employers if such employers come to trust the agency as an
effective initial screener of prospective inner-city employees. Such an
agency should also provide the kinds of services commonly employed
in effective welfare-to-work programs—an assessment of job readiness, classes in job readiness, and job-search assistance—and perhaps
referral to other programs such as GED classes, English as a Second
Language classes, or more extensive job training.
Likewise, transit options could be developed that reduce the costs
associated with reverse commuting. In fact, there are placement services and temporary employment agencies that run their own minivans
from inner-city neighborhoods out to suburban work sites. Federal
support for reverse commuting initiatives has recently expanded and
these programs have now been in place long enough in some larger
cities that researchers have begun to provide some preliminary assessments of their effectiveness and limitations (Blumenberg 2000; Minton
1999).
Another option is to facilitate the movement of people from decayed neighborhoods to the suburbs. This has been tried a number of
times in the United States, the most famous of these experiments being
the Gautreaux program in Chicago. The evidence suggests that such
programs can be effective, particularly if the impacts are measured over
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more than one generation. This strategy raises the incomes of those
able to move closer to centers of employment and to places with better
schools and better environments for children. It may worsen conditions, on the other hand, for those left behind as positive role models
become more scarce and labor market networks thinner, and it is certainly not compatible with community-development goals.
Other possibilities exist. To the extent that the employment problem in the inner city is a mismatch of skills or work habits, rather than
a spatial mismatch, job-training and work readiness programs, or programs to reduce high school drop-out rates, may be appropriate. The
point is this: The alternative uses of funds are many, and the incentives
offered in enterprise zones are not cheap. What if the revenues foregone through zone incentives were spent directly on other programs?
Consider the following “thought experiment” involving alternative approaches to increasing the mobility of inner-city residents looking for
work.
We begin by calculating a reasonable estimate of the direct state
and local cost of creating one job for an enterprise zone resident. Let us
take as a starting point the fiscal simulations reported on in Chapter 5.
These simulations assumed a gross annual rate of job growth (births
and moves in) of 10 percent, approximately equal to the observed rate
in our zone sample over 1990–1995. Let us next assume that in the average zone 10 percent of the gross job growth is attributable to the tax
incentives available in the zone; the other 90 percent would have occurred anyway. While 10 percent seems like a very low figure, it is actually quite optimistic, based on our estimates of the actual effects of
zone incentives on growth and based on other studies of the elasticity
of employment with respect to taxes.
If we take 10 percent inducement as a best case, for every 100 new
jobs in the zone each year, the 10 induced jobs would generate a net
state-local revenue gain of about $18,200 per job (the average among
our 75 cities), or a total of about $182,000. The 90 noninduced jobs
would entail a revenue loss of about $7,800 per job (the average incentive cost) or about $702,000 in total. The total net loss is $520,000, or
about $52,000 per induced job. (These figures all represent the present
value of gains or losses over 20 years.)
The next step is to estimate how many of the induced jobs are filled
by enterprise zone residents. Based on the limited analyses presented
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in Chapter 8, it would be a reasonable guess to assume that on average
about one in four jobs goes to a neighborhood resident; we will assume
a best-case scenario of one in two. That means that state and local governments spent $520,000 on average to create just five jobs for zone
residents, or about $104,000 per job. (And it only gets worse if we take
into account that these five jobs may not represent a net gain in zone
resident employment, since some of the jobs may be taken by zone residents leaving an existing zone job, which might then be filled by a
non-zone resident.)
Our estimate of $104,000 per job is a present value cost over a 20year period. At the 10 percent discount rate that we used, it is equivalent to an annual expenditure of about $12,200 over that period. (Keep
in mind that this is the best case; a more probable set of assumptions
would easily double or quadruple these figures.) So here is the thought
experiment: What could we do with $104,000?
Suppose that each prospective inner-city worker was bought a new
car. In 2000, the cheapest new cars on the market went for between
$7,000 and $9,000—used vehicles for much less. Assume that insurance for the first three years for each car would average around $3,000
(estimating conservatively that it would take inner-city residents new to
the work experience about three years to become attached to the labor
market and thus able to afford their own transportation). Add to this a
liberal administrative overhead of 25 percent (a full 10 percentage
points more than JTPA allowed). Such an “access” policy would have
a direct cost of between $12,500 and $15,000 per worker.3 There
would be other indirect costs and benefits. More cars on the road
would increase infrastructure costs for government and there would be
some negative externalities for other road users. However, given that
most of the new auto use would be reverse commuting, these extra
costs might well be small. Moreover, given that the mobility of whole
families, not merely prospective workers, would be improved, there
would likely be welfare benefits beyond access to work for the one
employee.
Clearly, a program such as the one described above would be difficult to implement (requiring, for instance, monitoring that cars were actually used to get to work), and would likely be challenged politically.
For instance, there would likely be opposition to the unemployed being
given free automobiles. Environmentalists would probably be opposed
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to the further government subsidies of automobile use. The policy experiment could be altered to take account of many of these challenges.
Community minivan pools, for instance, could replace individual cars.
No matter—the experiment shows that access to employment can be
provided comparatively cheaply. If the function of enterprise zones is
to provide access, then they are comparatively expensive tools.
Our thought experiment is not far from the recommendations of
some working in the area of welfare and transportation policy. Waller
and Hughes (1999) argue that both federal and state governments need
to consider the provision of autos to families in poverty. At its broadest, their reasoning is that the United States is an auto-dominated society and it is unreasonable to expect poorer people to compete economically without access to cars. They are justifiably skeptical of the
efficacy of reverse-commuting initiatives and of most transit-based responses to the problems associated with access to jobs by the poor. In
response to the environmental and congestion objections to subsidizing
automobile ownership for the poor, they write:
While [clean air and congestion] are all worthy concerns, should
we pursue them on the backs of poor people being compelled by
time limits and work requirements? Lower income households
undoubtedly drive older cars, which likely produce more air-polluting emissions. The answer is more assistance for better cars
and maintenance, not excluding poor workers from the highways.
More cars on these roads would undoubtedly add to congestion.
The answer is congestion pricing and other ways to manage overall highway demand, not just managing poor workers’ traffic. And
if public transit is the magic bullet that would solve both air quality and highway congestion, then policymakers should increase its
use by higher income workers rather than simply focus on maintaining a captive market share among poor workers who have no
alternative. (Waller and Hughes 1999, p. 12)

In their survey of transportation support to welfare recipients,
Waller and Hughes found widespread reliance on vouchers for public
transit and mileage reimbursement for existing private automobiles.
But they also found innovative funding solutions including paratransit
alternatives such as van pools and new mechanisms that help clients acquire cars. For instance, Pennsylvania and Michigan provide grants to
some families to buy cars; both states also provide for car repair. A few
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states help with getting drivers’ licenses, and all states in their survey
permit the use of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Block
Grant (TANF) funds for car repairs and for vehicle-operating expenses.
About half the states excluded the value of at least one car from the eligibility determination of TANF-funded benefits. So our thought experiment is not too far from strategies already being used by states to
encourage and support work among welfare recipients and others in
need.
A possible argument against this line of thinking is that enterprise
zones have at least two functions: encouraging employment and providing access. The thought experiment only deals with the latter of the
two. Our answer here is that enterprise zone incentives do not appear
to induce much employment. Enterprise zones would have to be radically more successful at inducing new investment than anyone has yet
found for them to be judged a success. In those few cases where enterprise zone incentives are probably successful, they are extremely costly. Presumably, in such cases, state government could set a small portion of the direct subsidy package aside to provide direct support to
improving accessibility.
Furthermore, our thought experiment thus far has spent only about
$15,000 of our $104,000 in available funds. What could we do with the
rest? Following some of the suggestions made by Hughes (1989) for a
six-part mobility/income strategy for inner-city residents, a number of
alternatives spring to mind: two years of community college education
would cost a few thousand dollars per year; a $400 per month subsidy
for day-care expenses would amount to $4,800 per year, enabling more
single parents to work (and reducing welfare costs in the process).
Some of the saved revenue could be invested in upgrading neighborhood schools and infrastructure, or operating a job-training and referral
center, or on housing assistance. Some of the saved revenue could fund
a state-earned income tax credit, which would supplement the wages of
entry-level jobs. The point is this: it is not difficult to imagine a set of
alternative programs that would enhance job access and improve incomes, immediately or in the long run, and that would cost less than the
zone incentive strategy.
The possibilities for funding alternative kinds of strategies become
clearer if we consider the total cost, in lost state and local revenues, for
a typical enterprise zone. As we reported in Chapter 5, for an average
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zone in our sample of 75 cities, with a typical incentive package and
average rates of firm births and deaths, the revenue losses from this incentive package would eventually rise to about $1.5 million per year
for state and local governments combined. An annual expenditure of
this magnitude clearly could fund alternative programs at a significant
level.

IMPROVING ENTERPRISE ZONES
While we have doubts about the overall effectiveness of enterprise
zone incentives, it appears that they will remain in place in the majority of states for the foreseeable future. One reason for their staying
power is that their costs are hidden; like all tax expenditures, they can
be portrayed as a tax-cut program rather than an expenditure program,
and this greatly enhances their political viability. So it is important to
consider how state enterprise zone programs could be improved. We
take as given that existing zones (except in the few states with sunset
provisions) will remain in place, and that tax incentives will remain a
central policy tool. Within those parameters, a number of reforms are
possible.
Let us assume for the moment that enterprise zone policy continues
to be guided by the basic premise that zones should be depressed areas
where additional jobs need to be created—in other words, it is a placebased investment strategy. It is important, then, to prevent the proliferation of zones, particularly into areas that are not really economically
distressed since that weakens the relative tax advantages conferred on
zones. States should also restructure the incentives offered in their
zones. There are five problems with the kinds of tax incentives currently emphasized, generally a combination of state corporate income
tax credits for jobs or investment and local property-tax abatements: 1)
they tend to favor capital over labor; 2) they tend to favor certain sectors over others, but not in an explicit and purposeful way; 3) they do
not aid in the retention of existing establishments but only in the attraction of new ones or investment in expansions; 4) they are front-loaded
and, hence, are more costly than they need to be; and 5) they rob local
governments of the ability to finance needed local services.
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There is an alternative incentive strategy that addresses all five of
these problems: exempting some percentage of zone income from state
corporate income taxation. By exempting a share of taxable income,
there is no bias in favor of any one factor of production, nor is there a
bias in favor of one industry over another. The effective tax rate on income is reduced by the same percentage regardless of the economic
sector. Since the income exemption applies to all firms with facilities
and labor in an enterprise zone, it would create an incentive to remain
in the zone as well as an incentive to locate or expand there. As such it
would probably have a larger effect on total zone employment than investment incentives alone. Such an exemption is constant and permanent and therefore is not front-loaded; thus even though it would be
more expensive in the short run (because existing firms would immediately qualify), since it is also more effective, in the long run it would
probably achieve a given inducement effect at lower cost to state government than a credit or abatement. Finally, since it is entirely state financed, it would not drain tax resources from local governments.
Alternatively, one could reorient zone policy and think of enterprise zones as concentrations of the hard-to-employ; the goal of the
policy, then, is to create incentives for firms, wherever they may be, to
hire zone residents, instead of incentives for firms to locate in zones
and then hire whoever they want. Of course, individuals identified as
hard-to-employ can be found anywhere; a demographic-based zone
strategy still makes sense to the extent that location itself is an important determinant of employability. This can occur for several reasons:
the prejudices of employers against workers from certain areas, the culture of joblessness or lack of role models that some authors attribute to
inner-city neighborhoods, the problem of transportation access, or the
lack of connectedness to job markets. Zone residence could be a necessary and sufficient condition to qualify for the credits, or it could be a
necessary condition combined with some other individual attributes
that define the hard-to-employ, such as those unemployed for long periods of time, TANF recipients, or individuals who are JTPA eligible. A
third possibility, of course, is to make either zone residence or employability a sufficient condition.
Under this alternative view, criteria for creation of zones would be
based entirely on the demographics of the residents, particularly chronic joblessness and high poverty rates. The zones should be confined to
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such areas, again to avoid dilution of effectiveness, but should also be
drawn to include all such areas within a given job market. (This is less
of a concern with investment-based strategies, since jobs in one place
can be filled by the hard-to-employ from neighboring areas, whereas
here we are creating a spatial definition of who qualifies.) Logically,
then, the incentives should be redesigned to consist entirely of state
jobs credits. There should be no capital incentives, including local
property-tax abatements.
The jobs credits need to be more generous than they typically have
been if they are to make a significant dent in the costs of employing the
hard-to-employ, and upper threshold limits should be eliminated, or at
least raised, to create stronger incentives to hire more-skilled, higherwage workers. Jobs credits are not sector neutral; they favor more labor intensive sectors, but that is entirely appropriate since they are designed to encourage hiring, not relocation per se. The incentives
should not be front-loaded for two reasons: front-loaded incentives will
be more costly in the long run, and it is important to create on-going incentives to retain the individuals hired. The credits should continue for
as long as that individual remains on the job. The credits should also be
available for replacement hires and should not be limited to hires associated with plant expansions. This would make it even more important
for the incentives to continue, to avoid creating incentives for churning
the labor force (getting rid of employees as soon as the credits are used
up and hiring someone new to start the credit process over again.)
Regardless of whether zones are viewed as a place-based investment strategy or a people-based employment strategy, there is a need to
integrate enterprise zones with transportation and social policy so that
those most in need of jobs have better access to them. Encouraging reverse commuting either through changes to public transit or support for
private van-pools would be useful. Better placement services, connecting inner-city residents to suburban job opportunities, would also be
good. Finally, moving people out to suburban residences would probably be the most effective of all (though also most likely to face stiff political opposition). All this implies that for enterprise zones to become
more effective, they must be part of a broader set of public policies
aimed at encouraging people to work productively.
We believe the expectations of enterprise zone policy have been far
too great. Enterprise zones, or for that matter any other simple eco-

Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 237

nomic-development policy, should not be expected to solve some of the
most deep-rooted problems in American society: racial inequality, welfare dependency, inner-city crime and decay, the breakdown of big city
education systems, and so on. At the very best, enterprise zones can
only be expected to make a small dent in these vast problems. It seems
to us that the problems enterprise zones were originally meant to tackle
would be better addressed directly and massively. In this sense, enterprise zones are only stop-gaps until an effective social and economic
policy response becomes politically palatable. Primarily for the same
reasons, it should come as no surprise (although it did at first to us) that
enterprise zones have not been successful.

Notes
1. It should be noted that Pennsylvania enacted the new Keystone Opportunity Zone
Program, with very generous incentives, but that took effect in 1999, too late to be
reflected in our 1998 effective tax rate comparisons.
2. Hughes (1989) describes a six-part mobility strategy to improve the mobility and
thus income of inner-city residents: provide job training; create job information
systems; restructure transportation systems; provide day-care facilities; increase
the level of the earned income credit; and modify policing and correctional practices.
3. If it were assumed instead that it would take six years for workers to become attached to the labor force, then total direct costs would still be $16,250–$18,750.
Assuming six years and very high administrative overhead (35 percent), direct
costs would still only be $17,550–$20,250 per worker.

Appendix A
Details of the TAIMez Model
TAIMez (Tax and Incentive Model-Enterprise Zones) is what we call our
new hypothetical-firm model for measuring effective tax rates on new investment and the value of incentives. It is a direct descendent of the original
TAIM model that we used for much of our research in the mid 1990s, in particular the research for the Upjohn Institute that led to the book Industrial Incentives (Fisher and Peters 1998). The new TAIMez model is much larger,
considerably more flexible, and capable of tax simulations we were not able to
perform in the original model. It also contains our responses to issues raised
by others about the original model (Netzer 1997; L. Papke 1997; Schwartz
1999). However, in basic structure and principle, the two models work in
much the same way. The reader is referred to our earlier book, Industrial Incentives, for a more complete discussion of model structure and data sources.
There are very few hypothetical-firm models in the United States. Most
have been built with specific purposes in mind and are therefore designed to
undertake quite specific simulations. We have discussed at length in various
academic papers how hypothetical-firm models should be evaluated.1 Suffice
it is to say here that the overall quality of a hypothetical model should be measured on how well certain pivotal tax questions are dealt with:
• Are federal and local taxes included?
• Are tax incentives included? If so, what range of tax incentives are included?
• Are sales taxes and sales tax exemptions and credits included?
• Does it model an existing firm’s new investment so that marginal tax
rates can be calculated, rather than the average tax burden on an established firm?
• Is the model multiyear, and if so how well does the model deal with the
replacement of assets?
• How well are state apportionment formulae, including throwback
rules, taken into account?
• How realistic is the model with regard to the distribution of firm payroll, plant, and sales?
The original TAIM model was designed to deal comprehensively with
these seven questions. Since a number of methodological improvements were
made to the hypothetical method to provide rigorous solutions to these ques239
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tions, the new TAIMez provides a highly flexible environment for modeling
state and local taxes and incentives.

HOW THE MODEL WORKS
The TAIMez model begins by simulating the firm’s costs and revenues,
and changes in its balance sheet, over a 20-year period, producing a stream of
annual cash flows. The simulations are performed twice, the first with the firm
operating in a “steady state” for 20 years with no new investment and constant
sales and operating costs; the second, with the firm constructing a new plant in
one of the states or cities in our study. The internal rate of return (IRR) or the
increment to cash flow attributable to the operations of the new plant can be
used as the measure of project returns; they capture the profitability of making
an investment at a particular site. Differences in project returns among states
and cities reflect differences in state and local tax structures and incentive
packages.
TAIMez’s implementation of the hypothetical-firm method allows simulations to be performed with and without the various categories of incentives included in the analysis. For instance, a first run might include the basic tax
structure and statewide tax incentives. A second run might add enterprise zone
incentives (or a particular enterprise zone incentive). The difference between
returns including enterprise zone incentives and without those incentives measures the value to the firm of the enterprise zone incentives. For example, one
of the sectors we model is SIC 24, lumber and wood products. In one simulation of 1998 state and local taxes of a small firm in this sector (investing
around $700,000 in plant and machinery and equipment, with 25 prospective
employees), over the 20-year period of the simulation, the firm would see a return on that investment of around 16.4 percent (or an increment to cash flow of
about $380,700) if it located in Ohio but outside an enterprise zone. However,
the IRR would rise to 17.4 percent (or a $429,800 increment to cash flow) if it
located in an Ohio enterprise zone and received State of Ohio enterprise zone
incentives. In other words, the state enterprise zone program is worth about
$49,100 more in income to this particular firm.2
Along the same lines, the difference between project returns with all incentives (including enterprise zone incentives) included and project returns
with only the basic tax structure, measures the after-tax value of the entire incentive package. The difference between returns in Ohio and returns in another state measures the competitive (dis)advantage of Ohio. For instance, the
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same SIC 24 firm (mentioned above) locating a new plant in an Indiana enterprise zone would generate a 15.9 percent IRR and a $346,100 increment to
cash flow. Thus, all else being equal,3 for this particular firm and investment,
the Ohio state enterprise zone program provides an $83,700 competitive advantage over the Indiana state program. One additional advantage of TAIMez
is that individual elements of the tax code—a particular jobs or investment tax
credit, for instance—can be evaluated, as can hypothetical changes in such
programs.
The model generates a large amount of data besides project cash flow (income) and IRR. Since tax payments to all levels of government must be calculated as a part of the model, these numbers are themselves part of model
output. For instance, a property-tax abatement or exemption offered by a community would likely raise the firm’s income (its project returns). But in so doing, the exemption increases the taxes paid by the firm to other levels of government (state income tax, for instance) and jurisdictions of government
(income taxes paid in other states, for example). Both tax and non-tax incentives thus have implicit intergovernmental revenue transfer consequences.
TAIMez is able to keep track of these and is thus able to calculate the true net
revenue costs to a state or local government unit using a particular incentive
program. (The measurement of these net revenue costs should not be confused
with fiscal impact studies—those in which the object is to measure the costs a
project imposes on city- or state-provided services, as well as indirect revenue
effects.)
TAIMez’s fiscal calculations allow us to compare the benefits that an incentive program provides to a firm with the net costs to government of that incentive, taking into account all, or an appropriate subset of, revenue transfers.
Doing so allows incentive programs to be compared on the basis of each incentive’s benefit-to-firm/cost-to-government ratio. The use of such a ratio has
been widely recommended in the economic development literature (for instance, Rasmussen, Bendick, and Ledebur 1984), but has seldom been implemented. Other things being equal, one would want government to maximize
usage of incentives that provide most benefit to the firm with least cost to government.

MANUFACTURING SECTORS MODELED
TAIMez incorporates financial and operating ratios for 16 hypothetical
manufacturing firms, based on the characteristics of real firms in 16 manufacturing sectors. In general, we have chosen sectors at various stages in the em-
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ployment growth cycle. The sectors also vary by labor and capital intensity, so
that the full effects of labor and capital subsidies available in enterprise zones
can be better understood. Each firm is assumed to construct a new plant, with
assumed plant sizes based on employment and asset data for typical manufacturing establishments. Balance sheets, income statements, and statements of
cash flows were developed for each firm based mostly on financial statements
for actual manufacturing corporations in the commercial database Compustat.
For each firm, we specified a new manufacturing facility (total plant and
equipment and working capital needed, employment, sales, and so forth); the
financial statements for the new plant mirror the characteristics of the parent
firm.
Financial statements do not contain information on employment, wages or
payroll, and these variables must be included in the firm profiles for the
TAIMez model in order to simulate the effects of tax incentives tied to job creation. Such incentives are usually a dollar amount per new job or a percent of
new plant wages. Firm financial statements also tell us nothing about the size
of typical establishments (in terms of assets or employment). These problems
were solved by relying on two additional sources of data. Annual new-plant
payroll for each hypothetical firm was constructed using the average annual
wage of production workers by two-digit SIC code from the Annual Survey of
Manufactures and an assumed number of new-plant production workers. The
new-plant employment figures, in turn, were based on data from two states
(Nebraska and Ohio), by two-digit SIC code, that show new manufacturing
plant assets and employment. The states collected these data from firms receiving state incentives. These data thus provide exactly what we need: establishment- (not firm-) level data for new manufacturing branch plants. From
these data we constructed typical new plant employment sizes by two-digit
SIC code. Since the state data also contained the total value of property, plant,
and equipment (PP&E), we were able to construct a ratio of assets to employment that allowed us to scale the plant to the typical employment size. New
plant PP&E then became the starting point for constructing the new plant financial statements: remaining statement items were constructed as ratios to
PP&E, the ratios coming from the firm-level data in the Compustat database.
The most important operating ratios for the sectors that are the focus of
this book are described in Table A.1. Capital intensity, as measured by the value of property, plant, and equipment per worker, ranges from $27,000 in the
lumber and wood products sector to $181,000 in the primary metal industries.
As a percent of total assets, inventories range from about 12 percent to nearly
37 percent, while machinery and equipment ranges from under 14 percent to
almost 53 percent. The average annual wage of production workers is under
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$14,000 in the apparel sector but reaches almost $38,000 in transportation
equipment.
Note that we include no service sectors. This is an important omission,
given that many enterprise zones seek to attract firms from a broad range of
sectors, including wholesale trade, services, and even retail. Unfortunately,
the modeling of sectors other than manufacturing is constrained by the lack of
crucial pieces of data. The omission is less important than it might appear,
however, given that previous research has shown that a large majority of the
jobs that are claimed by enterprise zone administrators are in manufacturing
(Erickson and Friedman 1990a).

THE FIRM’S FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
The heart of the TAIMez model consists of a set of pro-forma financial
statements: an income statement, a balance sheet, and a statement of cash
flows. The first year is the year prior to new-firm investment. If we are simulating the tax burden on a new plant to begin operation in 1994, for example,
the firm’s financial statements would begin with 1993, showing income and
assets at the beginning of the year in the absence of the new plant. For present
value calculations, 1993 is year 0, or the present. The pro-forma projections
extend through year 20, or 2014.
In order to focus on the effects of incentives on returns from a new investment, we assume that each hypothetical firm would have been in a “steady
state” but for the expansion. That is, each year the gross value of the depreciable assets in place on January 1, 1993 (to continue our example), is maintained by undertaking replacement investment equal to retirements. With
straight-line depreciation, annual depreciation of these assets is constant, and
therefore accumulated depreciation and the net value of these assets also remain constant. Replacement investment is financed by rolling over long-term
debt, so that total long-term debt and interest expense for existing assets remain constant. The result is that the simulation of firm operations in the absence of new-plant investment produces a constant net income after taxes each
year for the 20-year period; net income is also equal to cash flow.
Calculation of the steady-state or baseline set of financial statements was
not as simple as one might think. This is because the model must calculate
state income taxes in at least one state even in the baseline scenario (since we
are simulating an existing firm, with assets somewhere) and these state taxes
are deductible from income for federal tax purposes. Furthermore, some states

Characteristic
Firm
Total assets ($ millions)
Total sales ($ millions)
New plant
Total Assets ($ millions)
Property, plant & equipment, gross
($ millions)
Employees
Average annual wage ($)
Energy costs: % of operating costs
Asset composition: % of total assets
Current assets
Inventories
Property, plant & equipment
Real property
Machinery & Equipment
Property, plant & equipment per
worker ($)
Operating profit: % of sales
Rate of return (IRR) in a zero-tax
stateb (%)

Apparel
Food and and other Lumber Furniture Paper and Printing Chemicals Rubber &
kindred
textile and wood
and
allied
and
and allied plastics
products products products fixtures products publishing products products
20a
23
24
25
26
27
28
30
100.0
139.9

150.0
227.2

60.0
162.6

175.0
300.6

300.0
354.7

150.0
207.7

400.0
418.8

150.0
218.4

17.2
10.3

25.2
7.7

1.4
0.7

7.7
4.2

18.5
12.7

9.0
5.0

19.3
11.5

21.7
13.0

150
22,643
1.2

225
13,905
1.2

25
19,939
1.7

100
19,391
1.1

75
31,597
3.4

150
24,122
0.8

75
34,944
2.8

75
22,593
2.1

39.8
18.0
60.2
24.2
36.1
68,930

69.5
36.9
30.5
13.1
17.4
34,238

51.8
21.7
48.2
23.5
24.7
27,007

45.9
17.9
54.1
21.7
32.4
41,893

31.5
11.6
68.5
15.6
52.9
169,425

44.0
12.0
56.0
14.8
41.2
33,495

40.3
13.7
59.7
19.8
40.0
153,610

40.2
15.1
59.8
14.0
45.8
173,115

9.8
10.8

9.0
13.8

6.9
18.2

9.0
12.8

13.6
13.8

13.2
17.4

18.3
20.4

11.9
17.7
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Table A.1 Characteristics of the Representative Firms

Characteristic

a
b

50.0
70.3

200.0
204.3

250.0
357.6

60.0
92.6

50.0
69.2

40.0
55.7

100.0
173.0

100.0
117.6

13.9
3.1

11.4
7.4

45.6
27.2

17.1
8.8

27.6
10.2

42.4
17.8

35.2
18.6

37.1
15.0

100
15,584
1.0

75
26,656
4.7

150
33,199
4.5

75
26,188
1.5

100
28,814
0.8

100
24,392
0.8

300
37,898
0.6

100
28,397
0.8

77.5
32.0
22.5
8.8
13.7
31,308

34.9
15.9
65.1
17.3
47.8
99,311

40.4
18.3
59.6
13.5
46.1
181,192

48.9
19.2
51.1
17.8
33.3
116,686

63.2
20.9
36.8
10.9
25.9
101,698

58.0
20.7
42.0
12.4
29.6
177,904

47.3
19.1
52.7
15.8
36.9
61,850

59.5
21.0
40.5
14.4
26.1
150,489

9.9
11.1

16.9
15.4

10.8
13.9

11.1
19.2

10.9
12.1

12.5
13.6

11.0
15.7

13.6
15.0

Industry SIC code.
Rate of return on investment in a new plant after federal taxes, if located in a state with no state or local taxes.
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Firm
Total assets ($ millions)
Total sales ($ millions)
New plant
Total Assets ($ millions)
Property, plant & equipment,
gross ($ mill.)
Employees
Average annual wage
Energy costs: % of operating
costs
Asset composition: % of total
assets
Current assets
Inventories
Property, plant & equipment
Real property
Machinery & Equipment
Property, plant & equipment per
worker
Operating profit: % of sales
Rate of return (IRR) in a zero-tax
stateb

Leather
Stone,
and
clay and Primary Fabricated
Electric &
Instruments
leather
metal
metal
glass
Industrial electronic Transportation & related
products products industries products machinery equipment equipment
products
31a
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
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allow a deduction for other state income taxes or for federal income taxes. If
the model were to allow contemporaneous deductions (so that in a reciprocaldeductibility state such as Iowa, 1992 Iowa taxes are deducted in calculating
1992 federal taxes and 1992 federal taxes are deducted in calculating 1992
Iowa taxes), there would be a circularity problem that would prevent the
spreadsheets from calculating. To solve this, we created a separate set of proforma spreadsheets for computing the baseline cash flow; each year after the
first year, state income taxes for the previous year are deducted in calculating
federal income taxes in the current year, thus preventing circularity. Convergence is reached after a few years even in states such as Iowa with reciprocal
deductibility; state and federal taxes remain the same each year (at least when
rounded to the nearest dollar). The financial statements in the last year of the
baseline run (at the point when convergence is assured) define the “steady
state,” and the baseline cash flow that is produced in the steady state becomes
the model’s counterfactual—the annual cash flow that would have been produced for the next 20 years in the absence of new-plant investment. The addition to cash flow each year attributable to the new-plant investment is simply
the firm’s total net cash flow with the new investment less the baseline cash
flow.
The model begins by constructing a complete set of financial statements
for one of the prototype firms. For 1994 tax simulations, the initial balance
sheet is for January 1, 1993; the firm then builds a new establishment, with
the new-plant assets going on the books at acquisition cost at the end of 1993.
The new-plant assets generate income (and depreciation deductions) beginning January 1, 1994. Short-term assets and liabilities (inventories, accounts
payable and receivable, and so forth) are increased proportionately as a result
of the expansion. New PP&E is added in the same proportions to total assets
as for the existing firm. Additional net working capital (current assets minus current liabilities) necessitated by the new plant, as well as the new-plant
fixed assets, are financed by a combination of additional long-term debt, retained earnings, and the sale of common stock (if necessary), in such a way as
to maintain the same ratio of debt to equity.
New-plant private debt-financing terms vary by asset class and loan size.
The long-term rates (applied to financing land, plant, and infrastructure) are
based on corporate A-rated bond rates; the short-term rates (3–4 years, for financing short-lived equipment and working capital) are based on Federal Reserve data on commercial and industrial fixed-rate bank loans, with interest
rates declining substantially as loan size increases. Interpolation was used to
derive rates for intermediate-term loans (for equipment lasting 7–12 years).
The new PP&E is depreciated for tax purposes according to the MACRS
schedule that applies to buildings (straight line for 31.5 years prior to 1994, for
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39 years in 1994 or later), infrastructure (15 years, 150 percent declining balance), and machinery and equipment (200 percent declining balance, over a
period of 3, 5, or 7 years depending on the industry). The depreciable basis of
each asset is its acquisition cost (from the database of firm financial characteristics) plus state and local sales taxes on machinery and equipment, where applicable. Depreciable assets are assumed to have zero salvage value and to be
replaced at the end of the appropriate class life (20 years for infrastructure, 40
years for buildings, 5 to 15 years for machinery and equipment). Since we are
using a 20-year time horizon, replacement schedules are modeled only for machinery and equipment. Assets are depreciated on the books according to the
appropriate ADS straight-line schedule (20 years for infrastructure, 40 years
for buildings, 5 to 15 years for machinery and equipment).

TAXES MODELED
Data on state taxes and tax incentives were obtained largely from Commerce Clearing House’s Multi State Corporate Income Tax Guide and from
copies of corporate income tax forms and instructions for each state. Data on
local taxes were obtained from state reports, where available, or directly from
each city. Local abatement schedules generally had to be obtained directly
from the city.

Corporate Income Taxes
TAIM models only the major features of the corporate income and net
worth taxes:
• rates,
• deductibility of income taxes paid to other states, the federal government, or one’s own state,
• deductibility of property taxes,
• rules for apportionment of income,
• depreciation methods,
• the availability of general credits for other taxes paid, such as sales or
property taxes,
• the treatment of nonbusiness income—how it is allocated and whether
it is subject to apportionment,
• whether the property factor in the apportionment formula is measured
by acquisition cost or book value,
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• whether the sales factor includes nonbusiness receipts, and
• the availability of investment tax credits or jobs tax credits.
There seems to be agreement among the developers of hypothetical-firm
models that there is little point in modeling the very minor differences in the
measurement of the payroll factor or in modeling the differences in the treatment of subcategories of nonbusiness income: rents, royalties, interest on federal bonds, interest on state and local bonds, dividends from subsidiaries, capital gains, and so forth. We would argue that since the focus of our research is
on the location of facilities for the generation of sales of products—business
income—the treatment of such items is not relevant. There is a practical argument as well: data at this level of detail are not generally available, making the
models excessively reliant on empirically unsupported conjectures about firm
behavior. We make the simplifying assumption that the hypothetical firms
have aggregate nonbusiness income as given by the statistical data sources, but
it is entirely in the form of interest on corporate bonds, which is treated uniformly by the states. This approach allows us to model rules for the allocation
or apportionment of nonbusiness income without getting into the details of
what counts as nonbusiness income and what doesn’t. We also ignore the
treatment of foreign business income, foreign nonbusiness income, foreign tax
credits, extraordinary items such as write-offs for plant closures, goodwill, recapture of federal investment tax credits, and adding back in federal job incentive credits (by creating firms that have no such income or asset category). We
do not include firms with losses because of the logical and practical difficulties
in doing so over a 20-year period; thus, net operating loss (NOL) provisions
would never apply and are not modeled.

Sales Taxes
Most studies consider only the sales tax on purchases of fuel and electricity and of machinery and equipment. These are the two major categories of
expenditure by manufacturers that are sometimes taxed and sometimes exempted by the states. The exemptions are most often targeted exclusively at
manufacturing machinery, and at fuel and electricity used directly in the manufacturing process, which suggests that at least part of the motivation for the
exemption is an economic-development one. Our model includes expenditures on machinery and equipment, furniture and fixtures, computers, and fuel
and electricity; it does not include expenditures for office supplies, construction materials, or pollution-control equipment, so the results do not reflect the
minor differences caused by state variation in taxing these latter items. Each
state’s sales tax is part of the model; to the extent that the state applies the sales
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tax fully to, or exempts, or applies a lower rate to, purchases of manufacturing
machinery, computers, furniture and fixtures, transportation equipment, or other personal property, that will be reflected in a higher acquisition cost for those
assets, and hence larger depreciation deductions and larger financing requirements. To the extent that the state taxes or exempts purchases of electricity or
fuel, or exempts the portion used directly in the manufacturing process, the
firm’s operating costs will be more or less each year.

Property Taxes
All states allow localities to tax real property (or realty), which consists of
land and buildings, and associated site improvements, such as access roads.
States vary considerably in rules regarding the taxation of business personal
property, which consists of inventories (of raw materials, goods in process,
and finished products), manufacturing machinery and equipment, computers
and other office machinery, furniture and fixtures, and transportation equipment.
The property-tax component of TAIMez begins with specification of state
policy, which will generally determine whether local property taxes apply to
business inventories and to personal property in general, whether categories of
personal property such as manufacturing machinery and equipment are exempt, and whether different classes of property must be assessed at different
ratios to market value. States also generally establish rules or guidelines for
local assessors in determining the market value of personal property; typically,
the state will publish schedules for depreciating machinery and equipment,
which are usually by category (furniture and fixtures, transportation equipment) and industry (for manufacturing machinery and equipment), just as federal depreciation schedules are. The states that do not publish guidelines allow
assessors to use whatever guidelines they think appropriate; for these states,
we assume depreciation schedules representing the average of the other states.
These state guidelines are used by the model to value personal property; real
property is assumed to be valued at book value, using straight-line depreciation over the life of the building.
Property taxes are assumed to be paid in a given calendar year based on
the value of property at the end of the previous calendar year. The calculation
of property taxes begins with the valuation of taxable classes of property. Inventory and land values are constant from the year of new-plant construction
onward, since we assume no inflation and neither asset depreciates. Three
states tax inventories of raw materials, goods in process, and finished goods
differently. We follow the Wisconsin tax study (1990) in assuming 40 percent
of inventories are finished goods; we assume 25 percent are raw materials, 35
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percent goods in process. The second step in the calculation of property taxes
is the application of the assessment ratio (which may vary locally) to the value
of each asset. Finally, the model multiplies the assessed value by the consolidated local property-tax rate—the sum of the rates for the city, the school district (if independent of the city), the county in which a majority of the city is
located (where counties exist and levy taxes), and other special districts overlying the city. In the 20-state simulations of “average” locations in a state
(rather than particular cities), a statewide effective property-tax rate is applied.

THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE FIRM AND
THE DESTINATION OF SALES
Some studies using the hypothetical-firm approach to compare state business tax burdens treat each firm as if it were a single-plant firm, or at least a
single-location firm. This may make sense for comparative tax studies, but it
is not appropriate for the measurement of development incentives such as enterprise zones, which are provided for new investment. A firm with the financial characteristics and asset size of the average mature firm in the industry
cannot be treated as if it were a brand new establishment. The sensible approach is to assume an ongoing profitable business that invests in a new branch
plant.
Where the parent firm and the new plant are located matters because tax
burdens can differ dramatically depending on where a firm’s sales, property,
and payroll are located. This is because the spatial pattern of the firm’s investment determines what proportion of income is taxed in each state. In an analysis of five firms considering locations in 10 states, we found that for half of the
states a multistate firm would experience more than a 10 percent better (or
worse) rate of return than a single-state firm expanding in its home state (Fisher and Peters 1997b, Table 3).
Assumptions regarding the destination of the hypothetical firms’ sales are
critical because of the way in which states apportion business income for purposes of income taxation. Most states use a three-factor apportionment formula, where the three factors are payroll, property, and sales. The payroll factor, for example, is the ratio of the firm’s payroll located within the state to the
firm’s payroll everywhere. The sales factor is the ratio of the firm’s sales with
a destination within the state to the firm’s sales everywhere. A weighted average of the three factors produces the apportionment factor; when multiplied by
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the firm’s taxable income derived from operations everywhere, the result is income taxable by the state in question. The weight applied to the sales factor
varies from 33 percent in a number of states (equal weight given to the three
factors) to 50 percent in many states (double-weighted sales) and 100 percent
in a few states (single-factor apportionment).
The sales factor is complicated by throw-back rules. In several states,
shipments from facilities in that state to states in which the firm has no tax
nexus, or to the federal government, are thrown back to that state—in other
words, counted as part of the numerator in the sales factor. Sales destined for
states in which the firm is taxable (and in which those sales will be reflected in
that state’s apportionment formula) are never thrown back.
In constructing a hypothetical-firm simulation, assumptions must be made
with respect to the proportion of firm sales destined for: 1) the state in which
the new plant is located, 2) the state(s) in which the original firm is located, 3)
other states in which the firm is taxable, and 4) other states in which the firm
has no tax nexus. These assumptions significantly affect the results in terms of
the apparent relative competitiveness of states. If a large share of sales is assumed to go to category (4), this assumption disadvantages a state such as
Wisconsin, which requires throw-back of all such sales and which doubleweights sales in the apportionment formula. On the other hand, assuming all
sales are to states in which the firm is taxable increases the firm’s tax liability
to those states; this, in turn, puts a premium on the deductibility of other states’
income taxes, allowed in only a few states, and eliminates throwback effects
entirely.
The design of the model may constrain the sales assumptions that one can
make. If the model permits each firm to be located and taxed in only one or
two states, as most models do, one must assume that sales are quite unevenly
distributed (with all or most sales going to just those one or two states) or one
must assume that most sales are to the other 48 or 49 states and that the firm
has no tax nexus (not even a sales office) in any of those states. Both these assumptions are unrealistic. Data from Wisconsin corporate income tax returns
indicate that, among apportioning corporations, about 16 percent of total sales
are thrown back, in the aggregate.
The creation of a median state, intended to represent all other states in
which the firm has facilities, provides a solution to the sales allocation dilemma. We give this mythical state a population representing a large share of the
total U.S. population, and then allocate sales among the particular actual state,
the mythical median state, and the remaining (non-taxing) states in proportion
to population. This has the effect of attributing only a small share of sales to
non-taxing states (we assume 15 percent) without forcing the remainder to oc-
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cur in the actual state; most of the remainder is destined instead for the median
state, where the firm is taxed. This provides more accurate comparisons of
throwback versus non-throwback states, as well as of states allowing deductions for other states’ income taxes versus states that do not. It is also consistent with the national markets assumption; the actual state is allocated sales
only in proportion to its share of national population.

MEASURING EFFECTS OVER TIME AND
THE PROBLEM OF INFLATION
Almost all hypothetical-firm studies have assumed zero inflation; that is,
the financial projections are in real terms. If all project revenues and costs inflated at the same rate, nominal cash flows discounted at the nominal discount
rate would equal real flows discounted at the real rate, and the zero inflation
assumption would be harmless. But depreciation deductions and interest
expenses do not inflate; they are fixed at the time assets are purchased and
financed. The higher inflation is, the more advantageous are accelerated
forms of depreciation, since inflation erodes the real value of the deductions
taken in later years. On the other hand, inflation reduces the real after-tax cost
of debt.
The zero-inflation assumption could bias comparisons among states to the
extent that depreciation rules or the timing of incentives differ. Almost all
states allow federal MACRS depreciation, a notable exception being New Jersey, which requires a less accelerated form of depreciation. By ignoring inflation we ignore the lesser real value of New Jersey’s depreciation rules compared to other states. Similarly, consider state A, which provides incentives up
front in the form of grants, and state B, which provides incentives spread over
10 years (in the form of below-market rate loans). Inflation has no effect on
the value of A’s grants, but reduces the real value of B’s annual interest cost
reductions unless the interest subsidy is increased during periods of high
inflation.
How substantial is the bias produced by assuming no inflation? Brooks,
Tannenwald, Sale, and Puri (1986) tested the effects of a 5 percent inflation
rate over the entire 60-year period of their analysis, which calculated after-tax
rates of return on new investment at 16 sites in 11 states. Ten of the states allowed federal ACRS (accelerated) depreciation at that time; one (New York)
required pre-ACRS depreciation, resulting in quite different allowances in the
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first few years. The analysis also provided a test of the significance of incentive-timing differences: investment tax credits were offered at various rates by
4 of the 11 states. (Unlike other tax features that apply uniformly from year
to year, an ITC usually provides all its benefits in the year an asset is acquired.) Despite these differences among states, these researchers found that
“the actual rankings of the sixteen sites are virtually identical to those calculated assuming zero inflation” (Brooks et al. 1986, p. 65).
Inflation could also affect comparisons of incentive packages available
at different points in time. In this book, we compare the tax burdens and incentive packages based on 1990 tax law with those based on 1992, 1994, or
1998 tax law. In all comparisons, we use the same yardstick: representative
firm financial ratios based on actual 1992 corporate financial statements and
1992 Census of Manufactures data. This yardstick fixes technology, prices,
capacity utilization, and sales as they existed in 1992, which of course was a
particular point in the business cycle. Our comparisons thus show how a manufacturing firm as it existed in 1992 would have fared if 1990, 1992, 1994, or
1998 tax law had been applied to its financial results. The tax and incentive
differences that the model produces are therefore entirely due to tax law
changes, and not to changes in technology, prices, or the point in the business
cycle.
One must be careful, however, in interpreting differences in model results
across years. If, for example, the incentive package per job in a particular state
for a particular firm was worth $2,000 under 1990 law and $2,500 under 1998
law, that may or may not mean that incentives increased 25 percent in real
terms between 1990 and 1998. Let us suppose that the incentive consisted
entirely of an investment tax credit worth 8 percent of the value of new machinery in 1990, increased to 10 percent by 1998. This is clearly a real 25 percent increase in the value of the incentive. Incentives expressed as percentages are, in effect, automatically indexed to inflation (such as rises in the cost
of the machinery). If we had built into the model inflation in industrial machinery prices, the nominal value of the incentive would have been more than
$2,500 in 1998.
On the other hand, suppose that the incentive consisted entirely of a
$2,000 per job credit in 1990, increased to $2,500 in 1998. Inflation will have
eroded that value over the 8-year period. If wages had risen over that period,
the firm would have received the statutory $2,500 in 1998 in nominal terms,
but less than that in real (1990) dollars. The value of the credit as a percent of
wages would have fallen. In practice, job credits are frequently expressed in
this fashion, and the dollar amount is not adjusted for inflation in most states.
There are also fixed dollar amounts in the form of thresholds and ceilings that
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affect incentive values. Thus, inflation can affect the real value of complex tax
and incentive packages in complex ways that are not captured in our model,
which assumes constant prices. In some states, the change in the real value of
incentives over the period 1990 to 1998 will be less than the change shown by
our model results.

DISCRETIONARY INCENTIVES
Probably the biggest hole in the current research is that we have tended to
ignore discretionary agreements, including grant and loan programs, loan
guarantees, and special discretionary deals.4 Our earlier research paid considerable methodological attention to how the worth of discretionary incentives
should be measured. While TAIMez is capable of simulating discretionary incentives, we have not gone out and collected information on what discretionary incentives were available in enterprise zones in 1990, 1992, 1994,
1996, and 1998. The task would have been much too large and, given the results of our earlier research on this matter (Fisher and Peters 1997b, 1998), it is
unclear that the inclusion of such data would have had a substantive impact on
our conclusions about enterprise zones.
Moreover, we believe that in the present study there are good methodological reasons for leaving out estimates of actual discretionary awards. Tax
incentives are by far the largest incentive in enterprise zones. Even within individual enterprise zones offering discretionary incentives, variation in the
size of the awards present important methodological difficulties for the sorts
of econometric modeling we do later in this book. Furthermore, there is reason to believe that firms respond more to tax incentives than to discretionary
incentives.
Appendix Notes
1. See Fisher and Peters (1997b, 1998).
2. The increments to cash flow are measured in present value terms; the annual increment to cash flow over 20 years is discounted at 10 percent.
3. What we mean by “all else being equal” is that TAIMez assumes that all non-tax
costs (wage rates, for example) are equal in Ohio and Indiana. The only costs that
vary are tax costs. We also assume that the factor composition of the investment at
the two sites remains identical.
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4. For instance, in Ohio it is not uncommon for a firm that has received a large property-tax abatement in an enterprise zone to donate money to the local school district in lieu of the tax payment. Such donations have tax consequences useful to
the firm. Deals such as these are, more often than not, privately negotiated, and we
found it impossible to gather good information on them.

Appendix B
Do High-Unemployment Places Have Lower
Business Taxes? A Comparison of Results
from TAIM and TAIMez
As we indicated in Chapter 2, Bartik (1991) has made a persuasive case
for the plausibility of national economic benefits from state and local competition for jobs. Provided that tax cuts and incentive awards are more generous in
areas with higher rates of unemployment, and therefore tend to redistribute
employment toward such areas and away from areas of lower unemployment,
there will be a net gain for the nation as a whole because 1) the benefits of a
new job, measured as the wage the job offers minus the reservation wage of
the person employed, are greater in high-unemployment areas because the
reservation wage is inversely related to the local unemployment rate; 2) inflationary pressures may be reduced by increasing employment in labor surplus
areas where cost-push effects will be minimal and reducing it in tight labor
markets; 3) total employment may be increased because the overall level of labor subsidies nationally is increased; and 4) the distribution of income may become more equal, since the most pronounced effects will be felt by minorities
with above-average rates of unemployment.
Whether competitive state and local economic-development policy enhances the welfare of the nation as a whole depends crucially on whether incentives do affect location and where such incentives are offered. The first issue has been researched extensively, and two recent and comprehensive
reviews of that research have been published. Bartik’s (1991 and 1994) reviews of the literature on the effects of taxes on investment, employment, or
gross state product led him to conclude that the probable long-run interstate or
interregional elasticity with respect to total state and local taxes is about –0.3.
Wasylenko (1997) concludes that a reasonable estimate of this elasticity is
about –0.2. In other words, a 10 percent across-the-board reduction in state
and local taxes should produce about a 2 percent to 3 percent increase in business activity.
Earlier research has provided only limited, and somewhat contradictory,
evidence on the second issue: what kind of places offer the lowest taxes or
highest incentives. We have reported elsewhere (Fisher and Peters 1998) on
whether the economic-development incentives offered by states and cities are
significantly higher in high-unemployment places—in other words, whether
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there is evidence that the end result of competition for jobs could be a redistribution of jobs to regions that would benefit the most. The original study employed a hypothetical-firm model to analyze taxes and incentives in 24 states
(that together accounted for about 85 percent of U.S. manufacturing employment) and a random sample of 112 cities in those states. This research concluded that state and local tax systems, considered in the absence of any
investment or jobs incentives, were perverse in their effects, with higher-unemployment places tending to have higher taxes. The combined effects of
statewide, citywide, and enterprise zone incentives were, however, sufficient
(on average) to overcome the perversity of the state-local tax system. But the
end result was a pattern of returns on investment that was essentially random:
there was no discernible tendency for returns to be more attractive in high-unemployment or in low-unemployment places.
These results were consistent with the following two arguments (though
they certainly cannot be taken as proof of either one). First, state and local tax
reductions and development incentives are adopted for a variety of reasons;
high unemployment perhaps is one, but slow growth and simple imitation of
other states may be more important.1 Furthermore, large deals struck with particular firms subsequently produce pressure to extend the same kinds of tax
breaks to other firms in order to “level the playing field,” regardless of the economic climate. The second argument is that even where economic distress
(perhaps a recession) may have provided the original political impetus to cut
business taxes or adopt incentives, these measures are likely to persist even if
state economic performance improves.
As part of our current research project on enterprise zones, we have expanded the simulation model to incorporate state taxes and tax incentives for
each year from 1990 through 1997, for 16 of the 24 states in the original
study.2 These 16 states include 88 of the 112 cities in the sample. To test the
robustness of our results, we calculated the return on investment for each of 29
manufacturing sectors (the original model included only 8) for each of the 88
cities in 1990 and in 1997. The 16 states include all of the original 24 states
that had active significant enterprise zone programs. Of the 88 cities, 34 had
enterprise zones in 1990; 11 more established enterprise zones between 1991
and 1996.
The results of the simulations using the smaller sample of 88 cities with
1990 and 1997 taxes and incentives are shown in Table B.1. The basic result
found in the earlier book was corroborated. The pattern of returns on investment in new plants considering only the basic state and local tax systems was
negatively correlated with unemployment rates in 1990. Cities with higher unemployment had higher tax rates on investment. Incentives moderated this effect to a degree since they tended to be higher in high-unemployment cities. By
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Table B.1 Correlation between City Unemployment Rate and
Return on New Manufacturing Investment for 88
Cities in 16 States
Return on investment
Return
After basic state and local taxes
After taxes and statewide incentives
With zone incentives
Value
Total incentive package
Zone incentive package

1990a

1997b

–0.26
–0.19
–0.14

–0.14
–0.08
–0.09

0.16
0.07

0.05
–0.04

NOTE: Correlations shown are weighted averages of the correlations for
each of 29 manufacturing sectors, where the weights are the sectors’ shares
of U.S. manufacturing employment in 1992.
a
For 1990, return after 1990 taxes and incentives was corrrelated with the
city unemployment rate in 1990.
b
Return after 1997 taxes and incentives was correlated with 1996 unemployment rate.

1997, however, these effects were weaker. Basic tax systems were less perverse
in their distributional pattern, and incentives exhibited no discernible spatial
pattern.
This analysis was also performed at the state level, using a statewide average local tax system to represent a “typical” city for each state. While differences in local tax rates and tax abatements were substantial, it was largely
changes in state policies between 1990 and 1997 that accounted for the
changes in state-local tax rates on new investment over that period. Focusing
on states allowed us to measure the size of the changes in state taxes and incentives. Table B.2 shows how the average state-local tax rate on investment
was related to state average unemployment rates. For 1990, the pattern was
very similar to the city results, as one would expect. The perverse distributional effects of basic state and local taxes were only partly offset by the slight
tendency of non-zone incentives to be higher in higher-unemployment states.
In 1997, however, the negative relation between basic taxes and unemployment had largely disappeared as had the positive relation between incentives
and unemployment. Enterprise zone incentives, meanwhile, were negatively
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Table B.2 Correlation between State Unemployment Rate
and Return on New Manufacturing Investment at
an Average Location in Each State
Return on investment
Return
After basic state and local taxes
After taxes and statewide incentives
With zone incentives
Value
Total incentive package
Zone incentive package

1990a

1997b

–0.22
–0.14
–0.19

–0.07
0.08
–0.09

0.09
–0.01

–0.01
–0.21

NOTE: Correlations shown are weighted averages of the correlations for
each of 29 manufacturing sectors, where the weights are the sectors’
shares of U.S. manufacturing employment in 1992.
a
For 1990, return after 1990 taxes and incentives was correlated with
state unemployment rate in 1990–1992.
b
Return after 1997 taxes and incentives was correlated with 1996–1998
unemployment rate.

correlated with state unemployment, lower unemployment states offering larger zone incentives.
Differences between city and state results reflected the implicit weighting
provided by the city sample. Since the cities were sampled without regard to
state, the most populous states (California, Florida, and Texas) had a large proportion of the cities in the sample, so state policies in those populous states had
a much larger effect on the city correlations. The negative relation between
zone incentives and state unemployment in 1997 was largely due to the enactment of enterprise zone programs in Michigan and Iowa in 1996 and 1997,
two states with lower-than-average unemployment. But since there were only
six cities in these two states, these new zone programs had less effect on the
city correlations. The state correlations also tended to overstate the effects of
zones, since for the runs that included zone incentives the “average” site in
each state was assumed to be in an enterprise zone, regardless of how widespread zones were in that state.
To get a sense of which states had made the most significant changes in
tax and incentive policies between 1990 and 1997, we computed a weighted
average rate of return on new investment for each state, where the return for
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each sector was weighted by that sector’s share of manufacturing employment
nationally. We then ranked the states by that average rate of return. Table B.3
shows the results; the eight states in the top half had below-average unemployment rates in the period 1996–1998 (and all but one also had rates at or below average in the recession years 1990–1992). The eight states in the bottom
half had unemployment rates at or above the average in both 1990–1992 and
1996–1998.
There is no discernible relation between the state’s average level of economic distress, as measured by unemployment rates, and that state’s adoption
of business tax cuts or development incentives between 1990 and 1997. In
fact, the low-unemployment states improved their situation on average slightly more than the high-unemployment states. And while Michigan had the
highest unemployment rate in the earlier period (8.5 percent) and subsequently enacted what stands as the most generous set of enterprise zone incentives
among all the states, the Renaissance Zones (as they are called) were not enacted until 1996. At that point the unemployment rate had fallen to 4.9 percent; so although Michigan subsequently moved from 11th to 1st place overall, it would be difficult to argue causality in either direction, unemployment
rates bringing about incentives or the Renaissance Zones being responsible
for the decline in unemployment (they went into effect only in 1997).

Changes in IRR 1990–97

Statea

1990: IRRb
after all
incentives

With low unemployment
Minn.
13
Iowa
4
Ind.
15
Wis.
7
Va.
6
Mich.
11
Ohio
3
Mo.
5
Average rank
Average value

8
12.9

With high unemployment
Ill.
2
Conn.
10
Fla.
9
Pa.
14
Ky.
8

Due to
basic tax
changes

Due to changes
in incentive
package

1997: IRR
after all
incentives

Unemployment Unemployment
rate
rate
1990–92
1996–98

3
1
9
11
16
5
6
15

16
15
2
11
4
1
5
9

16
4
8
10
7
1
3
9

5.0
4.5
6.1
5.0
5.5
8.5
6.4
6.0

3.0
3.1
3.4
3.4
3.8
4.1
4.2
4.3

8
0.06

8
0.40

7
14.0

5.9

3.7

12
2
7
13
14

13
12
14
7
3

6
11
12
15
5

6.5
6.4
7.1
6.6
6.7

4.7
4.8
4.8
4.9
5.0
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Table B.3 States Ranked by Return on Investment after Taxes and Incentives, 1990–1997

y
Tex.
N.Y.
Calif.

4
10
8

10
8
6

13
2
14

6.8
7.0
7.4

5.3
5.9
6.4

9
12.9

9
0.04

9
0.18

10
13.7

6.8

5.2

NOTE: Highest rate of return or largest improvement in rate of return is ranked 1.
a
States are listed in order by 1996–98 unemployment rate.
b
Average rate of return (IRR) was calculated by weighting each of the 29 sectors by that sector’s share of U.S. manufacturing
employment in 1992.
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Average rank
Average value

12
1
16
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Appendix Notes
1. State incentives of all kinds, and investment returns after all state taxes and incentives, were negatively correlated with state employment growth between 1980 and
1990; in other words, slower-growing states offered higher incentives and higher
overall returns.
2. This sample, from our original research published in Fisher and Peters (1998) and
elsewhere, is used nowhere else in this book. We use the original sample here to
indicate the comparability of the original results and those reported in this book.

Appendix C
The Tax Elasticity of Employment
and Fiscal Break-Even
Bartik (1994) argued that the fiscal effects of tax cuts are bound to be negative, given the likely elasticities of economic activity with respect to differences in state and local taxes. Assuming the measure of activity is employment, this elasticity can be written:
(1)

dJ/J
E = ,
dT/T

where T represents the state-local tax rate and J represents total employment.
He then states that the net percentage change in state-local revenue resulting
from a new job, denoted dR/R, is approximately equal to dT/T plus dJ/J. Tax
revenues will increase by the percentage increase in jobs, and decrease by the
percentage reduction in tax rate. Substituting terms, he arrives at the formula
for the net change in revenue per new job:
(2)

dR R
 =  (1 + 1/E).
dJ
J

For the R/J term, Bartik (1994, p. 860) substituted the national average statelocal direct business tax revenue per job across all business sectors, which is
about $1,620. Assuming an elasticity of –0.3, the fiscal effect of a new job on
average would then be –$3,780.
Bartik also showed that fiscal break-even occurs when the elasticity is
equal to –1.0. Break-even occurs when dR/dJ in Equation 2 is equal to zero. If
we set (R/J)(1 + 1/E) equal to zero and solve for E the result is –1.
One can also derive the conditions for fiscal breakeven in the context of
changes in marginal state-local tax rates (taking into account investment or
job-creation incentives) and changes in the gross flow of new jobs, rather than
changes in average tax rates and the level of employment. We will use the following notation:
T = total or gross taxes paid per job
C = cut in taxes per job (or the per-job value of credits or other incentives
tied to investment or job creation)
I = induced jobs (number of jobs induced by the incentives)
265

266 Appendix C
N = noninduced jobs (number of jobs that would have been created in the
absence of the incentives)
(T – C) = net tax revenue per new job
Fiscal break-even occurs when the gain equals the loss; that is, when the
net revenues obtained from the jobs induced by those incentives equal the cost
of the incentives provided for the jobs that would have been created even without incentives:
I(T – C) = NC,
which, by rearranging terms, could also be written:
IT = C(N + I) or
I/(N + I) = C/T
In other words, fiscal breakeven requires that the percentage increase in employment induced by the incentives is equal to the percentage tax cut. This
could also be written as an elasticity:
(3)

I/(N + I)
 = 1 = E.
C/T

Thus if a locality adopts a property-tax-abatement ordinance that cuts
property taxes on new manufacturing plants by 25 percent from their existing
level, then at least 25 percent of the gross new manufacturing jobs created in
that locality in the future must be attributable to the abatement if the locality is
to break even in terms of tax revenue.1
The usefulness of this formulation depends on whether or not we can draw
inferences about fiscal break-even from the literature on the elasticity of business activity with respect to taxes. The elasticity of Equation 3 is based on
break-even conditions that assume cuts in marginal tax rates, not cuts in the average tax rate. That is, revenue losses occur only because some future jobs that
would have been created anyway will benefit from the cuts; the losses do not include reductions in revenue from all existing jobs, as would occur with an
across-the-board reduction in the tax rate. Thus, fiscal break-even from incentives is likely if the research on the effects of changes in the marginal tax rate on
the gross flow of business activity indicates an elasticity of 1.0 or more.
Much of the research on taxes and business activity has measured changes
in the average level of business taxation and changes in the level of employ-
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ment. Bartik (1991, p. 235) has shown that the two elasticities—the marginal
and the average—are equivalent “if all gross new activity responds the same
as the dependent variable being considered to taxes, and death rates are roughly constant.” The first condition means that we assume that we can draw inferences about the sensitivity of new job creation or establishment birth rates
to changes in taxes from studies of the effects of taxes on, for example, gross
flows of new investment. The second condition is illustrated with the following equation, where J is total jobs, G is the number of jobs gained, and L is the
number of jobs lost:
(4)

Jt = Jt–1 + Gt – Lt.

Bartik assumes that the “death rate” or rate of job loss Lt /Jt–1 is a constant fraction f; this implies that death rates are unaffected by changes in taxes. Then in
long-run equilibrium, where J has settled at a new constant level J* = Jt = Jt–1,
and substituting ( f × Jt–1) for Lt, Equation 4 becomes:
Jt = Jt + Gt – fJt,
which can be rearranged:
J* = Gt /f
Gt /J* = f.
In other words, in equilibrium the gross rate of job growth must equal the
gross rate of job loss. Bartik concludes: “Hence, a given percentage effect of
taxes on gross new activity will imply the same long-run percentage effect of
taxes on total business activity” (1991, p. 235).
This conclusion can best be demonstrated with an example. Suppose an
economy with 100 jobs is initially in equilibrium with a death rate of 10 percent. Equation 4 would become:
100 = 100 + 10 – 10.
Now suppose that the elasticity of gross new activity with respect to taxes is
1.0 so that a 20 percent cut in marginal tax rates produces a 20 percent increase
in the gross flow of new jobs G, or an increase from 10 to 12 per period. A new
long-run equilibrium will be attained:
120 = 120 + 12 – 12.
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In other words, total employment will also grow 20 percent, at which
point the annual job loss of 10 percent × 120 will just offset the new permanently higher annual job gains. The gross job growth rate has also been restored to its original level of 10 percent. The 20 percent tax cut thus produced
a 20 percent increase in gross annual job gains and in total jobs. Under Bartik’s assumptions, the distinction between the marginal and average elasticities
becomes moot, and we can legitimately compare and summarize a wide range
of elasticity studies. It should also be pointed out that we are talking about
long-run elasticities here; a 20 percent increase in the annual gross flow of jobs
will eventually produce a 20 percent increase in total employment. If this elasticity is equal to 1, fiscal break-even will occur immediately and each year, not
just at the point of long-run equilibrium.
One remaining problem appears to stand in the way of drawing inferences
about the fiscal effects of incentives: the elasticity research has been based for
the most part on studies using a tax variable that represents differences in average tax rates, cross-sectionally or over time, whereas the denominator in
Equation 3 is the percentage reduction in tax rates on new investment. This is
not as serious a problem as it appears. A 20 percent cut in taxes across the
board will also produce a 20 percent cut in taxes on new investment (though
the reverse is not true), and it is the cut in taxes on investment that is presumably the cause of the increased economic activity represented by the dependent
variable. Thus one could argue that these econometric studies really have been
estimating the effects of cuts in taxes on new investment.
This is a valid argument to an extent, but it is likely that the proliferation
of investment incentives over the past two decades has meant that the marginal rate has been declining and gradually pulling the average down with it, so
that the measured reductions in average rates have understated the reductions
in rates on new investment. To the extent that is true, the estimated elasticities
are overstated. An observed increase in investment or jobs will have been produced, for example, not by the measured 20 percent reduction in average rates
but by the 50 percent reduction in marginal rates that was responsible for
pulling the average down. The tax cut in the denominator, if measured properly, would have been 50 percent instead of 20 percent, and therefore the elasticity would have been smaller. The upshot is that incentives are probably even
less likely to produce fiscal break-even than we might have concluded by simply comparing Bartik’s consensus elasticity of –0.2 to –0.4 with the breakeven marginal elasticity of –1.0.
If one is willing to assume that the consensus long-run interstate or intermetropolitan elasticity of about –0.2 to –0.4 can also be interpreted as a reasonable estimate of the marginal elasticity of Equation 3, and that jobs and establishment births and capital investment all respond in approximately the
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same fashion to changes in taxes, we can then rewrite this elasticity to solve
for the average expected percentage increase in establishment births given
these elasticities and given a particular percentage tax cut represented by incentives:
(5)

C
I
 = E .
N+I
T

The average tax cut (C/T) among the 75 enterprise zone cities in our sample
was 26.4 percent, indicating that we should expect an increase in the birth rate
(and, in the long run, in total manufacturing establishments) of 5 percent to 11
percent.
Appendix Note
1. It can be shown that the elasticity of Equation 3 is identical to the standard elasticity formula based on the average over the interval, so that the percentage increase
in jobs is equal to induced jobs divided by an average of total new jobs before and
after (or with and without) the incentives, and the percentage tax cut is the cut divided by the average of taxes per job with and without the incentives.

Appendix D
The SSEL Data
The purpose of this appendix is to describe in more detail the structure of
the SSEL (Standard Statistical Establishment List) data set prepared by the
Census Bureau for this research project, and to discuss certain problems with
the data. The data set consists of establishment counts for every ZIP code in
the United States for three time periods: 1989–1991, 1991–1993, and 1993–
1995. The data cover every domestic employer establishment for every 2-digit sector (SIC code) and for industry divisions, with the exception of private
households and governments. The data set includes approximately 1.5 million
establishments affiliated with about 180,000 multi-establishment firms, and
about 5 million single-establishment firms. The data in the SSEL come from a
variety of sources, including IRS payroll tax records, annual company organization surveys sent to all multi-unit companies, the Annual Survey of Manufactures, and Current Industrial Reports surveys.
All establishments were further categorized by employment-size class
and by seven mutually exclusive status groups: births, deaths, moves in,
moves out, expansions, contractions, and constant employment. The latter
three groups include only establishments that were in the same ZIP code in the
first year and the last year of the period (as, for example, in 1989 and in 1991).
Definitions of each of these categories can be found in Chapter 6. We discuss
problems with the employment-size categorizations and with the various status classifications below.

EMPLOYMENT-SIZE CLASS
Establishments were categorized by three employment-size classes: 0–19,
20–99, and 100 or more. Establishment employment could change during a
two-year period; in most cases, the establishment is categorized by employment in the first year of the period. The only exception is for establishments
that were “born” in the second or third year of the period; here the size class
must be determined by employment in the last year of the period. Employee
counts are always as of the census survey conducted in mid March of each
year.
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The smallest employment-size class includes zero because an establishment could be in the database for 1989, for example, even though it had no
employees in mid March of 1989. This could happen if the establishment
were created after March, or if it were shut down for seasonal reasons in
March. As a result, there will be too many establishments in the smallest size
class and too few in the other two classes. This problem does not affect the regression analyses in Chapter 7 since establishments were not broken down by
size for this purpose. For the descriptive tables in Chapter 6, however, we
made adjustments to the counts of birth and deaths to provide a better picture
of establishment turnover by size. Adjustments to the expansion and contraction rates and problems with the moves in and out are discussed in separate
sections below.
Birth counts by size class were adjusted by estimating the number of births
that occurred in the last 9.5 months of 1991, 1993, or 1995 for the 0–19 size
class. We assume that the birth rate is constant over the 24-month period (1990
and 1991, for example) so that 9.5/24 or 40 percent of the births counted for the
given time period actually occurred after the mid-March employment reporting
date in 1991 or 1993 or 1995 and therefore have an unknown employment size
(though they were categorized in 0–19). The estimated number of births that
occurred after the point in March at which employment was measured was subtracted from the total number of births in the 0–19 size class. The result is a distribution of births by size class for all establishments for which employment
size was known. We assume that the establishments in the unknown category
are distributed by size in the same proportions; that is, we assume that births in
the last 9.5 months occur in the same proportions by employment size as they
did in the first 14.5 months. We then allocate the unknown-size births to the
three size classes in accordance with these proportions.
Similar adjustments were made to the death counts. Deaths that occurred
in the first 2.5 months of 1989, 1991, and 1993 (after January 1 but prior to the
mid March employment count) will show zero March employment. We therefore assume that 2.5/24 or 10.4 percent of the total deaths in a given time period are actually of unknown employment size; these deaths are subtracted from
deaths in the 0–19 size class. Once again, the proportions of establishments in
each size class, for the remaining cases of known size, are used to allocate the
unknown-size establishments among size classes.
Birth rates are calculated by dividing the adjusted birth counts for each
size class and SIC code by the estimated number of establishments in that
grouping as of the start of the period. For example, births during 1990 and
1991 are divided by the number of establishments as of the beginning of 1990,
which is estimated by taking the number of establishments present at some
point during 1989 (BEGIN) and subtracting an estimate of the number of
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deaths during 1989 (assumed to be one-half of the actual deaths during 1989
and 1990 combined). Similarly, death rates are calculated by dividing the adjusted death counts for each size class and SIC code by the estimated number
of establishments in that grouping as of the start of the period. For example,
deaths during 1989 and 1990 are divided by the number of establishments as
of the beginning of 1989, which is estimated by taking the number of establishments present at some point during 1989 (BEGIN) and subtracting an estimate of the number of births during 1989 (assumed to be one-half of the actual births during 1990 and 1991 combined).
Misclassification by employment size should occur less often for moves
in and out because these establishments existed elsewhere for part of the period and the employment size should in most cases have been correctly determined by March employment in one ZIP code or the other. For example, an
establishment that moved from ZIP A to ZIP B after March 1991 will be
recorded as a move into ZIP B for the first time period and will be assigned an
employment size based on March 1991 employment in ZIP A. However, if the
establishment moved into ZIP B sometime in 1990 and then died after January
1, 1991, but before mid March 1991 it would show up as a move in (because it
had payroll some time during 1991 in ZIP B) but with zero employment. This
is unlikely to happen very often, but, unfortunately, there is no way to estimate
the number of establishments that move and then die within this particular 2.5month period.
Similarly, an establishment that was born in ZIP A after mid March of
1989 but before December 31, 1989, would show up in the 0–19 size class regardless of actual employment; if this establishment then moved to ZIP B in
1990 or 1991, it would be recorded as a move out of ZIP A for the 1989–1991
period. It is impossible to estimate how many of the establishments moving
out of a ZIP code were born within that 9.5-month period. However, moving
so soon after being born seems more likely to occur with very small single-establishment firms, which would be correctly classified in the 0–19-size class
anyway, rather than larger branch plants. Thus, no adjustments were made to
the size-class categorizations for the moves in and out, but it seems doubtful
that the overcounting in the smallest size class is very significant.

BIRTHS AND DEATHS
The number of births and deaths recorded in the SSEL data set within a
time period will produce reasonably accurate birth or death rates for a 24-
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month period and therefore can be divided by two to get annual rates. The
two-year death rate is recorded accurately by counting as “present” in 1989 all
establishments with payroll for at least one day and counting as “absent” in
1991 only establishments with no payroll for any day that year. All establishments that actually died after January 1, 1989, will get counted as deaths,
while no firm that died after January 1, 1991, will be counted as a death, so
there will be exactly two years’ worth of deaths counted: all those that occurred in 1989 and 1990 (with the minor exceptions noted below). Conversely, the birth rate for 1989–1991 will record as a birth all firms that were actually born after December 31, 1989 (no payroll for any day in 1989) but before
January 1, 1992 (at least one day of payroll in 1991). Thus the birth count will
record (almost) all births during 1990 and 1991.
The only error for birth and death rates occurs when an establishment that
is born in the middle year of a period then dies the same year; such establishments are not counted at all. For example, an establishment that was born in a
ZIP code in January 1990 and then died in December 1990 should actually
count as a birth and a death for the period 1989–1991. It is not counted as a
birth because it had no payroll in the ZIP code at any time during 1991, and it
is not counted as a death because it had no payroll in the ZIP code at any time
during 1989. On the other hand, firms that are born during 1991 or 1993 and
die the same year are counted both ways: as a birth for the earlier period and a
death for the later period. The undercounting will occur only for years 1990,
1992 and 1994. For a given year, the sum of uncounted births will exactly
equal the sum of uncounted deaths. Unfortunately, we have no way of determining the extent of this undercounting but we assume it is small for the manufacturing sector.

MOVES IN AND OUT
Moves in and out of a ZIP code are determined in a fashion analogous to
births and deaths. An establishment that is coded in ZIP A in 1989 and is coded in ZIP B in 1991 is counted as a move out for ZIP A and as a move in for
ZIP B for the 1989–1991 period. Thus moves in, like births, should be recorded for establishments that actually moved into the ZIP during 1990 and 1991,
and moves out for establishments that left the ZIP during 1989 and 1990. Establishments that move existed in two different ZIP codes during the year of
the move, yet the SSEL database records only one location for any one year
(with the minor exception of establishments that underwent a reorganization
during the year).1 It is up to the firm to report the address of the establishment.
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As a result, moves that occurred in the middle year (such as 1990) will always
be recorded correctly, but moves that occurred during 1989 and 1991 may or
may not be recorded as moves during the 1989–1991 period. Suppose an establishment moves in mid 1989 from ZIP A to ZIP B; if it is recorded as being
in ZIP A for 1989 it will count as a move, but if it is recorded in ZIP B for 1989
(and is still in ZIP B in 1991) then it will not be a move. Instead, it will be included in either the expansion, contraction, or constant employment category.
Similarly, if it moved during 1991, then it will count as a move into ZIP B for
1989–1991 if the firm reports the 1991 location as ZIP B. If it is still coded in
ZIP A for 1991, it will not be a move for that period, though it will end up as a
move for the 1991–1993 period.
The result of these arbitrary classifications during the year of the move is
that the “moves in” category for, say, 1989–1991, will include some of the
moves during 1989, all of the moves during 1990, and some of the moves during 1991. The same can be said for moves out, of course. For large units of
observation, it is likely that the percentage of actual moves during 1989 that
are recorded as moves is about equal to one minus the percentage of actual
moves during 1990 that are recorded as moves, so that the total approximates
two years of moves. Suppose, for example, that firms are more likely to report
the new location; this occurs in 60 percent of the cases. Then 40 percent of the
1989 moves into ZIP B will be recorded as moves in (because they had the old
ZIP, ZIP A, for 1989), while 60 percent of the moves into ZIP B during 1991
will be recorded as moves in (because they show the new ZIP, ZIP B, for
1991). Then we would end up with approximately two years’ worth of moves
in, as long as the overall actual moving rates were about the same in 1989 and
1991. The same result would follow if most firms recorded whichever ZIP the
establishment was in for the majority of the year, as long as the time pattern of
moves over the course of a year was the same in 1989 and 1991. The more
disaggregated the data (a single ZIP, a single SIC code, a single size class) the
smaller the numbers involved and the less likely it is that the data are an accurate representation of two years’ worth of moves.
The data set does not allow us to distinguish establishments that actually
moved (in or out of a ZIP code) from those that remained in the same place but
had their ZIP codes changed due to ZIP code boundary changes.

EXPANSIONS AND CONTRACTIONS
The data on expansions and contractions overstate the actual number of
establishments that increased or reduced employment in a two-year time span.
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Expansions counted for the 1989–1991 period, for example, will include some
establishments that were born between March 12, 1989, and December 31,
1989. Such establishments will have payroll for some part of 1989 and so will
not be counted as births for the 1990–1991 time period, but they will have zero
employees in March 1989 and will most likely have more than zero in March
1991. These establishments end up appearing as if they were in the ZIP
throughout the period and increased employment. It is even possible that a
contraction is reported as an expansion and vice versa. Consider an establishment that went into operation in late 1989 with 50 employees and had cut back
to 30 employees by March 1991. It will be counted as an expansion, from zero
to 30 employees.
The converse can be said of contractions: establishments that died after
January 1 but before mid March 1991 will have zero 1991 employment and
will be counted as a contraction for 1989–1991. Expansions and contractions
are overcounted since they include some establishments that were born or died
rather than only establishments that existed in the same ZIP code for a twoyear period (March 1989 to March 1991, for example). This does not mean
that the birth or death rates are undercounted, however; they are not. The
births that are classified as expansions occurred during 1989, while the birth
rate for 1989–1991 measures births occurring during 1990 and 1991. Similarly, the deaths miscounted as contractions occurred during 1991, while death
rates for the first period measure deaths during 1989 and 1990.
A correct two-year expansion or contraction rate would consider only
firms that existed in the same ZIP code at two different points two years
apart—as of mid March 1989 and as of mid March 1991, for example. Employment on those two dates would be compared. This would tell us the percentage of firms that had their employment increased within 24 months.
Expansion rates were adjusted by estimating the number of births that occurred in the last 9.5 months of 1989, 1991, or 1993, based on the adjusted annual birth rates for that sector and firm size. Assuming that all of these later
births ended up getting counted as expansions, we subtracted them from the
count of expansions for the period (EXPAND). The expansion rate is then
found by dividing adjusted expansions by an estimate of the number of establishments in existence as of mid March. To determine the number of establishments that existed in mid March 1989, for example, we subtracted from the
number that existed at some point during 1989 (BEGIN) the number that we
estimated were born from mid March to December (as above) and the number
that died between January 1 and mid March (based on adjusted annual death
counts).
Similar adjustments were made to the contraction rates, by using annual
death rates to estimate the number of deaths that occurred in the first 2.5

The SSEL Data 277
months of 1991, 1993, and 1995 (after January 1 but prior to the mid March
employment count, thereby producing a zero March employment number and
resulting in a mislabeled contraction). To find contraction rates, the adjusted
contractions were divided by the same estimate of total establishments in mid
March of the first year as was used to calculate expansion rates.
Appendix Note
1. Trey Cole, Census Bureau, phone conversation with Peter Fisher, November 23,
1999.

Appendix E
Translating Enterprise Zone Boundaries
and Tax Characteristics of Zones
ENTERPRISE ZONE BOUNDARY FILES
For the various analyses we wished to perform, we needed a variety of
data for each zone; unfortunately, these data were available at varying levels of
geography. The state and city in which the zone was located determined the
appropriate taxes that would apply to a firm in the zone. Some of the economic variables were most appropriately defined at the county, city, or metropolitan area level since they related to the broader labor market or economic region. Data for these sorts of established areas are readily available. However,
we also needed establishment counts and demographic data at the enterprise
zone level, and here it was necessary to develop boundary files for each enterprise zone. Most of the census data required were from the sample questionnaire section of the Census of Population and so were available only at the
tract or ZIP-code level (or higher), and the finest geographic scale for the establishment counts was the ZIP-code level (see the description of the SSEL
database in Appendix D). Therefore we had to define the actual zone boundaries—in digital format, for use by Geographic Information Systems (GIS)
software—and then identify the set of ZIP codes that best approximated the
zone. The same process was undertaken for Traffic Analysis Zones (TAZs) in
order to analyze commuting patterns using TAZ-based census data. In this
section we describe the problems in developing zone boundaries and their approximations.
Enterprise zone computerized boundary files were derived from a number
of sources. In a very few cases, the files were provided to us by the city or
state (for instance, all enterprise zones in Ohio). Mostly, however, the files
had to be hand digitized either from paper maps, pictures, Web pictures or text
definitions of zone perimeters. In all cases, the boundaries were not digitized
free-hand, but were assembled based on census block (and in a very few instances, block group or tract) files derived from the TIGER/Line system (Bureau of Transportation Statistics 1995). Since blocks are the lowest level of
census geography (besides the household), our geographic representation of
enterprise zones is generally exact. In a few cases, problems arose. These
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were usually suburban enterprise zones that included only a part of a large suburban-exurban block whose subdivision had not yet been recognized in the
1995 TIGER/Line files. In these few cases, if the majority of the block was in
the zone, the block was defined as belonging to the zone, and vice versa. This
results in some small degradation of geographical accuracy. Chapters 6, 7, and
8 are the parts of the book that use data derived from these enterprise zone definitions. In almost all cases, the impact of this problem on the results is likely
to be small due to the much greater errors in translating the enterprise zone
boundaries into ZIP-code region and TAZ region equivalents.

DEFINING ZIP-CODE EQUIVALENTS OF ZONES
Converting enterprise zone boundaries into ZIP-code approximations
presents a difficult set of challenges. Enterprise zones tend to be small areas
and thus ZIP-code regions are hardly ever coterminous with enterprise zones.
Moreover, the shape of many enterprise zone boundaries is highly irregular.
As a result ZIP equivalents of enterprise zones will tend to leave out large parts
of enterprise zones and include areas not actually designated as enterprise
zones. To solve these problems, we developed a two-stage selection process.
In the first stage, all ZIPs that had any overlap with enterprise zones in the
sample were selected, giving a sample of ZIPs, s1. We then built a computer
algorithm that either assigned or did not assign each ZIP in s1 to a particular
enterprise zone.
After considerable experimentation we finally produced an algorithm implementing the following two decision rules:
1.
2.

If 5 percent of the land area of the designated zone was in the ZIP,
then ZIP was included in the ZIP definition of the zone, or
If at least 10 percent of the ZIP was part of the designated zone, then
the ZIP was included in the ZIP definition of the zone.

The rules were written in a commercial GIS using a standard macro language.
The result was the final sample of enterprise zone ZIPs, sf. More stringent
rules resulted in too many spatial anomalies—too many ZIP regions not being
included that clearly should have been—and less-stringent rules resulted in the
opposite. Relying on a single rule also caused problematic definitions, although the addition of any one of the two rules to the other resulted in the inclusion of fewer than 20 new ZIPs to the entire sample.

Translating Enterprise Zone Boundaries and Tax Characteristics
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Many of our results are directly dependent on this translation of enterprise
zone blocks into ZIP regions. This is particularly worrisome in Chapter 7,
where we build models of the impact of enterprise zone incentives on economic growth in zones. In order to test the sensitivity of our econometric results to the translation algorithm used, we developed models based on progressively more stringent translation rules. In the case of the econometric
models we found little evidence of sensitivity to translation criteria.
It is also worth pointing out that previous cross-sectional analyses of enterprise zones and growth have used even broader scales of analysis—usually
the county, and sometimes census place. Thus we believe that the problems of
geographical definition notwithstanding, our analysis comes significantly closer to accurately representing enterprise zones than previous work.
In the case of the Ohio data, other difficulties arose. Here each enterprise
zone was identified by the city that either fully or partly contained it. A sample of ZIPs (s1) was selected based on any geographic intersection between a
ZIP and the enterprise zone city. This sample (s1) was visually inspected and
ZIPs with negligible spatial overlap with enterprise zone cities were removed
(creating sample s2). Given the spatial proximity of many Ohio enterprise
zones, this resulted in a situation in which individual ZIPs were assigned to
multiple enterprise zone cities. To resolve the problem we wrote a further algorithm that measured, in cases in which multiple enterprise zones had been
assigned to a single ZIP, the distance between each ZIP centroid and each of
the assigned city centroids. Again a standard GIS programming language was
used in algorithm development. The program then assigned the ZIP to the
closest enterprise zone city centroid and removed assignments to all other enterprise zones creating our final sample (sf).

DEFINING TAZ EQUIVALENTS OF ZONES
The ZIP-code data are important to Chapters 6 and 7, which look at the relationship between enterprise zones and growth. The analysis relies on a special tabulation of the SSEL data set undertaken at the ZIP-code level. Chapter
8 focuses on those who live in or commute into enterprise zones. The only national data set of use here is the 1990 Census Transportation Planning Package (CTPP) (U.S. Department of Transportation 1990). This is organized
around traffic analysis zones (TAZs) in size usually not too dissimilar from
tracts (although cities have a lot of discretion in how their TAZs should be de-
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fined). The result is that for Chapter 8, the analysis moves from the ZIP-code
region to TAZ region level. Thus, enterprise zones must be translated into
TAZ equivalents. The problems described in the above two sections arose
again, although here in less-extreme form because TAZs are much smaller
than ZIPs and are therefore better able to describe enterprise zone geography.
It was not necessary to create city TAZ definitions because, in Chapter 8, the
broader context in which the enterprise zone operates is not the city, but the
commuting region (as defined by the U.S. Department of Transportation). We
describe these data in more detail in Chapter 8. Our method for translating enterprise zones into TAZs was similar to that described above, although given
the higher level of geographical disaggregation, we relied on visual inspection
of the overlap between enterprise zones and TAZ zones.

Table E.1 Tax Rates and Property-Tax Abatements in the Enterprise Zones in 75 Cities, 1994

City

6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.25
6.25
6.25
6.25

2.25
2.25
1.25
1.25
1.75
1.75
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.00
0.75

Local property-tax abatements

Average
Top state Local
Manuf.
rate
rate Real M&E Inventory Buildings M&E Inventory Termb percentb
9.3
9.3
9.3
9.3
9.3
9.3
9.5
9.5
9.5
9.5
9.5
9.5
5.5
5.5
5.5
5.5
5.5
5.5
4.8
4.8
4.8
4.8

NAc
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

1.06
1.06
1.02
1.06
1.03
1.01
2.87
4.48
2.88
3.19
1.91
2.17
2.25
2.40
2.13
2.61
2.62
2.58
2.58
2.65
2.58
4.52

1.06
1.06
1.02
1.06
1.03
1.01
2.87
4.48
2.88
3.19
1.91
2.17
2.25
2.40
2.13
2.61
2.62
2.58
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt

exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
5
5
5
5
5
5
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
4
5
5
10

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
80.0
80.0
80.0
80.0
80.0
80.0
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
100.0
100.0
60.0
50.0
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Los Angeles, Calif.
Pasadena, Calif.
Porterville, Calif.
Redding, Calif.
Sacramento, Calif.
Stockton, Calif.
Hamden, Conn.
Hartford, Conn.
Meriden, Conn.
New Britain, Conn.
Norwalk, Conn.
Norwich, Conn.
Clearwater, Fla.
Fort Lauderdale, Fla.
Fort Myers, Fla.
Jacksonville, Fla.
Miami Beach, Fla.
Tampa, Fla.
Alton, Ill.
Champaign, Ill.
Kankakee, Ill.
Maywood, Ill.

State Local

Corporate income Local property-tax rates
tax (%)
(%)a

Translating Enterprise Zone Boundaries and Tax Characteristics

Sales tax
rates (%)

Sales tax
rates (%)
City

State Local

Moline, Ill.
Pekin, Ill.
Evansville, Ind.
Fort Wayne, Ind.
Hammond, Ind.
Lafayette, Ind.
Muncie, Ind.
South Bend, Ind.
Covington, Ky.
Hopkinsville, Ky.
Lexington, Ky.
Louisville, Ky.
Ownesboro, Ky.
Joplin, Mo.
Kansas City, Mo.
Springfield, Mo.
St. Joseph, Mo.
St. Louis, Mo.
Auburn, N.Y.
New York City, N.Y.
Niagara Falls, N.Y.

6.25
6.25
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
4.23
4.23
4.23
4.23
4.23
4.00
4.00
4.00

0.50
1.00
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
2.13
2.25
1.75
2.60
2.38
4.00
4.25
3.00

Corporate income Local property-tax rates
tax (%)
(%)a

Local property-tax abatements

Average
Top state Local
Manuf.
rate
rate Real M&E Inventory Buildings M&E Inventory Termb percentb
4.8
4.8
7.7
7.7
7.7
7.7
7.7
7.7
8.3
8.3
8.3
8.3
8.3
6.3
6.3
6.3
6.3
6.3
9.0
9.0
9.0

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
2.5
1.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

2.85
3.19
4.23
3.59
9.12
3.62
5.30
5.08
1.45
0.75
0.82
1.12
1.07
1.71
2.90
2.04
1.56
2.50
3.44
2.82
4.33

exempt
exempt
4.23
3.59
9.12
3.62
5.30
5.08
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt
1.42
2.52
1.76
1.61
2.23
exempt
exempt
exempt

exempt
exempt
1.67
1.41
3.59
1.43
2.09
2.00
0.58
0.30
0.33
0.45
0.43
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt

Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

NA
NA
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

5
5
NA
10
10
6
3
6
20
5
NA
NA
13
20
10
10
10
10
10
10
10

45.0
100.0
NA
49.5
49.5
58.7
66.3
58.7
100.0
100.0
NA
NA
100.0
65.0
50.0
50.0
100.0
100.0
27.5
85.0
85.0
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3.00
3.00
4.00
0.00
0.50
3.00
0.50
0.00
0.75
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
1.50
2.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00

9.0
9.0
9.0
9.1
9.1
9.1
9.1
9.1
9.1
12.3
12.3
12.3
12.3
12.3
12.3
4.5
4.5
4.5
4.5
4.5
4.5
6.0
6.0
6.0
6.0
6.0
6.0
7.9
7.9

NA
NA
NA
2.0
2.1
2.0
1.8
1.5
1.5
0.5
0.3
0.0
0.0
0.6
0.6
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

2.62
3.20
3.64
1.61
2.07
2.27
1.94
1.84
1.75
0.52
0.90
0.67
0.73
1.01
0.76
2.35
2.49
2.71
2.41
2.53
2.53
0.76
1.16
1.20
1.49
1.32
1.45
3.81
3.22

exempt
exempt
exempt
1.63
2.04
2.11
1.89
1.74
1.54
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt
2.35
2.49
2.71
2.41
2.53
2.53
1.50
3.00
3.00
3.80
2.50
2.30
exempt
exempt

exempt
exempt
exempt
1.63
2.04
2.11
1.89
1.74
1.54
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt
2.35
2.49
2.71
2.41
2.53
2.53
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt
exempt

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
5
7
NA
NA
10
10
5
10
NA
10
5
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

85.0
27.5
27.5
60.0
100.0
67.0
67.0
75.0
67.0
43.0
84.0
59.3
NA
NA
100.0
42.5
50.0
38.5
NA
75.0
40.0
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
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4.00
4.00
4.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.25
6.25
6.25
6.25
6.25
6.25
3.50
3.50
3.50
3.50
3.50
3.50
5.00
5.00

Translating Enterprise Zone Boundaries and Tax Characteristics

Syracuse, N.Y.
Troy, N.Y.
Utica, N.Y.
Canton, Ohio
Cincinnati, Ohio
Cleveland, Ohio
Elyria, Ohio
Massillon, Ohio
Warren, Ohio
Chester, Pa.
Johnstown, Pa.
Lancaster, Pa.
Philadelphia, Pa.
Pittsburgh, Pa.
Scranton, Pa.
Amarillo, Tex.
El Paso, Tex.
Fort Worth, Tex.
Pharr, Tex.
San Antonio, Tex.d
Waco, Tex.d
Danville, Va.
Lynchburg, Va.
Newport News, Va.
Petersburg, Va.
Portsmouth, Va.
Richmond, Va.
Beloit, Wis.
Fond Du Lac, Wis.

Sales tax
rates (%)
City

State Local

Green Bay, Wis.
Milwaukee, Wis.
Racine, Wis.

5.00
5.00
5.00

a

b

c

d

0.00
0.50
0.00

Corporate income Local property-tax rates
tax (%)
(%)a

Local property-tax abatements

Average
Top state Local
Manuf.
rate
rate Real M&E Inventory Buildings M&E Inventory Termb percentb
7.9
7.9
7.9

NA
NA
NA

3.21 exempt
3.65 exempt
3.62 exempt

exempt
exempt
exempt

NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA

Nominal local property-tax rate times assessment ratio. Tax rates on personal property other than manufacturing machinery and
equipment and inventory are not shown; such property may be subject to the same rate as real property or the same rate as M&E, or
it may be exempt, or it may have its own rate.
Term is the number of years abatement applies; if the locality uses more than one schedule, the typical schedule applied to buildings
is shown. Average percent is the simple average percent of taxes abated over the term of the abatement, for the typical schedule applied to buildings.
NA = Not Allowed under state law, or Not Applicable either because it is exempt under state law or locality does not abate that class
of property.
Varying schedules apply; the one shown here is for plants creating 60–100 jobs.
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Table F.1 Effective Tax Rates on New Investment in 1994 for 75
Enterprise Zone Cities (Weighted Average for 16
Manufacturing Sectors)
Effective tax rate (%)

City and state
California
Los Angeles
Pasadena
Porterville
Redding
Sacramento
Stockton
Connecticut
Hamden
Hartford
Meriden
New Britain
Norwalk
Norwich
Florida
Clearwater
Fort Lauderdale
Fort Myers
Jacksonville
Miami Beach
Tampa
Illinois
Alton
Champaign
Kankakee
Maywood
Moline
Pekin
Indiana
Evansville
Fort Wayne

Percent reduction
in rate

With general Due to
Due to
After
With
zone
& zone
general
basic general
taxes incentives incentives incentives incentives
9.1
9.1
8.7
8.8
8.9
8.9

7.5
7.5
7.3
7.4
7.4
7.3

6.9
6.9
6.7
6.8
6.8
6.7

18.1
18.1
16.6
16.4
17.4
17.4

7.6
7.6
7.8
7.7
7.7
7.7

8.9
11.4
8.9
9.4
7.4
7.8

6.6
8.5
6.6
7.0
5.5
6.7

5.5
7.3
5.5
5.9
4.4
5.6

25.2
25.6
25.2
25.3
24.9
13.2

17.1
13.3
17.0
16.2
20.5
16.8

8.0
8.2
7.5
8.7
8.8
8.7

8.0
8.2
7.5
8.7
8.8
8.7

6.4
6.6
6.0
7.1
7.1
7.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

20.0
19.6
21.0
18.5
18.4
18.6

5.8
5.8
5.7
7.4
6.0
6.3

5.4
5.5
5.3
7.0
5.6
5.9

4.3
4.8
4.4
5.4
5.1
4.4

6.7
6.6
6.7
5.2
6.4
6.1

20.5
11.5
17.2
23.4
7.9
25.0

13.4
12.1

10.7
9.4

8.3
4.9

20.3
22.4

22.4
48.0
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Effective tax rate (%)

City and state
Hammond
Lafayette
Muncie
South Bend
Kentucky
Covington
Hopkinsville
Lexington
Louisville
Owensboro
Missouri
Joplin
Kansas City
Springfield
St. Joseph
St. Louis
New York
Auburn
New York City
Niagara Falls
Syracuse
Troy
Utica
Ohio
Canton
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Elyria
Massillon
Warren

Percent reduction
in rate

After
With
With general Due to
Due to
basic general
& zone
general
zone
taxes incentives incentives incentives incentives
22.8
12.2
15.5
15.0

20.1
9.5
12.7
12.3

9.5
5.5
9.2
6.9

11.9
22.2
17.6
18.1

52.8
42.2
27.8
43.8

9.1
7.6
7.7
8.2
7.9

5.8
4.5
4.9
5.4
4.6

5.0
2.7
4.0
4.6
3.8

35.4
40.4
36.9
34.3
41.6

13.9
39.7
16.5
15.0
17.4

8.9
12.1
9.5
8.8
12.7

6.5
9.8
7.6
4.8
9.7

4.9
8.2
6.0
3.2
8.1

26.8
19.1
20.0
45.8
23.6

24.4
16.2
20.9
33.7
16.4

6.4
9.6
7.1
5.7
6.2
6.6

3.6
5.9
2.7
2.1
3.4
3.8

2.9
5.2
1.9
1.4
2.6
3.0

43.9
38.0
62.1
62.3
45.1
43.3

20.7
12.7
27.9
35.2
22.2
20.0

9.1
10.5
11.0
9.9
9.3
8.8

8.1
9.6
10.0
8.9
8.4
7.9

5.8
4.7
6.7
5.9
5.2
5.3

10.9
9.4
9.0
10.0
10.6
11.2

28.4
50.6
33.1
33.7
37.4
32.1
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Table F.1 (Continued)
Effective tax rate (%)

City and state
Pennsylvania
Chester
Johnstown
Lancaster
Philadelphia
Pittsburgh
Scranton
Texas
Amarillo
El Paso
Fort Worth
Pharr
San Antonio
Waco
Virginia
Danville
Lynchburg
Newport News
Petersburg
Portsmouth
Richmond
Wisconsin
Beloit
Fond Du Lac
Green Bay
Milwaukee
Racine

Percent reduction
in rate

After
With
With general Due to
Due to
basic general
& zone
general
zone
taxes incentives incentives incentives incentives
11.0
10.7
7.4
7.5
13.7
13.0

10.4
10.3
6.5
7.3
13.6
12.3

8.5
8.4
4.6
5.4
11.7
10.4

6.0
4.0
11.5
2.4
1.3
6.0

18.2
18.4
29.0
25.7
13.9
15.4

10.6
11.1
11.8
10.8
11.0
11.2

9.7
10.9
10.9
10.8
9.8
10.7

8.3
9.5
9.4
9.4
8.4
9.3

8.7
1.3
8.1
0.0
11.2
4.1

15.1
13.6
13.6
13.7
14.6
13.8

5.2
7.3
7.3
8.5
6.9
6.7

5.2
7.3
7.3
8.5
6.9
6.7

4.4
6.4
6.5
7.6
6.0
5.9

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

16.4
11.8
11.7
10.1
12.5
12.7

7.6
7.0
7.0
7.5
7.4

7.6
7.0
7.0
7.5
7.4

5.6
5.0
5.0
5.4
5.4

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

26.7
28.9
28.9
27.5
27.4

Weighted average
for 16 sectors

City
Hammond, Ind.
South Bend, Ind.
Fort Wayne, Ind.
Lafayette, Ind.
Muncie, Ind.
Cincinnati, Ohio
St. Joseph, Mo.
Niagara Falls, N.Y.
Hopkinsville, Ky.
Evansville, Ind.
St. Louis, Mo.
Ownesboro, Ky.
Covington, Ky.
New York City, N.Y.
Cleveland, Ohio
Syracuse, N.Y.

Sector with largest
total incentives

Sector with smallest
total incentives

General
plus zone
incentives

Additional
value
of zone
incentives

General
plus zone
incentives

Additional
value
of zone
incentives

General
plus zone
incentives

Additional
value
of zone
incentives

22,678
13,295
11,632
10,758
10,167
9,679
9,641
8,378
8,282
8,085
7,750
7,274
7,120
7,082
7,022
6,953

19,193
9,810
8,147
7,273
6,682
8,411
2,739
1,019
2,780
4,600
2,699
1,407
1,414
1,021
5,754
1,024

44,401
25,089
20,957
19,533
19,883
17,037
17,337
19,326
15,655
15,421
13,969
14,444
14,212
17,279
12,035
17,019

41,190
21,878
17,747
16,322
16,673
15,881
5,223
6,043
4,361
12,211
5,072
2,680
2,689
6,045
10,879
6,045

7,540
5,182
4,760
4,543
4,343
3,323
3,281
3,087
3,094
3,836
2,618
2,178
2,152
2,720
2,572
2,676

4,916
2,558
2,136
1,919
1,719
2,350
1,022
604
1,489
1,284
1,019
459
461
604
1,600
605
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Table F.2 The Value of Incentives to Manufacturing Firms in 75 Cities, 1994 (Net Present Value over 20
Years, per Job)

6,761
6,721
6,694
6,628
6,524
6,515
6,497
5,947
5,820
5,819
5,762
5,692
5,648
5,602
5,595
5,263
4,924
4,566
4,546
4,474
4,241
4,018
3,942
3,860
3,810
3,810

2,716
1,817
5,426
2,692
1,409
1,396
5,229
2,707
1,012
1,823
1,013
1,016
4,380
1,824
1,824
3,995
1,828
3,239
3,240
2,340
3,240
2,382
2,367
3,236
952
952

12,350
11,689
11,401
12,082
13,373
13,355
11,032
10,941
15,229
10,207
15,132
15,012
9,409
9,851
9,840
8,705
8,737
8,540
7,879
7,979
7,346
6,696
6,585
6,695
6,791
6,791

5,139
3,250
10,245
5,053
2,684
2,658
9,876
5,105
6,040
3,269
6,041
6,041
8,253
3,273
3,273
7,549
3,288
5,774
5,774
3,845
5,774
3,863
3,855
5,804
1,506
1,506

2,318
2,404
2,494
2,298
2,025
2,023
2,435
2,079
2,353
2,141
2,336
2,315
2,209
2,077
2,075
2,087
1,879
1,286
1,494
738
1,406
1,196
1,172
1,296
858
858

1,020
850
1,521
1,017
561
559
1,462
1,019
603
850
603
604
1,237
851
851
1,114
851
967
967
738
967
776
770
967
291
291
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Joplin, Mo.
Hartford, Conn.
Massillon, Ohio
Kansas City, Mo.
Louisville, Ky.
Lexington, Ky.
Elyria, Ohio
Springfield, Mo.
Utica, N.Y.
New Britain, Conn.
Auburn, N.Y.
Troy, N.Y.
Warren, Ohio
Meriden, Conn.
Hamden, Conn.
Canton, Conn.
Norwalk, Conn.
Scranton, Pa.
Lancaster, Pa.
San Antonio, Tex.
Chester, Pa.
Fort Worth, Tex.
Amarillo, Tex.
Johnstown, Pa.
Los Angeles, Calif.
Pasadena, Calif.

Weighted average
for 16 sectors

City
Sacramento, Calif.
Stockton, Calif.
Norwich, Conn.
Redding, Calif.
Porterville, Calif.
Philadelphia, Pa.
Pittsburgh, Pa.
Maywood, Ill.
Milwaukee, Wis.
Green Bay, Wis.
Fond Du Lac, Wis.
Racine, Wis.
Beloit, Wis.
Waco, Tex.
Pekin, Ill.
El Paso, Tex.
Alton, Ill.

Sector with largest
total incentives

Sector with smallest
total incentives

General
plus zone
incentives

Additional
value
of zone
incentives

General
plus zone
incentives

Additional
value
of zone
incentives

General
plus zone
incentives

Additional
value
of zone
incentives

3,632
3,628
3,556
3,465
3,458
3,452
3,450
3,338
3,283
3,226
3,226
3,225
3,225
3,158
3,064
2,608
2,462

952
952
1,820
952
952
3,236
3,234
2,678
3,283
3,226
3,226
3,225
3,225
2,388
2,403
2,393
1,801

6,464
6,457
6,435
6,153
6,141
6,029
6,029
5,605
5,266
5,159
5,159
5,158
5,157
5,276
5,143
4,199
4,142

1,506
1,506
3,262
1,506
1,506
5,804
5,804
4,453
5,266
5,159
5,159
5,158
5,157
3,870
3,990
3,872
2,988

823
822
1,486
789
788
1,178
1,178
1,059
1,315
1,303
1,303
1,303
1,303
957
978
857
805

291
291
850
291
291
967
967
840
1,315
1,303
1,303
1,303
1,303
778
760
780
586
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Pharr, Tex.
Miami Beach, Fla.
Jacksonville, Fla.
Tampa, Fla.
Fort Lauderdale, Fla.
Clearwater, Fla.
Fort Myers, Fla.
Kankakee, Ill.
Champaign, Ill.
Moline, Ill.
Petersburg, Va.
Richmond, Va.
Newport News, Va.
Portsmouth, Va.
Lynchburg, Va.
Danville, Va.

2,390
2,308
2,308
2,307
2,300
2,294
2,289
2,156
1,680
1,381
1,045
1,045
1,045
1,045
1,045
1,045

2,390
2,308
2,308
2,307
2,300
2,294
2,289
1,495
1,019
720
1,045
1,045
1,045
1,045
1,045
1,045

3,868
3,495
3,495
3,495
3,495
3,495
3,495
3,633
2,839
2,345
1,117
1,117
1,117
1,117
1,117
1,117

3,868
3,495
3,495
3,495
3,495
3,495
3,495
2,481
1,685
1,193
1,117
1,117
1,117
1,117
1,117
1,117

779
870
870
870
870
870
870
717
558
441
573
573
573
573
573
573

779
870
870
870
870
870
870
498
382
265
573
573
573
573
573
573
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Highest-ranked sector
City and state
California
Los Angeles
Pasadena
Porterville
Redding
Sacramento
Stockton
Connecticut
Hamden
Hartford
Meriden
New Britain
Norwalk
Norwich
Florida
Clearwater
Fort Lauderdale
Fort Myers
Jacksonville

Lowest-ranked sector

Sector
(SIC)

Ranka

Tax
rate (%)

Sector
(SIC)

Ranka

Tax
rate (%)

Highest
rate (%)

Lowest
rate (%)

Rate
spread (%)

30
30
33
30
33
33

42
42
36
40
38
37

6.3
6.3
7.4
6.2
7.5
7.5

27
27
27
27
27
27

63
63
58
61
60
59

6.1
6.1
5.9
6.0
6.0
5.9

9.9
9.9
9.5
9.7
9.7
9.6

4.9
4.9
4.8
4.8
4.8
4.8

5.0
5.0
4.7
4.9
4.9
4.8

23
31
23
23
23
23

13
31
14
19
10
18

3.8
4.1
3.8
4.0
3.1
4.0

27
28
27
20
26
25

36
65
37
50
21
43

4.3
7.6
4.3
8.5
6.4
6.5

8.4
11.5
8.4
9.0
6.4
8.4

3.4
4.1
3.4
3.5
3.0
3.5

5.0
7.5
5.0
5.5
3.5
4.9

31
31
31
31

10
9
8
13

2.7
2.7
2.6
2.8

33
33
33
33

58
61
55
64

10.9
11.0
10.1
11.9

10.9
11.1
10.1
12.1

2.7
2.7
2.6
2.8

8.2
8.4
7.5
9.3
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Table F.3 Variation in City Rankings and Tax Rates by Sector, 75 Cities, 1994 (Cities Ranked by Tax Rate
after Enterprise Zone Incentives)

31
31

15
11

2.8
2.8

33
33

65
63

11.9
11.8

12.2
12.0

2.8
2.8

9.3
9.2

26
26
26
26
26
26

6
10
8
14
12
7

3.9
4.7
4.1
5.4
5.2
4.1

31
31
31
23
23
31

37
44
40
51
49
38

4.4
4.7
4.5
5.0
4.9
4.5

5.9
7.0
6.2
8.2
7.6
6.3

3.0
3.5
3.1
3.9
3.7
3.1

2.9
3.5
3.1
4.4
3.9
3.2

27
27
27
27
27
27

38
4
54
8
50
10

4.3
1.0
5.3
1.6
5.2
2.9

30
30
26
23
30
28

73
46
75
54
75
67

10.7
6.7
15.6
5.1
11.7
7.7

14.1
7.9
15.6
8.9
15.6
11.4

4.3
1.0
5.3
1.6
5.2
2.9

9.7
6.8
10.4
7.3
10.4
8.5

36
37
34
34
36

13
1
9
10
6

3.9
1.8
3.8
4.2
3.0

23
31
31
23
33

52
17
27
53
19

5.0
3.0
3.9
5.0
5.7

7.4
4.7
5.9
6.8
5.7

3.9
1.0
3.1
3.4
3.0

3.4
3.7
2.8
3.4
2.8

31
31
31

7
28
14

2.4
3.9
2.8

33
26
26

47
73
54

8.3
15.0
11.1

9.4
15.0
11.1

2.4
3.9
2.8

7.0
11.1
8.3
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Miami Beach
Tampa
Illinois
Alton
Champaign
Kankakee
Maywood
Moline
Pekin
Indiana
Evansville
Fort Wayne
Hammond
Lafayette
Muncie
South Bend
Kentucky
Covington
Hopkinsville
Lexington
Louisville
Owensboro
Missouri
Joplin
Kansas City
Springfield

Highest-ranked sector
City and state
St. Joseph
St. Louis
New York
Auburn
New York City
Niagara Falls
Syracuse
Troy
Utica
Ohio
Canton
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Elyria
Massillon
Warren
Pennsylvania
Chester
Johnstown
Lancaster

Lowest-ranked sector

Sector
(SIC)

Ranka

Tax
rate (%)

Sector
(SIC)

Ranka

Tax
rate (%)

Highest
rate (%)

Lowest
rate (%)

Rate
spread (%)

34
31

2
48

2.5
4.9

26
27

11
73

5.2
7.6

5.9
13.8

1.8
4.9

4.1
8.9

24
24
23
20
24
24

4
6
2
1
3
5

–0.9
1.9
1.6
3.0
–1.2
–0.8

20
31
20
37
20
20

11
59
4
2
8
14

5.8
5.3
4.2
2.1
5.4
6.1

5.8
6.7
4.2
3.0
5.4
6.1

–0.9
1.9
–1.8
–2.5
–1.2
–0.8

6.7
4.7
6.0
5.5
6.5
6.8

20
20
37
20
20
20

20
6
41
25
15
17

6.8
5.3
5.9
7.1
6.1
6.3

31
31
31
31
23
23

61
42
65
62
56
57

5.5
4.6
6.0
5.5
5.3
5.3

8.2
6.5
9.6
8.5
7.4
7.6

3.8
2.9
4.5
3.9
3.4
3.4

4.4
3.6
5.0
4.5
4.1
4.1

26
26
20

40
46
7

9.5
9.7
5.3

24
24
31

73
72
47

10.8
10.1
4.9

10.8
11.0
5.4

7.2
7.2
3.9

3.5
3.8
1.5
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Table F.3 (Continued)

a

33
26
33

18
68
60

5.7
13.4
10.9

31
20
23

58
75
74

5.3
15.7
10.5

6.9
15.7
14.0

4.5
9.6
8.4

2.3
6.1
5.7

28
28
28
28
28
28

42
66
62
64
48
63

6.5
7.6
7.5
7.6
6.7
7.5

37
33
23
33
24
23

69
73
73
72
71
70

9.2
12.8
9.9
12.7
6.8
9.4

12.0
13.8
13.7
13.7
12.1
13.5

5.2
6.3
6.1
6.2
5.2
6.1

6.8
7.5
7.6
7.5
6.8
7.4

20
23
23
31
23
23

5
24
25
29
20
17

5.2
4.1
4.2
4.0
4.0
4.0

26
32
32
26
26
26

28
58
59
70
51
49

7.2
8.5
8.6
13.7
10.3
10.0

7.2
11.4
11.4
13.7
10.3
10.0

2.8
3.5
3.6
4.0
3.4
3.4

4.4
7.8
7.9
9.7
6.9
6.6

33
30
30
26
26

25
15
14
22
20

6.0
4.4
4.4
6.5
6.4

24
24
24
24
24

52
41
40
49
48

5.4
4.8
4.8
5.2
5.2

8.5
7.3
7.3
8.2
8.1
9.4

4.0
3.5
3.5
3.9
3.8
3.6

4.5
3.8
3.8
4.3
4.3
5.8

For rankings, a lower number is better (a lower effective tax rate).
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Philadelphia
Pittsburgh
Scranton
Texas
Amarillo
El Paso
Fort Worth
Pharr
San Antonio
Waco
Virginia
Danville
Lynchburg
Newport News
Petersburg
Portsmouth
Richmond
Wisconsin
Beloit
Fond Du Lac
Green Bay
Milwaukee
Racine
Mean
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Table F.4 State and Local Direct Revenue Gains and Incentive Costs per
New Job for New Manufacturing Plants in 75 Cities, 1994
Sector with highest revenue

State

Average for
all zones
in state

Revenue gain per induced job
Calif.
39,865
Conn.
31,989
Fla.
39,636
Ill.
26,314
Ind.
43,279
Ky.
23,259
Mo.
35,192
N.Y.
20,642
Ohio
40,085
Pa.
58,843
Tex.
50,320
Va.
34,550
Wis.
28,592

Zone with
highest
revenue

Average for
all zones
in state

Zone with
lowest
revenue

40,389
39,710
41,950
29,034
53,587
29,005
46,109
35,521
46,202
86,675
52,738
41,657
30,018

5,316
4,072
4,244
2,990
3,343
2,903
5,056
–481
3,835
8,141
5,492
4,112
3,412

5,220
2,960
4,028
2,633
1,178
1,278
2,255
–2,045
3,240
3,193
4,903
2,721
3,193

Sector with
largest incentives

State

Average for
all zones
in state

Sector with lowest revenue

Zone with
largest
incentive

Incentive cost per non-induced job
Calif.
11,655
12,315
Conn.
14,189
17,790
Fla.
5,058
5,058
Ill.
6,040
8,700
Ind.
37,990
70,423
Ky.
22,386
24,496
Mo.
21,363
27,833
N.Y.
24,450
29,071
Ohio
18,391
27,067
Pa.
10,449
12,813
Tex.
9,043
12,592
Va.
1,616
1,616
Wis.
7,497
7,621

Sector with
smallest incentives
Average for
all zones
in state

Zone with
smallest
incentive

1,432
3,010
1,259
1,167
7,686
3,689
4,210
3,837
3,942
1,915
1,563
829
1,889

1,365
2,151
1,259
656
5,726
3,194
3,471
3,402
3,233
1,705
1,207
829
1,886
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Table F.5 Birth, Death, Expansion, and Contraction Rates
by Establishment Size and Time Period, for
64 Enterprise Zones
Establishment employment
Rate
Growth
1990–91
Births
Moves in
Total growth
1992–93
Births
Moves in
Total growth
1994–95
Births
Moves in
Total growth
Shrinkage
1989–90
Deaths
Moves out
Total shrinkage
1991–92
Deaths
Moves out
Total shrinkage
1993–94
Deaths
Moves out
Total shrinkage
Expansion
1989–91
1991–93
1993–95

0–19

20–99

100+

All sizes

15.1
6.7

8.0
4.1

5.0
3.0

11.8
5.5

21.8

12.1

8.0

17.3

14.1
11.0

9.2
8.9

5.4
5.2

11.7
9.7

25.2

18.1

10.6

21.4

14.3
6.0

7.2
4.3

5.4
3.8

11.3
5.3

20.3

11.5

9.2

16.5

17.5
9.8

9.5
5.5

7.4
3.5

14.0
7.8

27.4

14.9

10.9

21.7

16.4
11.2

9.4
10.4

5.9
7.7

13.2
10.5

27.6

19.7

13.6

23.7

15.8
6.1

9.5
5.0

5.5
4.7

12.9
5.6

21.9

14.6

10.3

18.5

26.0
26.5
33.7

31.0
35.3
49.4

33.7
34.8
45.6

28.4
30.0
39.5
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Table F.5 (Continued)
Establishment employment
Rate

0–19

20–99

100+

All sizes

Contraction
1989–91
1991–93
1993–95

28.3
26.5
23.2

50.3
42.1
32.2

54.7
50.2
42.1

37.9
33.8
28.0

NOTE: All rates represent the number of establishments being born, dying, expanding, and so forth, divided by the total number of establishments at the beginning of the first year of the two-year period (or as of
mid March of the first year, for expansion and contraction rates).

Appendix G
Gravity-Based Commuting Models
Gravity or entropy models are widely used as a way of understanding spatial accessibility. In the standard form:
(1)

Tij = α Rβi W jr/d ijδ .

Commuting flows between origin i (the residence) and destination j (the workplace), Tij are positively related to the number of workers resident in Traffic
Analysis Zone (TAZ) i (R) and the number of job opportunities in TAZ j (W),
and are inversely related to the distance between them (dij); the Greek letters indicate parameters. Various justifications for gravity models have been developed over the years. In essence the central argument is that workers and workplaces attract each other, but that the level of attraction is mediated by the
friction of distance (Isard et al. 1998). Here it should be noted that distance is
usually measured in terms of travel time (though occasionally time is replaced
by TAZ centroid-to-centroid distance in miles). Standard transportation demand analysis versions of the model are usually estimated using ordinary least
squares regression on a logarithmic version of Equation 1. Data are typically
from the Census Transportation Planning Package (CTPP), though sometimes
from the PUMS (Public Use Microdata Sample) urban census sample, with R
from element 1 data, W from element 2 data, and Tij from element 3.1 Typically, all TAZ-to-TAZ flows are included with zero observations removed. Dij is
derived from TAZ centroid-to-centroid calculations or from road network models. Following Isard (1960), the accessibility of workplaces to workers is:
(2)

Ai =  T̂ij /Riβ̂ .
j

T̂ is calculated from the model. There are more sophisticated ways to model
these relationships—in particular the CTPP provides count flows which may
better be described by a Poisson distribution (see Smith 1987). However, recent empirical results suggest that the simpler ordinary least squares model
may provide estimates of accessibility almost identical to the more complex
models.
Clearly this model poses some problems. It might be argued, for instance,
that median peak time would be a more appropriate measure. Indeed, most
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workers travel at peak time. But Tij covers commutes throughout the day and
emphasizing median peak time would exaggerate the overall impact of distance on commuting. It is very likely, however, that the δ parameter would
change during the course of the day. Insofar as models ignore movements in
the δ they may distort the true impact of the friction of distance on commuting
flows.
Another problem is that different groups of workers may experience the
friction of distance differently. Practically, what this means is that workers in
different income-occupational categories may be more or less inclined to travel further. Part of the reason for this appears to be that workers with more
skills tend to be rewarded for longer commutes, whereas those with less skills
do not. Thus, more-skilled workers may not consider distance as much of an
impediment as less-skilled workers do. Ideally, then, different classes of
workers should be modeled separately.
Appendix Note
1. See O’Regan and Quigley (1996) for a discussion of accessibility models in a similar context. Our presentation here relies on their work. Note, however, that in the
models we develop, R and W are not derived from row and column marginals of
the journey-to-work matrix, but from the household and work databases. Also, we
are concerned with commutes over the entire day.

Appendix H
Enterprise Zones and Commuting
The analysis presented here has been taken (and modified) from an earlier
(and preliminary) research paper undertaken in preparation for this book (Peters and Fisher 1999b). We decided not to repeat this analysis for our final
sample of cities because it would take us too far from the central concerns of
Chapter 8. Nevertheless, the results are interesting, and they reinforce the conclusions of Chapter 8.
Traditional spatial/transportation models which might be used in other
circumstances to measure the accessibility to employment probably do not
capture the actual employment functions of zones, since those functions differ
so widely. In relation to commuting behavior, at any rate, zones are not homogenous among states or even within states. Thus the building of traditional
gravity/entropy models of accessibility using the CTPP data—the only national data set available for this purpose—makes little sense. Instead, we focus on
answering a series of broader transportation and accessibility questions. With
regard to zone residents:
• Do zones include residential accommodation?
• Are people who live in zones wealthier than those who live outside of
zones?
• How do zone residents commute to work, and how long does it take?
With regard to zone workers:
• Are people who work in zones wealthier than those who work outside
of zones?
• How do zone workers commute to work and how long does it take?
Then, finally, with regard to flows between zone residents and zone workers:
• Where do zone residents work?
• Where do zone workers reside?
The analysis in this appendix relies on the CTPP, a reorganization of the
decennial Census of Population and Housing data, allowing households (commuting origins) to be connected, via commuting matrices, to places-of-work
(commuting destinations).
Although we are not building models and not testing hypotheses, it would
also be useful to state up front what we would hope to find from our descriptive analyses. If enterprise zones do work to mitigate the effects of spatial mis-
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match, then we would hope that they are located in older inner-city neighborhoods and are partly residential and that they actually contain (or are near)
“targetable” people. Moreover, if zones have the desired accessibility effect,
then residents should commute shorter distances to work and we would hope
that zones attract workers from older inner-city neighborhoods.

ZONE DEMOGRAPHICS AND COMMUTE TIME
Most of the other zones in our original sample of cities are too small (that
is, have too few TAZs in their TAZ regions) to conduct a useful commuting
analysis. Quite a few of the smaller metropolitan areas had fewer than 10
TAZs, making useful comparisons between enterprise zone and non-enterprise
zone TAZs nearly impossible. So this section focuses on enterprise zones in
regions with many TAZs (in effect, more than 40) and with a reasonable distribution of zone and non-zone TAZs. In the few instances when we found problems with the CTPP data, the city was removed from the sample. Los Angeles
and New York were also excluded. The sample has a few other peculiarities.
Most importantly, a few states dominate. This is a function of the original
sampling design (oversampling where local variation in incentives was important), and also the way zones are designated in a state.
Table H.1 describes some of the demographic differences between zone
and non-zone TAZs. Many of the zones have a much smaller average TAZ
population than non-zone TAZs. In only one case, Milwaukee, was the average enterprise zone TAZ population significantly bigger than non-zone TAZs.
Zones tend to be in industrial neighborhoods with fewer residential facilities.
The housing units variable confirms this picture.
In every case, median household income in zone TAZs was significantly
(and substantially) lower than in non-zone TAZs. In one of the more extreme
cases, St. Louis, zone TAZs had a median household income of just $7,492,
but non-zone TAZs had an income of $30,383. Unsurprisingly, in all but one
case (Kankakee) the median earnings of workers resident in zones was significantly less than that of workers resident outside the zones. But the earnings of
workers employed in the zones was mostly insignificantly different from the
earnings of workers employed outside the zone—in six cases the estimate for
in-zone earnings was actually greater than out-of-zone earnings, and in two of
these six cases, earnings in the zone were significantly higher than earnings
out of the zone (Kankakee and Milwaukee). This suggests that zones provide
good employment opportunities for workers from an area much broader than
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the zones themselves and that workers working in the zones earn considerably
more than those workers merely resident in the zones.
Travel time to work is either significantly shorter for zone residents than
non-zone residents or much the same for zone and non-zone residents. But the
travel time to work of those working in the zones was almost always longer
than those working out of zones (and in five cases the difference was statistically significant). In the case of Champaign, Illinois, workers employed in the
zone took an average of 12.6 minutes to get to work, while those employed
elsewhere took only 9.7 minutes. In only one case, St. Louis, was the travel
time of those working in the zone significantly shorter than those working out
of the zone (this may be a function of the longer, elongated boundaries of the
zone, which snake through the city).
The extra commute time of zone workers was not a function of the modal
choice of zone residents. Moreover, it was not a function of the relative poverty of zone residents and thus their need to take slower public transit. On the
contrary, the commute time of those working in enterprise zones is greater
largely because of the long-distance commuters zones attracted from elsewhere in the metropolitan area. Enterprise zones are metropolitan, not neighborhood, employment magnets.
This picture is generally confirmed by the results presented in Table H.2.
Here we calculate time-to-work regressions for the 10 cities in our sample.1 In
this table, earnings, mode, and an enterprise zone dummy were the independent variables, time to work was dependent. In every case, the estimate on the
enterprise zone dummy was positive, and, except in three cases, statistically
significant at α = 0.05. In more than half the cases, working in an enterprise
zone added more than three minutes to the commute time. While enterprise
zones may be providing some special local access (the data are not rich enough
to confirm or disconfirm this supposition), the fact remains that they definitely
provide work opportunities for broad regional labor markets.

COMMUTING INTO AND OUT OF ENTERPRISE ZONES
Unfortunately, the CTPP does not allow us to look at the labor characteristics of those individuals who commute into and out of the zone for work. So
it is difficult to say what sort of workers the enterprise zone is attracting from
local residents. The commuting data are restricted to flows with the only attributes being mode—nevertheless the data do extend the analysis presented
thus far.

Persons per TAZ
In zone
Out of zone
Housing units per TAZ
In zone
Out of zone
Median H/hold income of residents
In zone
Out of zone
Median earnings of workers
resident
In zone
Out of zone
Median earnings of workers
employed
In zone
Out of zone
Median travel time to work of
residents
In zone
Out of zone

Duval, Champaign, Kankakee,
Fla.
Ill.
Ill.

Kansas
City,
Mo.

St.
Louis, Canton, Cincinnati,
Mo.
Ohio
Ohio

404
1,089*

441
427

491
719

1,427
1,980*

924
2,320*

324
668

1,305
1,680

746
1,014*

647
571

2,609
1,416*

185
455*

194
164

199
270

703
821

460
947*

138
267*

566
665

231
323*

205
240

1,005
563*

7,690
27,049*

13,603
26,386*

20,416
28,340*

13,972
7,492 13,588
33,110* 30,383* 26,428*

16,119
30,316*

10,716 16,355
19,332* 24,621*

13,769
37,165*

6,551
15,982*

8,871
14,120*

14,124
15,510

11,881
6,592 10,716
18,920* 18,134* 16,597*

12,749
17,792*

6,513 10,359
11,190* 14,122*

11,464
20,190*

11,973
14,124*

11,121
11,332

14,291
7,759*

16,877 11,272 14,589
15,549 17,028* 13,711

17,192
15,318

10,187 10,753
10,113 12,094

18,570
15,611*

13.5
19.2*

10.3
12.9*

13.7
12.6

17.1
19.7*

10.1
19.5*

12.8
17.0*

18.2
19.2

El
Paso,
Tex.

15.4
15.2

Forth
Worth, Milwaukee,
Tex.
Wis.

16.4
16.2

18.2
18.8
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Table H.1 Residential, Income, and Journey-to-Work Differences for Those Working in and Residing in Enterprise
Zones, 1990

Median travel time to work of those
working
In zone
Out of zone

15.1
14.8

12.6
9.7*

14.0
6.3*

20.5
15.8*

13.9
18.8*

15.2
14.3

20.3
16.4*

14.5
14.2

13.4
13.3

19.2
13.7*

NOTE: An asterisk (*) indicates ANOVA F-score significant at 0.05.
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Table H.2 The Effect of Enterprise Zones on Commute Time,
Regression Results for Further Cities
City

Adjusted R2

Enterprise zone B

t

Duval, Fla.
Champaign, Ill.
Kankakee, Ill.
Kansas City, Mo.
St. Louis, Mo.
Canton, Ohio
Cincinnati, Ohio
El Paso, Tex.
Forth Worth, Tex.
Milwaukee, Wis.

0.16
0.05
0.08
0.23
0.30
0.08
0.22
0.05
0.16
0.13

4.6*
3.8*
4.2*
3.2*
1.9*
2.7*
3.0*
1.6
1.1
1.6

5.0
2.8
2.1
2.9
2.3
3.1
2.5
1.9
0.6
1.3

NOTE: Log of earnings and mode were the other two independent variables.
F test was significant in all cases. An asterisk (*) indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test).

For each zone we created maps with two distinct sets of thematic analyses: the first indicated the number of commuters traveling to the TAZ-defined
enterprise zone from each TAZ. The data are derived from the CTPP’s origin/destination journey-to-work matrices.2 The second thematic analysis was
of median household income (that is, household income of residents) of each
TAZ. We do not include the resulting maps here because of their chromatic
complexity (they are available from the authors). Unsurprisingly, enterprise
zones (particularly those in larger metropolitan areas) attract a large number of
commuters (both absolutely and proportionately) from distant and wealthy
suburbs. Part of the reason for this is the type of jobs available in the enterprise zones. On the whole, the jobs available in enterprise zones require at
least as many skills as jobs elsewhere in the metropolitan area.
Appendix Notes
1. The time-to-work model takes its form from the well-developed journey-to-work
literature. Here, commute time is usually seen as a function of income, mode of
transportation, and a series of other variables meant to capture various aspects of
the commute under investigation, such as the race and gender of commuters and so
on. In our restricted model, t = ∫(i, m, e); commuting time (t) is a function of the
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natural log of earnings (i), the mode (m) of commute (expressed here as a percentage of workers taking public transit), and, in this case, a dummy (e) (whether the
journey-to-work destination is an enterprise zone or not). In this form, our model
is workplace based; we are concerned with the commuting habits of those working
at a particular destination, not residing at a particular origin. Extended tests of
OLS regression assumptions were undertaken; the model showed no apparent
cause for concern.
In many standard commuting models, occupation rather than income is seen
as the important predictor of commuting time. Replacing income with various occupational variables leads to much the same results. For instance, in one equation
income was replaced by the proportion of executive, administrative, and managerial occupations and professional specialty occupations in the destination tract—
high-end occupations tend to be associated with longer commutes. In most cases
the B-value for the enterprise zone variable increased (those working in the zone
took longer to get to work than all others). Alterations to the occupational variable—essentially to expand the definition of high-end occupations or to define
less-skilled occupations—resulted in fairly consistent Bs.
2. These are commuters over the entire day, not just peak periods.
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